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Abstract. 
 
This thesis is about identifying valid self-defence claims in the UN collective security 
system. The thesis suggests a fresh theoretical approach to balancing the imperative 
for adaptation of the right of self-defence with the danger that too broad a right could 
be exploited by states wishing to justify national policy. The starting point for the 
thesis is the twin realist criticisms that the right of self-defence is either too narrowly 
GUDZQ DQG WKHUHIRUH QRW ILW IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI SURWHFWLQJ VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV RU WRo 
broadly drawn and therefore hostage to the subjective interpretation of states using 
force. These problems were intensified during the Administration of former President 
*:%XVK LQ WKH86$ ,Q WKLVZRUN WKHVH WZRFULWLFLVPVDUHGXEEHG µHVRWHULFLVP¶
DQGµH[SORLWDWLRQ¶UHVSHFWLYHO\ 
 
The problem of self-defence, as an exception to the general prohibition on the use of 
force, is often phrased in terms of a choice between the is of state practice and the 
ought of abstract norms. In this thesis, it is suggested that no such choice needs to be 
made. In order to identify a valid self-defence claim, the is of evaluative state practice 
is harnessed and constrained by a process of argumentation grounded in mutual 
understanding of the facts of a given case. Two strands of social theory are used to 
accomplish this. One of them questions whether states have to be conceived as 
rationally self-interested actors and suggests that the key to the identification of valid 
self-defence claims is for states to take responsibility for their claims and evaluations 
oIWKHULJKW7KHRWKHUVWUDQGRIWKHRU\H[SDQGVRQ+DEHUPDV¶LGHDRIWKHFULWLFL]DEOH
validity claim. The report that self-defence has been used should act as a starting point 
for argumentation and not the last word in national process of decision. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
2  
This thesis is about self-defence in the UN collective security system. It is asserted 
that unless it is possible to distinguish valid from invalid claims to use force in self-
defence, the system will be exploitable by dominant states wishing to legitimize their 
self-interested behaviour. The research question posed by this thesis is: Can the UN 
collective security system distinguish valid from invalid claims to have used force in 
anticipatory self-defence? The question was inspired by a growing feeling that the 
effectiveness of a legal system stands and falls with its ability to make distinctions 
between the valid and the invalid. Behind this is an assumption that legal systems in 
general, and the UN collective security system in particular, should be seen as 
discursive venues rather than instruments of behaviour modification. Self-defence is 
viewed in this thesis as a means of justifying uses of force which would otherwise be 
invalid under the blanket prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter.1  
 
The Nuremberg Military TribXQDOKHOGWKDW³ZKHWKHUDFWLRn taken under the claim of 
self-defence was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ DQG DGMXGLFDWLRQ LI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ LV HYHU WR EH HQIRUFHG´2 Indeed, 
Lauterpacht has written that it wouOGEH³VHOI-FRQWUDGLFWRU\´to claim that the right of 
self-GHIHQFHLV³DERYHWKHODZDQGQRWDPHQDEOHWRHYDOXDWLRQE\ODZ´3 The project 
of identifying valid self-defence claims is complicated by the propensity for the 
security environment to change; inter alia, actors, technology, diplomatic relations 
and modes of violence are all subject to change. The task for legal scholarship is to 
                                                 
1
 $UWLFOH81³$OO0HPEHUVVKDOOUHIUDLQLQWKHLULQWHUQDWLonal relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH3XUSRVHVRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV´ 
2
 -XGLFLDO'HFLVLRQV³,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LOLWDU\7ULEXQDO1XUHPEHUJ-XGJPHQWDQG6HQWHQFHV´
AJIL (1947) 172, p. 207. Interestingly, the Tribunal suggested that they were dealing with a claim of 
preventive self defence: that the invasion of Norway was necessary to forestall an allied invasion (p. 
205). 
3
 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1966) Archon Books, 
Connecticut, p. 180. 
3  
accommodate this change without opening the law to exploitation by giving too much 
power to the individual state to interpret it, or consigning the law to esotericism by 
opening an apparently impracticable credibility gap between the narrow exception of 
self-defence and the practice of states. 
 
International law is said to be caught between normativity and concreteness. It has 
been argued that where the law is justified as effective by its closeness to concrete 
state behaviour, it can be criticised for being insufficiently normative; for failing to 
distinguish the is from the ought. On the other hand, where law is justified as formally 
correct according to its own normative framework and distant from subjective 
standards, it can be criticised for being utopian and opening too broad a gap between 
concrete state practice and the norms of the collective security system.4 Consequently, 
it has been said that international law is ³VLQJXODUO\XVHOHVVDVDPHDQVRIMXVWLI\LQJRU
criticizLQJEHKDYLRXU´5   ,QWKLVWKHVLV.RVNHQQLHPL¶VµDSRORJ\¶DQGµXWRSLD¶WKHWZR
big realist criticisms against which international lawyers fight, have been renamed 
µH[SORLWDELOLW\¶DQGµHVRWHULFLVP¶7KLVLVEHFDXVHLWZDVKRSHGWKDWWKHVHZRUGVZRXOG
emphasise that norms are instruments that can be exploited or simply ignored. In 
FRQWUDVW WKH ZRUGV µDSRORJ\¶ DQG µXWRSLD¶ VHHP WR UHIHU WR WKH DUJXPHQWV of 
international lawyers justifying a particular reading of the norms, rather than to the 
norms themselves. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argumentation 
(2005) Cambridge, p. 58. 
5
 Ibid., p. 67. 
4  
A. The Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption. 
 
The so-FDOOHGµFUHGLELOLW\JDS¶DQGZLWKLWWKHLGHDWKDWVWDWHVPXVWWDNHPDWWHUVLQWR
their own hands to secure their national interests, is far from new. However, the 
criticism resurfaced with the emergence of a new National Security Strategy (NSS) 
for the United States in 2002. The George W. Bush Administration declared war on 
³URJXHVWDWHVDQGWKHLUWHUURULVWFOLHQWV´6 DQGORFDWHGWKHJUHDWHVWWKUHDWWRVHFXULW\³DW
WKH FURVVURDGV RI UDGLFDOLVP DQG WHFKQRORJ\´ LQ WKH IRUP RI WHUURULVWV DUPHG ZLWK
Weapons of Mass Destruction.7 In order to tackle these changes to the strategic 
environment, the Administration proposed a doctrine of pre-emption because ³QHw 
WKUHDWV«UHTXLUH QHZ WKLQNLQJ´.8 TKH &KDUWHU V\VWHP ZRXOG KDYH WR ³DGDSW WKH
FRQFHSWRILPPLQHQWWKUHDWWRWKHFDSDELOLWLHVDQGREMHFWLYHVRIWRGD\¶VDGYHUVDULHV´9 
This would mean that the US could use foUFH³even if uncertainty remains as to the 
WLPHDQGSODFHRIWKHHQHP\¶VDWWDFN´.10 
 
$OWKRXJK LW LV D SURGXFW RI D ³FXOWXUH RI G\QDPLVP´11 that rejects formal rules 
whenever they are taken to have outlived their usefulness,12 the rationale of the 
doctrine of pre-emption also has antecedents in the doctrine of self-help. This doctrine 
appeared to form part of customary law some time prior to the development of 
international collective security. It was therefore not altogether clear what status the 
new doctrine of pre-emption had in relation to law. It could be taken as a strategic 
                                                 
6
 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, p. 14. Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf. 
7
 Ibid., G.W. Bush Foreword.  
8
 Remarks by President G.W. Bush at the Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, 
West Point, New York June 1, 2002. 
9
 US National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15. 
10
 Ibid., p. 15. 
11
 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(2002) Cambridge University Press, p. 496. 
12
 Ibid., p. 485. 
5  
alternative to the law born of political expediency, or it could be taken as a necessary 
adaptation of the law that was already valid law by virtue of this necessity. By failing 
to break its ties with the UN collective security system, the doctrine of pre-emption 
attempted to cling to any residue of legitimacy that came from its attempted 
association (or at least lack of deliberate dissociation) with the collective security 
system. 
 
Self-help left the protection of its vital interests to the individual state and, according 
to some commentators, it is said to live on in the residual right of self-defence 
preserved in article 51 of the UN Charter.13 Accordingly, the doctrine of pre-emption 
was apparently linked to a conception of customary self-defence that preceded the 
Charter framework for the maintenance of international peace and security.14 More 
ZRUU\LQJO\WKH166DOVRZDUQHGWKDW³>Z@KLOHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZLOOFRQVWDQWO\VWULYH
to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act 
DORQH´15 This was an arrogation of the ultimate right to interpret self-defence and, it 
will be argued, to act in situations that are not easily evidenced in practice. Indeed, 
former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, said that its ³logic represents a 
fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace 
DQGVWDELOLW\KDYHUHVWHGIRUWKHODVW\HDUV´16 
 
7KHWKUXVWRIWKHWKHVLVLVWKDWDQµLQWHUVXEMHFWLYH¶DSSURDFKWRGHFLVLRQ-making could 
overcome some of the problems associated with doctrinal approaches to collective 
                                                 
13
 See Chapter I, at pp. 28-9. 
14
 ³)RUFHQWXULHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUHFRJQL]HGWKDWQDWLRQVQHHGQRWVXIIHUDQDWWDFNEHIRUHWKH\FDQ
lDZIXOO\WDNHDFWLRQWRGHIHQGWKHPVHOYHVDJDLQVWIRUFHVWKDWSUHVHQWDQLPPLQHQWGDQJHURIDWWDFN´US 
National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15. 
15
 Ibid., p. 6. 
16
 Press Release; UN Doc. SG/SM/8891; GA/10157 23 September 2003. 
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security law. A forceful realist criticism of doctrinal approaches is that, in practice, 
the formal norms of the collective security system are interpreted subjectively. To the 
extent that such formal norms are said to be objectively valid, this status can be 
exploited by states wishing to legitimate their actions.  
 
The intersubjective approach contained in this thesis shifts the focus from doctrine to 
process. Firstly, it does this by construing statements that self-defence has been 
H[HUFLVHG DV +DEHUPDVHDQ µFULWLFL]DEOH YDOLGLW\ FODLPV¶ -XVWLILFDWLRQ EHFRPHV D
matter of the process of evaluating a claim and not of the intrinsic quality of a given 
XVH RI IRUFH 7KH HOHPHQW RI µFULWLFL]DELOLW\¶ PRUHRYHU SODFHV WKH HPSKDVLV RQ WKH
audience of a claim rather than the claimant. In the UN collective security system, this 
amounts to a claim that all uses of force in self-defence should ultimately be subject 
to collective evaluation. The important factor to stress is that the move from abstract 
doctrine to concrete process means that evaluation is actually done by states, rather 
than notionally assumed by international lawyers.  
 
The thesis has two halves. In the first half, some of the realist criticisms and doctrinal 
responses are set out. The aim is to identify why doctrinal international lawyers have 
not been particularly effective in defending the collective security system. The second 
half of the thesis builds on what has been learned, suggesting that an intersubjective 
approach wherein states take responsibility for redeeming and evaluating self-defence 
claims according to the facts of each case is set out. A brief summary of each 
substantive chapter is set out below. 
 
 
7  
B. Summary of Chapters. 
 
&KDSWHU,LVHQWLWOHG³5HDOLVW&ULWLFLVPVRIWKH&ROOHFWLYH6HFXULW\6\VWHP´7KHDLP
RI WKH FKDSWHU LV WR VNHWFK RXW WKH SUREOHP RI WKH µFUHGLELOLW\ JDS¶ EHWZHHQ VWDWH
practice and doctrinal norms. In order to do this, the first part of the chapter is an 
introduction to realist thought. It is said that realist methodology aspires to be 
VFLHQWLILFDQGDVDUHVXOWUHMHFWVµought VWDWHPHQWV¶LQIDYRXURIµis VWDWHPHQWV¶7KH
idea is that rationally self-interested individuals cannot be constrained by a legal 
system that lacks effective enforcement measures because it adds little or nothing to a 
process of cost-benefit analysis. The effect of these assumptions on analyses of self-
defence is to emphasise, on the one hand, the importance of the interests that the right 
of self-defence protects and, on the other hand, the inability of the collective security 
system to protect these interests due to its doctrinal inflexibility. 
 
The aims of chapters II DQG,,,DUHYHU\VLPLODU7RVKRZWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV¶
attempts to answer realist criticisms thus far have not been entirely successful. 
Chapter II is entitled ³6HFRQGDU\ 5XOHV RI ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG &XVWRP´ It is about 
international lawyers¶ DUJXPents that relied on doctrines of interpretation and 
particular readings of the relation between custom and the Charter to justify a given 
view of self-defence. On the one hand, there are international lawyers whose work 
FDQEH FULWLFLVHGDV µHVRWHULF¶7KHse are writers who emphasise the normative over 
the concrete. For instance, regarding doctrines of interpretation, they might prefer to 
rely on the literal interpretation of the text and the intentions of the drafters of the 
Charter rather than the object and purpose of the document or the subsequent practice 
of the parties. Regarding customary law, such international lawyers tend to prefer the 
8  
element of opinio iuris to state practice. These techniques tend to distance the ought 
of the norm from the is of state practice and thus point to esotericism.  
 
On the other hand, some international lawyers attempt to answer realist criticisms by 
accepting many of the problems that they see in the system but arguing that the 
system can accommodate them. Such international lawyers tend to play up the 
FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP¶V DELOLW\ WR DGDSW WR WKH YLFLVVLWXGHV RI VWUDWHJLF UHDOLW\
However, it is argued, their approaches to interpretation and customary law can often 
bring the ought too close to the is and risk making the law exploitable. This is 
particularly the case where no process of third party evaluation of self-defence claims 
is suggested. 
 
Chapter III³(YDOXDWLRQVRI6HOI-'HIHQFH&ODLPVLQ812UJDQV´LV about such third 
party evaluations. It suggests, again, that while placing the ultimate authority to 
interpret the right of self-defence outside the reach of individual states, such writers 
can, nevertheless, become trapped in the concreteness-normativity dilemma. The 
chapter discusses conceptions of the Security Council (SC) as the ultimate evaluator 
of self-defence claims. 
 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI WKH &RXQFLO FDQ DSSHDU ERWK H[SORLWDEOH DQG
esoteric. Exploitable conceptions tend to emphasise the discretion that the Council has 
to maintain international peace and security and the notion that such freedom of will 
was the price of the involvement of the Great Powers. Esoteric conceptions 
sometimes offer a vision of SC discretion constrained in a quasi-constitutional system. 
This is sometimes done by subjecting the SC to certain abstract principles such as the 
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rule of law, and sometimes by considering the possibility for judicial review of SC 
resolutions. Finally, it is emphasised that while the SC is a multilateral body and 
therefore a more appealing alternative to autointerpretation by individual states, this 
status should not drive international lawyers to play down its flaws of selectivity, 
inconsistency and opacity. 
 
Chapters IV and V contain the rudiments of an alternative means of identifying valid 
self-defence claims without succumbing to esotericism or exploitability. Chapter IV, 
³,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\´, proposes that reports of self-defence should be conceived of as 
µFULWLFL]DEOH YDOLGLW\ FODLPV¶ 7KLV LGHD LV WDNHQ IURP -üUJHQ +DEHUPDV¶ 7KHRU\ of 
Communicative Action (TCA).17 The concepts of the criticizable validity claim and 
ZKDW LW PHDQV WR µUHGHHP¶ VXFK D FODLP DQG WKHUHIRUH SDUWLFLSDWH UDWLRQDOO\ LQ D
discourse oriented to reaching understanding, are discussed. It is argued that in order 
to vindicate a self-defence claim, a state must give reasons that can be accepted by his 
fellow participants in the evaluation discourse. 
 
In the second half of the chapter, it is argued that it would require a fundamental 
change in attitudes on the part of states to implement such a conception. This is 
because states are often seen to operate in what Alexander Wendt has called a 
³/RFNHDQ$QDUFK\´18 This means that states conceive of one another as rivals with 
more or less fixed interests that must be achieved at the lowest cost possible. It will be 
DUJXHGWKDWXQGHU86166RIWKH86FRQFHLYHVRIFHUWDLQDFWRUVDVµHQHPLHV¶LQ
                                                 
17
 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society 
and Vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, (trans. T. McCarthy) (1984 and 
1987) Polity Press, Cambridge. 
18
 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999) Cambridge University Press, p. 279.  
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the sense required by the Hobbesian conception of the other.19 The Hobbesian relation 
between self and other renders survival a maWWHU RI µNLOO-or-be-NLOOHG¶. This means 
self-defence claims can be GLIILFXOWWREHDURXWZLWKµJRRGUHDVRQV¶where third party 
evaluators have not also constructed a Hobbesian relation with the target state. In 
VKRUWWKHFKDSWHUFRQFOXGHVWKDWVWDWHV¶DWWitudes must change so that they accept the 
responsibility of the self-defence claim. For claimant states this responsibility is to 
offer good reasons and for evaluating states this is to offer criticism and pose 
questions: In both cases what is required is an attitude oriented to understanding and 
not to strategic victory or to the obliteration of the other. 
 
7KHILIWKDQGILQDOFKDSWHULVHQWLWOHG³An Evidence-Based Approach to the Evaluation 
of Self-Defence Claims´ 7DNLQJ WKH LQVLJKWV DERXW ZKHUH WKH LQWersubjective 
understanding with which a validity claim could be vindicated might come from, this 
FKDSWHUWXUQVIURPGRFWULQHWRµWKHIDFWV¶RISDUWLFXODUFDVHV7KHDLPRIWKHFKDSWHULV
to show that relying on the facts per se is problematic insofar as facts do not speak for 
themselves. The chapter takes the view that facts are socially constructed and 
therefore in order for intersubjective understanding of them to come about, the 
process of establishing them must be collective. This means that claimant states must 
substantiate their statements that they were facing, for instance, an imminent threat 
with evidence that they were so threatened.  
 
The key claim of the chapter is that the process of evidencing a claim requires the 
production of criticizable reasons for action. It is argued that the ancillary of 
criticizability is positivity. This means that processes of claim and justification must 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 260 
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be transparent and, preferably, recorded and publicised. It is argued that where a claim 
either cannot be evidenced, because the materialisation of a threat was merely 
possible RU ZKHUH LQWHOOLJHQFH LV EURXJKW LQ µHYLGHQFH¶ RI D FODLP EXW LV UHPRYHG
from the process of scrutiny, a state will not satisfy the conditions for the 
criticizability claim. In consequence, it is argued that self-defence taken pursuant to 
the Bush doctrine of pre-emption would be unlikely to be redeemable under this 
conception of evaluation. 
 
C. Scope of the Project and Omissions. 
 
Before embarking on the thesis proper, some words should be said about the ambit of 
the thesis and decisions to exclude certain elements. However, to list all relevant areas 
that one has not covered leaves one open to the devastating effect of a single counter 
example. It is hoped that no point necessary to make the argument is among the 
omissions in this thesis.  
 
The thesis is narrowly focused on the controversial question of whether self-defence 
can be used against future threats and attacks from other states. It is recognised, 
however, that there are other controversies surrounding the right of self-defence. One 
of the biggest of these is the position of non-state actors. While the issue of attacks 
and threats emanating from non-state actors can be closely connected to the need to 
anticipate or pre-empt threats, the decision has been made to exclude it from the ambit 
of the thesis. 
 
12  
The primary reason for this exclusion is lack of space. Furthermore the aim of the 
chapters II and III is to demonstrate some of the weaknesses of existing defences of 
the collective security system, rather than to make an exhaustive study of the right of 
self-defence. It is therefore hoped that these weaknesses can be demonstrated using 
selected examples. Additionally, it is submitted that the issue of non-state actors and 
the corresponding problem of state responsibility are matters that could be dealt with 
as part of a process of critical inquiry into a criticizable validity claim. There is no 
reason to suppose that the evidence-based approach that was applied to anticipatory 
self-defence could not also be applied to claims involving non-state actors. 
 
Another point to stress is that no attempt has been made to exhaustively review all the 
work done on self-defence by international lawyers. Instead, the work of certain 
international lawyers has been taken to evidence particular arguments made about 
self-defence. Furthermore, it is not suggested that the present project is the only 
approach to self-defence. It is only suggested that if the problem of self-defence is 
conceived of as a matter oIEDODQFLQJODZ¶VUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWRVRFLDOFKDQJHZLWKWKH
potential exploitation of that law with the powerful, then a solution involving public 
evaluative processes seems sensible. 
 
As for the scope of the project, it should be stressed that no blueprint for action is 
given in this thesis. The thesis is a work of theory and may be seen as the first steps 
towards a more practical project. The ideas presented are intended as a starting point 
for future discussion about the best way to evaluate self-defence claims. The 
contribution of the thesis is to emphasise the importance of the process of evaluation 
per se and to reject the proposition that international law should be accountable for 
13  
VWDWHV¶DVVXPSWLRQRI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKHLURZQH[HUFLVHVRI VHOI-defence. While a 
direction for future development of evaluation is suggested in the form of an 
evidence-led process of inquiry, the bricks-and-mortar institutionalisation is beyond 
the remit of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
Realist Criticisms of the UN Collective Security  
System. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
7KH WKHVLV DUJXHV WKDW WKH SUHVHQFH RI ³DUPHG DWWDFN´ LQ &KDUWHU $UWLFOH  Zhich 
contains the right of self-defence,1 facilitates the distinction between valid and invalid 
uses of force. The argument is made, in the light of the Bush Doctrine of Pre-
emption,2 that the further self defensive responses stray from an initial visible 
aggression such as an armed attack, the harder it is to identify valid claims. It is 
argued that without the ability to distinguish valid from invalid claims of self-defence, 
the collective security system risks providing powerful states with cosmetic 
justifications for violent coercion. 
 
The thesis is situated between realist critiques of the collective security system and a 
µOHJDOLVW¶RUµLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW¶VHQVHRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIOHJDOQRUPVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ
restraining violent power.3 Many have pointed out that the constraint of the use of 
armed violence between nations is marked by poles of realism and idealism, reality 
and utopia, the practical and the abstract for instance.4 Another way of describing this 
                                                 
1
 $UWLFOH81³1RWKLQJLQWKHSUHVHQW&KDUWHUVKDOOLPSDLUWKHLQKHUHQWULJKWRILQGLYLGXDORU
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
PDLQWDLQRUUHVWRUHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´ 
2
 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf+HUHLQDIWHUµUS 
National Security Strategy ¶ 
3
 WKLOH WKH WHUPµOHJDOLVW¶ LV VRPHWLPHVXVHGSHMRUDWLYHO\VHHHJ+-0RUJHQWKDX Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (1978) Knopf, New York, p. 12. (Hereinafter, 
µ0RUJHQWKDX Politics Among Nations¶ DQG 0 .RVNHQQLHPL ³7Ke Place of Law in Collective 
6HFXULW\´  Mich. JIL (1995-6) 455, p. 455. +HUHLQDIWHU µ.RVNHQQLHPL ³7KH 3ODFH RI /DZ LQ
&ROOHFWLYH6HFXULW\´¶LWLVQRWVRLQWHQGHGKHUH 
4
 See e.g. E.H. Carr, The Twenty YeaUV¶&ULVLV-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (1981) The MacMillan Press, London, pp. 10-+HUHLQDIWHUµCarr, The Twenty YeaUV¶
Crisis¶M. Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argumentation (2005) Cambridge University PreVVS+HUHLQDIWHUµKoskenniemi, From 
Apology¶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GLIIHUHQFH LV .HRKDQH¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ LQVWUXPHQWDO DQG QRUPDWLYH RSWLFV DV
opposing ways of viewing international relations.5 Indeed, such poles can play a 
useful role in describing or explaining how the collective security system or a system 
based on the balance of power works.  
 
This thesis takes many of the insights of realism and of critical approaches to 
international law6 and applies them to the arguments of those who wish to assert the 
relevance of the collective security system at whatever cost, and of those who wish to 
assert a vision of collective security that could abide in happy abstraction, untroubled 
by effective action. Many such arguments came to light after September 2001 because 
of the radical departure it was supposed to mark. International lawyers are divided in 
how to deal with the problems that it has thrown up: Greenwood has noted that there 
are those who see the doctrine of pre-emption as clearly illegal and those who see it as 
requiring a reconsideration of PIL.7  
 
The present author shares many of the sympathies of the international lawyers whose 
work is criticised by realists; a preference for more law,8 an assumption that PIL has a 
useful role WRSOD\LQUHJXODWLQJWKHXVHRIIRUFHDQGDJUHHPHQWWKDW³WKHFODLPWRDFW
pre-HPSWLYHO\ >LV@ D VHULRXV HURVLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ«VLPSO\ D HXSKHPLVP IRU
                                                 
5
 R. .HRKDQH ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7ZR 2SWLFV´  Harv. ILJ (1997) 
+HUHLQDIWHUµKeohane, ³7ZR2SWLFV´¶ 
6
 During the 1990s, David Kennedy attempted to form a loose grouping of those interested in New 
$SSURDFKHVWR,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ1$,/'.HQQHG\³$1HZVWUHDPRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
6FKRODUVKLS´Wis. ILJ (1988-7KHVHZHUHZHOOGLVFXVVHGE\'=&DVVLQ³1DYLJDWLQJWKH
Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´Nor. JIL (1996) 341. 
7
 &*UHHQZRRG³,QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDQG WKH3UH-emptive Use of Force against Afghanistan, al Qaeda 
DQG,UDT´San Diego ILJ (2003) 7, p. 8. +HUHLQDIWHUµ*UHHQZRRG³International Law and the Pre-
emptive Use oI)RUFH´¶6HHDOVR -<RR³8VLQJ)RUFH´ Univ. Chi. LR (2004) 729, p. 731. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ<RR³8VLQJ)RUFH´¶ 
8
 See '.HQQHG\³:KHQ5HQHZDO5HSHDWV7KLQNLQJ$JDLQVWWKH%R[´ 32 NYU JIL&P (1999-2000) 
S+HUHLQDIWHUµKennedy³ThiQNLQJ$JDLQVWWKH%R[´¶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DJJUHVVLRQ´9 Interestingly, E.H. Carr described realism DV ³D UHDFWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH
wish-dreams of WKH LQLWLDO VWDJH´ +H H[SODLQV WKDW ³UHDOLVP LV OLDEOH WR DVVXPH D
FULWLFDO DQG VRPHZKDW F\QLFDO DVSHFW´10 It is submitted that critical insights can be 
useful to strengthen the collective security system against being undermined, but that 
once such criticism turns to dogma it loses its insight. Certain realist writers appear to 
have substantive motivations behind their critical attitude to international law. While 
LQ WKHRU\ DOO VWDWHV¶ IUHHGRP RI DFWLRQ ZRXOG EH LQFUHDVHG E\ WKH UHPRYDO RI WKH
Charter rules on the use of force, in practice the inequalities in power between states 
PHDQVWKDWDVRUWRI7KXF\GLGHDQPRWWRRI³WKHVWURQJGRZKDWWKH\FDQDQGWKHZHDN
VXIIHUZKDWWKH\PXVW´ZRXOGKROGVZD\11 Thus, it is not unusual to find international 
lawyers in the US, the so-called sole superpower,12 XVLQJDPRUH³LQVWUXPHQWDORSWLF´
to give realist arguments for a broader reading of the right of self-defence. 
 
In the present Chapter the realist criticisms of the collective security system and 
³PDLQVWUHDP´LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKHPZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG,WLVDUJXHG
that the Bush doctrine can be seen as a consequence of a realist approach to 
international relations and that the arguments supporting it are realist. Such an 
approach rejects not only the content of the provisions of the Charter system of 
collective security but, in some cases, the very concept of such a system. The chief 
criticism is that, as between sovereign equals lacking a supreme authority, the system 
FDQQRWDFFRXQWIRUVWDWHV¶DJUeement to limit the right to use force under article 2(4). 
This criticism is attended by the view that general rules are inappropriate for 
                                                 
9
 05HLVPDQDQG$$UPVWURQJ³7KH3DVWDQG)XWXUHRIWKH&ODLPRI3UH-emptive Self-'HIHQVH´
100(3) AJIL (2006) 525 p. 547. 
10
 Carr, The Twenty YeaUV¶&ULVLV, p. 10. 
11
 7KXF\GLGHV¶History of the Peloponnesian War, ³The Melian Dialogue´ (Ch. XVII). 
12
 In the NSS, it was said that the US ³SRVVHVVHVXQSUHFHGHQWHG²and unequaled²strength and 
LQIOXHQFHLQWKHZRUOG´US National Security Strategy (2002), p. 1. 
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regulating the use of force between states because they are both over and under-
inclusive. This lack of fit between doctrine and reality is augmented whenever there 
are chaQJHV LQ WKH ³VWUDWHJLF UHDOLW\´ )RU H[DPSOH Whe development of nuclear 
weapons, the rise of guerrilla warfare, the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the danger that these may fall into the 
KDQGVRIWHUURULVWV6XFKDODFNRIILWKDVEHHQGXEEHGWKH³FUHGLELOLW\JDS´EHWZHHQ
the abstract norms of the Charter and the concrete reality of state practice.13  
 
PART ONE: REALISM. 
 
Two main realist criticisms of the rules on self-defence will be examined. One of 
these is that the gap between doctrine and practice is too wide. This is summed up by 
0LFKDHO*OHQQRQ³WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPKDVFRPHWRVXEVLVWLQDSDUDOOHOXQLYHUVH
of two systems, one de jure, the other de facto´14 A large part of this reason is that 
the collective security system ³LV GHILFLHQW LQ DOO WKUHH IXQGDPHQWDOV RI DQ HIILFLHQW
judicial system: compulsory jurisdiction, hierarchy of judicial decisions, and the 
application of the rule of stare decisis´15 Another, leading on from the first, is that the 
norms that exist are used solely by states as ex post rationalisations of action. These 
FRUUHVSRQG WR WKH ³LQWHUSUHWDWLYH WKHVLV´ DQG WKH ³FDXVDO WKHVLV´ LGHQWLILHG E\
Koskenniemi.16  
 
                                                 
13
 D. %RZHWW³5HSULVDOV,QYROYLQJ5HFRXUVHWR$UPHG)RUFH´AJIL (1972) 1, p. 1. (Hereinafter, 
µ%RZHtW³5HSULVDOV´¶70)UDQFN³:KR.LOOHG$UWLFOH"2U&KDQJLQJ1RUPV*RYHUQLQJWKH
8VH RI )RUFH E\ 6WDWHV´  AJIL (1970) 809, p. 837. +HUHLQDIWHU µ)UDQFN ³:KR .LOOHG $UWLFOH
"´¶0-*OHQQRQ³7KH)RJRI/Dw: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of 
WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV&KDUWHU´ Harv. JL&PP (2001-2) 539, p. 549. +HUHLQDIWHU µ*OHQQRQ³7KH
)RJRI/DZ´¶ 
14
 *OHQQRQ³7KH)RJRI/DZ´S 
15
 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 289. 
16
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The collective security system is an object of knowledge for both international 
lawyers in the discipline of Public International Law (PIL) and international relations 
(IR) scholars in their own discipline. However the perspectives that the mainstreams 
of both disciplines have on the use of force between states is very different. 
.UDWRFKZLO VD\V WKDW LQ ,5 QRUPV ³KDYH EHHQ XQGHUVWRRG VROHO\ DV LGHRORJLFDO
UHIOHFWLRQVGHFHSWLRQVVXEWHUIXJHVRU«DVDQLPSHGLPHQWWRDFKLHYLQJRQH¶VJRDOVLQ
D³UDWLRQDOZD\´.17 In PIL most scholars would reject such a cynical claim. However, 
there is disciplinary overlap and there is also marginal scholarship in both disciplines. 
7KXVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRLGHQWLI\D³QRUPDWLYHRSWLF´LQ,518 RUDQ³LQVWUXPHQWDORSWLF´LQ
PIL.19 
 
It is not possible to define realism without controversy, however it is thought 
necessary to emphasise some traits and commonalities. Carr identifies Machiavelli as 
WKH ILUVW LPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDO UHDOLVW+HH[SODLQV WKDW0DFKLDYHOOL¶V WKRXJKWKDG WKUHH
main tenets: The fLUVWZDVWKDW³KLVWRU\LVDVHTXHQFHRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFW´ the second 
is that theory does not create practice, practice creates theory; and the third one is that 
ethics are a function of politics and not vice versa.20 We can, in this, discern some of 
the main trends in realist thinking: A rejection of theoretically deduced or 
transcendentally presupposed rules that do not relate to practice, and their replacement 
with scientifically verifiable rules of causality.  
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The relationship of political realism to international law is profoundly connected to 
the discipline of IR. In The Gentle Civilizer of Nations .RVNHQQLHPLLQWURGXFHV³WKH
WXUQWRµLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV¶´XVLQJWKHZRUNRI&DUO6FKPLWWDQG0RUJHQWKDX21 As 
to Schmitt, Koskenniemi explains that his ³DQWL-formalism was connected to his 
emphasis on the significance of the political which, for him, was crucial for the 
6WDWH¶V IXQFWLRQ LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ RUGHU´22 In large part this was because where the 
normal order was disrupted, Schmitt relied on the sovereign to decide on the 
exception.23 7KLVLVUHPLQLVFHQWRI+REEHV¶Leviathan wherein ³the Right of making 
:DUUH´ is ³annexed to the Soveraignty´,24 and where the sovereign has the greatest 
power of all.25 It also provides a link into international law by way of early theories of 
voluntarism.26  
 
It is often thought that this individualism accurately describes what occurs in the 
FROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHP*OHQQRQVD\VWKDWLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOV\VWHP³VWDWHV
engage in a hard-headed, cold-blooded calculus, weighing the costs of violating the 
VXSSRVHGUXOHDJDLQVWWKHEHQHILWVRIFRPSO\LQJZLWKLW´27 From this, we can identify 
another key realist prioritisation: The interests of the individual decision-maker. This 
is key to the more modern strand of realism, Game Theory. The idea is to 
scientifically predict state behaviour from state interests. Keohane explains that 
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³>V@WDWHµLQWHUHVWV¶PD\EHLQIHUUHGIURPWKHLUEHKDYLRXUZKLFKLVWKHQµH[SODLQHG¶E\
WKHYHU\VDPHLQWHUHVWV´28  
 
The insights of Game Theory have been used by certain international lawyers in an 
attempt to create a more relevant international law. Thus, Goldsmith and Posner state 
WKDW ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ HPHUJHV IURP VWDWHV DFWLQJ UDWLRQDOO\ WR PD[LPLVH WKHLU
interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of 
VWDWHSRZHU´29 The problem with this is that it tends to reduce the ought of a norm to 
the is of behaviour. This deprives law of its constraining force and offers it up, 
instead, as a facilitator of the interests of those states powerful enough to take 
advantage of it. Accordingly, it will be argued that while those international lawyers 
ZKRWDNHRQWKHLQVLJKWVRIUHDOLVPFRPSOHWHO\PD\FORVHWKH³FUHGLELOLW\JDS´WKH\
open up the law to exploitation. 
 
A. The Science of International Relations? 
 
The realist method for evaluating the effectiveness of international law is often 
presented as scientific.30 A scientific method based in reality can be seen to generate a 
cynical tone to level at the utopian hopes of cosmopolitan international lawyers.31 
However the claim that the study of IR is a science is just as problematic as claims 
that international law is a science.32 Thus, Duxbury criticised the policy realism of the 
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New Haven School led by McDougal³>P]olicy science assumes the attainability of 
DQXQUHDOLVWLFVWDWHRIGHWDFKPHQW´33 The problematic nature of the claim of scientific 
method emanates from the reason for which this claim is usually made: The ability to 
claim to be correct. Realists are able to dismiss legalist approaches to self-defence 
because according to their purportedly objective, neutral technique of measuring state 
interests, they will prove useless.  
 
It has long been recognised that any claim to impartial objectivity in the social 
sciences should be treated circumspectly. One of its fore-fathers, E.H. Carr said that 
³>S@ROLWLFDOVFLHQFHLVWKHVFLHQFHQRWRQO\RIZKDWLVEXWRIZKDWRXJKWWREH´34 This 
was because it was not possible to rid IR of purposiveness.35 Critics of realist 
approaches have also pointed out that the objective outcomes of the realist process of 
cost-benefit analysis depend on what goes into the black box. Thus, Cryer criticises 
Goldsmith and Posner for making unjustified choices about what is and what is not in 
DVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVW36 This means that the pseudo-scientific nature of realist criticisms of 
the international legal system can simultaneously provide justifications for substantive 
policies that undermine it. 
 
Realist scholars often take advantage of the insights of the social sciences to ground 
their critiques of normative approaches.37 Thus, Morgenthau criticised international 
ODZ IRU ³SD\LQJ DOPRVW QR DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH SV\FKRORJLFDO RU VRFLRORJLFDO ODZV
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governing the actions of men in the international spheUH´DQGFRQFHQWUDWLQJRQZKDW
the law should be instead.38 Scientists collect data and analyse them using 
disciplinarily approved methods. Similarly, realists look at facts and apply reason 
based on self interest to them. In this way they hope to produce predictive theories 
about what might happen, as well as advising decision-makers about which courses of 
action in a given scenario are optimally rational. 
 
,WKDVEHHQH[SODLQHGWKDW³>U@HDOLVPUHFHLYHVLWVVWUHQJWKIURPLWVIRFXVRQHPSLULFDO-
instrumental qXHVWLRQV VXFK DV µZKDW KDSSHQHG"¶ RU µZKDW FDQ EH PDGH WR
KDSSHQ"¶´39 This approach means that it is common to see realists set great store by 
³WKH IDFWV´ 7KLV UHIOHFWV WKHLU SUHIHUHQFH IRU DUJXPHQWV IURP ³FRQFUHWHQHVV´40 The 
power of such an approach depends on the objective correctness of facts and their 
existence independent to the perception of those who might discuss them.41 
Morgenthau himself began his career as a lawyer, but became disillusioned with the 
positivism of his contemporaries. Koskenniemi has explained that he gradually 
EHFDPH³WKHH[WHUQDOREVHUYHULQUHJDUGWRODZ´VRWKDWKLVZRUNFHDVHGWREH³DVWXG\
in ODZ´EXWZDVD³VWXG\ of ODZ´42 The nub of the social scientific approach to the 
study of international affairs is that takes the perspective of an external observer.43 
This is the claim, pertinent to this thesis in another regard, that it is possible to take 
and to express an objective view of things and events in the world.44 
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One of the chief problems for international lawyers attempting to counter realist 
criticisms is that arguments from objectivity are unlikely to have persuasive force 
DJDLQVWUHDOLVWV¶RZQDUJXPHQWVIURPREMHFWLYLW\:KHUHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVWDNLQJ
a normative optic seek to argue that the norms of the collective security system are 
objectively valid, it is possible for a realist to simply counter that the system of 
GRFWULQDOODZLQZKLFKWKDWYDOLGLW\LVJLYHQLVVLPSO\LUUHOHYDQWWRVWDWHV¶SUDFWLFHLQ
the area. Where international lawyers taking a more instrumental optic argue that 
states have interests in abiding by the Charter norms, it is merely one reading of the 
facts against another and again is unlikely to have persuasive force with anyone 
committed to realist thinking. It cannot be assumed that the facts speak for 
themselves.  
 
A good example of this is the assumption that the collective security system has failed 
to prevent states engaging in armed violence. Glennon, for instance, notes that 
between 1945 and 1999 126 out of 189 states engaged in armed conflict.45 While 
Henkin does not dispute the validity of statistics that show states still engage in armed 
violence, he states that the occurrence of war in no way negates the value of the 
collective security system; the statistics simply do not show the greater number of 
times that the law on the use of force was observed.46 The use of statistics to 
VFLHQWLILFDOO\DQDO\VHVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULVIODZHGLQWKHPRVWSDUWEHFDXVHE\ORRNLQJ
at how states have behaved or what they have done, it is very often not possible to see 
why they have so behaved. Another problem affecting both sorts of counter-arguments 
that international lawyers might make is that the commitment of most international 
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lawyers to objectivity means that they are estopped from making meta-level attacks 
RQUHDOLVWV¶RZQFRPPLWPHQWWRREMHFWLYHWUXWK 
 
B. Primus inter Pares? 
 
Realists using the interpretative thesis argue that the collective security system is 
doomed because it lacks an effective centralised enforcement agency.47 It is said that 
withouWWKLV³>R@EOLJDWLRQVDUHERWKFDXVDOO\LQHIIHFWXDODQGXQDPHQDEOHWRVFLHQWLILF
LQTXLU\´48 It is said that even when the SC is not paralysed by the veto, it remains an 
ineffective central power because its decisions are dependent on the interests of its 
permanent members. The criticism depends on certain Hobbesian assumptions about 
actors and their anarchical inter-relation in the sphere of security. For instance, Waltz 
has written that ³>V@WDWHVVWULYH WRPDLQWDLQ WKHLUDXWRQRP\´49 It will be argued that 
these assumptions tend to make it impossible to appreciate the collective security 
system within a realist frame of understanding. Furthermore, the realist understanding 
of the natural condition of states as individualistic anarchy tends to exclude the 
Kantian cosmopolitan idea of the gradual legalisation through institutionalisation of 
international sphere.50 Waltz has also stated that ³>L@QWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHPV DUH
GHFHQWUDOLVHGDQGDQDUFKLF´DVRSSRVHGWR³FHQWUDOLVHGDQGKLHUDUFKLF´OLNHGRPHVWLF
ones.51 Furthermore, the pursuit and protection of interests has only one instrument in 
a system of anarchy shorn of more complex social structures: Force or coercion.  
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Waltz has also written WKDW ³>L@Q LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV IRUFH VHUYHV QRW RQO\ DV WKH
ultima ratioEXWLQGHHGDVWKHILUVWDQGFRQVWDQWRQH´52 Indeed, it is often assumed ± 
particularly insofar as coercion can be interpreted broadly to include a spectrum of 
pressure from the production of incentives for leverage to the threat of destructive 
force53 ± that coercion alone is capable of providing reasons for states to act. There is 
a certain assumption that the collective security system should be measured against 
constitutional regimes at the national level. This is an assumption that many 
international lawyers seem to share. It is argued that such ambition is not only beyond 
the reach of the collective security system at the present time, but quite unnecessary in 
order for it to be effective.  
 
It might be argued that collective security is impossible between states. This is based 
on a paradigm of order taken from Hobbes. It is sometimes said that, without the 
paraphernalia oILQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV³>D@mong states the state of nature is a state 
RIZDU´bellum omnium.54 The Hobbesian cure for this war of all against all is the 
Leviathan: A sovereign power capable of defeating all contrary claims to wield 
authority.55 By contrast, at the international level legal norms are applied and created 
horizontally as between states.56 The problem with this is that these norms cannot 
transform anarchy into order because they lack a greater power creating reasons for 
states to act against their prima facie interests.  
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Moreover, the horizontal system contains the seeds of its own ineffectiveness: Waltz 
explains tKDW³VRORQJDVDQDUFK\HQGXUHVVWDWHV UHPDLQOLNHXQLWV´57 This has clear 
implications for the ability to distinguish valid from invalid claims of self-defence in a 
situation where two sovereign equals claim that they have used self-defence against 
one another. However it also has implications for the behaviourist rather than 
communicative model of collective security. This holds that the collective security 
system is only effective where it manages to at least decrease the instance of inter-
state violence. This is a forceful criticism where international lawyers sympathetic to 
the collective security system also assume that it must be capable of changing VWDWHV¶
behaviour in order to be effective. Such an ambition is, as the realists point out, 
unlikely to be realised.  
 
Since the collective security system is part of a legal order which is supposed to 
regulate the behaviour of sovereign states, it is tainted by the contradiction in the idea 
of governing sovereigns. It has been said that the UN collective security system 
inherited the clash between individual national interests and collective ones that 
infected the League of Nations.58 Many international lawyers overcome this 
contradiction by stating that the legal system is a horizontal one; sovereign equals 
regulate one another. However the effectiveness of this in practice depends on the 
equality de facto and not just de iure of the sovereigns. This is because, as 
0RUJHQWKDX HPSKDVLVHG LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ILHOG ³LW LV WKH VXEMHFWV RI WKH ODZ
themselves that not only legislate for themselves but are also the supreme authority 
IRULQWHUSUHWLQJDQGJLYLQJFRQFUHWHPHDQLQJWRWKHLURZQOHJLVODWLYHHQDFWPHQWV´59  
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Chapter VII intensifies this tension between the individual and the collective by 
enabling the SC to override the article 2(7) protection of the domestic sphere in the 
name of the collective and at the same time preserving the sovereign right of self-
defence.60 An illustration of the way that individualism can lead to the potential 
exploitation of collective security norms can be found in the work of Bowett. In 1958 
he argued for a wide right of self-defence not limited to the occurrence of an armed 
attack. He defended this, inter alia, as ³DUHVWULFWLRQRQWKHULJKWVRIVRYHUHLJQVWDWHV
not lightly to EHSUHVXPHG´61 Bowett is not unusual amongst international lawyers, 
particularly more traditional doctrinalists, in so holding. Indeed, the Permanent Court 
RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO -XVWLFH¶V VWDWHPHQW WR VLPLODUHIIHFW LQ WKHLotus case is often cited: 
³5HVWULFWLRQVXSRQWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRI6WDWHVFDQQRWWKHUHIRUHEHSUHVXPHG´62 While 
LWKDVEHHQVDLGWKDWUHFHQWO\³DQREVHVVLRQZLWKVRYHUHLJQW\«KDVJLYHQZD\«WRDQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DQGDJHQHUDOOHJDORUGHU´63 it is submitted that some writers 
view the right of self-defence as an exception to this.64 
 
One such restriction, it is sometimes argued, is the narrow framing of article 51. Thus, 
while realists with an instrumentalist optic may argue for a right to use force in self 
help regulated by nothing but the necessity of survival or the rationale of individual 
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prosperity,65 those attempting to defend the relevance of the collective security system 
may be tempted to argue that the right of self-GHIHQFH LV ³LQKHUHQW´ DQG UHPDLQV
unchanged by the Charter. Morgenthau suggested that a sort of right of self help was 
SUHVHUYHGLQWKH81V\VWHPLQDUWLFOH$UWLFOHKHZURWHLVD³UHDIILUPDWLRQRI
the traditional principle of common international law: it is for the injured nation to 
enforce international law againsWWKHODZEUHDNHU´66  The individualistic approach to 
international affairs is inescapable in any discussion of individual self-defence.  
 
5REHUWR$JRH[SODLQHGWKDW³WKHYHU\HVVHQFHRIWKHQRWLRQRIVHOI-GHIHQFH´GHPDQGV
that every state has the prima facie right to apply self-GHIHQFH LWVHOI EHFDXVH ³WKH
H[WUHPHO\XUJHQWVLWXDWLRQREYLRXVO\OHDYHVLWQRWLPHRUPHDQVIRU´FRQIHUULQJZLWK
other bodies.67 In itself, this is unobjectionable. In domestic legal systems the exercise 
of the right of self-defence does not need prior authorisation.68 The problem is where 
the right of prima facie application is converted into unchallengeable authority. In 
most domestic criminal law systems self-defence is subject to subsequent evaluation. 
Individualism can seem to be closely connected to the question of autointerpretation 
and with the idea of sovereignty. This provides a connection between realist criticisms 
of the collective security system and the tenets of the international lawyers who 
attempt to defend it. In other ZRUGV UHDOLVWV FDQ XVH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶ RZQ
principles and assumptions against them.  
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It is assumed that when states feel threatened by one another they will consider 
neither ethical objections nor collective views about their response but will act wholly 
selfishly. The realist logic dictates that unless such objections and views can be 
rendered as interests to be weighed in the balance, they are simply irrelevant to the 
decision to use force. In order for a normative reason against selfish action WRµFRXQW¶
it is often said that it must be backed by the threat of sanction. This provides a bridge 
between realism in IR and the Austinian conception of law properly so called which 
GHPDQGHGWKHDGGUHVVHHVRIODZWREHLQ³VXEMHFWLRQ´WRWKHVRYHUHLJQOaw-giver.69 It 
is assumed that unless states which use force beyond the parameters of Chapter VII 
are likely to be sanctioned for such uses, it remains rational for them to flout article 51 
thus jeopardising the absolute prohibition on the use of force on which the Charter is 
said to hang.  
 
There are various degrees of this criticism. A few scholars argue that the anarchy 
between states is impervious to law and that the collective security system must 
necessarily fail. It is more usual to hear the argument that the collective security 
system simply lacks sufficient vertical authority in the form of reliable sanctions. This 
argument was at its height during the Cold War years when, as White wrote in 1990, 
³>S@HUPDQHQWPHPEHUSDUWLFXODUO\VXSHUSRZHULQWHUHVWs and influences have become 
so pervasive on the post-war world that the veto has effectively debarred the Security 
&RXQFLO IURP WDNLQJ DFWLRQ´70 However the argument has also been said to apply 
more recently in cases where the permanent members cannot agree that enforcement 
action under Chapter VII is necessary.  
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A recent instance of this was the dissenting views of France, Russia and China over 
WKHQHFHVVLW\RIXVLQJIRUFHDJDLQVW6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHLQ,UDTLQ:KLOH
it is generally agreed that the official justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
was an SC authorisation, some international lawyers were moved to argue that the use 
of force could have been taken as pre-emptive self-defence.71 This stance was aided 
by the US policy on multilateralism: The G.W. %XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V166ZDUQHG
WKDW ³>Z@KLOH WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ZLOO FRQVWDQWO\ VWULYH WR HQOLVW WKH VXSSRUW RI WKH
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise 
our right of self-defense by actinJSUHHPSWLYHO\DJDLQVWVXFKWHUURULVWV´72  
 
The suggestion in this is that the right of self-defence could be used outside the 
collective security system where the decisions of the SC did not match US 
expectations of the action necessary to ensure international peace and security. This 
approach severely undermines the authority of the SC to determine permissible uses 
of force and aggregates unchecked power to the hands of the most powerful member 
states. Indeed, the proposition sparked much debate about the position of the hegemon 
within the collective security system and the compatibility of the two. Many said that 
collective security could only survive where there was a balance of power and that it 
could not operate in a system in which some actors could flout the rules. 
 
Few international lawyers describe the international sphere as anarchic.73 This may 
reveal a difference in disciplinary vocabulary between PIL and IR that can prevent 
real engagement in argument. The word anarchy does not necessarily connote chaos, 
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which would tend to negate law, merely a lack of top-down rule.74 Wendt has written 
compellingly about three modes of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. These 
states of anarchy are characterised according to the inter-relation of the states within 
them: States in Hobbesian relation to one another are enemies; states in Lockean 
relation are rivals; and states in Kantian relation are friends.75 He explains that in his 
own discipline of IR the Hobbesian model can dominate realist thinking about stDWHV¶
behaviour.76 However Hobbesianism is also to be found in the bedrock of realist 
WKLQNLQJ WKDW ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV«LV D VWUXJJOH IRU SRZHU´77 According to this 
view, rational actors seek primarily to improve the position of the individual rather 
than the community.  
 
The place of the individual making rational choices at the centre of realist approaches 
leads naturally to the Hobbesian or Lockean conceptions of international anarchy: 
Any sort of submission to authority or to a collective is rendered contingent by the 
ongoing process of cost-benefit analysis and the preference for short-term gains that 
can be displayed in realist writing.78 This means that the collective security system 
cannot be seen as a good thing except insofar as it enables individual states to 
flourish. For this reason, realist arguments say that compliant state behaviour is 
contingent on coincidence of interest or the ability of the collective security system to 
punish infractions and assert its position independently of its individual members. 
This topic will be returned to in Chapter IV. 
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C. Adaptability of the Charter System? 
 
This section of the Chapter follows on from the last one sketching the Hobbesian 
assumptions of realist writers and how they overlap with certain doctrinal approaches 
to collective security. This is because a popular realist argument is that the prohibition 
on the use of force and the corresponding narrow right of self-defence are contingent 
on the ability of the SC to maintain international peace and security. In response many 
international lawyers argued that the collective security system was not necessarily 
doomed simply because article 43 agreements79 had never been made or because the 
Cold War prevented the permanent five (P5) from agreeing. A further argument was 
that article 51 could, in the light of the unforeseen circumstances, be construed more 
broadly to pull up some of the slack left by the lack of enforcement action. Some of 
WKHVH DUJXPHQWV ZHUH EDVHG RQ WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH ZRUGV ³QRWKLQJ LQ WKH present 
Charter shall impair the inhHUHQWULJKWRI«VHOI-GHIHQFH´LQDUWLFOHFRXSOHGZLWKD
prioritisation of the national decision. Others were based on evolutionary or 
responsive approaches to interpretation. The problem is that both approaches tended 
to give the ultimate authority to interpret the scope of the right to claimant states 
themselves since, owing to its paralysis, the SC was unlikely to be able to evaluate the 
claims. This rendered the Charter exploitable and, in the event, the right of self-
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defence was exploited inter alia throughout the 1980s by the Reagan 
Administration.80  
 
Similar arguments have taken place over other changes that have occurred in the 
security environment in which the collective security system operates.81 These include 
innovations in weaponry and tactics and will also be discussed below. All of these 
FKDQJHV WR ³UHDOLW\´ DUH OLQNHG E\ WKH LGHD WKDW XQOHVV WKH ³FUHGLELOLW\ JDS´ LV WR
increase even more, the Charter norms will have to be adapted, reinterpreted or 
scrapped. Thus, <RRMX[WDSRVHVKLV³LQVWUXPHQWDODSSURDFK´ZLWKWKH³GRFWULQDO´RQH
of many international lawyers82 such as Franck,83 Gray,84 Alexandrov,85 Henkin,86 
Brownlie87 and Bowett88 whose work focuses on the UN Charter. The need for 
adaptability is, relatedly, intrinsically linked to the commitment of international 
lawyers to generally applicable norms rather than evaluation on a case by case basis. 
This will be discussed at the end of the present section. 
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The credibility gap is particularly sensitive with regard to the UN Charter collective 
security system because its drafters made such a conscious effort to avoid the faults 
which engendered a yawning chasm between aspiration and fact in the League of 
1DWLRQV $V %ULHUO\ H[SODLQHG ³>L@W ZDV WR FRUUHFW WKH VXSSRVHd weakness of the 
/HDJXH DV D V\VWHP RI VHFXULW\ WKDW D QHZ DQG VWURQJHU ERG\ KDG WR EH FUHDWHG´89 
Wedgwood asserted that the League was founded on D³FRYHQDQWRILQDFWLRQ´90 The 
central innovations made the Charter collective security system resemble a primitive 
domestic constitution in the sense that they seemed to claim a monopoly on the use of 
force for the SC (with the exception of self-defence). As we have seen, article 2(4) 
prohibited the use of force as a weapon of policy. However the Charter included the 
possibility of enforcing this prohibition by providing for special agreements by which 
states would provide troops and equipment so that the SC could maintain international 
peace and security.91 Moreover the Charter provided for a Military Staff Committee 
(MSC) to oversee the deployment of such delegated forces.92 However article 43 
agreements were never made and the MSC remains a token committee.  
 
Furthermore, as critics of the collective security system do not tire of pointing out, the 
continuing unanimity of the Great Powers on which the system was premised did not 
last.93 International lawyers were faced with a dilemma, as the practice of states 
diverged from the black letter of the Charter: Should state practice be exposed as 
violative? Or should it be seen as gradually moulding the Charter rules to the 
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exigencies of politics? International lawyers who argued the former could be accused 
of rendering the right of self-defence under-inclusive and making the law esoteric. 
Those who argued the latter could be accused of making the collective security 
system vulnerable to exploitation by the powerful. 
 
The place of self-defence in the Charter is often explained doctrinally as one of the 
two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force contained in article 
2(4).94 In viewing the right of self-defence as an internal exception to the collective 
security system, rather than as an external alternative to it, the scope of the right of 
self-defence was tied to the effectiveness of the SC in maintaining international peace 
and security.95 This is reflected in the so-FDOOHG³DV\PPHWU\´RIDUWLFOHVDQG96 
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force but article 51 only allows states to take 
action against armed attacks. It would seem sensible to suggest that the scope of 
armed attack is smaller than that of threat or use of force. This connection is 
entrenched by the parallels that are often drawn between the prohibition on the use of 
force and the exceptional authority given to the SC to enforce international peace and 
security and the monopoly on the use of force that most national governments enjoy.97 
0RUJHQWKDXKDVZULWWHQWKDWWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI WKH&KDUWHUUHJLPHZDV³SUHGLFDWHG
on the continuing unity of the permanent members of the SecurLW\&RXQFLO´98  
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During the Cold War, the P5 were divided along East/West lines. Any attempt to use 
the SC to undermine one of the superpowers or its allies would be met with the veto 
by the other. Owing to the fact that the SC cannot take enforcement action under 
Chapter VII without the consent of its P5,99 the centralised protection of states by the 
SC was effectively non-existent. This led some to question the continued validity of 
the general prohibition on the use of force, but the more usual response ± and the one 
that seemed to be taken by some states ± was that the right of self-defence had simply 
expanded to fill the gap. McDougal wrote that self-GHIHQFH ³KDV EHHQ UHJDUGHG DV
LQGLVSHQVDEOHWRWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIHYHQWKHPRVWPRGHVWPLQLPXPRUGHU´100 There 
were many attempts to extend self-defence beyond the scope of article 51 to situations 
where an armed attack had not occurred: Cases of the protection of nationals,101 hot 
pursuit102 and anticipatory self-defence103 are all examples of this. 
 
The effectiveness of the Charter scheme has been subject to other social changes 
flowing from the Cold War. The end of bipolarity led to the age of the sole 
superpower.104 )RU H[DPSOH 6FKDFKWHU KDV ZULWWHQ WKDW WKH ³URXJK SDULW\ EHWZHHQ
them [the USA and the USSR] undoubWHGO\ FRQWULEXWH>G@ WR UHVWUDLQW´105 Once this 
balancing factor was removed after the Cold War, the US became not only the most 
powerful state outside the confines of the Charter, it also gained great power inside 
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the collective security system. This is because the US is among the permanent 
members of the SC. This means it has a veto that can prevent the SC from taking any 
measure adverse to its interests. Koskenniemi has also attested to the dominant role 
the US plays in the body.106 This is augmented by the fact that since the Cold War the 
SC has proved itself well capable of agreeing resolutions under Chapter VII. The 
power of the US to carry out its national policy in spite of or even through the UN 
organs should not be forgotten.107   
 
Aside from the changes in the effectiveness of the SC, other social changes have also 
been said to have had an effect on the scope of the right of self-defence. Gray has 
H[SODLQHG WKDW DUWLFOHV DQGDUH ³YHU\PXFKD UHVSRQVH WR WKH6HFRQG:RUOG
War and are accordingly directed to inter-VWDWH FRQIOLFW´108 More sceptically, Yoo 
wrote WKDW³WKHGUDIWHUVRIWKH81&KDUWHUGHVLJQHGWKHLUV\VWHPWRZLQWKHODVWZDU
QRW WKH QH[W´109 A common argument, therefore, against a narrow reading of self-
defence is that new paradigms of violence have taken hold, such as guerrillas or more 
recently non-state actors armed with WMD. It is argued that it would be foolhardy to 
expect a state to wait until an attack had occurred lest it be decisive. The doctrine of 
pre-emption expands this, arguing that it would be foolhardy to let a distant threat 
become imminent. 7KXV 5HLVPDQ KDV DUJXHG WKDW ³WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ IRr meaningful 
self-defence could be irretrievably lost if an adversary, armed with much more 
destructive weapons and poised to attack, had WR EH DOORZHG WR LQLWLDWH LWV DWWDFN´
first.110 It is argued by some that it is not possible to come to terms with non-state 
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actors as equals since they are effectively excluded from the collective security 
system because they are not states and since they do not respond to the same pressures 
as states nor to the same logics of action, states must be allowed to make pre-emptive 
surgical strikes on their encampments or to otherwise employ force to pacify these 
actors. 
 
As well as new actors using force, there are also new weapons and delivery systems. 
)RU LQVWDQFH%RZHWW VXJJHVWHG WKDW ³WKH WHFKQRORJLFDO DGYDQFHVRIPRGHUQZDUIDUH
may well have made any system of collective security simpliciter archaic and 
RXWPRGHG´111 Against this, Henkin maintained in 1979 tKDW³QHLWKHUWKHIDLOXUHRIWKH
Security Council, nor the birth of many new nations nor the development of terrible 
ZHDSRQV´ PHDQV WKDW DUWLFOH  VKRXOG EH H[SDQGHG112 Nevertheless, the march of 
technological progress means that the collective security system is sometimes seen as 
lagging behind new developments in the arms industry.113 The increased availability 
of ICBMs and nuclear weapons has changed the playing field by making a first strike 
potentially deadly. If this were to be the case then the logic of the inclusion of armed 
attack in article 51 ± that the act of aggression was the prior use of force and the act of 
defence the subsequent ± could no longer hold. It was argued that states could not be 
expected to wait like sitting ducks for a potentially devastating attack.114 
 
The constant social, political and technological changes that run through international 
life render the so-FDOOHG ³FUHGLELOLW\ JDS´ D SUREOHP IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV 7KH
problem is that Charter doctrine does not match state practice. In the context of 
                                                 
111
 %RZHWW³&ROOHFWLYH6HOI-Defence´S 
112
 Henkin, How Nations Behave, p. 141. 
113
 But cf. %\HUV³/HWWLQJWKH([FHSWLRQ3URYHWKH5XOH´, p. 10-11. 
114
 M.S. McDougal DQG )3 )HOLFLDQR ³/HJDO 5HJXODWLRQ RI WKH 5HVRUW WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RHUFLRQ
Aggression and Self-'HIHQVHLQ3ROLF\3HUVSHFWLYH´Yale LJ (1958-9) 1057, p. 1150. 
40  
UHSULVDOV%RZHWWLQWURGXFHGWKHSKUDVH³FUHGLELOLW\JDS´LQWRGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHODZRQ
the use of force.115 It is said that the practice of states does not bear out a narrow 
interpretation of the right of self-defence. Franck is another writer who once pointed 
WR WKH ³FUHGLELOLW\ JDS´ ,Q  KH ZURWH ³ZKDW NLOOHG DUWLFOH  ZDV WKH ZLGH
disparity between the norms it sought to establish and the practical goals the nations 
DUHSXUVXLQJLQGHIHQVHRIWKHLUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW´116 This disparity is increased or at 
least retrenched by claims that the strategic reality has fundamentally changed. The 
credibility gap is closely connected to the realist argument that states only seem to 
comply with international law where their interests coincide with it. This means that 
ZKHUHLWFDQEHLQVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWVWRYLRODWHDQRUPVXFKDVDUWLFOHLWLVSRVVLEOH
to argue that the Charter rules on the regulation of the use of force have become 
obsolete.  
 
In order to close the credibility gap and save the relevance of the collective security 
system, many writers have attempted to argue that such violations can actually be 
seen as commensurate with the law. There are various ways of doing this: Re-reading 
the facts; re-interpreting the Charter; or replacing it with customary norms instead. 
The credibility gap cannot be closed, however, until proponents of collective security 
let go of the claim to objectivity. In this regard, the realist criticism is potent. Carr 
H[SODLQVWKDW³WKHEDQNUXSWF\RIXWRpianism resides not in its failure to live up to its 
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principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested 
VWDQGDUGIRUWKHFRQGXFWRILQWHUQDWLRQDODIIDLUV´117 
 
When international lawyers argue that the Charter can adapt to meet realist criticisms, 
they are aided by the doctrine of sources.118 It is said that the binding power of 
collective security norms flows from ³WKH ZLOO RI HDFK LQGLYLGXDO PHPEHU RI WKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´.119 This does not have to include merely the initial consent 
to the Charter in 1945, but can be expanded to include small acts of consent by 
practice which can become customary norms. While some approaches to the 
formation of customary norms are relatively strict and require identification of 
general practice accepted as law, there are those who will find practice relevant to 
customary norm formation in mere acquiescence to practice purported to be lawful. 
3UDFWLFH LV DOVR XVHG LQ WKH IRUP RI ³VXEVHTXHQW SUDFWLFH´ DV D PHDQV RI WUHDW\
interpretation.120  
 
A familiar ground for the identification of practice with regard to self-defence, an 
action that is better described as exceptional rather than general, is the SC. The 
condemnation or commendation of a use of force by the SC on behalf of UN member 
states is sometimes seen as indicating the state of customary international law because 
it appears to reflect the opinio iuris of states. The authoritativeness of such indications 
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usually differs from scholar to scholar and from situation to situation.121 For instance, 
the apparently unanimous acceptance that the US had a right of self-defence in SCRs 
1368 and 1373 following the attacks of September 2001 is to be contrasted by the 
failure of SC members to take enforcement measures against Israel for its use of force 
against the Osiraq reactors in 1981. Both activities have been used to suggest that the 
SC has recognised a right of anticipatory self-defence.122  
 
D. Normative Indeterminacy. 
 
One of the factors enabling the importation of customary international law norms into 
WKH FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP LV WKDW WKH &KDUWHU LV IXOO RI ³ORRSKROHV´ DQG
indeterminacy. If the norms of the Charter appear to admit of more than one 
interpretation, it is said that the practice of states can aid international lawyers in 
identifying the more authoritative interpretation. While realists might urge such an 
approach because norms comprised of present state practice are sometimes seen as 
PRUHOLNHO\WREHLQVWDWHV¶LPPHGLDWHLQWHUHVWVPRUHGRFWULQDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV
can come to the same result using the concept of sovereignty and reasoning that the 
ELQGLQJ QDWXUH RI FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ QRUPV GHULYHV IURP VWDWH FRQVHQW 6WDWHV¶
changing interests can therefore be said to increase ambiguity. Accordingly, Schachter 
says that LQGHWHUPLQDF\RFFXUVSDUWO\EHFDXVH³>J@HQHUDOIRUPXODVDFFHSWHGDVODZDUH
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subject to continuing interpretation and, therefore, to fresh arguments as to what the 
ODZVKRXOGEH´123  
 
The more open-textured a norm is, the easier it will be to find an interpretation 
IDYRXUDEOH WR D VWDWH¶V LPPHGLDWH LQWHUHVWV 7KLV PLJKW EH WUXH IRU FDVH-to-case 
readings or over the longer term. For instance, where a state wishes to use force in self 
defence it may be eager to make a wide interpretation of article 51 but would be 
loathe to see that interpretation apply to a similar situation in which another wished to 
take action in self-GHIHQFH DJDLQVW LW 6WDWHV¶ PHGLXP-term power-relations are also 
relevant to this. If a state finds itself in the ascendant, as the US does at present, it 
may be in its interest to advocate a wide right of self-defence that is more available to 
it than to other states.124 However, should the US find itself under threat from an 
aspiring superpower in the future, such a broad interpretation would no longer be 
favourable to it. By imbuing the collective security norms with ambiguity, states 
HQVXUHGWKDW WKH&KDUWHUFRXOGHQGXUHHOLFLWLQJ³PD[LPXPVXSSRUW WKURXJKPLQLPDO
VSHFLILFLW\´125 
 
The indeterminacy of Charter norms therefore creates the danger alluded to in the 
UHDOLVW³FDXVDOWKHVLV´126 that where states use justifications of self-defence they do so 
merely for the tinsel of rationalisation. 0RUJHQWKDX VD\V WKDW ³LQ RUGHU >IRU
international documents] to obtain the approval of all subjects of the law, necessary 
for acquiring their legal force, [such documents] must take cognizance of all the 
GLYHUJHQW LQWHUHVWV WKDW ZLOO RU PLJKW EH DIIHFWHG E\ WKH UXOHV WR EH HQDFWHG´ 7KLV
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means that legislation is deliberately drafted in broad terms that can be ³YDJXH RU
DPELJXRXV´127 This does not mean that the collective security scheme of the Charter 
is meaningless, just that the net in which meaning is interstitially created128 is more 
loosely woven than it might be. The UN Charter is often held out to be a prime 
example of this.129 The ambiguity of the meaning of article 2(4), for instance, means it 
is possible, if not quite convincing, to argue that there is no general prohibition on the 
use of force, but only of those threats or uses of force against the territorial integrity, 
political independence or other purpose inconsistent with the Charter.130 However 
indeterminacy in the meaning of legal norms does not necessarily arise only from 
³ORRSKROHV´131  
 
Notable gaps in article 51 include the lack of reference to necessity and 
proportionality which might be used to govern the duration and mode with which self-
defence is carried out.132 For instance, in the case of the right of self-defence with 
which this thesis is primarily concerned, the article 51 formulation is said not only to 
be indeterminate but also over-determining. This means that ambiguity arises, as 
discussed above, from clashes between state interest and the literal interpretation of 
the text. Ambiguity has also been identified by scholars interested in linguistic and 
semantic indeterminacy. In this section, the text of the Charter will be dealt with 
before the more theoretical linguistic and semantic indeterminacy point is tackled. 
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Article 51 is said to be indeterminate because it appears to contain an internal 
contradiction between the rules of the Charter and those of customary international 
ODZE\GHVFULELQJWKHULJKWDV³LQKHUHQW´DQGWKHQJRLQJRQWRGUDZWKHERXQGVRIWKH
right more narrowly than states had been accustomed, GHVSLWHVD\LQJWKDW³QRWKLQJ in 
WKHSUHVHQW&KDUWHUVKDOOLPSDLU´LW7KHULJKWLVDOVRVDLGWREHLQGHWHUPLQDWHEHFDXVH
it does not suggest what sort of use of force might be appropriate to respond to an 
armed attack.133 Finally, where the customary principles of necessity and 
proportionality are read into the Charter framework,134 it has been said that they 
UHQGHUWKHULJKWXQFHUWDLQEHFDXVHWKH\³OHDYHDPSOHURRPIRUGLYHUVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV
LQSDUWLFXODUFDVHV´135  
 
However the right is also over-determining because not only does it require states to 
wait until the occurrence of an armed attack, but it also expressly makes the exercise 
of the right of self-defence subject to SC measures and, though failure to do so is said 
to be merely indicative of illegality, it imposes a reporting requirement on states.136 
The more determinate the rule, the less flexible it is and the more likely instances of 
violation will be. The less determinate a rule, the easier it is for claimants of self-
defence to argue that their behaviour technically falls within the scope of the 
provision however abhorrent it may be. The credibility gap can be widened or 
OHVVHQHG DFFRUGLQJ WR DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HU¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR UHVRUW WR FRQFUHWH
practice to assuage the utopian character of pure normativity. However, an 
international lawyer must be careful not to stray too far into concrete state practice 
lest the broad norm of self-defence he ends up advocating drifts too far from the 
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normative vision held in the Charter. This Koskenniemi skilfully describes as an 
oscillation between concreteness and normativity.137 Koskenniemi says that the 
impossible task mainstream international lawyers set themselves of justifying legal 
QRUPVDVERWKFRQFUHWHDQGQRUPDWLYHSURGXFHV DQ³DUJXPHQWDWLYHVWUXFWXUH«>WKDW@
both creates and destrR\V LWVHOI´ ³>7@KH WZR UHTXLUHPHQWV >RI QRUPDWLYLW\ DQG
FRQFUHWHQHVV@FDQFHOHDFKRWKHURXW´ .138 Through a realist lens, it might be seen that 
article 51 is an agglomeration of the worst of both worlds. Some international lawyers 
have attempted to argue for the continuing relevance of the Charter norms because 
within ambiguity lies the seed of adaptation.139 
 
This process of adaptation is aided by the first source of ambiguity noted; the apparent 
reference to natural or customary law in the first words of artLFOH³1RWKLQJLQWKH
present Charter shall impDLU WKH LQKHUHQW ULJKW´ RI VHOI-defence. This has enabled 
VFKRODUV WRDUJXH WKDW VLQFHDUWLFOHGRHVQRW LQFOXGH WKHZRUGV³LIDQGRQO\ LIDQ
armed atWDFN RFFXUV´ WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-defence is not to be read as limited to a 
response to an armed attack.140 To the extent that pre-1945 customary law permitted ± 
for instance - anticipatory self-defence, such scholars maintain, this should be 
imported into article 51 to illustrate other situations in which self-defence is 
permissible.141 It is arguable that the departure from the literal text of the Charter was 
aided by the ICJ when, in the 1980s, it sought jurisdiction over the US dispute with 
Nicaragua in the teeth of a US reservation rationae materiae to the optional clause.142  
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This reservation excluded disputes arising from multilateral treaties XQOHVV³DOOSDUWLHV
WRWKHWUHDW\DIIHFWHGE\WKHGHFLVLRQDUHEHIRUHWKH&RXUW´143 The dispute concerned 
the right of collective self-defence mentioned in article 51 of the Charter. If the 
dispute arising between the parties was found to come within the UN Charter, it 
would be non-justiciable as contravening the reservation. The Court, keen to assert its 
competence, held that it did not need to rely on the Charter because it found that a 
parallel regime existed in customary international law.144 7KHUHDVRQWKDW³customary 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZFRQWLQXHVWRH[LVWDORQJVLGHWUHDW\ODZ´LVWKDW³WKH&KDUWHUKDYLQJ
itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to regulate directly all 
DVSHFWV RI LWV FRQWHQW´145 This judgment has meant that the importation of state 
practice into the interpretation of the scope of the right of self-defence has the 
imprimatur of the foremost international judicial body.  
 
The judgment can be read as an attempt to assert the relevance of the collective 
security system, but it should be remembered that the broad view of self-defence 
thereby enabled can be easily exploited because of the difficulties in analysing state 
practice. Franck has warned that ³WKH OLQH EHWZHHQ YLRODWLRQ DQG DGDStaWLRQ´ is 
blurred.146 7RJRVWLOOIXUWKHULWLVSRVVLEOHWRPDNHD³IORRGJDWHV´DUJXPHQW7RWKH
extent that state practice is allowed into the Charter to aid its interpretation as better 
expressing either statHV¶ZLOORUWKHLULQWHUHVWKRZLVLWSRVVLEOHWRGUDZWKHOLQH"7KH
doctrine of pre-emption is most apposite since the G.W. Bush Administration 
purported to have based it on existing law. This meant that the doctrine could be 
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SUHVHQWHGDVDPHUH³DGDSWDWLRQ´RIWKHODZPHDQLQJLWZRXOGQRWVHHPOLNHDGLUHFW
challenge to the continuing relevance of the Charter system. In the NSS it was written 
that the US ³KDV ORQJ PDLQWDLQHG WKH RSWLRQ RI SUHHPSWLYH DFWLRQV WR FRXQWHU D
sufficient threat to our national VHFXULW\´147 This seems to seek authority from the 
practice of a single state, rather than the general practice of states so as to qualify as 
valid custom under article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute. However, it is submitted that 
the appeal to consistent past practice is more of an assertion of sovereignty and an 
implicit claim that the US has never acceded to the narrow reading of article 51.148  
 
On the other side of the coin are those international lawyers who read article 51 
literally and suggest that even if the Charter has not subsumed customary law, it has at 
least modified it.149 The credibility gap is sometimes VDLGWRHPDQDWHIURPWKH³SXVK
EXWWRQ DSSURDFK´ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV 6RIDHU KDV FULWLFLVHG WKH ³PHFKDQLFDO´
DSSURDFKRI³PRVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV´WRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHH[FHSWLRQVWRDUWLFOH
2(4) in the Charter.150 However Sofaer makes it clear that this critique is by no means 
new: He cites policy realists McDougal and Feliciano as criticising the narrow reading 
RI DUWLFOH  DV ³ORJLFDOO\ XQZDUUDQWHG´151 While it is submitted that few, if any, 
international lawyers think of the collective security system as a slot-machine, it is 
apparent that certain writers are less swayed by state interests than others.  
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One of the most eminent internatioQDOODZ\HUVZKRXVHVZKDW*UD\FDOOVWKH³QDUURZ
YLHZ´LV%URZQOLH152 In 2002 Brownlie told the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee that  WKH³ODQJXDJH>RIDUWLFOH@HIIHFWLYHO\H[FOXGHVWKHOHJDOLW\RISUH-
ePSWLYHDFWLRQ´ H[FHSWZKHUH D VWDWHG LQWHQWLRQ WR DWWDFNKDVEHHQGHFLVLYHO\ VHW LQ
train.153 This advice was not, ultimately, heeded by the British Government who 
preferred the more expansive reading of Greenwood.154 This is an illustration of the 
esotericism that can result from readings of the law that fail to take into account the 
national policies of states. The substance of the right of self-defence will be returned 
WRLQWKHQH[W&KDSWHUZKHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIGRFWULQHZLOOEH
discussed. We shall turn now to a matter better expressed as a question of form: 
Indeterminacy. 
 
Koskenniemi has ZDUQHGWKDWODZFDQRSHQD³PLQHRIDUJXPHQWDWLYHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRU
mala fide statesmen in search RI MXVWLILFDWLRQV´155 This is because the structure of 
international legal argumentation is characterised by dilemmas between utopia and 
apology.156 In terms of self-defence, we can see this in the tension within article 51 
between the utopian requirement that an armed attack has occurred before states resort 
WRIRUFHDQGWKHSKUDVH³QRWKLQJLQWKHSUHVHQW&KDUWHUVKDOOLPSDLUWKHLQKerent right 
WR«VHOI-GHIHQFH´ ZKLFK LQ VRPH KDQGV WHQGV WRZDUGV DSRORJLD The play between 
apology and utopia is mirrored in another axis; ascending and descending arguments. 
Ascending arguments justify positions from base factors such as state interest or 
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factual behaviour. Descending arguments justify positions from common interests or 
YDOXHVDQWHULRUWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQWHUHVW157  
 
.RVNHQQLHPL VD\V LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶V ³DUJXPHQWDWLYH VWUXFWXUH«LV FDSDEOH RI
providing a valid criticism of each substantive position but itself cannot justify 
DQ\´158 This is because, where valid counter arguments are always available from the 
opposing pole in a dilemma, none can ultimately impose themselves as correct. In 
terms of self-defence, this would mean that a state wishing to claim self-defence for a 
use of force that was made in anticipation of an attack would use ascending arguments 
from its interest in preventing damage to its territory and citizenry. However such a 
justification could be countered by a descending argument that the Lauterpachtian 
UXOH³WKHUHVKDOOEHQRYLROHQFH´SUHYDLOV159 
 
One of the basic criticisms levelled at doctrinal approaches to international law is that 
they unwarrantedly put their faith in the objectivity of legal reasoning. The objectivity 
RI WKH ODZ FRPHV WKURXJK WKH SURYLVLRQ RI VROXWLRQV ³LQ D OHJDOO\ GHWHUPLQHG ZD\
LQGHSHQGHQWRISROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´160 In some cases this criticism flows from a 
radical subjectivism critique that rejects the possibility of objectivity per se. Carty 
wrote that international law is no more than the way that international lawyers look at 
international relations.161 In other cases the criticism is based around a belief that a bit 
of subjectivity in the application of the law is a good thing.162 On the other hand, the 
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REMHFWLYLW\RI OHJDOIRUPLVDPHDQVRIFRXQWHULQJWKHSRZHUIXO LW³UHVLVW>V@WKHSXOO
WRZDUGVLPSHULDOLVP´163  
 
The claim that international law lacks objectivity and the belief that it must have 
objectivity if it is to provide a sufficiently forceful argument, or exclusionary reason, 
against state interests is particularly pertinent in the collective security system. This is 
because the prima facie applier of the right of self-defence is the state in question. 
This need not be a problem if such a decision was to be evaluated as an international 
claim ex post. However, as we will see in Chapter III, the evaluation of self-defence 
can be both formalised and esoteric and politicised and exploitable depending on the 
choices one makes in presenting an evaluation. Furthermore, as was discussed above, 
the sovereign, individualistic nature of the subjects of the collective security system 
means that evaluation cannot be foisted upon them if they are to cooperate with it.164 
To give a state primary responsibility to interpret a norm is to give it very great power 
to bring its action within a justification to the extent that the norm it applies is 
flexible.  
 
The objectivity of legal norms can also lend weight to the argument of those taking an 
instrumentalist optic. Here, objectivity tends not to be formal but substantive; certain 
values and principles are taken to be objective. This sort of objectivism can be found 
in the G.W. Bush Administration NSS. One of the legitimising reasons for an 
expanded right to use force is the descending argument that US national values of 
³IUHHGRPGHPRFUDF\DQG IUHHHQWHUSULVH´KDYHEHFRPHXQLYHUVDOO\DSSOLFDEOHVLQFH
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the Cold War.165 The assumption that principles can be universally applied is also 
found in the work of international lawyers who supported the G.W. Bush 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUHIHUHQFH IRU QDWLRQDO GLVcretion in the exercise of self-defence. 
Sofaer has put forward the test of ³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV LQ D SDUWLFXODU FRQWH[W´ to 
determine whether a use of force is valid or not.166 As .DQWSRLQWHGRXW³HDVHRIXVH
DQGDSSDUHQWDGHTXDF\RIDSULQFLSOHGRQRWSURYLGHDQ\FHUWDLQSURRIRI>DPD[LP¶V@
VRXQGQHVV´167  
 
In this case, Sofaer assumes that the factors on which a judgment of reasonableness is 
based are capable of being perceived by every one and interpreted in the same way. 
Indeed, resort to general principles rather than detailed rules is another means of 
imbuing the rules on self-defence with flexibility. However it is suggested that where 
no third party evaluation of a claim is possible, the subjective element which 
IOH[LELOLW\EULQJVWRWKHODZE\ZD\RIWKHRSHUDWRU¶VGLVFUHWLRn will render the right of 
self-defence ripe for exploitation by states. Indeed, when the same sort of technique 
was used by McDougal and Feliciano during the 1960s, their scholarship was widely 
seen to be an apologia for US foreign policy. For instance, Duxbury wrote WKDW³IURP
the Truman era onwards, policy science became DFORDNIRU&ROG:DUFKDXYLQLVP´.168 
0F'RXJDODQG)HOLFLDQRXVHGWKHYDOXHRI³KXPDQGLJQLW\´DVWKHXOWLPDWH telos for 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG DV D PHDQV IRU GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ ³WKH IDFWXDO SURFHVVHV RI
international coercion and the process of authoritative decision by which the public 
RUGHURIWKHZRUOGFRPPXQLW\HQGHDYRXUVWRUHJXODWHVXFKSURFHVVRIFRHUFLRQ´169  
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The ability of law to act as a conduit for the policies of the powerful through 
processes of universalization has been discussed by Koskenniemi.170 He has written 
WKDW DSSHDOV WR XQLYHUVDO LQWHUHVWV RI SULQFLSOHV DUH PHUHO\ DWWHPSWV ³WR UHDOLVH >«@
VSHFLDOLQWHUHVWZLWKRXWKDYLQJWRILJKW´171 .RVNHQQLHPL¶VSRLQWLVWKDWZKLOHDJLYHQ
value of, for instance, reasonableness, might appear to be universal, in fact it has been 
coloured with particularity and is not empty or neutral. Indeed, this is a criticism that 
has been made by realists such as E.H. Carr.172 
 
E. Autointerpretation. 
 
There are those who argue not only that the extent of the right of self-defence should 
be broader, but also that individual states have sole discretion to determine the limits 
RI WKLVEUHDGWK LQSDUWLFXODUFDVHV7KXV*OHQQRQZULWH WKDW³VWDWHVZLOO FRQWLQXH WR
judge for themselves what measure of force is required for their self-defense - action 
WKDWLVDSSURSULDWH«QRWEHFDXVHGHIHQVHLVSHUPLWWHGE\WKe UN Charter, but because 
defense is necessary for survival and survival is intrinsic in the very fact of 
VWDWHKRRG´173  
 
Auto-interpretation would be an insuperable obstacle to distinguishing valid from 
invalid uses of force in self-defence except from the point of view of the claimant 
nation. $V 6RIDHU DGPLWV ³>V@tates are hardly models of objectivity in seeking to 
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DGYDQFHDQGSURWHFWWKHLULQWHUHVWV´174 Indeed, the effect of auto-interpretation would 
be to reduce any apparent international claim to a national decision by denying any 
SURFHVV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO HYDOXDWLRQ 2VFDU 6FKDFKWHU¶V SRVLWLRQ LV WKDW ZLWKRXW
REMHFWLYHHYDOXDWLRQDVWDWH¶VFlaim to have used force in self-defence is not a legal 
one: 
 
To say that each state is free to decide for itself when and to what extent it may 
use arms would remove the principal ground for international censure, and, in 
effect, bring to the vanishing point the legal limits on unilateral recourse to 
force.175 
 
His position is that while the right of self-GHIHQFH PD\ EH ³LQKHUHQW´ LW LV QRW
³DXWRQRPRXV´LILWLVWREHUHJXODWHGE\WKHUXOHRIODZ176 This is indubitably the case 
where very powerful states are concerned. Gray sounds a note of caution in this 
regard, saying the disclaimer in the doctrine of pre-HPSWLRQWKDWWKH86³GRHVQRWXVH
LWV VWUHQJWK WR SUHVV IRU XQLODWHUDO DGYDQWDJH´177 ³ODFNV SODXVLELOLW\´178 Schachter is 
sensitive to the idea that there is a difference between views of law as a restraint and 
ODZ DV D IDFLOLWDWRU RI VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV179 +H VD\V WKDW ³>W@R FRQFOXGH WKDW ODZ PXVW
\LHOGWR«MXGJPHQWVRIQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWQHJDWHVWKHLGHDRIODZDVDUHVWUDLQWRQVWDWH
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FRQGXFW´180 Nevertheless there are legal realists who state that international law is 
PHUHO\IDFLOLWDWLYHRIVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGH[HUWVQRFRPSOLDQFHSXOO181  
 
The controversy between realists who believe that self-defence is a natural, and 
perhaps not even legal, right and the doctrinal and institutional lawyers who hold that 
it is a legal right delimited by law can also be seen through the prism of application. 
,QGHHGLWLVFHQWUDOWR/DXWHUSDFKW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQODZ¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHULJKW
and its regulation of it.182 Those who believe that the exercise of self-defence is a 
matter for the aggressed state alone to determine effectively recast what might be a 
claim at the international level as a decision at the national level. Glennon reads the 
ZRUG ³LQKHUHQW´ LQ DUWLFOH  DV DQ DIILUPDWLRQ RI WKH FODLPDQW VWDWH¶s authority to 
judge for itself the necessity to use force in self-defence, but also as indicative that it 
FDQQRWEHJDLQVDLGE\DQ\RWKHUERG\¶VHYDOXDWLRQ183 The effect of this is to remove 
the decision from the international political space and make it extremely difficult to 
criticise.  
 
A more prosaic argument buttressing the primacy of national discretion to use force in 
self-defence is that no-one but the aggressed state is in a better position to answer the 
question of what is necessary for its defence.184 In the Nicaragua case, although the 
US did not claim that law was irrelevant to self-defence claims, it did claim that the 
US alone was competent to judge the necessity of self-defence against the Contras.185 
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Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion at the Merits stage approved of this 
approach on the grounds that the court was not equipped with the information to make 
WKH GHFLVLRQ ³WKH FRXUW LV QRW LQ D SRVLWLRQ WR VXESRHQD WKH ILOHV RI WKH &HQWUDO
,QWHOOLJHQFH $JHQF\ DQG WKH :KLWH +RXVH´.186 The matter is particularly relevant 
regarding WKH WKUHDW IURP³URJXH VWDWHV DQG WKHLU WHUURULVW FOLHQWV´187 because threats 
DUH³PRUHGLYHUVHOHVVYLVLEOHDQGOHVVSUHGLFWDEOH´188 The argument that intelligence 
cannot be shared lest national security be jeopardised will be further discussed in 
Chapter V. For the present, it is enough to say that withholding the evidence on which 
a claim of pre-emptive self-defence was based would in effect mean that the US 
DVVXUDQFH WKDW³>W@KHUHDVRQVIRURXUDFWLRQVZLOOEHFOHDU´PXVW simply be taken on 
trust.189  
 
,W LV VRPHWLPHV VDLG WKDW QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ LV WKH PRVW IXQGDPHQWDO RI DOO VWDWHV¶
interests.190 Yoo argues that self-GHIHQFH LV ³JURXQGHG«LQ D YLVLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO
ULJKWVDQGOLEHUWLHVLQUHODWLRQWRVWDWHDFWLRQ´191 To the extent that this view is held by 
those advocating a cost-benefit analysis of the validity of claims to have used force in 
self-defence, it seems to weight the scales in favour of the state claimant of self-
defence. However, there are those who argue that a staWH¶V VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWVFDQEH
better protected by the collective than through unilateral action. On the one hand there 
is the long-term argument that once states begin to expect that force will not be used, 
they will be less likely to use force. On the other hand there is the argument that 
owing to the sorts of threats that states face nowadays, it is simply not possible to 
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tackle them unilaterally.192 One example of this is the attempt to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD. A single state acting alone cannot PRQLWRU DOO RWKHU VWDWHV¶
borders or ensure that their controls are adequate.  
 
This is a powerful argument for the continuing participation of the US in the 
collective security system, but it does not tackle those particular instances where a 
state may desire to act unilaterally. Equally, the argument that ultimately it is in all 
VWDWHV¶ IDYRXU WR KDYH D QDUURZ H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH DEVROXWH SURKLELWLRQ RQ WKH XVH RI
force is easily set aside in particular cases.193 This highlights one of the problems with 
the realist conception of interests; that it is possible for a decision-maker to have 
conflicting interests. This thesis itself deals with the conflicting interests of using 
force as a means to a desired end and using law as a means of justifying such force. 
The problem is that where international lawyers simply produce alternative readings 
RI ZKDW LV LQ D VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LW LV XQOLNHO\ WR KDYH PXFK SHUVXDVLYH SRZHU RYHU D
realist audience. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
The realist critiques of the UN collective security system and the right of self-defence 
that operates within it centre around two main objections. The first objection is that 
the right of self-defence is too narrow and does not take account of state interests. The 
second objection is that, without centralised machinery to evaluate claims, the 
indeterminacy of the Charter norms enables states to exploit its provisions to make 
VSXULRXVMXVWLILFDWLRQV7KHVHFRQFOXVLRQVIORZIURPUHDOLVWV¶DVVXPSWLRQVDERXWKRZ
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the rational state behaves, what state interests consist of and the facilitative role law is 
supposed to play at the international level.  
 
.RVNHQQLHPL¶VFrom Apology is about the structure of legal argumentation and it is 
submitted that the to-ing and fro-ing of argument about self-defence fits his model.194 
Esoteric arguments are descending arguments that appeal to normativity, while 
exploitable ones are ascending arguments rooted in concreteness. In the course of the 
Chapter we have encountered attempts by international lawyers to answer realists 
claims that international law is irrelevant to security issues. It has been shown that 
some of the answers given simply render international law esoteric because they fail 
to engage with the realist criticisms. $FFRUGLQJ WR +HQNLQ ³>X@nable to deny the 
limitations of international law, they insist that these are not critical, and they deny 
PDQ\RIWKHDOOHJHGLPSOLFDWLRQVRI WKHVHOLPLWDWLRQV´195  International lawyers who 
insist on a textual approach to interpreting article 51 might fall into this camp.  
 
On the other hand, we have also encountered international lawyers who attempt to 
beat realists at their own game, engaging with the critiques and showing how realists 
have underestimated the collective security system. In some cases this is because the 
international lawyer is writing for a different audience; for political decision-makers, 
for instance.196 Thus, %\HUVZULWHVWKDW³>L@QWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVLQWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI
State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in 
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shaping the lDZ WR DFFRPPRGDWH WKH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´197 It has been 
VKRZQ WKDW WKH ³FUHGLELOLW\ JDS´ FDQQRW EH FRPSOHWHO\ FORVHG ZLWKRXW UHGXFLQJ WKH
ought to the is and rendering adaptation and violation indistinguishable. International 
lawyers often echo +HQNLQ¶V FRPPHQW198 reiterated by the ICJ,199 that legal norms 
can be honoured in the breach.  
 
It is not unreasonable for realists to question whether international law has any place 
in questions of security. Indeed, realist critiques have uncovered much that is lacking 
or taken-for-granted in the present system. However, in the opinion of the present 
writer, the place of law in collective security is indispensable. This thesis will be 
concerned with showing how the collective security system may be able to distinguish 
between valid and invalid uses of force without simply opening itself to exploitation 
by dominant states. Koskenniemi, a former legal advisor to the Finnish delegation at 
the Security Council during the early 1990s showed how, when push came to shove, 
international law became very relevant indeed.200 There was a resurgence in this 
feeling following the more recent intervention in Iraq in 2003. It has been said that 
³LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZKDVEHFRPH LPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOO\ LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ DQGFXOWXUDOO\´ at 
that time.201  
 
International law had an important role to play not only in providing a justification for 
OIF but also as a means of criticising it. This was picked up by the media which has 
                                                 
197
 %\HUV³/HWWLQJWKH([FHSWLRQ3URYHWKH5XOH´, p. 9. 
198
 Henkin, How Nations Behave, p. 45. 
199
 ³,ID6WDWHDFWVLQDZD\SULPDIDFLHLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDUHFRJQL]HGUXOHEXWGHIHQGVLWVFRQGXFWE\
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's 
conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to 
weaken the rule´Nicaragua (Merits), para. 186. 
200
 .RVNHQQLHPL³7KH3Oace of /DZLQ&ROOHFWLYH6HFXULW\´ 
201
 S. Estreicher and P.B. Stephan, ³7DNLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ6HULRXVO\´Vir. JIL (2003) 1, p. 1. 
60  
arguably become an increasingly important forum in which international legal 
communication takes place.202 Many well-known academics signed a letter to the 
Guardian which garnered much coverage in protest against the action.203 Another 
important event that was much covered in the press was the resignation of the deputy 
legal advisor to the Foreign Office, Elizabeth Wilmshurst.204 International law was 
one of the few available means of authoritative opposition to the intervention.205 The 
second half of this thesis will explore what might be done to ensure that it retains its 
critical potential. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
Secondary Rules of Interpretation and Custom. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
In this chapter some examples will be given of the ways in which international 
ODZ\HUV XVLQJ GRFWULQDO DSSURDFKHV RU DGRSWLQJ D PRUH ³QRUPDWLYH RSWLF´1 have 
attempted to show that rules and doctrines of collective security can answer realist 
criticisms of their ineffectiveness and irrelevance. In the previous chapter some of the 
realist criticisms of the law on the use of force within the UN collective security 
system were set out DQG VRPH JHQHUDO REVHUYDWLRQV DERXW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶
responses to them were recorded. In this chapter, we will look at certain genres of 
response in more detail. There have been two main ways of countering the realist 
criticisms. One approach has been to use state practice either as an interpretive tool, or 
as part of customary law, to show that the right of self-defence is not in fact as narrow 
as it may seem from the text of the Charter. Another approach has been to stand by 
the text of the Charter and to argue that the narrow reading of self-defence, in which 
action is premised on the occurrence of an armed attack and which therefore rules out 
anticipatory self-defence, remains the law in force.  
 
While the former technique may lead to the exploitation of law through specious 
justifications using self-defence claims, the latter may lead to the collective security 
system becoming irrelevant to state practice. International lawyers using these 
techniques to justify their narrow or wide interpretations are often driven to make 
concessions to concreteness or normativity to prevent these consequences. For 
instance, those who rule out anticipatory self-defence may nevertheless create a 
category of exceptions to cover situations in which a nuclear warhead has been 
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launched.2 Conversely, those who support a wide right of self-defence based on 
customary law may attempt to limit the relevance of state practice using secondary 
rules of recognition whereby practice is only relevant when certain conditions are 
met. This means that conceptions of the collective security system vacillate between 
µFRQFUHWHQHVV¶DQG µQRUPDWLYLW\¶DQG WKHUHIRUHUHPDLQVYXOQHUDEOHERWK WRFULWLFLVPV
that question its objectivity and to criticisms that it is ineffective and irrelevant in the 
twenty first century.3 
 
The normativity of the law on the use of force lies in the distance between the is of 
state behaviour and the ought of the Charter. However the concreteness of the law, its 
effectiveness, lies in the experience that states appear to act in conformity with it. 
David Kennedy has written that international lawyers face a dilemma which causes 
³>V@RPH>WR@H[SODLQWKHQRUPDWLYLW\RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZLQ WKHSURFHVVUHGXFLQJLWV
VFRSH´ DQG ³>R@WKHUV >WR@ H[SODin its scope, but simultaneously [to] reduce its 
QRUPDWLYH SRZHU´4 6LPLODUO\ .RVNHQQLHPL ZURWH ³WKH ZLGHU WKH ODZV JUDVS WKH
ZHDNHULWVQRUPDWLYHIRUFH´5  
 
For many international lawyers, the gap between the is and the ought is mediated by 
secondary rules of international law. In order to justify a given reading of the scope of 
self-defence as law, it will be necessary for an international lawyer to do so within a 
legal framework of rules of recognition and interpretation. The commonality of this 
framework is what gives his arguments persuasive force against those who disagree 
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with him, to the extent that they purport to share that framework. Where argument and 
counter-argument originate in the same system, and where that system provides no 
uncontested, authoritative mechanism or principle for choosing between arguments, 
the stalemate can only be broken using arguments from outside the system.6 It is 
common to see arguments made from natural law or realpolitik, often under the guise 
RIµFRPPRQVHQVH¶7 in order to show why ± for instance ± one interpretation of the 
&KDUWHUIUDPHUV¶LQWHQWLVPRUHDXWKRULWDWLYHWKDQDQRWKHU8 Secondary rules are just as 
subject to multiple interpretations and selections as are the primary substantive rules 
on the use of force. 
 
A. Secondary Rules. 
 
In order to retain the normativity of the collective security system, doctrinal lawyers 
use an artificially limited measure of relevance. Legal positivism holds that a rule is 
valid when it has been validly created or interpreted. Secondary rules of creation and 
interpretation limit the factors that can be considered. In international law, these 
secondary rules pertain inter alia to the creation of valid customary norms and the 
interpretation of relevant norms. To the extent that such rules exclude considerations 
of necessity or impede the process of evolution of a norm, realists seem to think that 
they render the law esoteric or encumbering. Thus Glennon complains that 
                                                 
6
 Koskenniemi, From Apology, p. 63. 
7
 T.M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002) Cambridge 
University Press, p. 98. +HUHLQDIWHU µ)UDQFN Recourse to Force¶); R. Higgins, Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994) Oxford University Press, p. 242. (Hereinafter, 
µ+LJJLQVProblems and Process¶ 
8
 S.D. 0XUSK\³7KH'RFWULQHRI3UHHPSWLYH6HOI-'HIHQVH´ 50(3) Vill. LR (2005) 699, p. 703 
(HerHLQDIWHUµ0XUSK\³7KH'RFWULQHRI3UHHPSWLYH6HOI-'HIHQVH´¶2 Corten³7KH&RQWURYHUVLHV
2YHUWKH&XVWRPDU\3URKLELWLRQRQWKH8VHRI)RUFH$0HWKRGRORJLFDO'HEDWH´ 16(5) EJIL (2005) 
803S+HUHLQDIWHUµ&RUWHQ³7KH&RQWURYHUVLHV2YHUWKH&XVtomary Prohibition on the Use of 
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international lawyers have judged ³WKH XQLODWHUDO RSWLRQ LV LQWULQVLFDOO\ ZURQJ´ 
without considering all the relevant factors.9  
 
Some international lawyers take an alternative approach, seeking to minimise the 
HIIHFW RI IRUPDO UXOHVRQ WKHLUXVHRI VXEVWDQWLYHQRUPV ,Q IDYRXULQJ WKH ³FRPPRQ
ODZ\HU DSSURDFK´ 6RIDHU VD\V WKDW LW LV ³EDVHG RQ WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW XVH-of-force 
principles are mere words in the abstract and that their meaning therefore should be 
developed through a process of examining and weighing all the facts related to 
SDUWLFXODUXVHVRIIRUFH´10 Other international lawyers have attempted to engage with 
realist concerns and to include some non-legal factors in the consideration of the 
scope of self-defence. They have done so, usually, by modifying ± rather than 
abandoning - the secondary rules of interpretation or custom formation. In doing so, 
they not only make such interpretations vulnerable to exploitation by those with 
VSXULRXV FODLPV WR MXVWLI\ EXW WKH\ DOVR WUDS WKHPVHOYHV LQ ³a constant movement 
EHWZHHQIRUPDOLVPDQGUHDOLVP´11 This is because, in seeking to retain the authority 
of formal law while at the same time responding flexibly to social changes, such 
writers are vulnerable to claims that their work is both exploitable and esoteric. 
 
Rules of recognition and interpretation are what HerberW +DUW FDOOHG ³VHFRQGDU\
UXOHV´12 Secondary rules of interpretation are particularly important for our purpose 
because, as should be apparent from the previous chapter, one of the major realist 
                                                 
9
 0-*OHQQRQ³3ODWRQLVP$GDSWLYLVPDQG,OOXVLRQLQ815HIRUP´Chi. JIL (2005-6) 613 p. 
627. 
10
 $'6RIDHU³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG.RVRYR´Stan. IJL (2000) 1S+HUHLQDIWHUµSofaer, 
³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG.RVRYR´¶ 
11
 0.RVNHQQLHPL³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQD3RVW-5HDOLVW(UD´Aust. YIL (1995) 1, p. 2. (Hereinafter, 
µ.RVNHQQLHPL³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQD3RVW-5HDOLVW(UD´¶ 
12
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (1994) Oxford University PrHVVS+HUHLQDIWHUµ+DUW
The Concept of Law¶ 
66  
criticisms is that the rules on the use of force suffer from tKHGHIHFWRI³VWDVLV´+DUW
identified stasis as the second in a triumvirate of defects alongside uncertainty and 
inefficiency.13 These two criticisms were also made by realists of the collective 
security system. 7KXV0XUSK\REVHUYHGWKDW³>W@KHjus ad bellum is generally viewed 
DVDVWDWLFILHOGRIODZ´ULQJVWUXHDQGWKHODZULVNVEHFRPLQJLUUHOHYDQW14 
 
B. Structure of the Chapter. 
 
In the first section of this chapter the use of doctrines of interpretation will be 
discussed. It will be argued that, since the words of the Charter on their own have no 
LQKHUHQW PHDQLQJ µRUGLQDU\ ODQJXDJH¶ DSSURDFKHV WR DUWLFOH  DUH QRW
LQFRQWURYHUWLEOH,WZLOODOVREHDUJXHGWKDWWKHµLQWHQWLRQ¶VFKRRORILQWHUSUHWDWLRQFDQ
be problematic in the case of so-FDOOHG µTXDVL-FRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶ WUHDWLHV )LQDOO\
DUJXPHQWVIURPWKHµREMHFWDQGSXUSRVH¶RIWKH&KDUWHUZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHGDQGLWZLOO
be concluded that they too offer no decisive answer to the content of self-defence.  
 
In the second section of this chapter on the relationship between customary law and 
the Charter, the uncertainty of what counts as law will be discussed. The right of self-
GHIHQFH LV VDLG WR EH DQ ³LQKHUHQW ULJKW´ RU «droit naturel» in the equally 
authoritative French text of the Charter.15 Indeed, there are some who claim that the 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., pp. 92-3. 
14
 6'0XUSK\³3URWHDQJus Ad Bellum´27(1) Berk. JIL S+HUHLQDIWHUµ0XUSK\
³3URWHDQJus Ad Bellum´¶ 
15
 Article 51: Aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de légitime 
défense, individuelle ou collective, dans le cas où un Membre des Nations Unies est l'objet d'une 
agression armée, jusqu'à ce que le Conseil de sécurité ait pris les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir 
la paix et la sécurité internationales. Les mesures prises par des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit 
de légitime défense sont immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de sécurité et n'affectent 
en rien le pouvoir et le devoir qu'a le Conseil, en vertu de la présente Charte, d'agir à tout moment de 
la manière qu'il juge nécessaire pour maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales. 
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right of self-defence is a right of ius cogens.16 However at the same time, the right of 
self-defence seems to be placed under certain specific conditions by the text of article 
51 and it has been argued that these conditions did not exist before the Charter.17 It is 
far from clear, however, whether the extent of the right of self-defence in customary 
law is radically different to that under article 51.18  
 
PART ONE: DOCTRINES OF INTERPRETATION. 
 
It has been said that international ODZ¶VFODLPWRREMHFWLYLW\LVWKDWWKHODZLVDEOHWR
apply abstract principles to concrete problems so that legal solutions reflect the 
legitimate normative basis of international law.19 The objectivity of the law seems to 
reside in it being purely legal. The use of rules of interpretation is also a feature that 
distinguishes international lawyers from others who might suggest meanings for the 
text of the Charter.20 The ability to manipulate and navigate the secondary rules of the 
international legal system is central to the idea of international law. Indeed, if we refer 
again to Hart, the very existence of those secondary rules is a sine qua non of the 
status of international law as a legal system rather than merely a collection of primary 
substantive rules.21  
 
The systemic nature of the system might be said to depend on whether particular 
interpretations of the right of self-defence are guided by the doctrine of interpretation 
                                                 
16
 This argument was made by Bosnia and Herzegovina in its Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures of Protection on 20 March 1993, para. 129; See also, M. +DOEHUVWDP³7KH5LJKWWR6HOI-
'HIHQVH2QFHWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO7DNHV$FWLRQ´ 17(2) Mich. JIL (1995-6) 229, p. 238 
17
 Infra, at p. 110-114. 
18
 Infra, at p. 112. 
19
 13XUYLV³&ULWLFDO/HJDO6WXGLHVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´32(1) Harv JIL (1991) 81 p. 96. 
20
 ).UDWRFKZLO³,V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ³3URSHU´/DZ"´ARSP (1983) 13, passim. 
21
 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 214. 
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alone or by other political or moral reasons. One might expect, if the secondary rules 
of interpretation were to do this, that every correct application of these rules would 
yield the same result. However, according to +LJJLQV³DOPRVWHYHU\SKUDVHLQ$UWLFOH
 DQG $UWLFOH  LV RSHQ WR PRUH WKDQ RQH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´22 Koskenniemi has 
famously made the argument that a (liberal) system of rules can be manipulated to 
provide almost any outcome because of the aporetic nature of the norms within it: 
7KH\ DUH ³EDVHG RQ FRQWUDGLFWRU\ SUHPLVHV´23 This will be seen below where the 
object and purpose of the Charter will be discussed.24 Article 51 is an interesting case 
LQVRIDUDV LWVFRQWUDGLFWRU\SUHPLVHVDUHZULW ODUJH LQ LWV WH[W ,WKDVEHHQFDOOHG³DQ
LQHSWSLHFHRIGUDIWVPDQVKLS´25  
 
The narrow right of self-defence is often justified by the literal text of article 51: 
Article 51 allows self-GHIHQFH ³LI DQ DUPHG DWWDFN RFFXUV DJDLQVW D 0HPEHU RI WKH
8QLWHG1DWLRQV´Few writers hold that a state may only use self-defence in the event 
of the occurrence of an armed attack. This position has been criticised on the grounds 
that it renders the right of self-defence under-inclusive. In particular it has been said 
that modern warfare makes it impracticable to insist that a state allows its adversary to 
strike first before it has recourse to self-defence.26 On the other hand, article 51 can 
also be criticised for being over-LQFOXVLYH7KHUHDUHWLPHVZKHUHDVWDWH¶VUHVSRQVHWR
DQDUPHGDWWDFNLVQRORQJHU³QHFHVVDU\´IRULWVSURWHFWLRQDQGLWUHVHPEOHVDQLOOHJDO
act of reprisal.27 7KH³QRUPDWLYHLQGHWHUPLQDF\´RIVHOI-defence was discussed more 
                                                 
22
 Higgins, Problems and Process, p. 240. 
23
 Koskenniemi, From Apology, p. 67. 
24
 Infra, at pp. 87-94. 
25
 0F'RXJDO 06 0F'RXJDO DQG )3 )HOLFLDQR ³/HJDO 5HJXODWLRQ RI WKH 5HVRUW WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Coercion: Aggression and Self-'HIHQVHLQ3ROLF\3HUVSHFWLYH´Yale LJ (1958-9) 1057, p. 1145. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ0F'RXJDODQG)HOLFLDQR³/HJDO5HJXODWLRQRIWKH5HVRUWWR,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RHUFLRQ´¶ 
26
 See Chapter I, at p. 39. 
27
 D. W. Bowett³Reprisals LQYROYLQJ5HFRXUVHWR$UPHG)RUFH´AJIL (1972) 1, p. 3. 
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thoroughly in the previous chapter.28 In order to navigate these poles international 
lawyers have interpreted self-defence so as to lessen these effects in practice. 
 
Most international lawyers who discuss self-defence rely on a positive doctrine of 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRVRPHH[WHQW)UDQFNIRULQVWDQFHDGRSWVDQ³HYROXWLRQDU\´DSSURDFK
to interpretation which favours state practice.29 In contrast, Bothe prefers a more 
strictly formal approach, expressly invoking the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969 (VCLT).30 Interpretation does not apply solely to the text of the UN 
Charter or even to legal texts in general. Even international lawyers who reject the 
continued relevance of the Charter for determining the scope of the right of self-
defence31 must still have recourse to doctrines of interpretation. Those who 
concentrate on state practice must interpret that practice; facts do not speak for 
themselves but are asserted through communication by actors with agendas.32  
 
It should, however, be emphasised that international lawyers do not treat matrices of 
interpretation as a sort of black box. It is usually acknowledged that a good deal of 
subjective preference insinuates its way into the law through interpretation. 
Fitzmaurice wrote WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV PXVW ³DFFHSW WKH IDFW WKDW LQ WKH ODVW
resort all interpretation must consist of the exercise of common sense by the judge, 
                                                 
28
 See Chapter I, at pp. 42-53. 
29
 Franck, Recourse to Force, p. 7. 
30
 0%RWKH³7HUURULVPDQd the Legality of Pre-HPSWLYH)RUFH´EJIL (2003) 227, p. 229. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ%RWKH³7HUURULVPDQGWKH/HJDOLW\RI3UH-HPSWLYH)RUFH´¶  
31
 E.g. -<RR³8VLQJ)RUFH´Univ. Chi. LR (2004) 729+HUHLQDIWHUµ<RR³8VLQJ)RUFH´¶
J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (2005) Oxford University Press. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ*ROGVPLWKDQG3RVQHU³/LPLWV´¶0-*OHQQRQ³7KH)RJRI/DZ6HOI-Defense, 
,QKHUHQFHDQG,QFRKHUHQFHLQ$UWLFOHRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV&KDUWHU´Harv. JL&PP (2001-2) 
539. 
32
 +HQNLQZURWH WKDW ³ODZ LVPDGHE\SROLWLFDODFWV WKURXJKSROLWLFDOSURFHGXUHV IRUSROLWLFDOHQGV´
International Law: Politics and Values, (1995) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 4.  
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DSSOLHGLQJRRGIDLWKDQGZLWKLQWHOOLJHQFH´.33 It is submitted that the majority, these 
days, do.  
 
The problem is where it is not a judge but a national government that is interpreting a 
Charter provision, as is always, at least initially, the case with self-defence. Stone 
warned that ³>Q@R QRUPDWLYH IRUPXODH WKDW KDYH WKH VOLJKWHVW FKDQFH Rf even wide 
minority approval can hope to deprive the applying organ of ample leeways to decide 
DSDUWLFXODU FDVH DFFRUGLQJ WR LWV DUELWUDU\ZLOO´34 Even if a self-defence claim was 
subsequently evaluated at the international level, it is unlikely that this would take 
place in a courtroom. Lauterpacht wrote that governments do not like to submit their 
YLWDOLQWHUHVWVWRMXGLFLDOVHWWOHPHQWEHFDXVH³RIWKHLUUHOXFWDQFHWRHQWUXVWWKHGHFLVLRQ
on matters of vital national importance to outside bodies over which they have no 
FRQWURO´35 Aside from the question of authoritative interpretation, this raises questions 
about the fragmentation of evaluation as well as the paucity of evaluation. It has been 
said that states cannot prevent others from evaluating their uses of force, even if those 
evaluations do not constitute quasi-adjudicative binding judgments on them.36 The 
lack of centralisation and the presence of two political main organs in the UN mean 
that it is hard to build up a system of precedent like those of domestic common law 
systems. 
 
 
                                                 
33
 **)LW]PDXULFH³7KH/DZDQG3URFHGXUHRI the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQDQG&HUWDLQ2WKHU7UHDW\3RLQWV´BYIL (1951) 1 p. 3. 
34
 J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression (1958) 
Stevens and Sons, London, p. 25. 
35
 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1966) Archon Books, 
&RQQHFWLFXWS+HUHLQDIWHUµ/DXWHUSDFKWThe Function of Law¶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36
 26FKDFKWHU³6HOI'HIHQVHDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ´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A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
The VCLT provides WKDW³DWUHDW\VKDOOEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQJRRGIDLWKLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
OLJKW RI LWV REMHFW DQG SXUSRVH´37 It is often said that this provision reflects three 
distinct schools of thought: Those with a preference for the ordinary meaning of the 
text; those with a preference for the intentions of the drafters; and those who prefer 
teleological interpretation.38 While it is sometimes argued that these elements of 
ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose are hierarchically ordered,39 the 
wording of this provision might equally suggest that international lawyers are free to 
make interpretations involving any or all of these elements. This may, of course, lead 
to contradiction where the ordinary meaning of words conflicts with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. In the case of the interpretation of article 51, the ordinary 
meDQLQJ RI ³WKH RFFXUUHQFH RI DQ DUPHG DWWDFN´ PLJKW EH VDLG WR FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH
object and purpose of self-defence where a state cannot protect itself without 
anticipating such an attack.  
 
The VCLT throws up other potential points of controversy. For instance, in article 
E ³>W@KHUH VKDOO EH WDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH FRQWH[W« DQ\
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
WKHSDUWLHVUHJDUGLQJLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´  This seems to open the door to international 
lawyers who may wish to emphasise the importance of state practice in the 
interpretation of the right of self-defence and therefore to, perhaps, favour the broader 
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 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969, article 31(1). 
38
 N.D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International Justice, (2002), Lynne Rienner 
3XEOLVKHUVS+HUHLQDIWHUµ:KLWHThe United Nations System¶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 Cf. ILC Report 1966, YBILC 1966 II., paras 8-9. 
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conception justified through the preference for a more flexible system. It will be 
DUJXHG WKDW WKHXVHRI µVXEVHTXHQWSUDFWLFH¶DVDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLYH WRRO LVRIWHQSRRUO\
GLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWKHXVHRIµJHQHUDOSUDFWLFH¶DVDQHOHPHQWRIFXVWRPDU\ODZ7KH
question of subsequent practice will be discussed in the section on the intention of the 
parties, below.40 
 
A third potential point of contention is that the VCLT makes provision for 
³VXSSOHPHQWDU\PHDQVRI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ZKHUH WKHPHDQLQJUHPDLQV³DPELJXRXVRU
REVFXUH´DIWHUKDYLQJKDGUHVRUWWRDUWLFOHRUZKHUHLWOHGWRD³PDnifestly absurd or 
XQUHDVRQDEOH´ UHVXOW41 This effectively provides a further means of extending 
argumentation about the right of self-defence and therefore preventing an 
international lawyer from claiming that, under the VCLT rules, his interpretation is 
DXWKRULWDWLYH7KLVLVEHFDXVHIRUWKRVHZKRWDNHWKHLQGLYLGXDOQDWLRQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYH
it is manifestly unreasonable not to permit a state to pre-empt threats to its security, 
while IRUWKRVHZKRWDNHWKHFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHP¶VSHUVSHFWLYH, to allow nation 
states to have the final word on the legality of their own uses of force is equally 
absurd.  
 
Finally, it should be stated that the VCLT does not form the basis for all international 
ODZ\HUV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLYH H[HUFLVHV SDUWLFXODUO\ ZKHUH WKH 81 &KDUter is concerned. 
This is because the interpretative techniques that are seen as relevant to more or less 
short-term bilateral treaties are not thought to apply to treaties underpinning long-
running international organisations.42 :KLWH KDV ZULWWHQ WKDW ³>L@t would be 
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 Infra, at p. 83-87. 
41
 VCLT, articles 32(a) and (b). 
42
 )UDQFNVD\VWKDWWKH&KDUWHULVOLNHD³OLYLQJWUHH´XQOLNH³RUGLQDU\WUHDWLHV´DQGFDQQRWWKHUHIRUHEH
construed contractually, Recourse to Force, p. 6.  
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impractical and too legalistic to restrict the United Nations to the exact wording of the 
charter given that the treaty was formulated in 1945 and was designed to function in 
WKHZRUOGDWWKDWWLPH´43 The UN Charter can be further particularised in this respect: 
It is sometimes said to be a constitutional document.44 This feature can also work in 
favour of both narrow and broad interpretations of self-defence. It can favour the 
narrow conception because it might be argued that the constitutional nature of the 
norms of the Charter give them priority over other norms, including those of state 
practice.45 It can also favour the broad conception of self-defence because if the 
&KDUWHULVD³OLYLQJLQVWUXPHQW´LWVOLIHLVLQWKHSUDFWLFHRILWVPHPEHUVWates (within 
its organs).46 
 
It is suggested that the approaches to interpretation used by international lawyers 
bleed into one another to the extent that it becomes extremely difficult to track an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HU¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLYH PHWKRGRORJ\ 7KRVH LQternational lawyers who 
specifically refer to the VCLT seem to produce less ambiguous readings of the 
Charter based on more or less systematic uses of the doctrines contained in the Vienna 
Convention. However such clear readings can lead to accusations of esotericism 
because they remove the fluidity both from the substantive right of self-defence and 
from the secondary rules of interpretation.  
 
Those whose use of doctrines of interpretation is less explicit can be seen to create 
ambiguities in their interpUHWDWLRQV)RULQVWDQFHWKHFDWHJRU\RI³RUGLQDU\PHDQLQJ´
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 White, The United Nations System, p. 27. 
44
 See e.g. B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter and the Constitution of the International 
Community (2009) Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht. 
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 Franck, Recourse to Force, p. 7. 
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becomes meaning in the context of a particular case; the category of intention 
becomes confused between the present intention of UN members and that of the 
drafters of the Charter sixty years ago; finally, the question of subsequent practice 
becomes intermingled with that of customary law formation. Owing to the elastic 
QDWXUH RI ³RUGLQDU\ PHDQLQJ´ ³LQWHQWLRQ´ DQG ³REMHFW DQG SXUSRVH´ and their 
intertwined inter-relation, international lawyers who want to exploit the legitimacy of 
applying doctrines of interpretation are more free to do so.  
 
B. Ordinary Meaning. 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH 9&/7 LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV VKRXOG DWWHPSW WR ILQG WKH ³RUGLQDU\
PHDQLQJ´RIWKHZRUGVRIDSDUWLFXODUSURYLVLRQ7KHIirst port of call for some writers 
is a dictionary.47 It seems like common-sense to reject certain conceptions of self-
defence on the grounds that they do not seem to be reflected in the language of article 
51. However it should be emphasised that few, if any international, lawyers take a 
wholly ordinary-meaning approach. This is partly because the apparent requirement 
IRUDQµDUPHGDWWDFN¶WRKDYHRFFXUUHGDSSHDUVWRSUHFOXGHIRULQVWDQFHDQWLFLSDWRU\
action, and partly because ³WKHUHIHUHQFHWRµSODLQPHDQLQJ¶KDVOLWWOHYDOXHDQGEHJV
PDQ\TXHVWLRQV´48 An international lawyer could never decisively end a debate with 
ordinary meaning.  
 
Theories of linguistic indeterminacy have been used to bolster realist rule sceptic 
arguments as well as the Critical Legal Studies critique of legal objectivity. In the 
works following the Tractatus, Wittgenstein moved away from an idea that words 
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were reflections of reality.49 Since there is no word-world reflection, ³VHQWHQFHV
FDQQRWVD\ZKDWWKH\PHDQRUGR´.50 The meaning of words is not a given. According 
to Wittgenstein, what we understand by a given word depends on its use in context.51 
As Koskenniemi put it ³>H@[SUHVVLRQVDUHOLNHKROHVLQDQHW(DFKLVHPSW\LQ LWVHOI
and has identity only through the strings which separate it from the neighbouring 
KROHV´52 7KXV WR WDONDERXW WKHµRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJ¶RIZRUGV LPSOLHV WKDW WKHUH LVD
neutral context in which a word can be considered. The VCLT appears to appreciate 
this because it also determines what counts as relevant context in which a provision 
should be interpreted.  
 
7KH RUGLQDU\ PHDQLQJ RI µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ LV D SRLQW RI VRPH FRQWURYHUV\ DV LV WKH
VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH SKUDVH ³LI DQ DUPHG DWWDFN RFFXUV´ 6RPH ZULWHUV FRPSDUH WKH
French and English texts. It is sometimes said that «O¶REMHWG¶XQHDJression armée» is 
less ambiguous than armed attack.53 2WKHUVWU\WRUHDGµDUPHGDWWDFN¶LQ WKHOLJKWRI
the Definition of Aggression that was adopted as a General Assembly (GA) resolution 
in 1974.54 This became a common practice after the Nicaragua case when the ICJ 
asserted that the Definition had attained customary status.55  
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However, by no means every international lawyer views the Definition of Aggression 
DV KHOSIXO LQ HOXFLGDWLQJ WKH PHDQLQJ RI µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ 2QH SUREOHP LV that the 
GHILQLWLRQ SUHGDWHV  DQG WKH QHZ ³VWUDWHJLF UHDOLW\´ SRVLWHG E\ WKH *: %XVK
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJRIµDUPHGDWWDFN¶LVVLJQLILFDQWDVUHJDUGVWKH
accommodation of the doctrine of pre-emption in the collective security system 
because, over the years, international lawyers have been willing to designate various 
HYHQWVDV µDUPHGDWWDFNV¶ZKLFKPD\VHHPWRVWUHWFK WKHSKUDVH56 It is said that the 
SKUDVHµDUPHGDWWDFN¶LVOLQNHGWRDQRXWPRGHGYLHZRILQWHU-state violence that does 
not reflect the indirect aggression of states who sponsor terrorist or guerrilla groups. 
In 1945 the warfare paradigm was still the massing of armies along a frontier.57 
 
The idea that a decisive attack could come out of the blue, some say, is not 
contemplaWHG LQ WKH SKUDVH µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ ,Q RUGHU WR SUHYHQW WKH &KDUWHU IURP
becoming esoteric, international lawyers have been willing to be extremely creative in 
LQWHUSUHWLQJ µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ 6RPH DUJXH IRU ³FRQVWUXFWLYH DUPHG DWWDFNV´ ZKHUH
situations equivalent to an armed attack are caught within article 51 even though they 
GR QRW SDUWLFXODUO\ UHVHPEOH µDUPHG DWWDFNV¶58 There are also arguments that an 
accumulation of less grave forms of attack might amount to an armed attack.59 There 
are other arguments that the Charter does not specify when an armed attack begins.60 
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6RPHVFKRODUVKDYHUHIXVHGWRFRXQWHQDQFHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWµDUPHGDWWDFN¶FRXOG
DFFRPPRGDWH DQWLFLSDWRU\ DFWLRQGHVSLWH*UD\¶VREVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ³>V@WDWHVSUHIHU WR
rely on self-defence in resSRQVHWRDQDUPHGDWWDFNLI WKH\SRVVLEO\FDQ´UDWKHUWKDQ
invoke anticipatory self-defence.61 Bothe holds that article 51 was not intended to 
include anticipatory self-GHIHQFH EHFDXVH µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ FDQQRW EH UHDG WR LQFOXGH
threats of an armed attack. He H[SODLQVWKDWEHFDXVHDUWLFOHDSSOLHVWRWKHµWKUHDW¶
DV ZHOO DV WKH µXVH¶ RI IRUFH RQH ZRXOG H[SHFW DUWLFOH  WR KDYH LQFOXGHG H[SUHVV
provision for threats were they intended to be covered. Similarly, article 39 includes 
threats to the peace but was clearly meant to be of broader application than article 
51.62 It has been said that sucK DUJXPHQWV ULVN ³VWUHWFKLQJ«article 51 beyond all 
PHDVXUH´63  
 
,IµDUPHGDWWDFN¶LVJHQHUDOO\YLHZHGDVPHDQLQJDOPRVWDQ\WKLQJWKDWKDVZDUUDQWHGD
forcible response, then it might be said that the Charter text provides no effective 
obstacle to subjective interpretation.  .HOVHQSRLQWVRXWWKDWLWLV³YHU\SUREDEOH´WKDWD
VWDWHDFFXVHGRIDJJUHVVLRQZRXOG³GHQ\WREHJXLOW\RIDQµDUPHGDWWDFN¶HVSHFLDOO\
by interprHWLQJWKLVWHUPLQDQRWKHUZD\WKDQLWVRSSRQHQW´64 In order to counter-act 
this Franck has urged D³EUHDNLWGRQ¶WIDNHLW´DSSURDFKWRMXVWLILFDWLRQ65 One of the 
problems with widening the scope of self-defence is that it will be able to 
accommodate many more valid interpretations and therefore make disputes between 
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belligerents more difficult to settle. It is far from unusual for both sides to a conflict to 
claim to have used force in self-defence.66  
 
$VHFRQGFRQWURYHUV\KDVEHHQWKHPHDQLQJRI³LIDQDUPHGDWWDFNRFFXUV´%URZQOLH
VD\V WKDW ³WKHRUGLQDU\ PHDQLQJRI WKHSKUDVHSUHFOXGHV DFWLRQ WKDW LV SUHYHQWLYH LQ
FKDUDFWHU´67 +RZHYHUWKHUHDUHWKRVHZKRKDYHDUJXHGWKDWµDUPHGDWWDFN¶GRHVQRW
have to be read as exhaustive of the situations in which a state may resort to force in 
VHOISURWHFWLRQ7KLVSRVLWLRQLVRIWHQEDFNHGE\DFRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWµFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶
requires: In other words, those writers who have already decided on a preference for 
anticipatory action tend to use that assumption to back XSWKHµFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶RIWKHLU
proposition.68  
 
The question of the occurrence of an armed attack also begs the question when an 
armed attack begins.69 It seems that this cannot but be seen as a temporal continuum 
along a chain of causation that would be very difficult to predict in advance. 
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, it would be possible to argue 
that the doctrine of pre-emption was only a reasonable extension of this: The attack 
can be said to have commenced as soon as a state feels threatened. It has been written 
that this can be done using the concept of immediacy:70   
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Such an interpretation must not restrict defensive measures to mere 
reaction, or anticipation of an attack, but rather includes actions of a truly 
anticipatory character in the face of a clear and concrete threat of an attack 
within the foreseeable future.  
 
This is because it can be hard to draw the line between an attack that is at the launch, 
one that is in the planning stages and one that is merely intendeGE\RQH¶VDGYHUVDU\71 
2WKHUVKDYHULJKWO\SRLQWHGRXWWKDWVXFKDWURSHIRULQWHUSUHWLQJµDUPHGDWWDFN¶RQO\
succeeds where the attack is irreversible because self-defence is not necessary 
otherwise. However there is also controversy about when an attack has reached the 
point of no return. There are those, like Brownlie, who argue that self-defence 
involves an element of trespass and therefore that an attack has not commenced until 
an international boundary is crossed.72 The problem with this is that it does not take 
account of the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction mentioned in the previous 
chapter.73 
 
In this section the author has attempted to show that however clearly article 51 
appears to rule out anticipatory self-defence on the face of it, there are still those who 
are prepared to argue it does not in fact do so. Many such writers back up their non-
literal interpretations of self-defence using doctrines of interpretation that enable them 
WR LQWHUSUHW WKH SURYLVLRQV RI WKH DUWLFOH ³LQ FRQWH[W´ 6RPHtimes this refers to the 
context of the Charter and sometimes to that of the particular situation.74 These sorts 
of approaches can seem to be exploitable to the extent that they favour subjective 
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interpretations on a case by case basis over more predictable, less adaptable text-
based readings. 
 
C. Intention. 
 
The ordinary meaning of article 51 is important to many international lawyers because 
it represents the intention of UN member states. In his commentary to what became 
the VCLT, Waldock wrote WKDW³WKHbasic rule of treaty interpretation [is] the primacy 
RIWKHWH[WDVHYLGHQFHRIWKHLQWHQWLRQVRIWKHSDUWLHV´.75 In the specific context of the 
UN Charter this can be problematic for two main reasons. The first is that the parties 
to the Charter may not share an intention as to a particular aspect of an article. This 
may be because, as Franck has said, agreement among a large group of states requires 
watering down the specificity of the provisions to cover the broadest range of 
interpretations.76 It may also be because states simply did not contemplate a particular 
situation in 1945, and therefore formed no intention as to how the norm should be 
applied to it.77  
 
The second problem is that the states who signed the UN Charter in 1945 no longer 
represent the UN membership as it stands today. In 1945 there were 51 members, but 
since 2006 there have been 192 states members of the UN. In short, the words of the 
Charter are not representative of the intention of nearly three quarters of member 
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states insofar as they did not participate in the drafting process.78 A related problem is 
that the Charter is over 60 years old. In the light of the statement of the International 
Law Commission (ILC), that «le texte signé est, sauf de rares exceptions, la seule et 
la plus récente expression de la volonté commune des parties»,79 it seems that it must 
be argued that the Charter is such a rare exception, if it can be said to reflect the will 
of the parties. This suggests that textualist readings of article 51 are open to the 
critiFLVP WKDW WKH\ QR ORQJHU UHSUHVHQW VWDWHV¶ ZLOOV DV H[SUHVVHG WKURXJK WKHLU
actions.80 Indeed, McDougal stated that he thought Charter interpretation was a matter 
RI³ILQG>LQJ@RXWZKDWDUHFRQWHPSRUDU\H[SHFWDWLRQVRIZKDWLWPHDQVQRWZKDWVRPH
may think WKHZRUGVVD\OLWHUDOO\RUZKDWWKHIRXQGHUVPD\KDYHLQLWLDOO\LQWHQGHG´81  
 
There is a further problem with intentionalist approaches to interpretation which is 
that it is not possible to know what a state intended by a particular phrase without 
extraneous evidence. Indeed, Fitzmaurice has written that ³WKH TXHVWLRQ LV«QRW VR
much one of what meaning is to be attributed to the text in the light of the intentions 
of the parties, as of what the intentions of the parties must be presumed to have been 
in the OLJKW RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH WH[W´.82 If the text is the only elucidation of the 
SDUWLHV¶ LQWHQWLRQ WKHQ LW VHHPV D UDWKHU FLUFXODU PHWKRG ZKHQ LQWHQWLRQ ZDV
introduced in order to elucidate the meaning of the text.  
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This would explain the great frequency with which international lawyers refer to the 
debates at San Francisco despite the VCLT holding that the travaux préparatoires of 
a treaty are merely supplementary means of interpretation.83 In most cases, 
international lawyers can find in the travaux evidence for both the proposition that 
VWDWHVGLGQRWLQWHQGWROLPLWVWDWHV¶ULJKWWRXVHIRUFHWRFDVHVZKHUHDQDUPHGDWWDFN
has occurred,84 and for the proposition that article 51 was intended to be a highly 
limited temporary right.85 
 
One of the main arguments from intention, used to back up the narrow conception of 
self-GHIHQFH WDNHQ IURP DQ µRUGLQDU\ PHDQLQJ¶ UHDGLQJ RI ³LQ WKH RFFXUUHQFH RI DQ
DUPHGDWWDFN´ LV WKDW WKH81&KDUWHUZDVLQWHQGHGWRVXFFHHGZKHUHWKH/HDJXHRI
Nations had failed.86 According to James Brierly WKHUHZDVDJHQHUDOIHHOLQJWKDW³WKH
/HDJXH KDG IDLOHG EHFDXVH LW ZDV QRW VWURQJ HQRXJK IRU LWV WDVN´87 The League of 
1DWLRQV ZDV ³SDVVLY>H@ LQ WKH IDFH RI YLROHQFH´;88 on its watch, there was Japanese 
violence against Manchuria, Italian violence against Ethiopia and eventually, of 
course, the aggression of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The prohibition of the use of 
force and the creation of a Security Council with the power to bind member states 
were innovations that may have stemmed from this concern.  
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The League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War, and the inclusion in 
WKHSUHDPEOHRIWKH&KDUWHURIWKHDPELWLRQWR³VDYHVXFFHHGLQJJHQHUDWLRQVIURPWKH
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to manNLQG´
flows from this. However, international lawyers use this historical background in 
different ways. On the one hand, international lawyers arguing for a narrow right of 
self-defence say that the Charter must have intended to all but eliminate the unilateral 
recourse to force by states. They argue that the horrors of war were intended to be 
avoided at all costs.89 2QWKHRWKHUKDQG LWKDVEHHQSRLQWHGRXW WKDW³LI WKH8QLWHG
States had stumbled across the Japanese fleet clearly on course for Pearl Harbor in 
1941, it could have acted in self-GHIHQFH´90 
  
D. Subsequent Practice. 
 
There is an argument to be made that suggests that owing to the length of time since 
WKH &KDUWHU ZDV GUDIWHG WKH PDWWHU RI ³VXEVHTXHQW SUDFWLFH´ EHFRPHV SDUWLFXODUO\
important in elucidating the intentions of the parties.91 :KLWHKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDW³>W@KH
move has been away from the intent of the founding states toward more observable 
means of interpretation, namely, the purpose of treaties and subsequent practice, 
concerned with the current LQWHQWRIWKHPHPEHUVDQGWKHUHIRUHVXEMHFWLYH´92  
 
Furthermore, the lack of detail in article 51, particularly as to the nature of the force to 
be used in self-defence, is said by some to indicate that the framers of the Charter left 
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it to states to substantiate the norm through practice.93 Thus, Franck says that although 
WKH³LQWHUDFWLRQRIWH[WDQGSUDFWLFH´LVKDUGWRHYDOXDWH LW³FDQSURYLGHHYLGHQFHRI
µOLYH¶ PHDQLQJ JLYHQ WR LQHUW ZRUGV E\ H[LVWHQWLDO H[SHULHQFH DQG WUDQVDFWLRQDO
SURFHVV´.94 That is not to say that only those, like Franck, taking a broad interpretation 
of self-defence use subsequent practice to elucidate the meaning of a norm.95 In 
another area of its practice, the ICJ has shown itself willing to look to the practice of 
states to elucidate the meaning of Charter articles.96 
 
2QHSUREOHPKHUHLVWKDWVLQFHWKH&KDUWHUZDVGUDIWHGVWDWHVKDYH³VWUHWFK>HG@ article 
EH\RQGDOOPHDVXUH´.97 This means that to allow subsequent practice to count as 
better reflecting the intention of the parties to the UN Charter would not only be to 
prefer the practice of those states who are in a position to use force in self-defence, 
but also may make it easier to argue for a wide interpretation of self-defence. Murphy 
finds that those who take a narrow view of self-GHIHQFH ³WHQG>@ WR GRZQSOD\ RU
LJQRUH«WKHSRVVLELOLW\ WKDW RYHU WLPH VWDWHVPD\ UHLQWHUSUHW DUWLFOH WKURXJK WKHLU
SUDFWLFH´98 However this is not necessarily the case; the interpretative doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus, for instance, may allow international lawyers the opportunity to 
reinterpret article 51.99  
 
Subsequent practice can also be used to argue for a narrower right of self-defence. In 
the context of anticipatory self-defence, two incidents that are often cited are the 
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Israeli attacks on Egypt in 1967 and Iraq in 1981. Both of these uses of force were 
condemned by states and this is taken by some to indicate that states still understand 
article 51 to exclude anticipatory action.100 It is to be borne in mind that other equally 
distinguished commentators have drawn precisely the opposite conclusions from these 
particular episodes.101 
 
It is submitted that subsequent practice in treaty interpretation is not always clearly 
GHILQHGIURPLWVFORVHUHODWLRQLQFXVWRPDU\ODZµJHQHUDOSUDFWLFH¶7KLV OHDGVWRDQ
ambiguity in the secondary rules relating to the recognition and interpretation of the 
rules on the use of force that spans creation, modification and interpretation of self-
defence. Some international lawyers do not seem to distinguish interpretations of 
article 51 from identifications of the scope of the customary right of self-defence.102 
In the next part of the chapter, the relationship between customary law and the law of 
the Charter will be explored further. For now, suffice it to say that if the right of self-
defence is seen as being wider in customary law than it is in the Charter, incorporating 
LW LQ WKH&KDUWHUDVµVXEVHTXHQWSUDFWLFH¶HIIHFWLYHO\RYHUULGHVWKHQDUURZUHDGLQJRI
self-defence that does not permit anticipation of an armed attack. This is because the 
streams of law could not be said to exist separately; customary law would have 
colonised the Charter. 
 
There is some dissent as to the use of subsequent practice: Kammerhofer dislikes the 
idea that subsequent practice FDQPRGLI\DSULRUWUHDW\EHFDXVH³WKHWH[WUHPDLQVDQG
ZLWKHUVDOOVWRUPVRIFKDQJLQJFXVWRPV´103 If the intentions of the participants at San 
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Francisco are examined, it can be claimed that the interpretation is esoteric because 
the world has moved on so far since 1945. On the other hand, if the present intentions 
of the parties are taken as conclusive as to the meaning of the provision then it may be 
that the ought comes too close to the is and the Charter scheme loses its normativity.  
 
Perhaps for this reason, in the interpretation of the articles of the UN Charter, it is 
usually said that the practice of member states has significance where they act through 
UN organs rather than when they act individually.104 However this collective 
approach does not solve every problem where the intentions of parties are deduced 
merely from failure to condemn a potentially violative use of force.105 This is 
particularly objectionable where a failure to pass a condemnatory resolution in the 
Security Council (SC) is the result of a permanent member using its veto.106  
 
The subsequent practice of the parties can be as ambiguous as the words it is 
supposed to illuminate. According to 6LPPD 81 SUDFWLFH LV ³VRPHWLPHV
DPELJXRXV´.107 The concentration on the present intentions of the parties also brings 
the law closer to the policy realism school. This school advocated a view of legal 
norms as the expectations of states. McDougal and Feliciano say that where self-
GHIHQFH LV FRQFHUQHG³WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQWFRQGLWLRQ WKDWPXVWEH LQYHVWLJDWHd is the 
degree of necessity ± as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target-
FODLPDQW DQG LQFRUSRUDWHG LQ WKH SDWWHUQ RI LWV H[SHFWDWLRQV´108 The patterns of a 
                                                 
104
 White, The United Nations System¶S5+LJJLQVThe Development of International Law 
through the Political Organs of the United Nations, (1964) Oxford University Press for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. But cf. 0XUSK\³7KH'RFWULQHRI3UHHPSWLYH6HOI-'HIHQVH´, p. 737. 
105
 Franck used this method to validate the Israeli action mentioned above. 
106
 See Chapter III, at p. 154-157 
107
 B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed. (2002) Oxford 
University Press, p. 790+HUHLQDIWHUµ6LPPDHGThe Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary¶ 
108
 0F'RXJDODQG)HOLFLDQR³/HJDO5HJXODWLRQRIWKH5HVRUWWR,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RHUFLRQ´S-2. 
87  
VWDWH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV DUH GHSHQGHQW RQ PDQ\ YDULHG QRQ-legal factors. It might be 
suggested that such an approach would render the norm so flexible as to become more 
or less meaningless in the hands of a self-interested interpreter. 
 
It is suggested that recourse to the subsequent practice of the parties can render the 
right of self-defence exploitable because it enables scholars to accord a great amount 
of weight to prima facie violations of the Charter. It is also suggested that to the 
extent that it is conflated with the development of customary norm it can lead to 
FODLPVWKDW³UHFRXUVH must be had to customary law as a means of complementing the 
Charter lex scripta´109 It is suggested that this conflation of custom and the Charter is 
particularly exploitable because the near-universality of the Charter is used to garnish 
claims of contrary state practice and lend them its legitimacy as a treaty-based 
obligation. On the other hand those uses of subsequent practice that strictly limit it to 
express statements formally made by the parties may invoke criticism that the 
approach is esoteric.  
 
C. Object and Purpose. 
 
Kammerhofer has suggested that behind academic differences about the scope of self-
defence are differences about the telos or goal of the norm.110 While Murphy has 
ZULWWHQWKDW³UHDVRQDEOHPLQGVGLVDJUHHRQWKHREMHFWDQGSXUSRVHRIDUWLFOH´111 it 
is submitted that its purpose is fairly uncontroversial: The protection of the nation-
VWDWH .RVNHQQLHPL DJUHHV LW LV ³FOHDUO\ WR SURWHFW WKH VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG the 
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indeSHQGHQFHRIWKHVWDWH´112 What is controversial, however, is the relation between 
that purpose and the other principles and purposes expressed in the Charter.113  
 
The problem is that while the purpose of the right of self-defence is to protect states, 
there are potentially conflicting purposes elsewhere in the Charter such as the 
minimisation of the resort to force. Since article 51 is an exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of force, it might be expected that international lawyers would 
agree that the purpose behind article 2(4) should prevail. However, there are 
international lawyers who argue that such a purpose could not have been intended to 
limit the sovereign right to resort to force.114 In large part this argument is based on 
WKHµLQKHUHQF\¶RIWKHULJKWRIVHOI-defence as expressed in article 51.115  
 
It should also be borne in mind that during the Cold War, the right of self-defence was 
often seen to operate in lieu of collective security enforcement rather than as an 
exception to it. It would seem from the National Security Strategy that the doctrine of 
pre-emption would play a similar role in the event that the US could not secure the 
necessary support in the SC.116 This would mean that the relationship between the 
objects of minimisation of unilateral force and self-protection would be modified. 
Illustrative of this sort of approach is McDougal¶V YLHZ that a use of force to 
anticipate an imminent attack could not be contrary to the purposes of the UN.117 This 
is because he does not accept that the Charter laid down a presumption against the 
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validity of the use of force: Permissible coercion is supposed to be part of normal life 
among states.118  
 
Franck says that the drafters of the Charter were reacting to the horrors of total war 
DQG WKDW WKH SULQFLSOHV RI &KDSWHU , RI WKH &KDUWHU ZHUH ³RI WUDQVFHQGHQWDO
LPSRUWDQFH«HOXFLGDWLQJ DOO RWKHU SURYLVLRQV´.119 Nevertheless it is suggested that 
SULQFLSOHVDQGSXUSRVHVFDQEHVHHQWRFRQIOLFW0F'RXJDODQG)HOLFLDQRVD\WKDW³WKH
rules of the law of war, like other legal rules, are commonly formulated in pairs of 
complementary opposites and are composed of a relatively few basic terms of highly 
YDULDEOH UHIHUHQFH´120 It could be said that a complementary opposite can be found 
for many of the principles expressed in the Charter.  
 
In this part of the chapter it will be suggested that the opposing principles of the 
respect for state sovereignty and the minimisation of the resort to armed force will be 
discussed. The principles and purposes of the UN are contained in articles 1 and 2 of 
the Charter, respectively. It will be argued that, together with the preamble, they can 
support both the preference for sovereignty and the preference for pacifism. The first 
principle of the Charter aims inter alia IRU³WKHVXSSUHVVLRQRIDFWVRIDJJUHVVLRQ´121 
WKLVLVEROVWHUHGE\WKHVHFRQGSXUSRVHRI³VWUHQJWKHQ>LQJ@XQLYHUVDOSHDFH´122 As to 
the principles of the Charter, articles 2(3) for the peaceful settlement of disputes and 
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2(4) containing the blanket prohibition of the use of force both appear to confirm this 
view.123  
 
However support for the primacy of sovereignty can also be found in articles 1 and 2. 
)RULQVWDQFHWKHVHFRQGSXUSRVHRIWKH&KDUWHULQFOXGHV³UHVSHFWIRUWKHSULQFLSOHRI
HTXDOULJKWV´,WVHHPVWKDWRQHZD\RIHQVXULQJHTXDOULJKWVLVWRDOORZVPDOOHUVWDWHs 
to take defensive measures against larger states that might attempt to dominate them. 
The principles of the Charter seem to confirm this view. Indeed, the very first 
principle of the UN is respect for sovereign equality. The fact that article 2(7) 
specifically guarantees the sanctity of the domestic sphere except where enforcement 
action is concerned only serves to emphasise this. 
 
Those who take a narrow view of self-defence that precludes anticipatory action have 
tended to favour the minimisation of the use of force over the protection of the nation-
VWDWH %URZQOLH¶V YLHZ ZDV WKDW ³HYHQ DV D PDWWHU RI µSODLQ¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH
permission in Article 51 is exceptional in the context of the Charter and exclusive of 
any customary right of self-GHIHQFH´ 7KLV LV EHFDXVH ³>W@KH ZKROH object of the 
Charter was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defence, subject to control 
E\ WKH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ´ %URZQOLH VD\V WKDW WKLV LV HYLGHQW LQ WKH IDFW WKDW DUWicle 51 
makes the right of self-defence subject to the SC taking necessary measures.124  
 
Another international lawyer taking a narrow approach is Bothe. He held that 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKHREMHFWDQGSXUSRVHRIWKHWUHDW\WKH&KDUWHULVVXSSRVHGWR³UHVWUDLQ
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WKHXQLODWHUDOXVHRIIRUFH´125 As for the purpose of self-defence itself, Kammerhofer 
VD\VWKDWKLV³SHUVRQDOYLHZ´LVWKDWQRWHYHQDQWLFLSDWLRQRIDQLPPLQHQWDWWDFNFDQ
EH FRQVWUXHG DV DQ µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ EHFDXVH ³WKH FRQGLWLRQ >DUPHG DWWDFN@ PDNHV WKH
ending of an armed attack the only valid objective of self-defence under Article 
5´126 It is submitted that this is somewhat circular and that it would not be 
unreasonable to object that since a valid objective of self-defence is the protection of 
WKHVWDWHWKHZRUGVµDUPHGDWWDFN¶FDQQRWKDYHEHHQLQWHQGHGWROLPLWWKHULJKW 
 
Indeed, perhaps owing to this objection Brownlie apparently felt obliged to deviate 
from his unswervingly hard line against the unilateral use of force. Owing to his 
narrow conception of article 51 and his rejection of states using force to anticipate 
imminent threats,127 Brownlie creates a category of exception to catch cases  where 
³WHFKQLFDO PHDQV RI FRXQWHULQJ WKH LQVWUXPHQW RI DJJUHVVLRQ ZLOO QRW DGHTXDWHO\
ensure protection if action is only taken when the object enters the territorial 
GRPDLQ´128 He singles out cases of the use of rockets in flight and fast aircraft. 
However Brownlie admits that this category is a bit problematic because the policy of 
the law may be undermined and even abused.129 Similarly, Henkin suggests that there 
PD\EHDQH[FHSWLRQ³IRUWKHVSHFLDOFDVHRIWKHVXUSULVHQXFOHDUDWWDFN´+HVD\VWKDW
³LI WKHUH ZDV FOHDU HYLGHQFH RI DQ DWWDFN VR LPPLQHQW WKDW WKHUH ZDV QR WLPH IRU
SROLWLFDO DFWLRQ WR SUHYHQW LW´ DQG WKH RQO\ PHDQLQJful action was pre-emptive self-
defence the action may be legal.130 
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Those who take a broader view of self-defence also use the object and purpose of the 
Charter to justify their view. They tend to prefer the individual perspective of national 
protection over the collective perspective of the minimisation of the recourse to force. 
*UHHQZRRGVD\VWKDWWKH&KDUWHUJLYHVSULRULW\WR³NHHSLQJWKHSHDFH´RYHUSUHYHQWLQJ
the use of force.131 6LPLODUO\%RZHWWZURWHWKDW³LWZRXOGEHDVWUDQJHFRQFOXVLRQLID
VWDWH¶V SURWHFWLRQ RI LWV RZQ OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV ZHUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK´ WKH
maintenance of international peace and security.132 Reisman is another commentator 
WR SULRULWLVH WKH QDWLRQDO RYHU WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ³7KH ILUVW LPSHUDWLYH RI HYHU\
territorial community ± hence the first imperative of the international law that these 
communities have created ± LVSURYLVLRQIRUQDWLRQDOGHIHQVH´133  
 
There are other objections to this expansive view of self-defence. The biggest 
objection is that to the extent that self-defence is not interpreted within the Charter 
framework and therefore balanced against, for instance, the general prohibition on the 
use of force, the purpose of national protection can justify an extremely broad 
spectrum of force. Corten suggests that those who take an expansive approach to 
identifying and interpreting the customary right of self-defence follow a purposive 
logic. They assume that the norm is for the protection of states and that states will 
VWRS DW QRWKLQJ WR SURWHFW WKHPVHOYHV ³7KLV W\SH RI UHDVRQLQJ«UHVWV XSRQ DQ
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objectivist theoretical viewpoint...It is logically and objectively impossible to refuse 
to allow pre-emptive anti-WHUURULVWDFWLRQ´134  
 
Another argument against purposivity, at least purposivity in the hands of the self-
interested interpreter is that the object and purpose of the Charter includes the desire 
to limit the exploitation of self-defence for national purposes.135 For instance, Judge 
Sir Robert Jennings pointed out the collective self-GHIHQFH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRDEXVHDV
D³FRYHUIRUDJJUHVVLRQGLVJXLVHGDVSURWHFWLRQ´.136 Thus it seems that the broad view 
of self-defence drifts too far from a normative ought and it becomes easier for states 
to exploit the Charter provisions to their own advantage. 
 
Finally in this section, it should be mentioned that there are also those who attack the 
Charter conception of self-defence on the grounds that article 51 can act as a 
³VLJQSRVWIRUWKHJXLOW\DQGDWUDSIRUWKHXQZDU\´137 It has been said that it does not 
EHKRYHWKHODZWROLVWWKHIDFWRUVWKDWZRXOGVLJQDODQLQYDOLGFODLPOHVWLW³RSHQ>@D
mine of argumentative possibilities for mala fides statesmen in search of 
MXVWLILFDWLRQV´138 The argument here is that where international lawyers seek to flesh 
out the abstract norm of self-defence, they may inadvertently make the right of self-
defence more exploitable even though they may feel that the instances of lawful force 
that they are enumerating under the category of self-defence make the rule less 
ambiguous not more so.  
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This is a crucial point: The right of self-defence is not exploitable only because it is 
ambiguous and therefore leaves statesmen ample room to employ it in justifications. 
Self-defence is also exploitable where it is over-specified because it creates extra 
categories under which an act of self-defence can be justified. This is particularly 
relevant to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption which was accompanied by rhetoric 
DERXWDQµD[LVRIHYLO¶139 .DPPHUKRIHUSRLQWVRXWWKDWLQDVLWXDWLRQZKHUH³DVWDWHRU
group of states) is a priori DFFRUGHG WKH VWDWXV RI µLQQRFHQW¶ DQG RWKHUV DUH DOZD\V 
µJXLOW\¶ WKHQ«DQDEVWUDFWGHILQLWLRQRIDJJUHVVLRQ LVQRWGHVLUDEOH´140 7KH µD[LVRI
HYLO¶FRPSULVHG,UDQ,UDTDQG1RUWK.RUHDWKUHHVWDWHVZKRZHUHDOVRVLQJOHGRXWLQ
WKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\6WUDWHJ\RIDV³URJXHVWDWHV´141 It therefore seems that the 
clear but contradictory phrases of article 51 may leave the right of self-defence 
vulnerable to exploitation rather than protecting it. 
 
PART TWO: CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE UN CHARTER. 
 
³,QWHUQDWLRQDO FXVWRP DV HYLGHQFH RI D JHQHUDO SUDFWLFH DFFHSWHG DV ODZ´ LV
recognised as a source of law to be applied by the ICJ.142 It is comprised of state 
practice and opinio iuris and is not necessarily tied to a negotiated text. International 
lawyers who make a narrow reading of self-defence tend to limit the effects of state 
practice and therefore prioritise the Charter over customary norms. This ties the use of 
force in self-defence to the existence of an armed attack and its logic of strict 
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exception to the general prohibition on the use of force which is the cornerstone of the 
collective security system.  
 
To the extent that the fundamental norms of the collective security system are not 
duplicated in the system of customary law, to purport that custom exists beside the 
Charter would mean that the collective security system could be bypassed without 
violating the law. Thus, .HOVHQ¶VYLHZZDVWKDW the right of self-defence has no other 
content than that determined by article 51.143  However, article 51 purports to preserve 
WKH µLQKHUHQW¶ ULJKW RI VHOI-defence.144 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the 
right of self-defence sketched in article 51 is insufficiently detailed and that recourse 
to custom is therefore unavoidable to flesh it out.145  
 
There are international lawyers who believe that the Charter text is no longer relevant 
to the task of finding the limits of self-defence. For instance, Murphy argues for a 
³SURWHDQ jus ad bellum´ EHFDXVH WKH &KDUWHU QRUPV QR ORQJHU UHIOHFW WKH UHDO
normative situation.146 Murphy, echoing the sentiments of the New Haven school, 
wouOGSUHIHU³DQRUPDWLYHUHJLPHWKDWLVOHVVRULHQWHGWRZDUGDWH[WXDOFRGLILFDWLRQRI
the norm and more toward the practical and nuanced application of the jus ad 
bellum´147 Custom, particularly the state practice element, is also a useful tool in the 
interpretation of the right of self-defence particularly as it reflects subsequent 
practice.148  
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Many international lawyers assert that a separate right of anticipatory self-defence is a 
customary norm based on the Caroline correspondence. A debate exists as to whether 
the Charter preserved such a right or erased it.149 The use of customary international 
law to modify the extent of the right of self-defence can be seen along a spectrum, 
stretching from armed attack to pre-emption, that is punctuated by qualitative 
differences in approach. These differences are: Firstly between the use of customary 
practice as an aid to interpretation; secondly the use of custom as providing a right of 
anticipatory self-defence; and thirdly the use of custom as a conduit for self help. That 
the form of custom is able to accommodate such vastly contrary positions suggests 
that Carty was right to call WKHFRQFHSWRIJHQHUDOFXVWRP³WKHPRVWGXELRXVDSSDUDWXV
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV´150  
 
A. State Practice and opinio iuris. 
 
It has been suggested that the use of custom by international lawyers differs greatly 
depending on their preference for a narrow or wide right of self-defence, and 
depending on their international or national perspective. The difference comes in how 
the international lawyer uses customary international law and what significance and 
form he accords to state practice and opinio iuris.151 The differences in the ways that 
international lawyers use the custom are difficult to untangle. Murphy has explained 
that this is because international lawyers are often dilatory in setting out their 
methodological premises.152 However, it may be said that the relationship between the 
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Charter and custom and the genre of customary international law itself are somewhat 
problematic in themselves.  
 
According to article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, customary norms are evidence of a 
³JHQHUDO SUDFWLFH DFFHSWHGDV ODZ´7KLV LV VDLG WRKDYH WZRHOHPHQWV3UDFWLFH DQG
opinio iuris. On the face of it, practice might be described as what states do and 
opinio iuris as what states say they do. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases it 
was said that opinio iuris LPSOLHV³WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDVXEMHFWLYHHOHPHQW´RIEHOLHIWKDW
WKHSUDFWLFHLV³UHQGHUHGREOLJDWRU\E\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDUXOHRIODZUHTXLULQJLW´153 
Opinio iuris prevents the norm being over-concretised and reduced to the is of state 
practice. It demands that international lawyers show not only that, for instance, the 
practice of anticipating attacks in self-defence is done by states in fact, but also that 
VWDWHV YLHZ VXFK SUDFWLFHV DV OHJDO $V %RWKH H[SODLQV ³>D@ JRRG IDFWXDO DUJXPHQW
GRHVQRWPDNHQHZODZ´154 Thus, Corten says a major difference between restrictive 
and expansive approaches is that restrictive approaches favour opinio iuris over 
practice.155 
 
The twin pillars of customary norms, practice and opinio iuris, are subject to various 
difficulties. Koskenniemi wrote that these two elements of opinio iuris and practice 
are circular because they refer back to one another.156 In the first place, it is not 
always easy to distinguish one from the other. This is because it is not always clear 
what constitutes general practice or opinio iuris. There seem to be differences in 
opinion about the probative value of conduct or of speech in establishing opinio iuris, 
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belief that certain behaviour is lawful. There are also differences between the 
µPRGHUQ¶DQGµFODVVLFDO¶DSSURDFKHVWRopinio iuris. Some seem to suggest that opinio 
iuris can be implied through acquiescence.157 Against this, it is said that on the 
restrictive view of self-GHIHQFH ³WKH ZLGHVSUHDG DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH ZDU DJDLQVW
Afghanistan is insufficient to support the conclusion that there has been a relaxation 
LQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI LQGLUHFW DJJUHVVLRQ´158 This suggests that the exclusion of 
acquiescence in the formation of custom may be criticised as leading to esoteric 
norms. 
 
7KHUH LV DOVR VRPHFRQFHUQ WKDWHVWDEOLVKLQJ³JHQHUDOSUDFWLFH´ LVSUREOHPDWLF VLQFH
self-defence is an exception to a rule and therefore, in theory at least, a rarity. 
Furthermore, the two elements of opinio iuris and practice are not always well 
separated159 and it is not clear what their relationship is.160 A related matter is that 
sometimes the practice of certain states seems to be valued above the practice of 
others in establishing the content of the norm. 161 This final point profoundly affects 
the value that is given to particular instances of the acceptance or rejection of a self-
defence claim, as opposed to any general attempt to elucidate the abstract norm.162 
 
State practice is relevant to the customary right of self-defence as evidence of its 
extent. In many cases, practice that is taken as evidence does not expressly state its 
significance. Instead, analysts must infer conclusions from particular behaviour. The 
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more interpretable state behaviour is, the more things it could signify, the greater the 
subjective discretion of the interpreter. Murphy says that whether writers focus on 
what states say or what they do is important.163 This is because where states express 
the significance of their actions, the discretion of the interpreter is lessened. In the 
opinion of McCoubrey and White, who take a narrow view of self-GHIHQFH ³D
significant emphasis should be placed on what states say in compiling an analysis of 
VWDWHSUDFWLFH´164  
 
+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHRWKHUZULWHUVZKRGLVWUXVWVWDWHV¶RZQGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHLUFRQGXFW
and who dismiss the relevance of state practice in UN organs on the grounds that it is 
deceitful.165 For McDougal and Feliciano, mere verbal allusion is insufficient fRU³D
VWUXFWXUH RI OHJDOLW\´ :KDW LV QHFHVVDU\ LV WKDW LW ³PXVW JR EH\RQG ZRUGV WR
H[SHFWDWLRQV WKDWDUHVXEVWDQWLDOO\FRUURERUDWHGE\GHHGV´166 These authors think of 
themselves as expert analysts of state behaviour who can glean scientifically 
respectable conclusions from their neutral methods.167 Against this view, the ICJ 
FDXWLRQHG DJDLQVW ³DVFULE>LQJ@ WR VWDWHV OHJDO YLHZV WKDW WKH\ GR QRW WKHPVHOYHV
DGYDQFH´168 It seems that while the McDougalist approach may enable the law to 
respond with far more agility to the pull of necessity, it also makes self-defence 
extremely vulnerable to exploitation.  
 
A further problem with self-defence as a whole is that it is an exceptional act rather 
than a daily occurrence and therefore practice relevant to it will be infrequent. It is 
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said that there have been very few justifications of anticipatory self-defence to date.169 
If there is a lack of practice suggesting, for instance, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-
defence, does this mean that it has not crossed the threshold of normativity? It has 
EHHQDVVHUWHGWKDW³VFDUFLW\RISUDFWLFHGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHIOHFWVXFKD>QHJDWLYH@
belief; it may just indicate that the circumstances calling for preemptive self-defense 
RQO\ LQIUHTXHQWO\ DULVH´170 Since there are few incidents in which states have 
unequivocally asserted a right to anticipatory self-defence, its proponents must make 
inferences from state practice that may signify a great number of possible meanings. 
As Murphy astutely points out, it is often hard to discern whether a state is acting in 
anticipation of a threat, pre-emptively or in response to a prior act.171  
 
This difficulty is demonstrated by the US-led action in Afghanistan in 2001, 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This action was taken in response to the 
bombing of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. The US representative 
Ambassador Negroponte wrote to the President of the SC, according to the reporting 
requirement in article 51, explaining that the US was acting in self-defence and 
suggesting that the US had evidence of potential future attacks that it intended to 
³SUHYHQWDQGGHWHU´172 However, in resolution 1368, the SC unanimously asserted that 
the US had a right of self-defence on the day after the attacks before any such 
evidence was publicised. It is hard to tell, therefore, whether OEF could be taken as 
evidence of anticipatory self-defence or whether it should be seen as a case of reprisal 
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or, indeed, whether it should simply be taken sui generis in the light of the uproar 
caused by 9/11. 
 
As far as state practice is concerned, it is also to be remembered that most 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV WKLQN WKDW WKH SUDFWLFH PXVW EH ³ZLGHVSUHDG´ UDWKHU WKDQ
isolated.173 This is because if the norm is to be universally applicable, it should reflect 
the will of all states. It is therefore necessary to look at the reactions of states to 
claims of self-defence by others. This has the added advantage of limiting the 
exploitability of state practice by including as large a survey as possible. Murphy 
worries that this technique is problematic in practical terms: What sorts of actions will 
FRXQWDVDUHDFWLRQWRDQRWKHU¶VFODLP":KDWLIWKHUHDUHFRQWUDGLFWRU\VLJQDOVRQWKH
QDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOV":KDWLIRQHGRXEWVWKDWWKHµUHDOPRWLYH¶EHKLQGWKH
reaction was connected to the legal status of the claim?174  
 
On a practical level, gauging the reactions of states is extremely hard work.175 There 
are 192 states in the UN and all of them have numberless outlets for opinion. Based 
on the approach of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, Kritsiotis has attempted to limit the 
UHOHYDQFHRIVWDWHV¶UHDFWLRQVDFFRUGLQJWRZKHWKHUWKH\DUHSROLWLFDORUOHJDO, formal 
or informal.176 These distinctions can seem artificial. For instance, is a statement legal 
EHFDXVH LW LQYROYHV µVHOI-defenFH¶ RU PXVW LW LQYRNH DUWLFOH " *UD\ UDLVHV IXUWKHU
difficulties when she notes that states tend not to condemn or commend uses of force 
RQ WKH EDVLV RI GRFWULQH EXW WHQG WR GR VR RQ WKH IDFWV 6WDWHV¶ XVHV RI IRUFH DUH
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frequently condemned on the grounds that they are disproportionate so that the states 
evaluating them do not commit themselves to particular readings of doctrine.177  
 
$ WKLUG SUREOHP ZLWK DVVHVVLQJ VWDWHV¶ UHDFWLRQV WR XVHV RI IRUFH OLHV LQ WKH
problematic concept of opinio iuris. A state is an artificial entity and, even if one does 
QDUURZGRZQWKHµPLQG¶RIWKHVWDWHWRLWVJRYHUQPHQWQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDUHDOVR
artificial entities. It may be the case, then, that a state cannot be said to possess a view 
on whether particular behaviour was legal or not. This can make it hard to draw 
conclusions about the relevance of particular instances of evaluation to the 
development or adaptation of the right of self-defence. 
 
B. Reducing the ought to the is? 
 
,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDW³>F@XVWRPLVprecisely what enables us to link the abstract 
OHJDO FRQFHSW WR WKH SDUWLFXODU IDFWXDO VLWXDWLRQ´178 It might therefore be suggested 
that what states usually do provides a sort of informal precedent that offers guidance 
to those attempting to interpret the right of self-defence bearing in mind the idea that 
the binding force of norms flows from the sovereign will. The use of customary 
norms and state practice sometimes reflects an affinity with the concerns of realist 
writers that the Charter system does not adequately deal with the reality of interstate 
relations.179 )RULQVWDQFH%RZHWWZKRGHVFULEHVKLVDSSURDFKDV³HPSLULFDO´VHHNVWR
analyse the practice of states to see which rights have been deemed capable of 
protection by the exercise of self-defence.180  
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Further along the spectrum, the school of policy realism which thinks of norms as 
H[SUHVVLQJVWDWHV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVDVUHIOHFWHGLQZKDWWKH\XVXDOO\GRDQGZKDWWKH\DUH
otherwise expected to do) has justified a broad view of self-defence. Finally, the 
doctrine of pre-emption was justified in part by an assertion of US practice181 and in 
SDUWE\FHQWXULHV¶ROGSUH-prohibition on the use of force) international law.182  
 
For international lawyers wishing to answer the realist criticisms by suggesting that 
customary norms or state practice mitigate the rigour of article 51 in some way, a 
problem arises. They must provide a legal framework of recognition and 
interpretation which prevents the is of practice subsuming the normativity of the right 
of self-defence. The problem is that the existence of secondary rules limiting, for 
instance, the speed with which self-defence can adapt, or requiring widespread 
practice rather than consistent practice by a single state,183 means that many of the 
criticisms about the responsiveness of law made by realists still bite. This is 
LOOXVWUDWLYH RI .RVNHQQLHPL¶V FULWLFLVP WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV DUH RIWHQ VWXFN
between arguments of normativity and arguments of concreteness.184  
 
Koskenniemi has warned that ³WKHUH PXVW EH VRPH GLVtance between fact and the 
ODZ´.185 This is because, as .UDWRFKZLOH[SODLQV ³WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIYLRODWLQJQRUPV
has made the explanation and prediction of action in terms of norms particularly 
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GLIILFXOW´7KXVLQ,5QRUPV³KDYHEHHQXQGHUVWRRGVROHO\DVLGHological reflections, 
GHFHSWLRQVVXEWHUIXJHVRU«DVDQLPSHGLPHQWWRDFKLHYLQJRQH¶VJRDOVLQD³UDWLRQDO
ZD\´186 This highlights that the different conceptions of the functions of collective 
security norms is central to the question of whether the norm is effective or not. For 
UHDOLVWVDQGRWKHUVWDNLQJDQ³LQVWUXPHQWDOLVWRSWLF´187 norms express expectations of 
IXWXUHEHKDYLRXU)RUGRFWULQDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUVDQGRWKHUV WDNLQJD³QRUPDWLYH
RSWLF´QRUPVFDQEHFRQVWUDLQWVRQEHKDYLRXUWKDWPD\RUPD\Qot be obeyed.  
 
This basic difference can make it difficult for the defenders of the collective security 
system to engage with its critics. However, the difference should not be over-
emphasised. Few doctrinal international lawyers are blasé about whether the 
prohibition on the use of force is obeyed in practice. In part this is because two of the 
PDMRUVRXUFHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZWUHDWLHVDQGFXVWRPDUHEDVHGRQVWDWHV¶LQWHQWLRQ
to be bound. If state practice ceases to display such an intention or submission, it may 
be questioned whether the provisions of the Charter have validity according to a 
doctrinal framework never mind a realist one. Those adhering to a vehemently 
doctrinal method may render the law esoteric in the process. 
 
Custom introduces an added level of complexity into identifying valid self-defence 
because the formulation of the norm is no longer static, reduced to a moment of time 
in which a document was signed, but instead dependent on what states do over time. 
A flexible norm is also a moving target. In relation to this, it is to be emphasised that 
the use of customary norms and state practice also makes the job of distinguishing 
violations and adaptations of self-defence more complex. Thus Reisman says that the 
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decentralised nature of inWHUQDWLRQDO ODZPHDQVWKDW³PXFKODZ-PDNLQJ«LVLQLWLDWHG
E\XQLODWHUDOFODLP´188 While Franck is a little more circumspect, he says WKDW³>L@Q
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZYLRODWRUVGRVRPHWLPHVWXUQRXWWREHODZJLYHUV´189 However Gray 
makes the point that most state practice does not lead one to reappraise the law even 
where it is law-violating because the violation is a matter of fact and not doctrinal 
development.190  
 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶ attempts to mediate between the descriptive is and the 
prescriptive ought are often mirrored by a parallel mediation between the subjective 
and the objective. Practice relevant to law goes beyond the merely subjective. Many 
international lawyers objectify such practice using secondary norms that set more or 
less stringent conditions on the sort of practice that can be said to be norm-generating. 
However, international lawyers disagree among themselves about the degree of 
stringency of these norms and, consequently, the flexibility of the system.  Further, 
the array of different opinions about the scope of self-defence can stoke FULWLFV¶ILUHV
by enabling them to claim that the norms of the collective security system are 
³VLQJXODUO\ XVHOHVV DV D PHDQV RI MXVWLI\LQJ RU FULWLFL]LQJ EHKDYLRXU´191 This is 
because such disagreement among international lawyers is sometimes taken as 
evidence that legal doctrine cannot produce objective answers. 
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C. Parallel Streams of Law? 
 
,Q %RZHWW¶V YLHZ WKH &KDUWHU LV QRW D VRXUFH RI ULJKWV DQG WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH 81
have more rights than those accorded to them under it. For him, there is nothing to 
stop other rights existing simultaneously with the Charter.192 If a separate customary 
right of self-defence were to exist in parallel to article 51, the scope of self-defence 
would be broadened to the extent that the customary right was broader than the 
Charter one. This is because states would simply justify their uses of force according 
to custom and not the Charter. Brownlie points this out and deduces that article 51 
cannot exist alongside some other right: ³>:@KHUHWKH&KDUWHUKDVDVSHFLILFSURYLVLRQ
relating to a particular legal category, to assert that this does not restrict the wider 
ambit of the customary law relating to that category or problem is to go beyond the 
ERXQGV RI ORJLF´ %URZQOLH VD\V WKHUe would be no point in having the Charter at 
all.193  
 
The intermingling of the customary and Charter law on the right of self-defence is 
something all international lawyers have had to take seriously, whatever their stripe, 
since the mid-1980s.194 The ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to hear a case brought 
by Nicaragua against the US, despite the fact that the US had made a reservation to 
DUWLFOHRI WKH ,&-6WDWXWHSURYLGLQJ IRU WKH&RXUW¶VFRPSXOVRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ195 
This reservation seemed prima facie to exclude the question of self-defence from the 
SXUYLHZRIWKHFRXUW,WH[FOXGHG³GLVSXWHVDULVLQJXQGHUDPXOWLODWHUDOWUHDW\XQOHVV
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(1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before 
the Court, or (2) the United 6WDWHVRI$PHULFDVSHFLDOO\DJUHHV WR MXULVGLFWLRQ´7KH
Court found that it was precluded from considering the applicability of either article 
21 of the Organisation of American States (OAS) Charter or article 51 of the UN 
Charter.196 However, it concluded WKDWWKHUHVHUYDWLRQWRWKH2SWLRQDO&ODXVH³KDVQR
further impact on the sources of international law which Article 38 of the Statute 
UHTXLUHVWKH&RXUWWRDSSO\´197  
 
The Court rejected two further US arguments: Firstly, that it is precluded from 
applying customary norms; and secondly that the use of force in self-defence is not 
justiciable. As to the first argument, it was said that this was ³HLWKHUEHFDXVHH[LVWLQJ
customary rules had been incorporated into the Charter, or because the Charter 
influenced WKHODWHUDGRSWLRQRIFXVWRPDU\UXOHVZLWKDFRUUHVSRQGLQJFRQWHQW´198 The 
Court took as evidence for the continued existence of a customary right of self-
GHIHQFH WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH ZRUG ³LQKHUHQW´ LQ DUWLFOH  7KH &RXUW VDLG WKDW LW
³FDQQRW«EH KHOG WKDW $UWLFOH  LV D SURYLVLRQ ZKLFK µVXEVXPHV DQG VXSHUYHQHV¶
FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ EHFDXVH WKH GHWDLO RI DUWLFOH  PXVW EH VXSSOLHG E\
customary international law.199  
 
As to the second argument, the US suggested that ³WKH &RXUW VKRXOG KROG WKH
application to be inadmissible in view of the subject-matter of the application and the 
position of the Court within the United Nations system, including the impact of 
proceedings before the Court on the on-JRLQJ H[HUFLVH RI µWKH LQKHUHQW ULJKW WR
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individual or collective self-GHIHQFH¶ XQGHU $UWLFOH ´200 7KH 86 FODLPHG WKDW ³D
MXGJPHQW RI WKH &RXUW WKDW SXUSRUWHG WR GHQ\ WKH YDOLGLW\ RI D VWDWH¶V FODLP WR EH
engaged in self-GHIHQFH«PXVW QDWXUDOO\ µLPSDLU¶ WKH µLQKHUHQW¶ ULJKW JXDUDQWHHG WR
that state by Article ´201 It has been pointed out that the adoption of this position by 
the US is somewhat curious since it made the opposite arguments at the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.202  
 
The Court did not deal exhaustively with the relationship between article 51 and the 
customary right of self-defence. In particular, it refrained from discussing whether a 
customary right of anticipatory self-defence existed.203 However the Court found that 
³ERWK WKH &KDUWHU DQG WKH FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ IORZ IURP D FRmmon 
IXQGDPHQWDO SULQFLSOH RXWODZLQJ WKH XVH RI IRUFH LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV´204 The 
Court also held that the Charter provisions continued to be relevant to the 
determination of the scope of the customary law applicable.205 In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Sir Robert Jennings was critical of the majority for doing this.206 As 
the basis for its understanding of customary self-defence, the article 2(4) prohibition 
on the use of force was said to exist in customary law.207 It found evidence for this, 
inter alia, in the Declaration of Friendly Relations208 which is said to attract 
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³XQDQLPRXVDJUHHPHQW´209 The weight attached to the judgments of the ICJ by many 
of the international lawyers taking a restrictive view of self-defence means that the 
scope of the customary right of self-defence cannot be ignored in a discussion of self-
defence. 
 
7KH ,&-¶V MXGJPHQW KDV EHHQ FULWLFLVHG IRU GUDZLQJ WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-defence too 
narrowly. The Court refrained from examining state practice in the actions of states 
and instead based its findings on negotiated texts passed as GA resolutions. This can 
be criticised for artificially distancing customary international law from the is of state 
practice. Reisman says that behind the Nicaragua judgment was a desire to prevent 
³DQLQH[RUDEOHVOLGHGRZQWKDWSUHFLSLWRXVVORSH´WRZDUGVSUH-emption. For him, the 
reasoning is not easily applicable where the non-state actors concerned are armed with 
WMD and are impervious to concerns about reciprocity of retaliation.210  
 
Thus, the relevance of a narrow conception of state practice and the customary right 
of self-defence can be criticised for failing to reflect changes in the strategic reality 
from which necessity flows. However the fact that the Court recognised that the two 
streams of law exist in parallel means that those who take a broad view of self-
defence are relieved of the necessity of making the argument that customary law is 
relevant. The question then becomes about the extent of the customary right of self-
defence that exists along side the Charter. 
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'7KHµ,QKHUHQW¶5LJKWWR6HOI-Defence. 
 
The confusion between custom and the Charter is fomented by the wording of article 
 2ZLQJ WR WKH IDFW WKDW DUWLFOH  RSHQV ZLWK WKH ZRUGV ³QRWKLQJ LQ WKH SUHVHQW
Charter shall impair the inherent ULJKWWR«VHOI-GHIHQFH´211 international lawyers of a 
more traditional stripe are able to approach the realist conception that the right of self-
defence is not a legal right under the Charter but a rival sort of natural right that is not 
regulated by international law or collective evaluation. McDougal wrote that ³>W@KHUH
is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the United Nations Charter, by 
inserting one provision which expressly preserves the right of self-defence, had the 
intent of imposing by this new provision limitations upon the traditional right of self-
GHIHQVH´212 Against this, Kelsen thought WKDW WKHDGGLWLRQRI WKHZRUG³LQKHUHQW´ LQ
article 51 was PHUHO\DOHJLVODWRU¶VSUHIHUHQFHDQG that there would be no difference if 
it were dropped.213 $OWHUQDWLYHO\%URZQOLH¶VUHDGLQJRIDUWLFOHXVHVWKHSUHVHQFHRI
³LQKHUHQW´WREROVWHUDUHVWULFWLYHDUJXPHQW³>,@WLVQRWLQFRQJUXRXVWRUHJDUG$UWLFOH
51 as containing the only right of self-GHIHQFHSHUPLWWHGXQGHUWKH&KDUWHU´7KLV LV
because of tKH UHIHUHQFH WR ³LQKHUHQW ULJKW´214 The extent of that right depends on 
what the extent of the right was prior to 1945. 
 
There are two rival conceptions of the state of customary law in 1945. One is that 
sovereign states were free to take measures of self help as a way of safeguarding their 
interests.215 The opposing view is that the basic norm of the prohibition on the use of 
                                                 
211
 Emphasis added. 
212
 0F'RXJDO³7KH6RYLHW-&XEDQ4XDUDQWLQH´S6HHDOVR-<RR³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ DQG,UDT´
97(3) AJIL (2003) 563, p. 571+HUHLQDIWHUµ<RR³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG,UDT´¶ 
213
 Kelsen, Law of the United Nations, p. 792. 
214
 %URZQOLH³7KH8VHRI)RUFHLQ6HOI-'HIHQFH´, p. 239. 
215
 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, p. 3. 
111  
force has effectively rendered acts of self-help illegal. In a well-known article, 
Brownlie noted the confusion caused by the residue of pre-Charter self help.216 It has 
EHHQ VDLG WKDW LQ WKH SDVW ³HDFK VWDWH >KDG@ DQ XQFRQWUROOHG IDFXOW\ DV D VRYHUHLJQ
competence and prerogative, to prosecute its rights, real or imagined, by recourse to 
FRHUFLRQDQGYLROHQFH´217 This is because self help involves the vindication of a legal 
right whereas self-defence is related to self-preservation, a category with narrower 
purposes than that of self-help.  
 
The right of self-defence is narrower still because it connotes reaction against a use of 
force.218 There was no need for a state to have been the victim of any violence before 
it could take forcible countermeasures to vindicate its rights. Self help, then, is 
DQDWKHPDWRWKH&KDUWHU¶VSURKLELWLRQRIWKHXVHRIIRUFH7KHUHIRUHWRWKHH[WHQWWKDW
the custoPDU\ULJKWµSUHVHUYHG¶LQWKH&KDUWHULVRQHRIVHOI-help, it effectively negates 
the collective security system because it can no longer be said that the system has the 
monopoly on the use of force. 
 
The terminology of self-defence, self preservation and self help causes some 
confusion. While the terms are not often used interchangeably these days, it remains 
the case that self-defence is often related to self help. For instance, there are 
academics who view self-defence as a species of self help.219 In doing so they may 
seem to suggest that self-defence is not only an exception to the prohibition on the use 
of force, but it is an exception that exists outside the collective security system and 
does not share its logic or its internationalist perspective.  
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According to Brownlie, self-preservation acts as a sort of conduit between Charter 
self-defence and nineteenth century self help. +H ZURWH ³>W@R SHUPLW DQWLFLSDWRU\
action may well be to accept a right which is wider than that of self-defence and akin 
to that of self-SUHVHUYDWLRQ´220 To the extent that it can be argued that the preservation 
RIWKHVWDWHLVDQµLQKHUHQW¶ULJKWLWFRXOGEHVDLGWKDWWKHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHRFFXUUHQFH
RIDQDUPHGDWWDFNLVXQIRXQGHG,QWRGD\¶VOLWHUDWXUHWKLVFRQIXVLRQLVPDQLIested in 
the use of the Caroline correspondence which occurred at a time when self-
preservation and self-defence were not distinguished.221 It is possible to argue, then, 
that the Webster formulation of the right of anticipatory self-defence cannot be 
accommodated in the collective security system as part of pre-existing customary 
international law because it did not relate specifically to self-defence. Thus, 
Kammerhofer suggests that the Caroline correspondence is not necessarily relevant 
because in 1837 the use of force had not been prohibited and the Charter right of self-
defence can only be understood in the context of the Charter.222  
 
7KHHIIHFWRIWKHLQFOXVLRQRIµLQKHUHQW¶LQDUWLFOHZLOOGHSHQGRQZKHWKHUZULWHUV
believe that pre-1945 custom was based on self help or whether it included the 
prohibition on the use of force. Some scholars seem to think of custom as being 
primarily shaped by the nineteenth century practices of the Great Powers when 
restrictions on the sovereign state were not lightly presumed and war was viewed as 
an instrument of national policy.223 However, Brownlie has made the argument that 
pre-Charter customary law was not very different to the article 51 right. He pointed to 
                                                 
220
 %URZQOLH³7KH8VHRI)RUFHLQ6HOI-'HIHQFH´, p. 227. 
221
 Ibid., p. 227. 
222
 Kammerhofer, ³8QFHUWDLQWLHVRIWKH/DZRQ6HOI'HIHQFH´S 
223
 McCoubrey and White, International Law and Armed Conflict, p. 19. 
113  
the seismic developments that occurred after WWI: The League of Nations and the 
Kellogg-%ULDQG3DFWERWKSRLQWHGWRDGHYHORSLQJWUHQGWRZDUGVOLPLWLQJVWDWHV¶ULJKW
to resort to force.  
 
The Covenant of the League demonstrates a move towards the pacific settlement of 
GLVSXWHVZLWKVWDWHVXQGHUWDNLQJWKDW³LIWKHre should arise between them any dispute 
likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial 
VHWWOHPHQWRUWRHQTXLU\E\WKH&RXQFLO´UDWKHUWKDQLPPHGLDWHO\UHVRUWLQJWRIRUFH224 
In signing the Covenant, members agreed that resort to war in violation of this would 
be construed as an act of war against all League members who would break off 
relations with the delinquent state.225  
 
The Kellogg-%ULDQG 3DFW ZDV VLJQHG IRXU \HDUV ODWHU LQ  ,W SURYLGHG ³IRU WKH
renunciatiRQ RI ZDU DV DQ LQVWUXPHQW RI QDWLRQDO SROLF\´226 Moreover, the early 
twentieth century had seen a gradual move towards the legalisation and 
institutionalisation of inter-state dispute settlement. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration was established in 1899 by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes. Moreover, the conduct of warfare had also begun to be 
regulated in the nineteenth century with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 
For those scholars who prefer a narrow view of self-defence, these events seem 
conclusive of the proposition that the Charter reflected state practice in 1945.  
 
On the other hand, it has also been possible for international lawyers to counter-argue 
that this trend towards limiting the sovereign right to resort to war did not in fact, and 
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was not meant to by the states responsible for these innovations, to deprive sovereign 
states of the right to use force in self-defence. A frequently used example are the 
reservations to the Kellogg-Briand Pact by which several states specifically exempted 
the right to resort to force in self-defence from the ambit of the Pact. The British 
UHVHUYDWLRQSXUSRUWHGWRFRYHUDQ\WKLQJWKDWZDVD³special and vital interest for our 
peace and safety´227 This has been taken to mean VRPHWKLQJ ZLGHU WKDQ µDUPHG
DWWDFN¶ DQG WKHUHIRUH WR UHIOHFW WKH SRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-defence remained 
unlimited by the developments of the early twentieth century.228 It has also been 
claimed that the prohibition on the use of force rested on the ability of the SC to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. It might be argued that during 
the Cold War when the SC was deadlocked, customary practice necessarily diverged 
from the Charter norm as states took matters into their own hands.229 
 
E. Imminence. 
 
Having examined the question of the relationship between the Charter and customary 
versions of self-defence in broad terms, we will now turn to the question of 
anticipatory self-defence. As mentioned above,230 anticipatory self-defence is 
sometimes said to be valid insofar as it can be said to have survived developments 
since the mid nineteenth century. In an exchange of letters in the 1830s and 40s with 
Lord Ashburton on behalf of the UK, the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, 
asserted that an action in self-defence would be valid where the necessity of self-
                                                 
227
 In Further Correspondence with Government of the United States Respecting the United States 
Proposal for the Renunciation of War (1928) an exchange of letters between the US and the UK 
reveals that the drafters of the Treaty specifically had in mind the reservation of self-defence. Available 
at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbbr.asp#no2.  
228
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, p. 433. 
229
 See Chapter I, at p. 33. 
230
 Supra, at p. 110-111. 
115  
GHIHQFHZDV³LQVWDQWRYHUZKHOPLQJOHDYLQJno choice of means, and no moment for 
GHOLEHUDWLRQ´231 This is commonly read as laying down three requirements for a valid 
use of force in self-defence: Necessity, proportionality and imminence. Following 
this, the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo applied a test of 
imminence to the German invasion of Norway and the Japanese invasion of the Dutch 
East Indies, respectively.232  
 
However, as far back as the 1960s, certain writers asserted that ³WKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJLV
now widespread that a test formulated in the previous century for a controversy 
EHWZHHQ WZR IULHQGO\ VWDWHV LV KDUGO\ UHOHYDQW WR FRQWHPSRUDU\ FRQWURYHUVLHV´233 
While perhaps not reflecting the reasoning behind this criticism, this statement might 
also be related to the existence of the collective security system. It may be said that 
during the mid-nineteenth century there was no SC to take action to maintain 
international peace and security and that therefore the right of self-defence had to be 
broader.  
 
Objections have also been made to the use of the Caroline RQWKHJURXQGVWKDW³>W@KH
IRUPXOD ZDV QRW FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ LQ ´ ³D VLQJOH LQFLGHQW FDQQRW
FUHDWHFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´WKHDJUHHPHQWZDVSROLWLFDOQRWOHJDOQRUZDVLW
accepted in practice and finally that it was limited to certain kinds of self-defence.234 
These are objections that flow from choices made about the recognition of valid legal 
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norms: The secondary rules that enable scholars to claim objectivity for their readings 
of self-defence. 
 
There have been other criticisms of the use of the Caroline correspondence on the 
grounds that it is too restrictive. McDougal and Feliciano have written that the 
:HEVWHU IRUPXOD LV ³VR DEVWUDFWO\ UHVWULFWLYH DV DOPRVW LI UHDG OLWHUDOO\ WR LPSRVH
SDUDO\VLV´235 This does not, however, mean that the formulation is no longer used. 
Rather, the general acceptance of the relevance of the Caroline, particularly following 
-HQQLQJV¶ZHOONQRZQDUWLFOH236 means that it can be seen as a minor snag in the fabric 
of international law that may lead to its unravelling.  
 
Relying on the Caroline LQ WKH OLJKW RI 0F'RXJDO¶V REMHFWLRQV Sofaer has made a 
reading of the three Webster principles that entirely subordinates imminence to 
necessity and proportionality.237 Other international lawyers are less radical, but they 
have still been willing to exploit the Caroline to justify a right of self-defence that 
supposedly comSOHPHQWV WRGD\¶V VWUDWHJLF UHDOLW\ Greenwood makes it clear that 
GHILQLQJ³LPPLQHQFH´GHSHQGVRQVRFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV+HVD\VWKDW³LWLVQHFHVVDU\
to take into account two factors that did not exist at the time of the Caroline LQFLGHQW´
The gravity of the threat (WMD) and the delivery of the threat (by terrorists).238 
Similarly, Yoo has written that ³XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKH FRQFHSW RI LPPLQHQFH
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must encompass an analysis that goes beyond the temporal proximity of a threat to 
include the probability thDWWKHWKUHDWZLOORFFXU´239 
 
The imminence requirement has been central to many discussions of the G.W. Bush 
doctrine of pre-emption. What is striking about the National Security Strategy of 2002 
in which it was set out240 is that the claim made was that international law must 
adapt.241 There has been some confusion about whether the proposition was not one of 
ought or is. It is not clear whether the changed strategic reality somehow 
automatically enlarged the scope of the unilateral right to use force or whether the 
Bush administration was arguing for a change in the law.  
 
This confusion stems from the approach of the NSS drafters. Instead of rejecting the 
current system outright, the NSS appears to simultaneously lay down an ultimatum 
for reform and suggest that the reform is well underway within the system.242 The 
NSS markets the doctrine of pre-emption as an extension of the right of anticipatory 
self-defence based on imminence, necessity and proportionality, the Webster formula. 
It has been suggested that ³WKe US seeks first to secure a pre-existing claim, and then 
WR VWUHWFK WKH UHVXOWLQJ UXOH VR DV WR UHQGHU LW KLJKO\ DPELJXRXV´243 Mention of the 
Charter norms on the use of force is conspicuous by its absence in Part V of the NSS 
in which the doctrine is contained.244  
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%\HUV H[SODLQHG WKDW ³DFFRUGLQJ WR WUDGLWLRQDO PHDQV RI WUHDW\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH
ZRUGV ³LI DQ DUPHG DWWDFN RFFXUV´ SUHFOXGH DQ\ ULJKW WR SUH-HPSWLYH DFWLRQ´245 In 
effect, it is suggested, the doctrine of pre-emption is situated in a framework of 
customary international law bowdlerized of the Charter norms. This is one of the 
reasons that international lawyers wishing to defend the Charter system by tempering 
its rigour with the flexibility of custom may, in effect, bolster arguments for pre-
emption rather than counter them to the extent that the Charter can be subsumed 
completely by custom.  
 
It is arguable that allowing anticipatory self-defence in this way can encourage a 
³VOLSSHU\VORSH´WKDWHIIHFWLYHO\UHQGHUVWKH:HEVWHUIRUPXODQRPRUHWKDQ a badge of 
legitimacy. The Bush doctrine was an attempt to remove the imminence criterion 
completely 7KH UDWLRQDOH IRU KLV UHPRYDO ZDV WKDW ³DW WKH FURVVURDGV RI UDGLFDOLVP
DQGWHFKQRORJ\´H[LVWWHUURULVWVDUPHGZLWK:0'246 Yoo has offered an argument in 
favour of this move, suggesting that ³DPRUHIOH[LEOHVWDQGDUGVKRXOGJRYHUQWKHXVH
of force in self-defense, one that focuses less on temporal imminence and more on the 
PDJQLWXGHRIWKHSRWHQWLDOKDUPDQGWKHSUREDELOLW\RIDQDWWDFN´247  
 
The idea is simply that the US could not afford to wait for the terrorists armed with 
WMD to strike. It argued that the alternative to pre-empting this new breed of threat is 
ZDLWLQJOLNH³VLWWLQJGXFNV´248 RU³KRSLQJIRUWKHEHVW´249 Former US President G.W. 
Bush has said WKDW³>L@QWKHZRUOGZHKDYHHQWHUHGWKHRQO\SDWKWRVDIHW\LVWKHSDWK
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RIDFWLRQ´250 It will be argued that this sort of precautionary approach to self-defence 
gives the claimant state a dangerously broad authority to invoke self-defence in a way 
that does not admit of third party evaluation.251 
 
While the right of anticipatory self-GHIHQFH LV VDLG WR EH ³FRQWURYHUVLDO´ E\ VRPH
writers,252 since 9/11 many have given more credence to the view that it may be 
possible to anticipate an imminent attack in certain situations. Indeed, the view has 
been expressed by both the former Secretary General of the UN and by his High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which were established to consider 
WKH FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP¶V UHVSRQVH WR FKDQJHV LQ WKH VWUDtegic environment. 
)RUPHU 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO .RIL $QQDQ ZDV FRQILGHQW WKDW ³>L@mminent threats are 
fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to 
defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this 
covers an LPPLQHQWDWWDFNDVZHOODVRQHWKDWKDVDOUHDG\KDSSHQHG´253  
 
Similarly, the High Level Panel found that despite the fact that 1945 and 2004 are 
³GLIIHUHQW ZRUOGV´254 ³DUWLFOH  QHHGV QHLWKHU H[WHQVLRQ QRU UHVWULFWLRQ RI LWV ORQJ-
understRRGVFRSH´255 +RZHYHU³DFFRUGLQJWRORQJHVWDEOLVKHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ can 
take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means 
ZRXOG GHIOHFW LW DQG WKH DFWLRQ LV SURSRUWLRQDWH´256 However Gray says that at the 
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World Summit in ³DPDMRULW\RIVWDWHVZHUHQRWZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWDQWLFLSDWRU\
let alone pre-emptive self-GHIHQFH´257 Glennon also criticises the High Level Panel 
for suggesting that self-defence can be used in response to an imminent attack. He 
says that this has no basis in doctrinal sources.258 The inclusion of imminence in the 
definition of anticipatory self-defence falls short of the freedom of action propounded 
by the G.W. Bush Administration. It can therefore be seen as an unsatisfactory 
compromise that does not properly address concerns about the efficacy of the 
collective security system.259 )RULQVWDQFH³DSRWHQWLDODWWDFNPD\EHWUHDWHGDVYHU\
OLNHO\WRRFFXUHYHQWKRXJKLWLVQRWLPPLQHQW´ZRXOGQRWIDOOZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQ260 
 
It will be claimed that a crucial difference between pre-emption and anticipation is 
WKDW ³>D@ FUHGLEOH FODLP IRU DQWLFLSDWRU\ VHOI-defense must point to a palpable and 
imminent threat. A claim for preemptive self-defense can only point to a possibility, a 
FRQWLQJHQF\´261 It is suggested that insofar as the imminence of an attack makes it 
easier to recognise and to evidence, the ability of the collective security system to 
distinguish valid from invalid self-defence claims rests on it. Thus Greenwood 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW ³>W@he right of self-defence will justify action only where there is 
VXIILFLHQWHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHWKUHDWRIDWWDFNH[LVWV´262  
 
Many international lawyers have suggested that a similar reasoning lay behind the 
LQFOXVLRQ RI µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ LQ DUWLFOH 263 It is suggested that to the extent that a 
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claim can be evidenced to the satisfaction of an evaluative discourse, this distinction 
is possible to make. It is submitted that the distinction could no longer be made where 
a state took action pre-emptively and then refused to give evidence for its actions on 
the grounds that it was based on classified intelligence.264 In this part of the thesis I 
have presented some ambiguities and problems in the operation of customary law in 
order to demonstrate that where custom is applied in order to µVDYH¶DUWLFOHIURP
obscurity and esotericism, there is a danger that the writer will open the door to far 
broader claims than he intended. This is because the operation of custom in practice is 
deeply contested. On the other hand, where customary norms are used to create a rule-
guided compromise between the narrow position of article 51 and the doctrine of self-
help, they remain open to the criticism that they are overly determining and irrelevant 
to the present day strategic reality. International lawyers have not seemed able to 
escape the double-bind of exploitation and esotericism. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
International lawyers sympathetic to the UN collective security system face a 
dilemma posed by the realist challenge to doctrinal and other normative approaches. 
7KH UHDOLVW FKDUJH LV WKLV ³$UWLFOH  LV JURXQGHG XSRQ SUHPLVHV WKDW QHLWKHU
DFFXUDWHO\GHVFULEHQRUUHDOLVWLFDOO\SUHVFULEHVWDWHEHKDYLRXU´265 The challenge has a 
long pedigree; Franck famously declared the death of article 2(4) in 1970 on the 
grounGV WKDW ³ZKDW NLOOHG DUWLFOH  ZDV WKH ZLGH GLVSDULW\ EHWZHHQ WKH QRUPV LW
sought to establish and the practical goals the nations are pursuing in defense of their 
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QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW´266 The dilemma is this: In order to assert that the Charter system 
remaLQVUHOHYDQWDQGHIIHFWLYHWRVWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQVWRXVHIRUFHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV
must show that states adhere to its provisions. However in order to assert that the 
article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force is not merely illusory and that the article 51 
right of self-defence is more than a carte blanche, international lawyers must be able 
to distinguish violations of self-defence from adaptations.267  
 
)RU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV WDNLQJ WKH UHVWULFWLYH DSSURDFK WKH IDFLOLWDWLRQ RI VWDWHV¶
interests is not the primary objective. It does not always seem to matter whether the 
UXOHZRUNVZHOORUQRW³:KHWKHURUQRWDQRUPSURGXFHVXQGHVLUDEOHHIIHFWVLIDSSOLHG
WRUHDOLW\LVLUUHOHYDQWIRUWKHYDOLGLW\´268 This is, perhaps, because they are conscious 
of maintaining the distance between the concrete is and the normative ought. Indeed, 
in many cases it is apparent that international lawyers are chary of increasing the 
VFRSHRIDUWLFOHOHVWLWEHDEXVHGE\SRZHUIXOVWDWHV$V.RVNHQQLHPLSXWVLW³WKH
wider the right of self-defence is, the wider the authorisation for those people who can 
DFWXDOO\XVHIRUFHWRGRVR´269 Thus, the effectiveness from the point of view of the 
nation state simply is not very important for such international lawyers. Corten writes 
tKDW WKH UHVWULFWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ KROGV ³>H@YHQ LI LW HQFRXQWHUV OLPLWV LQ LWV
HIIHFWLYHQHVV«´270 6LPLODUO\ LWKDVEHHQVDLG WKDW³>U@HJDUGOHVVRI WKHVKRUWFRPLQJV
RI WKHV\VWHP WKHRSWLRQRIDSUHYHQWLYHXVHRI IRUFH LVH[FOXGHGE\$UWLFOH´271 
Such international lawyers could be criticised for esotericism, and it could be claimed 
that international law has the capacity for more flexibility. However, in this section 
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the author has sought to show that, since adaptation often comes in the form of a 
prima facie violation, this technique may open the law to abuse. Thus, Carty warns 
that when a state declares adherence to international law we should be put on our 
guard and not comforted.272 
 
Defending the restrictive approach to self-defence, Corten writes that ³>W@KHGLYHUVLW\
of possible interpretations is not denied, but this relativism is limited by the need to 
justify choices in terms of the common reference framework that positive law 
UHSUHVHQWV´273 The problem with this is that those scholars who take a broader 
approach and justify it using, primarily, state practice and the realist logic of rational 
interests may simply suggest that the framework of positive law is just as ineffective 
and irrelevant as the restrictive reading of self-defence that it justifies. In effect, the 
debate about the scope of self-defence is merely transported to the realm of secondary 
rules. In this respect, Murphy has suggested that the differences in approaches to self-
defence are methodological.274 The methodological differences lead to more or less 
narrow or wide rights of self-defence.  
 
It seems, with this proliferation of methods, that the secondary rules that international 
lawyers assert as the framework in which they conceptualise the right of self-defence 
are not givens but are in fact choices. Murphy has suggested that ³LQ UHDGLQJ WKH
literature one cannot help but feel that international lawyers are often coming to this 
issue with firm predispositions as to whether anticipatory self-defense or preemptive 
self-defense should or should not be legal and then molding their interpretation of 
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VWDWH SUDFWLFH WR ILW WKHLU SUHGLVSRVLWLRQV´275 It may be said that one of these 
preferences stems from the suspicion that, as Reisman suggests, international lawyers 
are resistant to change. Reisman suggests that this is an illogical and unreflective 
response.276 This undermines the claim to objectivity made by many international 
lawyers who must try to assert the correctness of their own set of secondary rules. 
This tends to point towards an infinite regression of authority 
 
.DPPHUKRIHU KDV DVWXWHO\ REVHUYHG WKDW ³WKHUH DUH QR µNQRFN-GRZQ DUJXPHQWV¶ LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´277 If neither arguments for the restrictive conception of self-
defence nor arguments for the broad view can command a decisive victory over the 
other, one is left to wonder how legal arguments come to an end. Koskenniemi says 
WKDW WKHUH LV ³QR legal criterion that will say when [the point of argumentative 
WHUPLQDWLRQ@KDVEHHQUHDFKHG´.278 In the light of the confusion within the collective 
security system that this chapter has attempted to sketch, it seems problematic to 
suggest that a correct answer could be reached either as to the meaning of self-defence 
in abstracto or to the validity of a particular claim of self-defence. Koskenniemi has 
VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG LQWHOOHFWXDO VWUXFWXUHV RI PRGHUQ VRFLHW\´ LQ ZKLFK
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV DUH SUHVHQWO\ VLWXDWHG FDQQRW ³DQVZHU TXHVWLRQV RI SUDFWLFDO
UDWLRQDOLW\´ EHFDXVH ³WKH RQO\ MXVWLILDEOH DUJXPHQWV DUH WKRVH ZKLFK DUH
µREMHFWLYH¶´279 The so-called ³IOLJKW WR WKH REMHFWLYH´ characteristic of some 
international lawyers does not in itself provide an incontrovertible means of assessing 
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the validity of self-defence claims.280 Instead, the claim of objectivity allows 
international law to be hi-jacked by those wishing to give spurious justifications a 
patina of legality.  
 
While it might be said that norms are indeterminate in abstracto, it may also be 
claimed that, in practice, what is and what is not a valid claim of self-defence can be 
made evident through the process of evaluation. The next chapter will deal with this 
question. While international law is often criticised for lacking centralised machinery, 
the collective security system is centred around the SC which, at least notionally, has 
the clout to enforce its decisions. It will be argued that, again, international lawyers 
DUHFDXJKW LQDGLOHPPD7KLV LVEHFDXVH WKHSULFH WKDW LVSDLGIRU WKLV µFORXW¶ LV WKH
politicisation of the process of decision-making. The chapter also warns against 
attempting to describe the Council as an institution constrained by norms. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that using secondary rules of recognition or 
interpretation does not enable international lawyers sympathetic to the collective 
security system to defend it from realist criticisms that it is ineffective or irrelevant. 
This was because where an international lawyer attempted to meet realist criticisms 
by acknowledging that the system has become outmoded and that it should adapt to 
include at least anticipatory self-defence, he often justified himself according to a 
framework of secondary norms that remained open either to the criticism of 
exploitability or to the criticism of esotericism.  
 
In this chapter, we will move away from the idea of the indeterminacy of the abstract 
norms of the collective security system by focussing on the practice of the Security 
Council (SC) in the evaluation of particular self-defence claims. Koskenniemi has 
written that the vocabulary of the laZ¶V³VLJQLILFDQFHUHVLGHVQRWLQ what [it] mean[s], 
but in who can authoritatively decide what action [it] suggests in concrete 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´.1 It is therefore important to identify the evaluator of self-defence 
claims. The possibility that individual states could evaluate their own uses of force 
will not be discussed: Autointerpretation was discussed in chapter I.2 Suffice it to say 
that several proponents of a very wide right of self-defence, one that would operate as 
an alternative to the collective security system rather than an exception within it, 
IDYRXU ZKDW KDV EHHQ FDOOHG D ³TXDOLWDWLYH WKUHDW DSSURDFK´3 This means that the 
subjectivity of the decision to use force is supposed to be alleviated by the application 
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of various criteria such as the gravity of the threat, the probability of its 
materialisation and the exhaustion of alternatives.4 In chapter V, it will be shown that 
criteria like these do not form a sufficiently reliable bulwark against exploitability.5 
The current chapter will concentrate on those who claim that self-defence can be 
evaluated within the system rather than outside it. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to look at the effectiveness of propositions that some of the 
inflexibility or indeterminacy of the right of self-defence can be overcome through 
particular evaluations of self-GHIHQFH FODLPV 7KLV WDNHV :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V LQVLJKW
mentioned in the previous chapter; words are given their meaning in contexts of use.6 
Everything hangs on the construction of this context of use: The breadth of the right 
of self-defence will depend on whether a claim is interpreted within a framework of 
purposive law that operates to enable rather constrain the users of its norms, or in a 
framework of formal law that is orientated to internal coherence and takes the 
V\VWHPLFSHUVSHFWLYH7KHZRUGµIUDPHZRUN¶LVXVHGKHUHWRLPSO\QRWRQO\DGRFWULQDO
network of primary and secondary rules, but also institutional contexts both formal 
and informal. Evaluating institutions will be seen in the light of what Koskenniemi 
called ³VWUXFWXUDOELDV´WKDWSUHVDJHVWKHRXWFRPHRIDQ\JLYHQFODLP7 
 
It will be argued that international lawyers who locate the force of the law in its 
ability to give objectively valid answers to legal problems remain stuck between 
esotericism and exploitability. It is generally accepted that international law operates 
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on a horizontal plane rather than a vertical hierarchy.8 This means that the question of 
who provides the objective evaluation of a self-defence claim is not clear-cut. To the 
extent that international lawyers view self-defence as a right within the collective 
security system, most of them look to the UN main organs for answers.9 Owing to the 
position of the Security Council in the collective security system,10 it features more 
heavily in discussions of self-defence evaluations than the other two organs. As 
Alvarez has noted, promoting the General Assembly (GA) or the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) to FKLHILQWHUSUHWHUVWDWXVDUHERWK³H[WUHPHDQVZHUV´QHLWKHURIZKLFK
has much support.11 Consequently, this chapter concentrates on the practice of the 
Council.12  
 
It is emphasised, however, that the ICJ and the GA ± as well as non-UN organs ± have 
played a role in the evaluation of self-defence claims and that international lawyers 
look to them for authoritative interpretations of the law. 7KH*$KDVHYDOXDWHGVWDWHV¶
uses of force many times in the past.13 ,W KDV DOVR LVVXHG FRQGHPQDWLRQV RI VWDWHV¶
actions when the SC not done so.14 As to the ICJ, doctrinal international lawyers 
naturally look to the Court for authoritative statements of the law.15 While the Court 
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 See e.g. UN Doc. A/Res/ES-6/2 (1980) in an emergency session requested by the SC, the GA 
deplored the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan; UN Doc. A/Res/41/31 (1986) calling for US 
compliance with the judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua FDVHLQZKLFKWKH&RXUW¶VUHMHFWHGWKH86¶V
justification of collective self-defence. 
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expressing regret that the SC had not acted to enforce its own resolution; UN Doc. A/Res/41/38 (1986) 
Condemning the US for Operation Eldorado Canyon in which it bombed targets in Libya.  
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 ,WKDVEHHQFDOOHG³WKHJXDUGLDQRIOHJDOLW\IRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVDZKROH´ Questions of 
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has had relatively little opportunity to evaluate self-defence claims,16 the matter has 
come before it several times.17 This chapter is not intended to provide an exhaustive 
study of evaluations of self-GHIHQFHFODLPV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶DSSURDFKHVWR WKH
practice of the Council are laid out in order to demonstrate that attempts to minimise 
exploitability have often taken the form of secondary rules and that this can render the 
law inflexible, cumbersome and esoteric.  
 
To avoid the dangers of auto-interpretation, many international lawyers using a more 
normative-optic or taking a perspective from the collective security system assert that 
evaluations have to be performed within the system. Again, the problem with 
evaluating claims within the system is that to the extent that the organ has rigorous 
and open processes of decision-making and operates according to the rule of law, it 
can fail to take into account the necessities of particular situations because it is bound 
by procedural rules. It will be argued that where the SC is said to operate within a 
normative framework of secondary rules, such a conception does not seem to reflect 
the practice of the Council and it can appear esoteric. On the other hand, to the extent 
that the organ is free from procedural or substantive constraints, it can be abused 
insofar as it can be influenced by the claimant state.  
 
It will be suggested that international lawyers should beware of putting too much faith 
in the SC as the evaluator of self-defence claims. A blind preference for any 
                                                                                                                                            
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) ICJ Reports, Order of 14 April 1992 
Request for the indication of Provisional Measures. Separate opinion of Judge Lachs, p. 138. 
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multilateral decision-making over auto-interpretation at the national level is not 
enough to save the collective security system from exploitation. It will be argued that 
it matters how and by whom claims are evaluated. In the two chapters following this 
one, some ideas about how evaluations ought to occur will be laid out.18 The rest of 
this chapter is divided into two halves. The first half discusses different ideas about 
the framework of the UN in order to show that even where international lawyers agree 
that evaluations should take place within the system, they do not necessarily mean the 
same system and that this can result in different degrees and varieties of constraint. 
The idea of structural bias will also be introduced in this part. In the second half of the 
chapter, the Council will be discussed in some depth.  
 
PART ONE: EVALUATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. 
 
It is submitted that most international lawyers, particularly those with a preference for 
a narrower right of self-defence and a stronger prohibition on the use of force, think of 
the UN organs as the ultimate arbiters of self-defence claims.19 2ZLQJWRWKH&KDUWHU¶V
identity as a treaty imposing obligations on almost all states and its commitment to 
law,20 the UN can be seen as a primary site of international law. Myjer and White 
wroWHWKDW³>Z@KHQDVWDWHFODLPVWRKDYHEHHQVubject to an armed attack against it, 
WKHQRUPVDQGVWUXFWXUHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVKRXOGFRPHLQWRSOD\´21 Self-defence is 
viewed as an exception occurring within the collective security framework and 
therefore, in order to secure the reality of the absolute prohibition on the use of force, 
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 In particular Chapter V, at pp. 322-333. 
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 T.M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002) Cambridge 
University Press, p. 107. +HUHLQDIWHUµ)UDQFNRecourse to Force¶ 
20
 Article 1(1) UN. 
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it must be subject to regulation within that system. Another reason for the emphasis 
on UN organs is that they can be seen as a convenient reservoir of state practice.22 
This may be because international legal discourse ³LV PRVW LQWHQVH LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
RUJDQLVDWLRQV´23 or it may be because the task of evaluating the practice of every state 
for the last sixty five years could not be accomplished by a single scholar.24 
 
Evaluation within the collective security system is not clear-FXW ,W LV VDLG WKDW ³WKH
problem of authoritative decision-PDNLQJ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRFLHW\ UHODWHV«WR LWV
GHFHQWUDOLVHGFKDUDFWHU´25 However, it is also sometimes suggested that the situation 
is different as regards the law on the use of force. Thus, ÖVWHUGDKOZULWHV³>D@VZHDOO
know, decision-making on the use of force is centralised and resides within the UN 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´26 In other words, in the field of international peace and security, 
the Council seems to encourage the domestic analogy to be made.27 Bull explained 
WKDW WKHUHDUH WZRPHDQLQJV WR WKLV2QH WDNHV LWVFXH IURP+REEHV7KDW³VWDWHV«
like individual meQZKROLYHZLWKRXWJRYHUQPHQWDUHLQDVWDWHRIQDWXUH´7KHRWKHU
WDNHVLWVFXHIURP.DQWLDQFRVPRSROLWDQLVPWKH³UHSURGXF>Wion of] the conditions of 
                                                 
22
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Press, p. 152. 
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Decision-Making and the Use of Force ± /DZDVLW&RXOGEH´ in O. Engdahl and P. Wrange (eds) Law 
at War: The Law as it Was and the Law as it Should Be (2008) Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, p. 293. 
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RUGHUZLWKLQWKHVWDWHRQDXQLYHUVDOVFDOH´28 The latter form of the analogy, where it 
is used in the descriptive sense, can signal a faith in the system over the individual 
that is unwilling to reflect on the concrete practice of its decision-makers. 
 
The practice of UN main organs is also the practice of states who, in the horizontal 
system, act as agents in them. It will be suggested that where states have particular 
power within UN organs, the system and the individual come together in a way that 
makes the former vulnerable to exploitation by the latter. The problem is that the UN 
FROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHPIDFHVDGLOHPPDEHWZHHQDFWLQJDVD³EHQHILFHQWVHUYDQWRI
WKH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶´ DQG ³UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH UHDOLWLHV RI SRZHU´29 The 
demands of the powerful cannot be ignored altogether lest they leave the system, 
rendering it toothless. On the other hand, to cave in to the powerful altogether may 
mean that the collective security system becomes no more than a rubber stamp for 
their policies. 
 
There is a delicate balance between the prima facie individualist right of self-defence 
and the communal nature of the collective security system. This reflects the paradox 
RI ZKDW .RVNHQQLHPL FDOOV ³WKH OLEHUDO GRFWULQH RI SROLWLFV´ ³WR SUHVHUYH IUHHGRP
RUGHUPXVWEHFUHDWHGWRUHVWULFWLW´30 This applies to the right of self-defence insofar 
as the use of force in self-GHIHQFHDOZD\VLPSLQJHVRQDQRWKHUVWDWH¶VIUHHGRPDWWKH
same time as attempting to vindicate the claimant statH¶VIUHHGRP.RVNHQQLHPLKDV
explained that the way the liberal doctrine manages to reconcile the competing pulls 
                                                 
28
 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd. ed. (2002) Palgrave, 
Basingstoke, p. 44. 
29
 Alvarez, International Organisations as Law-Makers¶S[ 
30
 Koskenniemi, From Apology, p. 71. 
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towards individual freedom and collective order is in the concept of the rule of law.31 
The rule of law holds that order must be neutral and ascertainable.  
 
The rule of law and self-defence can be uncomfortable bed-fellows. It is said that state 
claimants of self-defence recoil from the suggestion that third parties have the right to 
evaluate uses of force taken to protect their own essential interests. On the other hand, 
uses of force in self-defence also have target states which may need the protection of 
the law against dominant states who seek to use the claim of self-defence as 
justificatory garnish. However, before moving on to discuss the presence of the rule 
of law in the collective security system, we will first examine the idea of structural 
bias.32 
 
A. Structural Bias. 
 
In this section of the chapter, it will be suggested that it matters where and by whom a 
VWDWH¶VVHOI-defence claim is evaluated. It is not enough to say that to the extent that 
VWDWHV¶ FODLPV WR KDYH XVHG IRUFH LQ VHOI-defence are evaluated at the international 
level, problems with the indeterminacy of legal doctrine are overcome. Since this 
thesis is concerned with the exploitability of the collective security system for the 
legitimation of uses of force, we will consider the possibility that ex post evaluations 
of self-defence claims may cover uses of force with a veil of legitimacy. It will also 
be argued that the perception of structural bias can also lead to the side-lining of 
potential evaluators who may not be expected to hand down the desired verdict. 
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32
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.RVNHQQLHPLFRLQHGWKHWHUP³VWUXFWXUDOELDV´,WPHDQVWKDW ³the system still de facto 
prefers some outcomes of distributive choices to other outcomes or choices´33 He 
developed the thesis after it occurred to him that describing systemic norms as 
indeterminate does not explain experiences of decision-making.34 He sought to 
explain why it is that practicing lawyers often think of the practice of law as a fairly 
predictable exercise, making it possible for claimant states to exploit the system by 
taking their justifications to specific organs whose structural biases may favour their 
position. 
 
,W KDV EHHQ VDLG WKDW ³>W@Ke United Nations system has a strong bias against 
XQLODWHUDOLVP´35 This explains the preference for auto-interpretation displayed by 
certain scholars.36 However, within the UN system there are differences in bias. The 
VWUXFWXUDOELDVRIWKHµSROLWLFDORUJDQV¶RIWKH81WKH6&DQG*$GRHVQRWDULVHIURP
the formal rules of process so much as the lack of them. This can be contrasted to the 
ICJ which operates within and through an abundance of rules. While the Charter 
SOHGJHV UHVSHFW IRU ³WKH VRYHUHLJQ HTXDOLW\ RI DOO LWV PHPEHUV´37 in practice states 
often vote according to their alliances and interests rather than on the merits of a 
particular claim.38 The structural bias of a given organ can be determined by social 
factors such as the relative economic, diplomatic or military clout of actors within a 
forum. Additionally, fora of evaluation may be biased according to other, less 
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advertent, measures. For instance, they may place procedural hurdles before a 
claimant state in the vindication of its self-defence claim. Alternatively, they may 
have a preference for the maintenance of international peace over the pursuit of 
national security thus prejudicing claimant states. Illustrating his theory, Koskenniemi 
has given the example of the Al-Jedda case in the UK.39 Brooke LJ, giving the 
unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal, said that the obligations contained in 
6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO UHVROXWLRQ   ³TXDOLILHG DQ\ REOLJDWLRQV FRQWDLQHG LQ
KXPDQULJKWVFRQYHQWLRQVLQVRIDUDVLWZDVLQFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHP´40 
 
In WKHYLHZRIWKHSUHVHQWDXWKRUµVWUXFWXUDOELDV¶GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\KDYHDQHJDWLYH
connotation. This view is held because it is not thought possible to identify a neutral 
IRUXP RI HYDOXDWLRQ )XUWKHUPRUH LW LV VXJJHVWHG WKDW µELDV¶ LV SDUW DQG SDUFHO Rf 
µVWUXFWXUH¶RQHFDQQRWKDYHRQHZLWKRXWWKHRWKHU+RZHYHULWLVSRVVLEOHWRLGHQWLI\
more or less exploitable or esoteric bias and therefore to make judgments about the 
structures that produce such bias. The matter of structural bias is intertwined with the 
matter of secondary rules. Indeed, in legal institutions one can see secondary rules as 
effectively creating the structure in which evaluations take place. The quality of the 
evaluative space created in the Security Council will depend on the secondary rules 
that are seen to constitute it. A paucity of secondary rules of law and an apparent 
mandate to make decisions based on exigency opens the SC to exploitation by its 
powerful permanent members.41 On the other hand, the conception of SC practice as 
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occurring within a framework of rules can make the body seem overly formalised and 
XQGXO\WROHUDQWRIµURJXHVWDWHV¶42 
 
It has been said that ³VWDWHV XQGHUWDNH HIIRUWV WR MXVWLI\ WKH UHVRUW WR IRUFH LQ
accordance with international legal principles, and these efforts are intended to satisfy 
SDUWLFXODU DXGLHQFHV´.43 If such claimants choose either the ICJ or the SC, it is 
relatively easy for them to make the argument that the decision thereby reached is 
correct. This is particularly the case if an evaluation of a claim by a permanent 
member is made in the SC.44 However it can also be the case in a body with relatively 
rigorous and transparent process. In the ICJ, for instance, it is harder for a claimant of 
self-defence to vindicate his claim. This is because the claimant state will bear the 
burden of proof to show that he did in fact use necessary and proportionate force in 
response to an armed attack.45  
 
.RVNHQQLHPLKDVDVVHUWHGWKDWDFWRUV¶DZDUHQHVVRIWKHVWUXFWXUDOELDVHVRILQVWLWXWLRQV
means that political conflict is played out as jurisdictional conflict.46 In the context of 
collective security this was illustrated by the judicial review debate pursuant to 
/LE\D¶V VHLVLQJ RI WKH ,&- DIWHU WKH 86 DQG WKH 8. XVHG WR 6& WR VDQFWLRQ KHU IRU
refusing to extradite the Lockerbie suspects.47 Koskenniemi says that in specific cases 
³>W@he choice of the frame determine[s] the decision. But for determining the frame, 
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there [is] no meta-UHJLPHGLUHFWLYHRUUXOH´.48 +HZULWHV WKDW³[i]n a world of plural 
regimes, political conflict is waged on the description and re-description of aspects of 
WKHZRUOGVRDVWRPDNHWKHPIDOOXQGHUWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRISDUWLFXODULQVWLWXWLRQV´.49 
 
B. The Rule of Law. 
 
7KH LGHD WKDW WKH UXOH RI ODZ FDQ UHFRQFLOH WKH FRPSHWLQJ µDVFHQGLQJ¶ DQG
µGHVFHQGLQJ¶DUJXPHQWVLGHQWLILHGE\.RVNHQQLHPL50 depends on its ability to provide 
a neutral background against which the substantive rules operate. To this extent, the 
rule of law is closely related to the Hartian idea of secondary rules on which depend 
the systemic nature of international law.51 If the system of decision-making is 
complete in that it does not require subjective or political factors to be taken into 
account in order to reach a decision, it would be possible to call the evaluation of a 
self-defence claim an objective one. However, a system that excluded such extra-legal 
concerns would not adapt well to changing social circumstances or to the imperatives 
of necessity. It might be said that it risked becoming esoteric as the social norm 
deviated from the legal one. 
 
In the present section, two approaches to the systemic nature of the Charter regulation 
of the use of force will be very briefly considered. One approach makes a claim that 
the Charter is a constitutional document. Onuf has suggested that the constitutional 
nature of a set of rules resides in the presence of secondary rules to administer the 
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 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (1994) Oxford University Press, p. 214. (Hereinafter, 
µ+DUWThe Concept of Law¶ 
139  
primary rules of obligation in the Hartian sense.52 This suggests that the system it 
creates is quasi-governmental and therefore holds it up to high standards of 
legitimacy. Another approach suggests that the Charter creates a collective security 
V\VWHP.HOVHQZURWHWKDW³WKHSULQFLSOHRIFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\LVSODFHGDKHDGRIDOO´
other provisions, that the monopoly of force is with the UN and that enforcement is 
centralised in the Security Council.53 On this view, it is possible to give the organs 
within the framework far more freedom to act purposively within the specific 
limitations set down in the Charter.54  
 
Many international lawyers talk about the UN Charter as a constitution,55 as though 
the organs comprising the UN were equivalent to a legislature, judiciary and 
executive.56 This can mean that the SC is thought of as an international executive of a 
sort of world government with the GA as its legislature and the ICJ as its judicial 
arm.57 However, this separation of competences does not always fit the practice of the 
organs concerned. This can lead to the SC being endowed with the functions of 
judiciary and legislature.58 This might be said to render the so-FDOOHG³VHSDUDWLRQRI
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N.D. White, ³2QWKH%ULQNRI/DZOHVVQHVV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SRZHUV´UHGXQGDQWEHFDXVHWKH\ZRXOGDOOEHYHVWHGLQRQHERG\DQGQRORQJHUDEOH
WRDFWDVFKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVRQWKHRWKHUV¶H[HUFLVHVRISRZHU Reisman has written 
that tKH &KDUWHU GRHV QRW LQFRUSRUDWH D ³WKHRU\ RI FRQstitutional checks and 
EDODQFHV´59 An overt attempt to apply this to the UN collective security system will 
be discussed in the section on judicial review of SC resolutions.60 It will be suggested 
that even if judicial review could happen in theory, courts tend to defer to executives 
over matters of security. 
 
Perhaps owing to the legacy of Kant,61 the constitutional conception of the UN is 
often linked to the idea of world-government.62 This ties in with the idea that the 
Charter prohibits the use of force among the subjects of law and vests its monopoly in 
the SC.63 It also links to the idea that the UN is something that may restrict as well as 
enable its members, an idea that realists reject.64 On this view, acts of self-defence 
would happen within the UN system and not as an alternative to it. This flows from 
the pervasive nature of the UN when it is conceived of as regulating the public space 
in general rather than specific subject-areas within it. The conception of the UN as a 
collective security system tends to suggest that the UN regulates specific matters 
within the public realm. 
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It should be noted that not all international lawyers share the constitutional conception 
of the UN.65 Wood has dismissed the constitutional conception as fashionable. He 
says that it requires the unwarranted importation of conceptions from domestic 
jurisdictions.66 However, if the Charter is seen as establishing only a system of 
collective security, many of the problems of viewing the UN as a government are 
replayed.67 This is because of the systemic element of collective security; it implies a 
framework in which decisions, even if they are political, are not completely subjective 
and ad hoc. This will be returned to in the final part of the chapter where the Charter 
purposes and priQFLSOHVDUHFRQVLGHUHGDVOLPLWDWLRQVRQWKH&RXQFLO¶VDXWKRULW\68 
 
7KH FODVVLFDO FRQFHSWLRQ RI D FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP LV ³D V\VWHP UHJLRQDO RU
global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern 
of all and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the 
SHDFH´69 ,W KDV DOVR EHHQ VDLG WKDW ³>D@ WUXH FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP«SULQFLSDOO\
involves the provision of a police force which is largely independent of any members 
or groups that PDNHXSVRFLHW\´70 7KLVLPSOLHVWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWVDUH
subordinated to those of the collective insofar as it implies that an undertaking to 
assist others when to do so might not involve a benefit and may incur costs. It also 
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implies that an individual state would not be able to reap benefits by dominating the 
system of enforcement and using it as a tool for the fulfilment of national policy. 
 
It has therefore been suggested that the UN Charter does not represent a system of 
collective security.71 6RPH UHDOLVWV FODLP WKDW ³WKH &RXQFLO¶V DFWLYLW\ VKRXOG QRW EH
XQGHUVWRRG DV D IXQFWLRQLQJ FROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\ V\VWHP´ EHFDXVH QR UXOH DSSOLFDWLRQ
differentiates it from balance of power policy.72 It is said, in particular, that the 
dominance of the SC by the permanent members and their possession of veto-rights is 
incompatible with the concept of collective security.73 This is because no action could 
be taken against a permanent member in the event that they were accused of 
aggression. Furthermore, the discretion with which they are endowed in finding 
threats to, or breaches of, the peace suggests that collective action is not automatic.74 
Attempts to counter these claims and anchor the SC more firmly within a Charter 
system based on the rule of law will be discussed later.75 
 
On the other hand, the UN system is often talked of as a collective security system by 
international lawyers.76 Furthermore the reports by the Secretary General77 and High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change designate the UN a collective 
security system.78 Others seem to see the UN as part of a larger system of collective 
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security in which Regional Organisations can be seen as part of the apparatus.79 To 
the extent that these arrangements come within Chapter VIII of the Charter, they can 
be seen as coming within the UN system as opposed to operating outside it.80 
However the proliferation of potential evaluating organs raises the problem of 
fragmentation which tends to militate against a systemic conception of collective 
securiW\ 7KLV LV EHFDXVH ³>L@Q WKH DEVHQFH RI DQ RYHUDUFKLQJ VWDQGSRLQW OHJDO
WHFKQLTXHZLOOUHYHDOLWVHOIDVPRUHHYLGHQWO\SROLWLFDOWKDQHYHUEHIRUH´81  
 
Thus, it may be possible for states to choose the forum in which they make a self-
defence claim in ordeUWREHQHILWIURPWKHµVWUXFWXUDOELDV¶RIWKDWIRUXP7KHXVHRI
force against Serbia in 1999 is a case in point. Russia was against the use of force and, 
reacting to Operation Allied Force, VDLG WKDW LW ZDV ³SURIRXQGO\ RXWUDJHG´ by it.82 
Proponents of the use of force had used the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) to authorise the use of force.83 Russia is not a member of NATO and the 
balance of opinion in that organisation leaned heavily towards the US and British 
position that force was necessary.84 The Security Council is also structurally biased in 
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favour of its permanent members (P5). The extent of that bias will depend on the 
extent to which the P5 are restrained by a normative framework, whether that arises 
from the text of the Charter or from more general considerations of the rule of law.  
 
PART TWO: THE SECURITY COUNCIL. 
 
0DQ\FRPPHQWDWRUVORRNDW6&SUDFWLFHLQHYDOXDWLQJVWDWHV¶VHOI-defence claims.85 In 
many cases no clear rationale is given for the focus on the SC, however it is 
sometimes pointed out that the right of self-defence in article 51 is dependent on the 
exercise by the SC of its responsibilities and on the report of the claimant state to the 
SC.86 It is often unclear whether SC practice in determining specific self-defence 
claims is viewed as an adjudicative function that may have informal precedental 
value, whether it is viewed as the practice of the UN for the purposes of the 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter norms or whether it connotes state practice 
relevant to the development of customary law. This lack of clarity tends to facilitate 
the exploitation of the collective security system by making it difficult to argue 
against certain readings of the practice concerned.  
 
Exploitability will be a theme of this part of the chapter. It is said that the Council 
lacks a legal culture.87 The SC, in avoiding the problems of over-proceduralization 
and a preference for normativity over concreteness, falls into exploitability. It will be 
argued that international lawyers who wish to affirm the importance of international 
ODZWRVWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQ-making on the use of force may pay too high a price for the 
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benefits of effectiveness that the SC may bring. It will also be suggested that those 
international lawyers who posit normative conVWUDLQWVRQ WKH&RXQFLO¶VGLVFUHWLRQ WR
make Chapter VII determinations may inadvertently provide justifications for 
otherwise arbitrary decisions. 
 
,WKDVEHHQVDLGWKDW³>R@QHRIWKHPDMRUIXQFWLRQVRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLOLVLWVUROHDV
D µFROOHFWLYH OHJLWLPL]HU¶ RI WKH XVH RI IRUFH E\ PHPEHU VWDWHV´88 The Council has 
³SULPDU\ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH PDLQWHQDQFH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\´89 
Any action that is taken pursuant of the exercise of the right of self-defence involves a 
use of force. This is because measures not involving a use of force, though perhaps 
illegal by other lights, do not violate the absolute prohibition on the use of force.90  
Bearing this in mind, it is likely that exercises in self-defence will come within article 
39 of the UN Charter, the gateway to Chapter VII.91 Indeed, since members of the UN 
are empowered to bring any dispute to the attention of the SC (or the GA),92 it would 
also be possible for the target state of the exercise of self-defence to complain to the 
SC. Further, it would be possible for the SC to initiate its own inquiry after, for 
instance, a state had reported its exercise of the right under article 51.93 In practice, 
there is nothing to stop SC members, or international lawyers, treating the case as 
though there had been a self-defence claim.  
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The SC is often alluded to by writers as an organ that is both powerful and legitimate. 
It is powerful because of its composition and LWVPHPEHUV¶ discretion to take wide-
ranging and binding decisions under Chapter VII. It is legitimate because it forms part 
of the collective security system. In this section, it will be questioned whether these 
two characteristics can be seen simultaneously in the work of the organ. It is said that 
the SC is the organ with the ability to decide competing claims. Corten believes that 
WKLVOHQGVDVRUWRI³SURFHGXUDOOHJLWLPDF\´WRWKHSURFHVV94 He writes that the legality 
RIDXVHRI IRUFH LV UHFRJQLVHG³DV WKH UHVXOWRIDGHEDWHDQGYRWHRQSDUWLFXODUDQG
RIWHQ RSSRVLQJ FRQFHSWLRQV´ &Rrten says that this means that the particular 
FRQFHSWLRQWKDWSUHYDLOV³ZLOOQRWEHGHFRGHGXSRQE\DQ\SDUWLFXODULQWHUSUHWHUEXW
E\PHDQVRI D VWURQJO\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGSURFHGXUH´95  More formalistically, Kelsen 
found that the SC is the only UN organ cRPSHWHQWWRGHFLGH³ZKHWKHUDQDUPHGDWWDFN
KDVRFFXUUHGDQGZKRLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRULW´96 Gray, on the other hand, urges caution 
and questions whether the SC has the ultimate authority to make findings of legality 
or illegality over the use of force.97 
 
A. An Evaluation of a Use of Force by the Council. 
 
The SC has dealt with complaints about the use of force wherein the complained 
against state has claimed it acted in self-defence. A relatively recent example of this 
was the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. On 12 July 
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Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel from Southern Lebanon and abducted two Israeli 
soldiers. In response, having reserved the right to use force in accordance with article 
51,98 Israel blockaded and bombed Lebanon. The Lebanese government complained 
RI ³,VUDHOL DFWV RI DJJUHVVLRQ´ WR WKH 6& DQG XUJHG LW WR FDOO D PHHWLQJ99 The case 
involved complexities of both fact and law.  
 
On 14 July the SC met to discuss the matter. The general consensus was one of 
condemnation of ,VUDHO¶VXVHRIIRUFH+RZHYHUWKHJURXQGVRQZKLFKVWDWHVGLGWKLV
were very different. For instance, Argentina, Denmark, France, Greece, Peru, 
6ORYDNLD DQG WKH 8. DOO DIILUPHG ,VUDHO¶V ULJKW RI VHOI-defence but said that the 
manner in which it was exercised was excessive.100 The Russian delegate, calling 
,VUDHO¶V DFWLRQ ³UHWDOLDWRU\´ VXJJHVWHG WKDW LW ZDV GLVSURSRUWLRQDWH DQG
inappropriate.101 The three African representatives, Congo, Ghana and Tanzania also 
condemned the disproportionate use of force.102 Lebanon and its supporters did not 
mention self-GHIHQFHDQGLQVWHDGFODVVLILHGWKHDFWLRQDVRQHRI³DJJUHVVLRQ´103 In the 
minority, Israel and the US, while not mentioning self-defence talked in terms of a 
necessary reaction to terrorism.104 Nevertheless, the SC did not pass a resolution 
FRQGHPQLQJ,VUDHO¶VXVHRIIRUFH 
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The SC also heard a briefing from the Secretary General on the 20 July, although it is 
clear from the record of that meeting that there had been prior consultations of SC 
members.105 While the SHFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO FRQGHPQHG +H]EROODK¶V DWWDFNV DQG
DIILUPHG ,VUDHO¶V ULJKWRIVHOI-defence, he said that the Lebanese government clearly 
NQHZQRWKLQJRIWKHDWWDFN+HDOVRVWDWHGWKDW,VUDHO¶VXVHRIIRUFHZDVH[FHVVLYH106 
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKH &RXQFLO¶V GLVFussion following this briefing was carried out 
through informal consultations for which no public record exists. The eventual 
RXWFRPH RI WKH &RXQFLO¶V GHOLEHUDWLRQV ZDV UHVROXWLRQ  SDVVHG RQ  $XJXVW
2006.  
 
The focus of this resolution was the negotiation of a ceasefire, the extension of the 
UNIFIL mandate and the imposition of an arms embargo on Lebanon rather than the 
apportionment of responsibility. While the SC ³[e]xpress[es]  utmost concern at the 
FRQWLQXLQJ HVFDODWLRQ RI KRVWLOLWLHV´ DQG ³>H@PSKDsiz[es] the need for an end of 
YLROHQFH´ LW IDOOV VKRUW RI EODPLQJ HLWKHU SDUW\ IRU WKH FRQIOLFW The resolution was 
PDGHXQGHU&KDSWHU9,,DQGLWGHVLJQDWHVWKHHQWLUHVLWXDWLRQ³DWKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDO
SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´,WLVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKLVVLtuation displayed some of the familiar 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI WKH6&¶VPDQDJHPHQWRIVLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHUHKDVEHHQDVHOI-
defence claim. These include a lack of detailed public scrutiny of the evidence, a lack 
of focus on the question of self-defence itself, a lack of engagement between speakers 
and the lack of any concrete finding of responsibility. 
 
It might be questioned whether the SC can get around the problems with evaluation 
WKDWKDYHEHHQDWWULEXWHGWRWKH,&-$IWHUDOODQ\HYDOXDWLRQRIDVWDWH¶s use of force 
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in self-GHIHQFH FRXOG VWLOO SRWHQWLDOO\ XQGHUPLQH D VWDWH¶V ULJKW WR VHOI-defence. 
However Schachter has explained that while it is not surprising that states do not 
welcome international scrutiny of their self-defence measures, ³WKH LQIOXHQce of 
FRPPXQLW\MXGJPHQW´LVIHOWWKURXJKWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIXVHVRIIRUFHE\WKH6&.107 
In other words, if realists seek an enabling law then augmenting its legitimating 
properties can only make the collective security system more useful to facilitate state 
policy. While other states may not trust a national decision, it will be harder for them 
to deny the validity of a decision in a UN organ. It can be argued that readings of the 
SC which view it as the handmaiden of powerful states may ensure its continuing use 
in the international area, but also reveal its vulnerability to exploitation. 
 
%'RHVWKH6&KDYHD³TXDVL-MXGLFLDO´UROH" 
 
9DULRXVZULWHUVKDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH6&LVµTXDVL-MXGLFLDO¶108 In this section, it will 
be argued that those who claim that the SC has a quasi-judicial role in order to present 
a picture of the UN collective security system as a closed entity immune to political 
pressures or individual subjectivities, tend to render the system exploitable. This is 
because many of the questionable aspects of the SC, such as its dominance by 
powerful states or its lack of transparency,109 are skated over or justified by such 
writers. To the extent that one wishes to compensate the indeterminacy of doctrine 
with an authoritative and effective decision-maker within the system, writers may be 
tempted to read into SC practice quasi-adjudicative determinations of self-defence 
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claims. It will be suggested that in fact the SC does very little express evaluation of 
self-defence claims and the perception of it as a would-be court is unfounded. 
 
However the argument that the SC may act as a Court is not without basis in the text 
of the Charter. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, the SC was given a dispute 
resolution authority to investigate disputes that might endanger international peace 
and security.110 It is suggested that to the extent that the phrase self-defence has come 
to imply a use of force, any dispute involving self-defence comes within its remit. 
This is because article 39, the gateway to Chapter VII, does not seem to demand a 
global element so much as a non-national element in its three categories of 
aggression, breach of the peace and threat to the peace.  
 
7KH 6& GRHV QRW SXUSRUW WR EH D OHJDO RUJDQ LW LV NQRZQ DV D ³SROLWLFDO RUJDQ´111 
However, thDW KDV QRW VWRSSHG PDQ\ IURP DVVHUWLQJ WKDW LW KDV D ³TXDVL-judicial 
UROH´112 Such an assertion, it is suggested, lends the SC decision-making process a 
certain credibility that it does not necessarily warrant, as will be seen below. Kirgis 
has pointed out that when the SC acts in what he calls quasi-MXGLFLDOPRGHLW³KDVQR
rules of procedure for fair adjudicative hearings; nor could it reasonably be expected 
WRDGRSWRUIROORZDQ\VXFKUXOHV´113 Various international lawyers sympathetic to the 
collective seFXULW\ V\VWHP KDYH ZULWWHQ KRSHIXOO\ DERXW WKH 6&¶V MXULGLFDO TXDOLWLHV
Elihu Lauterpacht said that there have been times when SCRs have been couched in 
³ODQJXDJH UHVHPEOLQJ D MXGLFLDO GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH ODZ´ 2QH H[DPSOH JLYHQ E\
Lauterpacht was the CoXQFLO¶V UHDFWLRQ WR WKH GHFODUDWLRQ RI LQGHSHQGHQFH E\ WKH
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µ7XUNLVK 5HSXEOLF RI 1RUWKHUQ &\SUXV¶114 The Council not only held that the 
GHFODUDWLRQZRXOG³FRQWULEXWHWRDZRUVHQLQJRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ´EXWVLJQLILFDQWO\WKDWLW
ZDV³LQYDOLG´115 
 
One might assume that a self-defence situation would come more or less 
XQFRQWURYHUVLDOO\ZLWKLQ³DJJUHVVLRQ´LQVRIDUDVWKHUHKDGEHHQDQDUPHGDWWDFNRUDW
least insofar as the purported exercise itself resembled an armed attack. However the 
SC has been wary of finding DQ³DJJUHVVLRQ´XQGHUDUWLFOH116 The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has suggested that; 117  
 
:KLOHWKHµDFWRIDJJUHVVLRQ¶LVPRUHDPHQDEOHWRDOHJDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
WKH µWKUHDW WR WKH SHDFH¶ LV PRUH RI D SROLWLFDO FRQFHSW %XW WKH
determination that there exists such a threat is not a totally unfettered 
discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits of the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter. 
 
,QVRIDU DVDJJUHVVLRQ LV D³PRUH MXGJPHQWDOFRQFHSW´118 this would tend to suggest 
that the SC is averse to acting like a court. Indeed, in more recent years it has tended 
WR DYRLG VSHFLI\LQJ DQ\ SDUWLFXODU DUWLFOH VLWXDWLRQSUHIHUULQJ WKH WHUP³WKUHDW WR
LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKLVKDVVWHPPHGIURPDQ
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unwillingness to apportion responsibility between states.119 Even after Iraq invaded 
.XZDLWLQWKH6&RQO\IRXQGD³EUHDFKRIWKHSHDFH´120 On the other hand, it is 
VDLG WKDW³>W@KH&RXQFLO LVQRWDFRXUW´DQGFRQFHSWVVXFKDVEUHDFKRI WKHSHDFHRU
threat to the peace are not international crimes.121 This suggests that the SC is more 
attuned to extra-legal concerns than the ICJ. Indeed, unlike the ICJ, the SC is 
comprised of diplomats with a direct line of authority to nation state. While ICJ 
judges may have national sympathies, they are first and foremost members of the 
legal profession and not representatives of their nations.122  
 
On the other hand the SC is not renowned for acting like a court. It has been said that 
³>W@oo often, the United Nations and its Member States have discriminated in 
responding to threats to international security´.123 The SC has been particularly guilty 
for this and is known for its selectivity.124 One of the factors contributing to this is the 
very great discretion that has been given to the SC to exercise its powers.125 Indeed, 
some have even suggested that the SC operates under no constraints.126 Another factor 
is the fact that the SC is not a judicial organ. Schachter accepts that the members of 
SROLWLFDORUJDQVHYDOXDWLQJFODLPVGRQRW³REVHUYHVWDQGDUGVRILPSDUWLDOLW\´DQGVD\V
WKDWQDWLRQVWDWHV³DUHH[SHFWHGWRWDNHSRVLWLRQVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHLUFRQFHSWLRQV
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RI QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW´127 While the SC has adopted rules of procedure that 
institutionalise, to some extent, its functioning, the fact that these rules remain 
provisional suggests that, on a spectrum of normativity and concreteness, the SC leans 
towards the concrete. The secondary rules of procedure that would govern the way 
that the SC handles legal rules are lacking in the SC. In large part this was because the 
SC was intended to be able to act promptly and decisively in emergency situations 
without getting tied up in red-tape. 
 
$QRWKHUDVSHFWRIWKH6&¶VSROLWLFDOQDWXUHLVWKDWZKHQLWLVIDFHGZLWKDVHOI-defence 
claim, it tends to view the claim as part of a wider factual situation rather than as a 
particular cause of action that must be decided upon in itself. States, pursuant to 
article 51, are encouraged to make self-defence claims to the SC. However, the SC 
does not stage corresponding public debates that look into the niceties of every claim. 
7KHUROHHQYLVDJHGIRUWKH6&LQDUWLFOH³GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHTXLUHWKH&RXQFLO
to pronounce on the legality of any claim to self-GHIHQFH´128 Indeed, Schachter wrote 
that the SC was never intended to fulfil such a role.129  
 
However to the extent that a situation in which a self-defence claim was made would 
de facto affect international peace and security, the SC may not be able to avoid 
making an implied judgment of the legality of the use of force in self-defence. 
-RKQVWRQH VD\V WKDW KDYLQJ XVHG D OHJDO QRUP ³UKHWRULFDOO\ >JRYHUQPHQWV@ EHJLQ WR
argue over its interpretation and application to the particular case at hand, rather than 
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WKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHODZLWVHOI´130 This would particularly be the case if the SC did not 
then take enforcement measures to relieve the state acting in self-defence as suggested 
by the text of article 51. Gray has pointed out that where states do discuss self-defence 
claims as such, they tend to condemn or accept the use of force on the basis of its 
factual characteristics rather than entering into extended doctrinal analysis.131 
Nevertheless, the SC has, in practice, HYDOXDWHGVWDWHV¶VHOI-defence claims.132 
 
C. Composition. 
 
A major reason IRU WKH 6&¶V H[SORLtability is its composition.133  The SC has five 
permanent members (the P5) and ten non-permanent members who are chosen by the 
GA on a rolling basis every two years according to equitable geographical distribution 
and their ability to contribute to international peace and security.134 The P5 have great 
advantages within the SC. In the first place this is because, as permanent members, 
they have more opportunities to influence the organ and to learn how to operate 
within its structures. In the second place, the P5 are advantaged by the veto. In order 
for the SC to pass a resolution it must have the affirmative votes, or at least the tacit 
acquiescence, of each permanent member.135 The Cameroonian representative at the 
SC in 2002 told his fellow members that: 
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[T]hH SUHVHQFH RI SHUPDQHQW PHPEHUV«LPSOLHV DQ DOPRVW SHUIHFW
mastery of issues, procedures and practices and even of what is not said. 
:KHQ«DFFRPSDQLHGE\DSDUWLFXODUO\ IDYRXUDEOH UHODWLRQVKLSRISRZHU
WKHUHLVDWHQGHQF\WRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIRQH¶VSRVLWLRQ.136  
 
The P5 represent the victors of the Second World War. It is said that the rationale 
behind the decisional power that they wield in the SC is a result of their ability, as 
great powers, to form an effective power-house for the enforcement of SC 
decisions.137 6LPPDKDVSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³LQPRVWFDVHVWKH6&LVXQDEOHWRLPSOHPHQW
Chapter VII measures by its own means, and therefore, often makes use of other 
RUJDQVRUHQWLWLHVIRU WKLVSXUSRVH´138 This is because the article 47 agreements that 
would have put troops and military resources at the disposal of the SC have never 
been made and so the SC is dependent on the ad hoc support of states.  During the 
Cold War, the need for unanimity among the P5 meant that few SCRs were passed. 
However the end of bipolarity, while it enabled the activation of the SC, also meant 
the beginning of unipolarity. 
 
7KH6&LVVRPHWLPHVVDLGWREHGRPLQDWHGE\WKH³3´PHDQLQJ%ULWDLQ)UDQFHDQG
WKH 86 RU HYHQ E\ WKH ³3´ PHDQLQJ WKH 86139 The US exercised its veto several 
times during the 1980s to prevent its armed violence in Central America being 
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condemned in the SC.140 In some cases it was not necessary for the veto to be used 
because no proposed resolution was voted on. An example of this occurred 
concerning Operation Eldorado Canyon in 1986. The US bombed targets in Tripoli 
DQG%HQJKD]LLQUHWDOLDWLRQIRU/LE\D¶VDOOHJHGLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH%HUOLQ'LVFRWKqTXH
incident. Libya complained to the SC, requesting an immediate meeting.141 The 
meetings lasted for several days, and many states condemned the US,142 but no 
UHVROXWLRQUHVXOWHGIURPWKHSURFHVV5DZVNLDQG0LOOHUFRQFOXGHWKDW³>W@KH&RXQFLO
KDVEHHQIRUFHGWRFDWHUWR86LQWHUHVWV´143 However, it should be noted that while the 
US can prevent the Council from issuing condemnations, it cannot force the Council 
WRGRVRLQWKHIDFHRIDQRWKHUSHUPDQHQWPHPEHU¶VYHWR 
 
In cases where US, or other P5, interests are not directly at stake, their dominance of 
the SC need not prevent the body making an evaluation of a self-defence claim. 
However, it tends to be the case that those actors to whom the guarantee of collective 
security has been entrusted are the same actors who have the economic and military 
power to use force in self-defence. This could mean that if a permanent member of the 
SC were to claim self-defence, it could simply prevent the SC from discussing it. It 
KDVEHHQZULWWHQWKDW³>H@URVLRQRI6HFXULW\&RXQFLODXWKRULW\WRGHDOZLWKVLWXDWLRQV
WKDWIDOOZLWKLQ&KDSWHU9,,DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHFRPH«SDUWRIWKHSROLF\RISRZHUIXO
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staWHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´144 For instance, in the case of the US 
intervention in Grenada a draft resolution condemning the use of force was defeated 
by the negative vote of the US.145  
 
Another pertinent matter flowing from the composition of the Council is the 
superiority of the missions of the permanent representatives to the SC. In part this is 
EHFDXVH ³>W@KH VWDIILQJ FDSDELOLWLHV RI WKH SHUPDQHQW PHPEHUV ZLWKLQ WKH &RXQFLO
allows them disproportionately to influence the outcome of its proceedingV´146 The 
permanent members are also advantaged by the fact that their officials are already 
familiar with the workings of the SC. Furthermore, it is said that the non-permanent 
PHPEHUV RI WKH 6& DUH ³YXOQHUDEOH«WR WKH GLSORPDWLF HFRQRPLF DQG PLOLWDU\
inflXHQFH´RIWKHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV147 
 
D. Matters of Fact. 
 
One of the ways in which SC evaluations of self-defence claims may avoid the danger 
of rendering self-defence claims exploitable is to evaluate each case on its merits. 
This is often given as a caveat in the proposals of international lawyers using an 
instrumental optic to view self-defence.148 However it is also given by international 
lawyers with a more normative approach. )UDQFNKDVZULWWHQWKDW³Lt appears that the 
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principal organs of the United Nations have responded in accordance with the 
QXDQFHGVLWXDWLRQDOPHULWVRIHDFKFULVLV´DQGQRWDFFRUGLQJto a general definition of 
self-defence.149An assumption is made that if the facts can be established, an answer 
to normative questions of reasonableness or necessity will be forthcoming. It might 
therefore be suggested that if the SC has sufficient capacity and will to find and 
analyse facts, its evaluation of self-defence claims could not be exploited by powerful 
states. However this proposition is simple neither in theory nor in execution. While 
the matter will be examined in some detail in chapter V,150 some general issues will 
be touched on here.  
 
It is sometimes said that the SC does not have sufficient means to gather facts on 
which to make evaluations of self-defence claims.151 Thus, Schachter writes that it is 
QRWWKHSROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQVEXWWKH³XQFHUWDLQW\VXUURXQGLQJWKHIDFWXDOFODLPV´WKDW
mean condemnations in UN organs are not always persuasive.152 Hutton has written 
that although in the early 19V WKH 6& PHPEHUV KDG ³IHZ VRXUFHV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ
EH\RQG WKRVH DYDLODEOH WR WKHLU RZQ VWDWHV´ LQ PRUH UHFHQW \HDUV WKH 6& KDV
recognised the benefits of broadening and improving its information base.153 However 
it is submitted that the SC remains dependent on the knowledge-gathering and 
knowledge-sharing capacities of its members.154 In large part this is because although 
the SC can, acting under Chapter VII, give states no choice but to host fact-finding 
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FRPPLVVLRQVDVZDVVHHQRYHUWKHTXHVWLRQRI,UDT¶VGevelopment of WMD, the host 
VWDWH¶VFRRSHUDWLRQLVRIWHQYLWDOIRUWKHVXFFHVVRIWKHPLVVLRQ155  
 
The SC has been empowered by UN member states to set up subsidiary organs to 
enable it to fulfil its responsibility and it seems that there is no reason why this should 
not include fact-finding commissions.156 Indeed, the SC has set up commissions on 
various occasions. For instance, it established a commission of inquiry to investigate 
reports of breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur.157 It 
has also set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the assassination of Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005.158 In a few cases the SC has initiated 
fact-finding into questions pertinent to a self-defence claim. For instance, in 1991 it 
charged the Secretary General with establishing responsibility for the Iran-Iraq 
conflict.159 7KH 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO UHIHUUHG WR ³,UDT¶V DJJUHVVLRQ DJDLQVW ,UDQ´ EXW
advised that there was little to be gained in establishing an independent commission to 
investigate the question of responsibility.160  
 
It is submitted that while the use of independent fact finding commissions is to be 
applauded, the record of the SC suggests that they are the exception rather than the 
rule, and that many judgments remain dependent on information put forward by 
individual member states. Indeed, many international lawyers appear to exempt the 
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6& IURP ³WKH EXUGHQ RI SURRI DQG HYLGHQFH´161 Gowlland-Debbas wrote that the 
&RXQFLO³LVQRW ERXQGE\MXGLFLDOSURFHHGLQJV´ In reachinJLWVFRQFOXVLRQVLWQHHGQ¶W
³LQVLVW RQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI HYLGHQFH FURVV-examine witnesses or examine in any 
GHSWK WKH OHJDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´162 $JDLQVW WKLV LV2¶&RQQHOO¶VYLHZ WKDW VWDWHVPXVW
DGKHUHWR³DFOHDUDQGFRQYLQFLQJVWDQGDUGRIHYLGHQFHWRMXVWify a use of force in self-
GHIHQFH´163 However, it is submitted that there is a chasm between judicial treatments 
RI IDFWV DQG WKH 6&¶V DSSURDFK WR IDFWV ,Q ODUJH SDUW WKLV IORZV IURP WKH ODFN RI
transparency in the operations of the Council.164 The SC has no intelligence-gathering 
capacity of its own,165 and must therefore rely on the contributions of its members and 
their willingness to share their findings with one another. This can mean that it is not 
at all clear what, if any, evidence the SC has considered.  
 
E. Selectivity and Inconsistency. 
 
It is said that the SC is selective in the uses of force it evaluates.166 In large part, it 
will be argued, this is because its permanent members can prevent resolutions being 
passed.167 For instance, during the 1980s the SC passed resolutions concerning 
conflicts in the Middle East and Africa but not about Central America.168 In 1983 the 
US intervened militarily in Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury), through indirect CIA-
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led means in Nicaragua from 1982 and in 1989 in Panama (Operation Just Cause), but 
none of these incidents resulted in an evaluative resolution. While both Operation Just 
Cause and Operation Urgent Fury prompted open SC debates, it was not possible to 
agree on a decision about the uses of force.169 Gray has poinWHGRXWWKDW³>W@KHXVHRI
force in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan and Vietnam could not even be put on 
LWVDJHQGD´170 
 
To illustrate the difficulties of gleaning a resolution from the SC where it directly 
concerns a permanent member of the SC, we will look briefly at the Grenada 
intervention from the SC perspective. Nicaragua complained to the SC about the US 
invasion of Grenada and demanded that the international community condemn it.171 
This request was reiterated by Grenada.172 The US claimed that it was acting pursuant 
to a resolution of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States that found the 
disintegration of government in Grenada a threat to the continued peace and security 
of the Eastern Caribbean. However the US letter also stressed that its interest was in 
removing US civilians from danger.173 The US letter did not mention self-defence 
and, owing to the transmission to the Secretary General rather than the President of 
the SC, it did not appear to be acting pursuant to article 51.  
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Guyana and Nicaragua drafted a resolution on the Grenada situation condemning the 
LQYDVLRQ RI *UHQDGD DV D YLRODWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG RI *UHQDGD¶V
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although the resolution does not 
name the US as an aggressor, it does call for the immediate cessation of the 
intervention and is a clear indictment of the unlawfulness of the action.174 This draft 
was rejected at a meeting of the SC.175 A new draft was presented by Guyana, 
Nicaragua and Zimbabwe the next day.176 This was discussed and rejected at another 
SC meeting.177 In contrast, Operation Urgent Fury was roundly condemned at the 
GA.178 All this tends to suggest, once again, that the SC is not capable of evaluating 
particular claims on their merits because of its structural bias in favour of already 
powerful states.179 
 
$OWKRXJK FHUWDLQ ZULWHUV FODLP WR KDYH REVHUYHG ³a fairly coherent continuum of 
UHVSRQVHV WR VXFK SOHDV LQ PLWLJDWLRQ´,180 it is also the case that one of the 
consequences of the selectivity SC evaluations of uses of force is inconsistency. If the 
SC is to have the freedom to decide what is purposively necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security, it is said that it should not be subject to 
constraining precedent.181 The lack of consistency points towards the absence of 
secondary rules of adjudication that safeguard applications of the law from 
arbitrariness.182 Hart suggested that part of the minimum moral content of law was 
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that like cases are treated alike.183 It would therefore be extremely hard to argue that 
SC evaluations occurred as part of a legal system of collective security. This is 
particularly damaging insofar as the evaluation that a self-defence claim is valid is a 
legal determination. This creates a dilemma because, as an avowedly political body, it 
is difficult to hold the SC to adjudicative standards. Nevertheless, it may be that a lack 
of consistency is also detrimental to conceptions of political collective security; lack 
of consistency would prevent the accumulation of experience and the emergence of 
expectations among states.  
 
)UDQFN WUDQVSRVHG +DUW¶V PD[LP LQWR KLV RZQ WKHRU\ DERXW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG
suggested that consistency is a characteristic of fairness.184 This seems to be 
supported by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which found 
that consistency of decisions makes for the credibility of the SC and that the SC 
cannot function effectively without credibility.185 However it has been suggested that 
FRQVLVWHQF\ LVQRW D UHDOLVDEOHDPELWLRQ IRU WKH6&³(YHQ if members of a security 
pact had parallel interests, a collective reaction procedure could still not be applied 
consistently. Political choices will have to be taken when interpreting, for example, 
ZKR WKH DJJUHVVRU LV«´186 Thus it seems that the SC is in a double-bind: Caught 
between the legitimacy of its decisions and the freedom to act decisively wherever it 
is necessary to do so. It is also to be emphasised that making claims that a pattern can 
be found in the evaluations of the political organs can also legitimate their decision-
making in cases where it might be thought that states did not vote according to the 
merits of a particular case, but according to their own interests.  
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F. Ambiguity of Evaluations. 
 
Another aspect in which evaluations by the SC can be exploited is that it is not always 
clear precisely what is being evaluated. This is because states do not always make a 
self-defence claim where it might be expected that they would. Secondly, they often 
make self-defence claims where it may not be expected that they would: During the 
&ROG:DUERWKWKH86DQGWKH8665ZHUHDFFXVHGRI³SOD\LQJIDVWDQGORRVH´ZLWK
the claim of self-defence.187 Finally, it is also because the SC itself does not usually 
refer to self-defence.188 A good example of this is IVUDHO¶V2SHUDWLRQ2SHUDDJDLQVWWKH
Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in June 1981. Franck uses the incident as an instance of 
anticipatory self-defence.189 Iraq had made a complaint to the SC requesting it to 
convene to discuss the matter.190 However, while it wrote to the President of the SC, 
Israel did not immediately claim self-defence.191  
 
The letter, which did not mention the reporting requirement in article 51, ended with 
WKHZRUGV³>Z@HVKDOOGHIHQGWKHFLWL]HQVRI,VUDHO in time, and with all the means at 
RXUGLVSRVDO´192 +RZHYHUDW WKH ILUVW6&PHHWLQJ IROORZLQJ ,UDT¶VFRPSODLQW ,VUDHO
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specifically invoked article 51 and cited the works of inter alia Waldock and Bowett 
to the effect that a state cannot be expected to await an attack before it takes measures 
in self-defence.193 Engaging with this claim, the Iraqi delegate countered with a 
textual reading of article 51.194 At the second meeting of the Council on the issue, 
some speakers engaged in depth with the self-defence claim,195 while others did not 
mention it.196 It is suggested that it is far from clear on what grounds the Council 
HYHQWXDOO\SDVVHGUHVROXWLRQZKLFK³VWURQJO\FRQGHPQ>HG@WKHPLOLWDU\DWWDFNE\
,VUDHO LQ FOHDU YLRODWLRQ RI WKH &KDUWHU´197 The resolution quoted the text of article 
2(4), but it made no mention of self-defence. 
 
Israel was ultimately condemned for its use of force in the Council. But according to 
Franck, states rejected the claim because Israel had not provided evidence of the 
imminence of the threat from Iraq.198 This reading helps him to suggest that the SC 
has tacitly accepted the doctrinal idea of anticipatory self-defence. However other 
ZULWHUVKDYHQRWDFFHSWHGWKLVUHDGLQJRIWKH6&¶VHYDOXDWLRQ199 The British delegate 
said in response to the claim that the act was one of self-GHIHQFHWKDW³WKHUHZDVQR
instant or overwhelming necessity for self-GHIHQFH´200 While this seems to be a direct 
reference to the Caroline case, other states were far less juridical in their references: 
)RU LQVWDQFH )UDQFH VDLG WKDW ³>Q@RWKLQJ FDQ MXVWLIy an act which, moreover, has 
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DURXVHG XQDQLPRXV FULWLFLVP WKURXJKRXW WKH ZRUOG´201 The US representative, who 
declared VLPSO\WKDW³,VUDHOVKRXOGEHFRQGHPQHG´ZDVVLOHQWDVWRVHOI-defence.202  
 
Running alongside the piecemeal doctrinal discussion was a torrent of emotion. 
5HMHFWLRQVRI,VUDHO¶VFODLPDUHLQYDULRXVFDVHVSHSSHUHGZLWKUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHZLGHU
LVVXHRI,VUDHO¶VSODFHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQGLWVRZQSRVVHVVLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV
For instance, the Iraqi representative spoke in some detail of IsUDHO¶V QXFOHDU
capacity.203 The lack of focus of the debate on the specific question of self-defence, 
and its political nature, is also reflected in the language used by some representatives: 
For instance, the Algerian representative rHIHUUHGWRWKH³=LRQLVW HQWLW\´6imilarly the 
Iraqi representative UHIHUUHG WR ³=LRQLVW DJJUHVVRU´ DQG WKH 6XGDQHVH FDOOHG ,VUDHO¶V
FRQFHSWLRQ RI QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ ³EL]DUUH´204 Such incendiary language is not only 
antagonistic, but also deviates from the question at issue. More importantly, however, 
the failure of speakers in the SC to confine themselves to commenting on the specific 
use of force tends to militate against any claim that the SC considers each issue on its 
merits. 
 
Related to the ambiguity of evaluations is the question of tacit acceptance of a use of 
force. To the extent that writers suppose that where the SC has considered an issue, it 
has decided in not passing a resolution to acquit a claimant of self-defence, it is 
SRVVLEOHIRUWKHPWRDUJXHWKDWWKH6&¶VIDLOXre to agree a resolution demonstrates its 
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acceptance that the use of force is not an act of aggression. Schachter wrote that in a 
IHZ FDVHV ³WKH &RXQFLO¶V IDLOXUH WR DFW KDV EHHQ FRQVWUXHG«DV WDFLW DSSURYDO RU
WROHUDWLRQRIWKHXVHRIIRUFHLQTXHVWLRQ´205. This was the position taken by Franck in 
his view that the Israeli use of force in anticipation of attacks by Egypt and Jordan in 
1967 was accepted as a use of anticipatory self-defence. However the use of 
acquiescence has also been criticised.206 
 
Franck wrote that since a Russian draft resolution condemning Israel and demanding 
WKHUHWXUQRIFDSWXUHGWHUULWRU\JDUQHUHGRQRIPHPEHUV¶YRWHVDQGEHFDXVHWKH
resolution ultimately adopted did not call for the surrender of captured territory,207 
³>L@WLVGLIILFXOWQRWWRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKH&RXQFLOPHPEHUVJDYHFUHGHQFH´WR,VUDHO¶V
justification.208  *UD\ FULWLFLVHV ³ZULWHUV ZKR VHHN WR MXVWLI\ WKH XVH RI IRUFH´ ZKR
³VHL]HRQ«IDLOXUHWRFRQGHPQE\WKH6&DQGWKHIDLOXUHWRWDNHDQ\DFWLRQDJDLQVWWKH
state using IRUFH´209 Wood also denies that the absence of condemnation is evidence 
of the legality of an action.210  
 
This method of viewing SC practice accounts for abstract claims by asserting a 
presumption and demanding contrary evidence for its rebuttal. In this sense the 
evidence is established by absence: Absence of condemnation; absence of opposition; 
absence of contrary reason. It is suggested that these assumptions rely on the 
presumption that the SC acts within a framework of secondary rules that guide its 
                                                 
205
 6FKDFKWHU³Self-GHIHQFH´p. 264. 
206
 White, ³2QWKH%ULQNRI/DZOHVVQHVV´S 
207
 81'RF65HV1RWHKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHVROXWLRQGRHVDVVHUW³WKHLQDGPLVVLELOLW\RI
acquisition of terriWRU\E\ZDU´LQLWVSUHDPEOH 
208
 Franck, Recourse to Force, p. 103. 
209
 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 128. 
210
 Wood, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures. 7KLUG/HFWXUH³7KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLODQGWKH8VH
RI)RUFH´1RYHPEHUSDUD+HUHLQDIWHUµ:RRG7KLUG/HFWXUH¶ 
168  
action, rather than according to the subjective discretion of political actors. To the 
H[WHQWWKDWVXFKDVVXPSWLRQVHQDEOHWKH6&WREHXVHGWRH[SODLQDZD\VWDWHV¶XVHVRI
force, it is submitted that the SC is exploited because its structural bias favours the 
claimant of self-defence over the target state. 
 
G. Indeterminacy of SCRs. 
 
Intimately connected to the questions of what the SC has evaluated, and on what 
grounds, is the question of the interpretation of Council resolutions.  It is said that the 
6&³GRHs not make express determinations of violations; instead it very occasionally 
µUHFDOOV¶$UWLFOHLQWKHSUHDPEOHVWRLWVUHVROXWLRQV´211 Resolutions are said to be 
ambiguous because, in order to garner the support, ideally, of 15 disparate member 
states, they have to cater to a variety of potentially conflicting interests. Thus, 
according to Wood, SC resolutions tend not to be very detailed.212 Indeed, in some 
cases the names of the parties are not even mentioned.213 In other instances, the SC 
does not make clear the precise grounds on which a use of force has been condemned 
RUDFFHSWHG$QRWRULRXVH[DPSOHRIWKHODWWHUZDVWKH&RXQFLO¶Vex ante acceptance of 
WKH 86¶V 2SHUDWLRQ (QGXULQJ )UHHGRP LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ LQ  5HVROXWLRQ 
recognises the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter,214 but it 
does not suggest what sort of action would be appropriate, still less whether the right 
of self-defence subsists after an attack is complete. Alvarez says that the Charter 
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framers recognised thaWZKDWPDWWHUVLV³JHQHUDODFFHSWDQFH´215 This might imply that 
the passing of a resolution is more important than its content.  
 
It is frequently difficult to tell on what terms an SCR has evaluated a claim of self-
defence. Rosalyn Higgins has written that LQPDQ\FDVHVVWDWHV¶YRWHVFDQEHDVFULEHG
WR³SROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHVUDWKHUWKDQWROHJDOEHOLHIV´216 Wood says that this is putting it 
mildly.217 Nevertheless, international lawyers still appear to expect it and in many 
cases, provide their own ratio decidendi. Bedjaoui has noted that the SC has tended 
QRW WRPHQWLRQWKHOHJDOEDVLVIRU LWVFRPSHWHQFHLQDSDUWLFXODUPDWWHU³E\RPLWWLQJ
any express reference to the chapter and article of the Charter on which its action was 
founded´.218 Moreover, the SC tends not to make principled article 39 determinations, 
or at least not to do so in public, to ensure that its actions do not set unlimited or 
unintended precedents.219  
 
Bedjaoui says that because of the lack of explicit reference to authority, international 
lawyers are driven to interpret SCRs in order to glean the legal bases for their 
findings.220 Interpretation of SCRs is far from straightforward. Michael Wood has 
written about the difficulties of interpreting the resolutions of the SC on the basis that 
³WKHUHLVlittle authority on the interpretation of non-WUHDW\WH[WV´221 Wellens notes that 
³WRROHJDOLVWLFDORRNDWIRUPXODWLRQLVQRWDSSURSULDWH´222 EXWWKDWLQPRVWFDVHV³WKH
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IRUPXODWLRQLVWKHUHVXOWRIORQJDQGLQWHQVLYHQHJRWLDWLRQ´223 6&5VXVH³WKHFRYHUHG
lanJXDJHRIGLSORPDF\´HLWKHU³RXWRISROLWLFDOQHFHVVLW\´RU³SURIHVVLRQDOKDELW´.224 
In very few cases of dispute between states over conflicting readings of the facts has 
the SC favoured one side over the other by finding that one of the parties, as opposed 
to a non-state actor or an event, constitutes the threat.225 
 
The ambiguity of SC resolutions is exacerbated because they do not often use 
standard formulae. This includes the use of legal formulations. It is rare to see an SC 
resolution that refers to particular Charter terms.226 $SSDUHQWO\ WKHUH LV DOPRVW ³QR
LQSXW IURP WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 6HFUHWDULDW´ DQG ³QR VWDQGDUG SURFHGXUH IRU GUDIWLQJ
6&5V´227 On the other hand, international lawyers and other interpreters often 
attempt to find evidence of standard formulae. A good example of this was the phrase 
³DOOPHDVXUHVQHFHVVDU\´LQ6&UHVROXWLRQ7KHTXHVWLRQZDVZKHWKHUWKLVSKUDVH
ZDVFRGHIRU³XVHRIIRUFH´,WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDW6&LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHVHHQ
as an exercise in cryptography. 
 
Wood sayV WKDW WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 6&5V ³GHSHQGV LQ WKH ODVW DQDO\VLV RQ WKH
intentions of the Security Council (as evidenced by the text of the resolution and the 
                                                 
223
 Ibid., p. 21. 
224
 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions p. 230. 
225
 With the possible exceptions of Iraq. UN Doc. S/Res/660 (1990) where the invasion of Kuwait was 
FDOOHGD³EUHDFKRIWKHSHDFH´DQG,UDTZDVGLUHFWO\FRQGHPQHG7KH1RUWK.RUHDQVZHUHFRQGHPQHG
for a breach of the peace by its armed attack on the Republic of Korea UN Doc. S/Res/82 (1950). This 
can be compared with UN Doc. S/Res/1798 (2008) where WKH6&PHWLFXORXVO\UHIHUVWR³WKHVLWXDWLRQ
EHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV´ DVWR(WKLRSLDDQG(ULWUHD¶VFRQIOLFW. Likewise UN Doc. S/Res/1778 2007) selects 
none of the states involved for particular condemnation in the Chad, Central African Republic case. UN 
Doc. S/Res/1773 (2007) is another example of the SC condemning neither Israel nor Lebanon in their 
dispute. In UN Doc. S/Res/713 (1991) none of the parties to the dissolution of the SFRY was singled 
out for blame. 
226
 0XUSK\³7KH'RFWULQHRI3UHHPSWLYH6HOI-DefeQVH´, p. 737; Gray, International Law and the Use 
of Force, p. 18. 
227
 :RRG³7KH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQV´S 
171  
VXUURXQGLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHV´228 But intention is very hard to pin down when one must 
first resolve the indistinction surrounding the identity of the drafter: Are SC members 
WREHWDNHQVHSDUDWHO\IURPWKHERG\"+LJJLQVKDVSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKH6&³LVUHDOO\D
dual concept; it is each of its individual members stating a case and it is also the sum 
total oI WKH PHPEHUV DFWLQJ LQ WKH QDPH RI WKH RUJDQ´229 When the SC passes a 
UHVROXWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR YDOLG SURFHGXUH LW VKRXOG EH VHHQ DV ³a reflection of the 
corporate will of the Security Council, not the aggregation of the wills of the members 
RIWKDWERG\´230 She says that when SC members act as participants in debates they 
use law in a very different way to when they act as decision-makers. This is a key 
point. One of the greatest sources of indistinction in the collective security system is 
that it is not clear when states act in their national capacity and when they act as 
organs of the collective security system. Higgins says that the positions of 
³SURWDJRQLVWV DQG LPSDUWLDO RUJDQ´ DUH EOXUUHG )RU WKH IRUPHU, the law is an 
instrument of national policy or DILJOHDIIRU³GLVDJUHHDEOHSROLWLFDOUHDOLWLHV´)RUWKH
latter, ODZLVD³FRPPRQODQJXDJH´RIMXVWLILFDWLRQ231 
 
Against this is the idea that, since the end of the Cold War, WKH 6& KDV EHJXQ ³WR
EHKDYH DV D FROOHFWLYH ERG\´ FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ ³JUHDWHU FRRSHUDWLRQ´232 The idea of 
the communality of the SC has been taken forward by Ian Johnstone in his assertion 
that, ZKLOH WKH 6& PD\ QRW FRQVWLWXWH DQ LQWHUSUHWLYH FRPPXQLW\ LQ 6WDQOH\ )LVK¶V
sense, there is sufficient normative commonality to enable understandings to 
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develop.233 The National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration also sought to 
assert generally shared values of freedom and democracy.234 This coming together of 
values has put a higher premium on unanimity in the SC.235 Not only does this tend to 
make for vaguer resolutions more capable of attaining the consent of all SC 
members,236 but it has also increased the frequency with which states make separate 
statements explaining their own position outside the SC.  
 
Hutton has pointed out that the price RI XQDQLPLW\ LV ³UHFRXUVH WR WKH GHYLVH RI
H[SODQDWLRQVRIYRWH´WRUHFRUGDSRVLWLRQZLWKRXWEORFNLQJFRQVHQVXV237 A notorious 
instance of this practice concerned resolution 1441 (2002) passed in the run-up to the 
US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. The resolution found that if Iraq 
FRQWLQXHGWREHLQ³PDWHULDOEUHDFK´RILWVREOLJDWLRQV³VHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHV´ZRXOG
EHFRQVLGHUHGE\WKH&RXQFLO7KHODFNRIWKHZRUGV³DOOQHFHVVDU\PHDQV´VXJJHVWHG
according to some, that the Council did not intend to take military action since that 
formulation has become usual in cases of authorisation of force.238 However, the UK 
justified its part in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an authorised use of force pursuant to 
resolution 1441 which, it said, had reactivated resolution 678.239 It has been suggested 
that the members of the SC drafted it deliberately ambiguously so that they could 
retain political freedom.240 Perhaps a better explanation is that Council members that 
supported military action settled for ambiguous language in the face of 
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uncompromising opposition from France and Russia. This reading is suggested by the 
relatively unambiguous, if conflicting, statements given by the state representatives 
after the resolution was passed.241 
 
The SC meeting at which the resolution was passed demonstrates this. The US 
GHOHJDWH VWDWHG WKDW ³If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of 
further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any Member State from 
acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United 
Nations resolutions and protect world SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\´242 The French delegate 
welcomed WKHODFNRI³DXWRPDWLFLW\´DQGWKDW,UDT¶VIXUWKHUIDLOXUHWRFRPSO\ZRXOG
be met with a further SC meeting.243 Similarly, the Russian delegate stressed the 
LPSRUWDQFH RI ³QRW \LHOGLQJ WR WKH WHPSWDWLRQ RI XQLODWHUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH 
UHVROXWLRQ¶VSURYLVLRQV´.244 In the light of what occurred subsequently, it is clear that 
the expression of such contrary readings of resolutions plays an important part in the 
subsequent justification of uses of force. 
 
Byers explained it is not that one set of arguments is better than the other but that both 
VHWVRIDUJXPHQWVDUH³SODXVLEOH´245 If the SC were to apply this sort of reasoning to 
its evaluations of self-defence claims, disputes about who had the right to use self-
defence would not be prevented from escalating. It is suggested that in that case, the 
value of unanimity is not worth the price of the resolution appraising the use of force 
being ambiguous.  
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H. Lack of Transparency. 
 
A major factor exacerbating the ambiguity of SC evaluations of self-defence claims 
and resolutions concerning particular uses of force is the lack of transparency in its 
operations. The debates that lead up to resolutions, and from which it may be possible 
to ascertain the grounds on which states made their assessments, are often made 
behind closed doors.246 This not only deprives international lawyers of a guide to 
interpretation, but also removes the possibility of scrutinising the process of decision-
making.247 ,W LV VXJJHVWHG WKDWSRVLWLRQV OLNH WKDWRI'LQVWHLQZKRVDLG³>D@VDQRQ-
MXGLFLDOERG\WKH&RXQFLOLVQRWUHTXLUHGWRVHWRXWUHDVRQVIRULWVGHFLVLRQV´248 tend to 
render the SC exploitable. 
 
It has beHQVDLGWKDW³>D@VWKH&RXQFLOKDVEHFRPHPRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGSRZHUIXOLWKDV
EHFRPH PRUH VHFUHWLYH´.249 Reisman says that it now contains smaller and smaller 
³PLQL-&RXQFLOV´ ZKLFK ³PHHW EHKLQG FORVHG GRRUV ZLWKRXW NHHSLQJ UHFRUGV´ 7KH
elitism implied in this is likely to alienate many states.250 On the other hand he says 
WKDW ³LQ PDQ\ FDVHV FORVHG GHOLEHUDWLRQV PD\ EH MXVWLILHG´251 In this vein, David 
Malone has pointed out that the informal P5 meetings that followed the end of the 
&ROG:DU³KHOSHGDQWLFLSDWHDQGGLIIXVHFRQIOLFWV´252 Wood has noted that the more 
controversial the perception of a given issue, the more likely it is to be resolved off 
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WKHUHFRUGLQ³FRUULGRUQHJRWLDWLRQV´253 It is likely that, unless the interests of none of 
the current SC members are implicated, self-defence claims will fall within this 
category. Moreover there is a fear that the holding of public meetings merely creates a 
forum for propaganda and grandstanding.254  
 
The SC holds private meetings and public meetings. Public meetings are further sub-
GLYLGHGLQWR³RSHQGHEDWH´³GHEDWH´³EULHILQJ´DQG³DGRSWLRQ´IRUPDWV7KHH[WHQW
of non-SC PHPEHUVWDWHV¶ participation will be determined by the format chosen.255 
:KLOHWKHIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFPHHWLQJLVVDLGWREH³>W@RWDNHDFWLRQDQGor hold, inter 
DOLD EULHILQJV DQG GHEDWHV´256 WKH IXQFWLRQ RI D SULYDWH PHHWLQJ LV ³>W@R FRQGXFW
discussion and/or take actions, e.g., recommendation regarding the appointment of the 
Secretary-*HQHUDOZLWKRXW WKHDWWHQGDQFHRI WKHSXEOLFRU WKHSUHVV´257 The SC has 
also made great use of the separate consultations Chamber. This tends to be used 
rather than the formal and public Council Chamber.258 This has a further effect of 
alienating smaller states and tends to suggest that the SC is dominated by its 
permanent members. %DLOH\DQG'DZVUHIHUWR³WKHRXWUDJHIHOWE\VRPHPHGLXPDQG
smaller states when they realised that the Security Council might sometimes meet in 
SULYDWH´259  
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However not all of the de-formalisation of the SC has had negative consequences. Not 
DOO ³LQIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQV´ LPSO\ VKDGRZ\EDFNURRPGHDOV VRPHDUH DQQRXQFHG LQ
the UN Journal with a list of topics.260 Moreover not all informal meetings are 
exclusive. One IRUPRIPHHWLQJWKDWKDVJURZQPDUNHGO\LQXVHLVWKH³$UULDIRUPXOD
PHHWLQJ´ZKLch means that SC members can hear what external speakers have to say 
LQ D ³YHU\ LQIRUPDO´ VHWWLQJ261 However an Arria formula meeting comprises 
members of the SC for an exchange of views; it is not a meeting of the SC. The 
problem for international lawyers is that there is no record of the meeting except any 
off-the-record statements that might filter through.  
 
It has been suggested that in many cases smaller states sitting on the SC are excluded 
from participation in the deliberative process because the meetings in which action is 
decided upon are not sufficiently publicised. This has two effects: One is that the 
claim that the SC acts on behalf of all members of the UN is undermined; and the 
seond is that when the SC meets behind closed doors, no official record of the 
meeting is available for analysis. In theory states not members of the SC can request 
to be present at SC debates as non-voting participants.262 This is particularly 
important where the SC is discussing a matter that is of direct relevance to a state, 
particularly if that state has been involved in a self-defence situation. In response to 
this the 2005 World Summit outcome document recommended that ³the Security 
Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involvement of 
States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its 
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DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR WKH PHPEHUVKLS DQG LQFUHDVH WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ RI LWV ZRUN´263 At 
present the SC purports to be attempting to take account of these problems.264  
 
However, real change is hampered where the permanent members of the Council are 
loath to change their working practices. It seems that there is a dilemma between the 
OHJLWLPDF\RIWKH6&SURFHVVLQLQYHVWLJDWLQJDQGGHDOLQJZLWKLVVXHVDQGWKH³SURPSW
DQG HIIHFWLYH DFWLRQ´265 it is supposed to be able to take to maintain international 
peace and security. At an SC meeting, the UK has held that ³>W@here will always be a 
need to balance transparency with the need for the Council to be able to work 
HIIHFWLYHO\´266 Similarly, the French representative stressed that while openness and 
transparency are a good thing in the abstract, in practice France is against the 
formalisation of informal consultations.267 Some international lawyers take a similar 
view. 0XUSK\ RSLQHV WKDW ³µIDLU¶ DQG µJHQXLQHO\ FROOHFWLYH¶ GHFLVLRQ-making by the 
Security Council is [not necessarily] a sensible approach for global conflict 
PDQDJHPHQW´268 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &RXQFLO¶V ,QIRUPDO Working Group on Documentation and Other 
Procedural Questions ³[m]any non-members of the Council expressed concern about 
MXVWEHLQJSDVVLYHUHFLSLHQWVRIGHFLVLRQVDQGQHZVDIWHU WKHHYHQW´269 It seems that 
questions of access and participation could be solved relatively easily. This is because 
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 [k]nowing what the Council was likely to discuss, why and when was one 
of the most basic hurdles encountered by non-Council members hoping to 
have any kind of impact on the Council's work. The obscurity and lack of 
transparency inherent in the Council's working methods left most UN 
members extremely unhappy on all these fronts. Even within the Council, 
process was often obscure for elected members.270  
 
While formal SC meetings are announced in the UN Journal, the substance of the 
informal consultations is not. It seems that the matter of dissemination is a core 
problem for the SC. At a debate on working methods, the Indonesian representative, 
while recognising that the nature of SC work required it to respond to crises as they 
arose rather than sticking rigidly to its agenda, suggested that the SC develop a more 
inclusive and responsive system for informing UN members of its work.271 The 
dissemination is also important if the SC is to be properly scrutinised in its work.  
 
Moreover the keeping of records is important if international lawyers are to be able to 
give their legal opinions about evaluations of uses of force made by the SC. To the 
extent that the decision-making processes of the SC are reserved from public view, it 
seems that there is no way of checking whether or not the SC is acting arbitrarily or 
UHVSRQGLQJWRWKHPHULWVRIDJLYHQFODLP0LFKDHO:RRGKDVVDLGWKDW³PRVWRI WKH
QHJRWLDWLQJKLVWRU\RIDUHVROXWLRQLVQRWRQWKHSXEOLFUHFRUG´272 Similarly Anthony 
$XVWVDLGRI6&SUDFWLFHLQWKHHDUO\V³QRZDGD\VWKHYHUEDWLPUHFRUGRIDQ6&
mHHWLQJXVXDOO\JLYHVOLWWOHLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHSURFHVVZKLFKOHGWRWKHDGRSWLRQRI«D
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UHVROXWLRQ´273 However it is submitted that the lack of documentary evidence of the 
process of evaluation creates indistinction that flows both from the lack of hooks for 
interpretation and from mistrust that such secrecy evokes in interpreting audiences.  
 
I. Limits on Security Council Authority. 
 
In order to tackle the problem of the exploitability of the SC, its broad discretion to 
use its binding powers and the dominance of its permanent members, some writers 
suggest that the SC is subject to legal limitations. It will be suggested that however 
desirable this might be, making the claim that the SC is in fact bound by such 
constraints in practice may help to legitimise the Council in ways that it does not 
deserve.  
 
In the HDUO\VVFKRODUVEHJDQWRIHDUIRUWKH6&¶VRYHU-activity. Some writers are 
happy to suggest that that there are enough de facto limits on the SC without imposing 
any normative ones.274 5HLVPDQVD\V³>h]ard substantive and procedural standards for 
UHYLHZ RI &KDSWHU 9,, DFWLRQV DUH GLIILFXOW WR SLQSRLQW LQ WKH &KDUWHU´275 However 
RWKHUVKDYHDWWHPSWHGWREULQJWKH6&¶VGLVFUHWLRQZLWKLQQRUPDWLYHOLPLWV,WLVVDLG
that the SC is bound by at least the principles and purposes of the Charter.276 The 
6&¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH&KDUWHUV\VWHPZDVGHVFULEHGWKXVE\IRUPHU,&-3UHVLGHQW-XGJH
Bedjaoui:277  
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[O]ne could say that it would not be unreasonable to state that the Security 
Council must respect the Charter, on the one hand because it is the act to 
which it owes its very existence and also and above all because it serves 
this Charter and the United Nations Organization«>2@ver and above the 
spirit of the Charter, the actual text points the same way. Article 24, 
paragraph 2, of the &KDUWHU H[SUHVVO\ VWDWHV WKDW µin discharging [its] 
duties, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles RIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶. 
 
It is also said that members of the UN are only obliged to carry out Council decisions 
where they are in accordance with the Charter.278 One problem here is that, as 
GLVFXVVHGLQWKHODVWFKDSWHUWKH&KDUWHU¶VSULQFLSOHVDQGSXUSRVHVDUHDPELJXRXV279 
For instance, article 1(1) of the Charter could be read as containing conflicting 
imperatives both for effective measures to maintain international peace and security 
DQGRQHV³LQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHVRIMXVWLFHDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´280  
 
Against the view that the SC is constrained by Charter purposes and principles, Wood 
notes WKH FRQWURYHUV\ WKDW VXUURXQGV WKH SKUDVH ³LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH SUHVHQW
&KDUWHU´ LQ DUWLFOH  DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK PHPEHU VWDWHV DJUHH WR FDUU\ RXW 6&
decisions.281 He says that to leave it to the individual states to decide whether an SC 
decision was in acFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH&KDUWHUZRXOG³SODFHWKH&KDUWHUV\VWHP«DWWKH
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PHUF\ RI LQGLYLGXDO VWDWHV´ DQG UHQGHU LW WRRWKOHVV OLNH WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV282 
:RRG¶VRZQSRVLWLRQLVWKDWWKHSKUDVHLVDGGUHVVHGWRVWDWHV¶DFWLRQVDQGQRWWKRVHRI
the Council.283 It is suggested that such an interpretation of SC discretion tends to 
render any limit on SC discretion to evaluate self-defence claims nugatory.  
 
Similarly, Franck suggests that the SC is bound by a duty to act bona fides when 
using its Chapter VII powers .284 It is not entirely clear what acting bona fides implies 
in practice.285 For instance, would a bona fides finding that a claim to have used force 
in self-defence was invalid involve detailed consideration of all the available 
evidence? Or would it merely involve not allowing deciding according to inter-state 
alliances and enmities? In addition, while the concept is said to have fallen out of 
favour recently,286 it has been asserted that the SC must at least be limited by 
peremptory norms of ius cogens.287 This question came before the ICJ in relation to a 
self-defence claim by Bosnia and Herzegovina and its claim that resolution 713 
(1993) deprived its of its inherent right of self-defence.288 However the application 
and content of ius cogens norms is not clear.289 This indeterminacy has practical 
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HIIHFWV -XGJH6LPPDSRLQWHGRXW WKDWZHUH WKH6&WREHVXEMHFWRQO\ WR WKH³UDWKHU
LQGHWHUPLQDWHVWDQGDUGRIMXVFRJHQV´WKHVWDQGDUGPD\DFWDVD³ILJOHDI´290 
 
Another potential limit on the Council is said to be its need to create a general 
consensus behind its proposed action. It is said that the SC discretion in the use of its 
&KDSWHU9,,SRZHUVLVWHPSHUHGEHFDXVH³LIDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQE\WKH&RXQFLOZDVQRW
generally acceptable, it would be no more binding on members than a comparable 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ E\ DQ\ RWKHU RUJDQ´291 However it is submitted that in some cases 
general acceptability may not save so-FDOOHG ³SDULDK VWDWHV´292 For instance, it is 
suggested that if Iran or North Korea were to anticipate a perceived attack from the 
US, this would be received in a very different manner to any anticipatory action taken 
E\WKH86DJDLQVWWKHVHVWDWHV,QVKRUWLWLVVXJJHVWHGWKDWµJHQHUDODFFHSWDELOLW\¶PD\
simply be a conduit for widely shared prejudices that have not been appropriately 
examined. 
 
J. Judicial Review. 
 
Nevertheless, in some cases where the SC seems to have been used as a tool for 
national policy, there has been a widespread feeling that it has over-stepped the mark. 
Perhaps the most controversial example of the use of the SC as a tool for national 
policy was its use by Britain, France and the US to force Libya to extradite the men 
suspected of perpetrating the Lockerbie bombing of December 1988. In response, 
Libya applied to the ICJ for provisional measures to preveQWWKH3IURP³WDNLQJDQ\
action against Libya calculated to coerce or compel Libya to surrender the accused 
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LQGLYLGXDOV WR DQ\ MXULVGLFWLRQ RXWVLGH RI /LE\D´293 To the extent that such action 
LQFOXGHGDFWLRQWDNHQWKURXJKWKH6&/LE\D¶VUHTXHVW± had it been granted ± would 
have compelled the Court to subject an SC resolution to judicial review. While the 
Court did not reject this possibility outright, it nevertheless declined to do so in this 
case. 
 
More recently, the Kadi case has raised the spectre of judicial review once again. In 
WKLVFDVHD6DXGL<DVVLQ$EGXOODK.DGLZDVSODFHGRQRQHRIWKH6&¶VVDQFWLRQVOLVWV
which obliged UN members to freeze any funds or financial resources controlled by 
him directly or indirectly. In order to implement this, the EC passed a Council 
regulation which Mr Kadi sought to be annulled by the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
on the grounds that it violated inter alia his right to a fair hearing and his right to 
property. The CFI refused to annul the regulation and Kadi appealed to the ECJ. In 
2008 the Advocate General, Miguel Poiares Maduro, revived the judicial review of 
SC resolutions debate by suggesting that the ECJ should annul the regulation. He 
suggested that since there is no effective judicial review within the UN, the EC could 
not avoid undertaking review of SC resolutions itself.294 The ECJ itself was more 
HTXLYRFDO ,W VDLG WKDW ³LW LV QRW«IRU WKH &RPPXQLW\ MXGLFDWXUH«WR UHYLHZ WKH
ODZIXOQHVVRIVXFKDUHVROXWLRQDGRSWHGE\DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOERG\´EXWWKDWWKLVGLd not 
mean it could not review the EC level implementing measures.295  
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Many writers think that direct judicial review is unlikely because courts tend to defer 
to the executive.296 The possibility of a less direct form of judicial review of SC 
resolutions has also been discussed. For instance, Cassese has suggested there might 
EHVFRSH IRU WKH³LQFLGHQWDO´ MXGLFLDO UHYLHZRI UHVROXWLRQV297 Another possibility is 
WKH ³H[SUHVVLYH PRGH´ RI UHYLHZ $OYDUH] H[SODLQV WKDW WKLV PHDQV WKDW WKH &RXUW
NHHSV XS DQ ³RQJRLQJ GLDORJXH´ ZLWK WKH &RXQFLO 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH ,&- FRXOG
without actually finding that a Chapter VII resolution was ultra vires, suggest that the 
Council was not acting according to the rule of law.298 It is submitted that this sort of 
weak judicial review may not be able to prevent Council members making arguments 
that the overriding purpose of the Charter is the maintenance of international peace 
DQG VHFXULW\ DQG WKDW WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ PD\ UHQGHU WKH &RXQFLO¶V
ability to carry out its article 24(1) responsibility, it is incompatible with the Charter 
scheme.299  
 
This judicial review discourse is interesting because it demonstrates the desire of 
PDQ\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV WR FRXQWHU WKH 6&¶V FRQFUHWH HIILFDF\ ZLWK QRUPDWLYH
legitimacy.300 If SC resolutions could be subject to judicial review by the ICJ, for 
instance, it would mean that SC practice would have to more closely conform to a due 
process model. This would particularly be the case where a resolution resulted in the 
imposition of sanctions or other members that are capable of affecting individuals 
within a member state as well as the government of that state. It is suggested that such 
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a move may simply render the SC useless in the eyes of the member states who 
wished to use it to further their own policies.  
 
(+ &DUU VDLG WKDW ³DV VRRQ DV WKH DWWHPSW LV PDGH WR DSSO\«VXSSRVHGO\ DEVWUDFW
principles to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent 
GLVJXLVHVRIVHOILVKYHVWHGLQWHUHVWV´301 It is suggested that this is, perhaps, to claim 
too much. The important question is whether such exploitation of legal rules can be 
scrutinised and challenged. It is submitted that the main evaluator of self-defence 
claims suggested by international lawyers, the SC, does not usually scrutinise or 
challenge self-defence claims; particularly when they are made by a member of the 
P5. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
)UDQFNKDV VWDWHG WKDWDUWLFOH LV ³YXOQHUDEOH WR VHOI-VHUYLQJDXWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ LQ
SDUW EHFDXVH WKHUH LV QR ³FUHGLEOH OHJLWLPDWLQJ LQVWLtutional process to patrol its 
OLPLWV´302 Many international lawyers consider that the SC has the ultimate authority 
to interpret self-defence claims.303 The practice of the Council itself has been 
explored. Despite the temptation for international lawyers to take advantage of the 
concentration of power within the SC, it has been said that the Council cannot be seen 
as an unproblematic evaluator of self-defence claims. This is because its 
pronouncements concerning the use of force are the product of heavily self-interested 
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and opaque processes and because in very few cases is it possible to identify an 
unambiguous rejection of a self-defence claim. 
 
$OYDUH] KDV HOHJDQWO\ SRLQWHG RXW WKH WHQVLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH µUHDOLVW¶ DQG µOHJDOLVW¶
approaches to the matter of the place of law in collective security. He wrote that while 
the former sees the system as a purposive arrangement, structured with the SC at its 
apex, the latter view the collective security system as constitutional and see the rule of 
law as a limit of the &RXQFLO¶VSRZHU304 In practical terms, however, it seems that the 
authority of the Council to have the last word on a self-defence claim is absolute. In 
large part this is because of its permanent members. Part of the price paid for their 
participation in the UN system was their dominance in the SC.305 
 
,WKDVEHHQULJKWO\VDLGWKDW³WKHUHKDVEHHQDWHQGHQF\WRLQYHVWLQWKH816HFXULW\
Council hopes for collective security that exceed what can be prudently based on the 
&KDUWHU DQGRQ WKH&RXQFLO¶V UHFRUG´306 It is suggested that such a tendency, while 
motivated by good reasons, may end up making the system more vulnerable to 
H[SORLWDWLRQDQGQRWOHVV,WKDVEHHQVDLGWKDWWKLV³DWLWVZRUVWPDVNV«WKHH[WHQWWR
which particular actors pursue their own agenda under the banner of collective 
DFWLRQ´307 This is because the Council is said to have UHIOHFWHG³WKHVSHFLDOLQWHUHVWV
and factual predominance of the United States and its Western allies within the 
&RXQFLO´308 
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.RVNHQQLHPLKDVZULWWHQWKDW³>O@DZ¶VFRQWULEXtion to security is not in the substantive 
responses it gives, but in the process of justification that it imports into institutional 
SROLF\DQGLQLWVDVVXPSWLRQRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHSROLFLHVFKRVHQ´309 It is to this 
contribution that we now turn. The following two chapters will sketch out a role for 
law in the process of evaluation of self-defence claims. The first chapter will 
introduce the idea of intersubjectivity. It will be argued that realist criticisms of 
international law can be answered more firmly if the claim to the objectivity of legal 
norms and evaluations is dropped. The idea of the criticisable validity claim will also 
be set out. This entails the idea that if a state makes a self-defence claim, it must be 
prepared to vindicate the claim and others must be prepared to demand that it does. 
The final chapter will be an exploration of the place of facts and evidence in the 
vindication of self-defence claims. The idea is that there is insufficient normative 
commonality in disputes over self-defence to lead to intersubjective understanding 
about how the rules should apply. Instead, it is suggested that it may be possible for 
intersubjective understanding to be reached about what happened in a given case. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Intersubjectivity. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
In this chapter and the one that follows it, a change of pace and direction will be made 
in pursuing the aim of this thesis; to seek a means of identifying valid self-defence 
claims. ,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUV¶UHVSRQVHVWo realist criticisms 
that the UN collective security system is either esoteric or exploitable have not 
managed to escape both poles simultaneously. It was suggested that where it was 
argued that international law would have to adapt to changing social circumstances 
and technological developments, their responses tended to render the right of self-
defence so flexible that it could prove difficult to show that a state had acted outside 
the right. On the other hand, where the imperative to adapt was brushed aside, or 
where the process of adaptation was conditioned with secondary rules and quasi-
adjudicative institutions, they remained open to the accusation that the law was 
esoteric and overly rigid. 
 
The following two chapters will develop a new response to realist criticisms based on 
elements of JüUJHQ+DEHUPDV¶7KHRU\RI&RPPXQLFDWLYH$FWLRQ7&$7KHLGHDLV
to develop the rudiments of a system of evaluation that is both sensitive to changes in 
the strategic environment and difficult to exploit. This will be done by decoupling the 
validity of a given self-defence claim from adherence to certain rules and re-coupling 
LWWRWKHFODLPDQWVWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRJLYHJRRGUHDVRQVIRULWVXVHRIIRUFH7KHFRQFHSW
of a good reason demands intersubjective recognition of what is or is not a good 
reason. It is suggested that, owing to the contested nature of the norms of the 
FROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHPWKHEHVWZD\WRGRWKLVLVWRORRNWRµWKHIDFWV¶RIDJLYHQ
situation.  
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At present, statements that force has been used are not always taken as claims and are 
sometimes viewed as assertions.1 Statements that force has been used in self-defence 
would be taken as criticizable validity claims. This means that they would be 
contestable; actors making such statements would be claimants who must look to their 
audience for vindication. It will be argued that the G.W. Bush Administration doctrine 
of pre-emption is fundamentally incompatible with the UN collective security system 
because RILWVGHVLJQDWLRQRI³RXWODZVWDWHV´2 the amorphousness of the threat that is 
pre-empted, the claim that the individual nation has the ultimate right to decide and 
the lack of transparency in the decision-making process. These factors reduce 
decision-making about the validity of a self-defence claim to the policies of elite 
actors capable of enforcing their will. This is for two reasons. The first reason, and a 
potential remedy for it, will be discussed in this chapter and the second in the next 
chapter.  
 
The first reason that the doctrine of pre-emption is not commensurate with the 
collective security system is that statements that armed force has been used in self-
defence are viewed as decisions at the national level and not as claims at the 
international level. This tends to mean that any process of evaluation at the 
international level can simply be ignored by a state powerful or stubborn enough to do 
so. The problem is located in the attitude of certain states to self-defence. It is seen as 
a mode of self-help, a natural right of self protection that cannot be taken away by law 
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and operates outside the collective security system.3 The role of the collective security 
system is simply to acknowledge the right of states to use force in this way. It will be 
suggested that a potential solution to this problem lies in the attitudes to 
communication of the actors in the collective security system. Habermas explained 
WKDW ³>F@RPLQJ WR DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ PHDQV WKDW WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV LQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
reach an agreement concerning the validity of an utterance; agreement is the 
LQWHUVXEMHFWLYH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH YDOLGLW\ FODLP WKH VSHDNHU UDLVHV IRU LW´4 In 
consequence the presumption will be that the claimant state could be obliged to 
vindicate that claim by responding to criticisms levelled at it from other actors in the 
system.  
 
The second reason concerns evidence. This has two major elements. The first is that 
the threats that are pre-empted are probabilistic and not material; evidencing them is a 
matter of intelligence estimates and inference. The second is that the nature of the 
threat, rogue states and their terrorist clients armed with WMD,5 is said to require 
intelligence precautions. This makes widespread intelligence sharing extremely 
unlikely and, since little direct evidence of probabilistic threats is in the public 
domain, renders any evaluation of pre-emption claims on the facts of each case as it 
arises highly unlikely. Here, the solution is simply to deny valid self-defence to 
claims that cannot be vindicated through evidence. This would act as a line-drawing 
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exercise that, hopefully, would distinguish instances of acceptable flexibility from 
instances of exploitation on a case-by-case basis.6 
 
It should be underscored that what follows is not a description of what already occurs 
in international discourses about self-defence. In effect, this part of the thesis is 
largely prescriptive. The aim is to lay down some minimal requirements for 
distinguishing valid from invalid claims to have used force in self-defence. In order to 
prevent the claims made being completely utopian, certain concessions to possibility 
will have to be made. However, this will be done bearing in mind the danger of 
exploitation that the collective security system faces from states that want to use it as 
a means of legitimating their actions and policies.  
 
One concession that will not be made, however, is that the attitudes of states must 
change. It is submitted that many international lawyers take for-granted self-interested 
and strategic behaviour by states, perhaps because of the doctrine of sovereignty.7 
Wendt has pointed out that the conception of the individual as a rationally self-
interested actor is used by liberal scholars as well as realists.8 The central claim of this 
thesis is that states have to take responsibility for the process of claim and evaluation, 
rather than have it imposed on them by international lawyers as a notional duty. It 
might be that the responsibility to account for self-defence, and to evaluate such 
accounts, is the price states pay for tapping into the legitimacy of UN collective 
security processes.9 
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A. From Objectivity to Intersubjectivity. 
 
The force of this challenge to realist criticisms flows from intersubjective 
understanding generated among collective evaluators of the self-defence claim. The 
idea of intersubjectivity will replace objectivity as a counter to realist rule-sceptic 
arguments about radical subjectivity. It is the intersubjective understanding of a claim 
that will eventually determine whether it was or was not valid. Intersubjectivity 
occupies the ground between objectivity and subjectivity. If objectivity posits that 
things existing outside human perception do so independently of that perception, then 
subjectivity posits that nothing exists without the human subject who has autonomous 
control over his perception of the world. Intersubjectivity rejects the former position 
and modifies the latter. The idea is that the external world is constructed through the 
interaction of speaking and acting subjects. Meaning is created through 
communication about the world, it is not a given to be discovered by lone interpreters. 
To relate this to the evaluation of self-defence claims, we might say that a self-
defence claim would be valid in the context of a specific discourse, if the evaluating 
audience and claimant could construct an understanding of the force used by the 
claimant to that effect. 
 
International lawyers who sought to rely on the objectivity of legal norms and 
institutions as the location of the force of the law tended to run into two realist 
criticisms. One criticism was that the objective can be seen as a sort of empty 
                                                                                                                                            
IXWXUHFDQEHDSURJUDPPHRISUDFWLFDODFWLRQ³WKHRU\LWVHOILVDIRUPRISUDFWLFH´3$OORWWEunomia: 
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structure that can disguise and legitimize the particularity of its contents.10 
Koskenniemi has argued that the political contest over legal words manifests itself in 
an attempt to make the particular appear to be universal.11 Using the work of Laclau,12 
he has argued that a fulfilled universal is hegemonic.13 In other words, the objectivity 
of the law can disguise the subjectivity of interpretations of legal norms. This was a 
particular problem for self-defence because it is, by its nature, applied by subjects of 
the law rather than officials of the legal system. Another criticism was that the 
objective was simply too uncompromising a prescription. It was argued that, to the 
extent that the objectivity of a norm was expressed through its constancy, it would 
prove inflexible and therefore run the risk of desuetude and esotericism.14 
 
It is submitted that intersubjectively reached evaluations are opposable to subjective 
national decisions to use force in self-defence. The authority of the evaluation will 
stem both from the mutual identification of the evaluator and the claimant (it may be 
WKDW WRGD\¶V HYDOXDWRU LV WRPRUURZ¶V FODLPDQW,15 and from the credentials of the 
process of evaluation itself.16 Evaluation is a critical process of argumentation. 
Evaluators would be expected, on the one hand, to subject claims to thorough scrutiny 
and, on the other hand, to accept claims where they have been vindicated with good 
reasons. In turn, the acceptability of a given evaluation depends on its scrutability. In 
other words, evaluations of self-defence claims themselves raise criticizable validity 
claims that are guaranteed by reasons. 
                                                 
10
 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(2002) Cambridge University Press, p. 500+HUHLQDIWHUµKoskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer¶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113 p. 115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If evaluations of self-defence claims are to be scrutinised, the factors on which the 
decision was made would have to be available; the claimant would have to be, in 
practice, willing to provide evaluators with the reasons for its decision. Furthermore, 
the process of the evaluation of the claim should be publicised. This is because the 
evaluation of the self-defence claim would be capable of multiple interpretations. The 
production of the grounds for, and processes of, evaluation would limit these 
interpretative possibilities. In this way, the process of evaluating a claim could be 
seen as the search for a better argument$V+DEHUPDVKDVVWDWHG³>W@KHYDOLGLW\FODLP
RIQRUPVLVJURXQGHG«LQWKHUDWLRQDOO\PRWLYDWHGUHFRJQLWLRQRIQRUPVZKLFKPD\EH
TXHVWLRQHGDWDQ\WLPH´17 
 
The strength of intersubjective evaluations of self-defence claims lies in ³WKHIRUFHOHVV
IRUFHRISODXVLEOHUHDVRQV´.18 While what is and what is not a better argument is not a 
given, it is submitted that by incorporating certain features of legal processes such as 
rigour, transparency, consistency and accountability into the process of evaluation, it 
stands a better chance of countering subjective claims. These processes, it will be seen 
in the next chapter, should relate to claims of fact. It is suggested that evaluating the 
validity of self-defence claims without a common conception of the factual situation 
of a self-defence claim renders case-by-case evaluation impossible. If the collective 
security system is to benefit from the flexibility of a case-by-case approach without 
becoming vulnerable to exploitation by dominant states, it will be necessary to ensure 
WKDW WKH µFDVHV¶XQGHU UHYLHZDUH VXEVWDQWLDWHG7KLV LVSDUWLFXODUO\ LPSRUWDQW LI LW LV
                                                 
17
 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (trans. T. McCarthy) (1988) Polity Press, p. 105. (Hereinafter, 
µ+DEHUPDVLegitimation Crisis¶.) 
18
 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (trans. W. Rheg) (1997) Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 24. 
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borne in mind that, as Gray wrote, states tend to criticise uses of force in terms of 
factual criteria such as proportionality rather than doctrinal ones.19 
 
B. Structure of the Chapter. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: A discussion of some of the elements of 
+DEHUPDV¶ 7&$ ZLOO lead into consideration about whether intersubjective 
understanding in the collective security system could be possible as regards purely 
normative statements. Finally, the argument will be made that the key factor that will 
enable valid from invalid claims to be distinguished from one another is the identity 
and attitudes of the participants in discourse. :HQGW¶VFRQVWUXFWLYLVWWKHRU\RIFXOWXUHV
of anarchy will be used to make the point.  
 
,W ZLOO EH DUJXHG WKDW NH\ WR +DEHUPDV¶ 7&$ LV WKH LGHD RI EHLQJ DFFRXQWDEOH DQG
taking respRQVLELOLW\IRURQH¶VVWDWHPHQWV. This requires a willingness to offer reasons 
for their vindication. Secondly, it is argued that participants in discourses must 
recognise one another. This is important in order for them to recognise the validity of 
RQH DQRWKHU¶V DUJXPHQWV ,W ZLOO EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH *: %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
UHFRJQLWLRQRIµURJXHVWDWHV¶QRWRQO\REMHFWLILHG those states, but also presupposed the 
question of whether a given action was aggressive. 
 
This chapter is intended to set up the theoretical framework for a more detailed 
discussion of the appraisal of facts in self-defence discourses in the next chapter. For 
                                                 
19
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this reason, we will remain at the level of theory except where a practical example has 
illustrative value.  
 
PART ONE: INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING. 
 
In this thesis, intersubjective understanding refers to the understandings created about 
facts, norms and other expressible matters between subjects participating in 
discourses. Understandings about self-defence between states and other international 
actors are mediated by language.20 Accordingly, Koskenniemi has accepted the view 
RI ODQJXDJH DV ³DQ LQWHUVXEMHFWLYH SUDFWLFH´21 Discourse participants understand an 
utterance, something that is said, when they can accept or reject it for reasons. An 
utterance is criticizable when reasons can be given for it.22 ,Q+DEHUPDV¶FRQFHSWLRQ
of understanding-creation, therefore, the rationality of an utterance is tied to its 
criticizability rather than to its intrinsic qualities such as truth or sincerity.  
 
Accordingly, in this thesis, it will be held that a self-defence claim is valid if it can be 
accepted on the basis of reasons given to redeem the claim. The intersubjective 
element conditions validity not on objective correctness nor on subjective coercion, 
but on the mutual understanding of participants in an evaluation discourse. If claims 
in the collective security system are to avoid being exploitable, members of the 
                                                 
20
 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 10. 
21
 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argumentation 
(2005) Cambridge University Press, p. 597+HUHLQDIWHUµKoskenniemi, From Apology¶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evaluation discourse must adopt attitudes open to understanding wherein they base 
their acceptance or rejection of a claim on the better argument.23 
 
.RVNHQQLHPLIDPRXVO\VDLGWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZZDV³VLQJXODUO\XVHOHVVDVDPHDQV
RI MXVWLI\LQJ RU FULWLFLVLQJ EHKDYLRXU´24 His reasoning was that for every argument 
from normativity, there could be a counter-argument from concreteness and vice 
versa.25 In the previous three chapters we have encountered various examples of how 
a claim to objectivity by those attempting to counter realist criticisms of the collective 
security system has exacerbated the esotericism or exploitation of the approach. 
Intersubjectivity attempts to reconcile concreteness and normativity to the extent that 
the latter is determined by processes of discourse that are done by participants. The 
concreteness lies in the doing of communication that creates a normative result; the 
validation or rejection of a self-defence claim. 
 
To the extent that the recognition of validity claims within the collective security 
system is an intersubjective process, claimants can be expected to take responsibility 
for their claims and be prepared to bear them out. It is submitted that one of the 
SUREOHPVZLWKDWWHPSWVWRDQVZHUUHDOLVWFULWLFLVPVRIWKHFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHP¶V
ineffectiveness was that many of them took the strategic nature of states as an 
objective fact. It is assumed here that there is no necessary reason for states to act 
strategically; in principle, they are capable of acting communicatively.26 It will be 
argued that the validation of a self-defence claim requires such a communicative 
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 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society 
T McCarthy (trans) (1984) Polity Press, Cambridge, S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attitude if the national decision is not to be merely imposed at the international level. 
The attitudes and identities of actors in the collective security system will be more 
thoroughly dealt with in the second part of the chapter. 
 
This conception of law in the collective security system is, therefore, one of process 
DQG QRW GRFWULQH .RVNHQQLHPL¶V FULWLFLVP RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ GHPDQGV D YLHZ RI
legal argumentation as a process of unengaged claim and counter-claim. While this 
may succeed as a critique of those who profess that the legal doctrine is coherent and 
complete,27 it does not provide a satisfactory critique of the use of legal language.28 
Contrariwise, communicative engagement is at the heart of intersubjective 
understanding. While counter-claims and alternative interpretations will be available 
to participants in discourses, they will be subjected to criticism and not left hanging in 
the ether. 
 
A. Criticizable Validity Claims. 
 
$ FULWLFL]DEOH YDOLGLW\ FODLP LV ³HTXLYDOHQW WR WKH DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH conditions for 
validity RIDQXWWHUDQFHDUH IXOILOOHG´29 There is an assumption in the TCA that any 
proposition raised in discourse is raised as a criticizable validity claim.30 Habermas 
DVVHUWHG WKDW ³DQ\RQH DFWLQJ FRPPXQLFDWLYHO\ PXVW LQ SHUIRUPLQJ DQ\ VSHHFK act, 
UDLVH XQLYHUVDO YDOLGLW\ FODLPV DQG VXSSRVH WKDW WKH\ FDQ EH YLQGLFDWHG´ EHFDXVH LI
³VKH ZDQWV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ D SURFHVV RI UHDFKLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ VKH FDQQRW DYRLG
                                                 
27
 Koskenniemi, From Apology, p. 62. 
28
 This is something Koskenniemi recognises. M. .RVNHQQLHPL³7KH3ROLWLFVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ± 20 
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UDLVLQJ >FHUWDLQ@ YDOLGLW\ FODLPV´31 This means that understandings are precarious: 
³>7@KH ULVN RI GLVDJUHHPHQW >LV@ LQKHUHQW LQ OLQJXLVWLF FRPPXQLFDWLRQ´32 An 
understanding FDQQRWEHµEDQNHG¶DVLWZHUH if it were to be raised at another time, it 
would be raised as a criticizable validity claim. 
 
Statements that imply truth claims are ³GLVFXUVLYHO\ UHGHHPDEOH DQG IXQGDPHQWDOO\
FULWLFL]DEOH FODLPV´33 In short this implies that the speaker is not imposing his 
interpretation of the world on his audience but opening it to discussion. Habermas 
explained that:  
 
[c]orresponding to the openness of rational expressions to being 
explained, there is, on the side of persons who behave rationally, a 
willingness to expose themselves to criticism and, if necessary, participate 
properly in argumentation.34 
 
A criticizable validity claim is a sort of warranty for the validity of the assertion 
made.35 It is a guarantee to produce reasons, if need EH³$VSHDNHUZLWKDYDOLGLW\
claim, appeals to a reservoir of potential reasons that he could produce in support of 
WKHFODLP´36 
 
An assertion can be criticiseG RQ VHYHUDO JURXQGV +DEHUPDV ZURWH WKDW ³>H@YHU\
speech act as a whole can always be criticized as invalid from three points of view: as 
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32
 Habermas, ³$FWLRQV6SHHFK$FWV´S 
33
 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 9. 
34
 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol I, p. 18. 
35
 Ibid., p. 302. 
36
 Habermas, ³$FWLRQV6SHHFK$FWV´S 
201  
XQWUXHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVWDWHPHQWPDGH«DVLQFRUUHFWZLWKUHVSHFWWRHVWDEOLVKHG
QRUPDWLYH FRQWH[WV« RU DV ODFNLQJ LQ WUXWKIXOQHVV ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH VSHDNHU¶V
LQWHQWLRQ´37 However, the strength of the criticism is likely to be affected by the 
reasons that the state making the criticism has to support it. For instance, a criticism 
that a given state is untruthful may be difficult to prove eo ipse, while a criticism that 
the statement it made is untrue may be capable of being demonstrated. 
 
If national decisions are not to become de facto international decisions, there must be 
a process of evaluation at the international level by which a national claim by an 
individual state becomes subject to an international decision taken collectively. 
However, in order for that process of evaluation to be meaningful the evaluators must 
be in a position to (in)validate the claim by the state. This requires input from the 
claimant state which in hard cases (and most self-defence cases will be fiercely 
contested) cannot rely on the self evident nature of the existence of a valid claim. The 
claimant state should therefore be taken to hDYHUDLVHGD³criticizable validity clDLP´
in its assertion that self-defence characterises its action. The onus is then on that state 
to provide reasons to bear out its claim. If the right of self-defence is a legal right, it is 
submitted that this can hardly be seen as an unreasonable request, particularly where 
the claim is challenged. 
 
Validity claims are redeemed through discourse.38 7KH\PXVWEH³JURXQGHG´,QRWKHU
words, there must be some common ground between the speaker and the hearer of the 
claim in which they can share reasons for the validity of the claim. For instance, 
³µJURXQGLQJ¶ GHVFULSWLYH VWDWHPHQWV PHDQV HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI VWDWHV RI
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DIIDLUVµJURXQGLQJ¶QRUPDWLYHVWDWHPHQWVHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\RIDFWLRQVRU
norms of DFWLRQ´39 A corollary of the raising of the validity claim and the project of 
critique is that speaker and audience must be capable of being connected in 
understanding. If the evaluators of a self-defence claim and the claimant do not 
engage with one another, then the process of evaluation becomes a tick-box exercise 
that can be exploitable or merely esoteric. Habermas has explained that 
 
[o]bjective agreement about something in the world ± i.e. agreement the 
validity of which is open to question ± is dependent on the fact of the 
creation of an intersubjective relation between the speaker and at least one 
listener capable of taking a critical position.40 
 
Habermas based the rationality of a proposition on its criticizability.41 To say that a 
claim is rational is to say that it can be understood. This has two prongs. The first 
prong is that states must expect that self-defence claims will be subject to evaluation. 
This involves abandoning the idea that they are fundamentally a sovereign decision.42 
The second is that questions can be asked and answered about the claim that has been 
made. The ability to answer a question will depend on the existence of a common 
perception in many cases. It will be argued that a common perception in the UN 
collective security system is better based on facts than norms.43 
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B. Discursive Redemption of Claim. 
 
It will not be necessary to undertake a process of discursive redemption of a validity 
claim in every case. It may be that the claim raised is not problematized by any of the 
other participants. However, it is unlikely that self-defence claims would prove 
unproblematic. It is therefore to be assumed that redemption will take place through 
DUJXPHQWDWLRQ +DEHUPDV ZURWH WKDW ³>Y@LQGLFDWLRQ PHDQV WKDW WKH
SURSRQHQW«MXVWLILHV WKH FODLP¶V ZRUWKLQHVV WR EH UHFRJQL]HG DQG EULQJV DERXW D
VXSUDVXEMHFWLYHUHFRJQLWLRQRILWVYDOLGLW\´44 The worthiness of the claim will depend 
RQWKHHYDOXDWRUV¶DFFHSWDQFHRIUHDVRQVJLYHQLQVXSSRUWLILW 
 
5DWLRQDOLW\FRPHVIURPWKH³JXDUDQWHHWKDWDVSHDNHr gives that, if necessary, s/he is 
in a position to honour with good justifications the claim s/he raises for the validity of 
WKDWVSHHFKDFW´45 In the next chapter it will be argued that this implies inter alia a 
willingness to share intelligence.46 However, the guarantee that a speaker gives also 
relates to the possibility that the audience addressed will be able to understand his 
proposition, that they will share a frame of reference with him. Validity claims are 
³HIIHFWHGLQVWUXFWXUHVRI OLQJXLVWLFDOO\ SURGXFHGLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\´47 This underlines 
the incompatibility of a communicative approach with the view that a self-defence 
claim could be seen as a matter solely for the individual state. It is to be emphasised 
that the validity of a self-defence claim does not lie in the objective correctness of that 
FODLP EXW LQ WKH LQWHUVXEMHFWLYH UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW LW LV FRUUHFW :KLOH ³VHQVRU\
H[SHULHQFH LV UHODWHG WR VHJPHQWV RI UHDOLW\ ZLWKRXW PHGLDWLRQ´ FRPPXQLFDWLYH
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experience has only a mediated relation with reality,48 and must therefore take 
account of those involved in the mediation as well as the objects of communication. 
 
The conception of claims of self-defence as criticizable validity claims requires not 
only that the claimant is willing to give reasons in redemption of his claim, but also, 
in order for the claim to be found valid or not, that those reasons resonate with the 
HYDOXDWRUV5LVVHSRLQWVRXW WKDW³>V@SHDNHUVFDQQRWVLPSO\UHSHDW WKHLUXWWHUDQFHV LI
WKH\ZDQWWRFRQYLQFHDVFHSWLFDODXGLHQFH´.49 7KHVHDUHWKHWZRIDFHWVRI+DEHUPDV¶
communicative rationality; openness to discourse and ability to give good reasons. 
The first of these aspects will be discussed in more detail in the second half of this 
chapter. For now, something will be said as to the second aspect, the ability to give 
good reasons. 
 
The use of criticizable validity claims implies that when a statement is made, 
particularly a descriptive one that force has been used in self-defence, others can 
question it. The probability of a staWHPHQW¶VEHLQJTXHVWLRQHGZLOO ULVHDFFRUGLQJ WR
the degree of controversy that it suggests. Self-defence claims are inherently 
controversial. This is because, as between states, the use of force is either an act of 
aggression or one of defence and it has been in response to a (potential) act of 
aggression or defence. Dinstein has pointed out that in many cases both states claim 
self-defence.50 The use of force in international law is also controversial per se. This 
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is because, contrary to what many realists hold, the absolute prohibition on the use of 
force is strongly embedded in conceptions of acceptable behaviour.51 
 
,Q JHQHUDO LW FDQ EH VWDWHG ZLWK UHODWLYH FRQILGHQFH WKDW ³>D@Q DSSHDO WR SXUH
SDUWLFXODULVPLVQRVROXWLRQ´52 DQGWKDW³>W@KHDVVHUWLRQRIRQH¶VSDUWLFXODULW\UHTXLUHV
DSSHDOWRVRPHWKLQJWUDQVFHQGLQJLW´53 In other words, if a state claims self-defence, it 
cannot justify itself by simply stating that it acted in its own best interests. This 
remains the case even though the right of self-defence arises as an exception to the 
general prohibition on the use of force.54 The reason is not simply that self-defence 
arises within the collective security framework, but more particularly that the reasons 
redeeming self-defence claims must be seen as good reasons in the eyes of the 
evaluating states. Purely subjective claims of self interest are unlikely to hold much 
weight with potentially sceptical states. Schachter wrote that in order to be persuasive, 
governments have to justify their positions according to other than national interests.55 
,W KDV HYHQ EHHQ VDLG WKDW ³JRYHUQPHQWV DUH impelled to justify their positions on 
grounds other than national self-LQWHUHVW´56 6LPLODUO\5LVVHVD\V WKDW³LW LVYLUWXDOO\
impossible in public debates to make self-serYLQJ DUJXPHQWV RU WU\ WR MXVWLI\ RQH¶V
claims on self-LQWHUHVWHGJURXQGV´57  
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In order for a state to vindicate a claim, particularly where the claim is controversial, 
it cannot simply assume that its reasons are obvious. This is particularly the case 
where the purportedly defensive use of force was not a reaction to a visible armed 
attack. For instance, when Israel bombed the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981,58 it 
claimed that when it acted there was ³OHVV WKDQ DPRQWK WRJREHIRUH2VLUDNPLJKW
have become crLWLFDO´.59 Other states remained unconvinced. It was mentioned that the 
IAEA had condemned the attack, affirming the Non-Proliferation Treaty right to 
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.60 Indeed, the development of nuclear 
weapons is a good example of threats that may induce uses of pre-emptive force.61 
The problem is that whether nuclear fuel cycle technology will or will not be used for 
military purposes, and whether those purposes will or will not involve an attack on a 
specific state, are not necessarily things that can be known. Wittgenstein explains that 
LW LV QRW HQRXJK WR FRXQWHU WKH DVVHUWLRQ ³LW FDQQRW EH NQRZQ´ ZLWK WKH FRXQWHU-
DVVHUWLRQ³, NQRZ LW´62 In other words, it is not enough for a claimant state to feel 
certain that it will fall victim to a nuclear attack. 
 
An important aspect of the redemption of criticizable validity claims is that the parties 
involved in the justificatory discourse create an understanding about the claim; they 
do not simply discover the right answer. Similarly, the process of redeeming a 
FULWLFL]DEOH YDOLGLW\ FODLP LV QRW RQH RI VLPSO\ FRQYLQFLQJ RQH¶V DXGLHQFH RI RQH¶V
RZQ SRVLWLRQ $V +DEHUPDV H[SODLQV LW ³is not a question of achieving some 
prolocutionary effect on the hearer but of reaching rationally motivated understanding 
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with the hearer, an understanding that comes about on the basis of a criticizable 
YDOLGLW\ FODLP´63 This implies a non-strategic engagement between speaker and 
hearer and will be further discussed in the second half of the present chapter.64 
 
It is worth emphasising that it is in the nature of the redemption of criticizable validity 
claims to be temporarily authoritative: A finding that a self-defence claim is or is not 
valid does not become objectively correct because it is intersubjectively recognised. 
Habermas went as far as to say that agreement could be better described as 
³GLVDJUHHPHQW WKDW KDV EHHQ DYRLGHG´65 The validity of the claim holds while the 
validity conditions of the claim are intersubjectively recognised. One of the 
consequences of this is that there would be no direct system of precedent. Habermas 
KDV ZULWWHQ WKDW ³>Z@H FDQQRW VLPSO\ IUHH]H WKH FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK ZH KHUH DQG QRZ
consider a certain type of reason to be the best and we cannot exclude a priori that 
other types oIUHDVRQVZRXOGKDYHDJUHDWHUYDOLGLW\LQRWKHUFRQWH[WV´66 
 
Another consequence of the limited nature of evaluations of self-defence claims is 
that they do not necessarily hold outside a discourse in terms of space or over time.67 
As Wittgenstein has stated, ³ZKDWPHQFRQVLGHUUHDVRQDEOHRUXQUHDVRQDEOHDOWHUV´68 
Further, a claim to have used force in self-defence may be intersubjectively 
recognised by a discourse, but this does not mean that every other discourse that heard 
the claim would also have recognised it. The evaluation is only as good as the process 
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of criticism that went into scrutinising the self-defence claim. If a state were to bring a 
claim before an audience it assumed would be predisposed to accept its claim ± if the 
US brought a claim before NATO, for instance ± the evaluation of that audience 
would in turn be open to critique as a criticizable validity claim in another discourse. 
The evaluators would have to give good reasons for their decision and defend 
themselves against accusations of structural bias.69 
 
In this sense, Habermas says that since justifications are affected by the context and 
DUJXPHQWDWLRQDOIRUPWKHUHLVQRLPSOLFDWLRQRIDKLHUDUFK\³QRPHWD-discourses in 
the sense that a higher discourse is able to prescribe rules for a subordinate 
GLVFRXUVH´70 +H DGGV WKDW ³>D@UJXPHQWDWLRQDO JDPHV GR QRW IRUP D KLHUDUFK\
'LVFRXUVHVUHJXODWHWKHPVHOYHV´71 In other words, while the validity of propositions 
within a discourse might depend on the norms that characterise its intersubjective 
environment ± the characteristics that make a certain discourse different from others ± 
the validity of propositions outside it will be contingent on a separate act of 
recognition. Having said that, a good reason for the validity of a certain proposition 
that could be given in redemption of a claim may be that a previous discourse had 
already recognised the validity of the self-defence claim. What is to be stressed is that 
the characteristic norms of intersubjective understanding are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive norms.  
 
In order for a reason to resonate as a good reason that can vindicate a self-defence 
claim, it must relate to some mutually recognised referent. Moreover, participants in a  
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discourse, if they are to understand one another at all, must share certain perceptions 
about the world and assumptions about one another. There would be no point entering 
into discourse with one another if it was not expected or hoped that an understanding 
FRXOGEHUHDFKHGDQGWKDWRQH¶VZRUGVZHUHQRWPHUHO\falling on deaf ears. 
 
C. The Lifeworld. 
 
In order for actors to vindicate a given assertion, they need to be able to refer to a 
common measure that is external to any one of them when making such truth claims. 
,Q+DEHUPDV¶7&$WKLVSRLQWRIFRPPRQDOLW\ LV provided by the constantly shifting 
lifeworld.72 7KHOLIHZRUOG³LVSULRUWRDQ\SRVVLEOHGLVDJUHHPHQWDQGFDQQRWEHFRPH
FRQWURYHUVLDO LQ WKHZD\ WKDW LQWHUVXEMHFWLYHO\VKDUHGNQRZOHGJHFDQ´73 It therefore 
provides a constant aspect to a given evaluation and can be seen as characterising a 
particular discourse. 
 
As a transcendental presupposition that is not, by definition, given to empirical 
observation, the lifeworld is a problematic concept.74 However, taken in its thinnest 
guise, it might be thought that there is little to object to. The lifeworld consists of 
common understandings about the world. These understandings vary as discourses 
change the perceptions and understandings of their participants. However, the 
common understandings need not be substantive ones. For instance, it may be enough 
that there is an understanding that a question requires a response. Similarly, in order 
for participants to communicate with one another, they must ± in most cases ± make 
the assumption that they are each capable of understanding the other.  
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The distinguishing factor of the lifeworld is that it is not criticizable. This is because it 
is not expressed: Participants do not make assertions about lifeworld knowledge.75 If 
they do, it ceases to be taken-for-granted as part of the lifeworld. This is because the 
OLIHZRUOGLV³WKHWHUUDLQRIWKHLPPHGLDWHO\IDPLOLDUDQGWKHXQTXHVWLRQDEOHFHUWDLQ´76 
Accordingly, the lifeworld plays an important role in the TCA. The criticizability of 
validity claims, as has already been noted, threatens to make communication overly 
dynamic. The lifeworld provides an anchor that stabilises understandings; it prevents 
everything from slipping into uncertainty.77 
 
The stability that the lifeworld provides is not, however, grounded in objectivity. The 
OLIHZRUOGLVIXOORI³IDOOLEOHVXSSRVLWLRQVRIYDOLGLW\´+DEHUPDVGRHVQRWFODLPWKDWLW
LV D UHDOP RI WUXWK ,Q IDFW LW KDV RQO\ ³D SUHFDULRXV NLQG RI VWDELOLW\´78 Although 
lifeworld knowledge is not criticizable, this does not mean that the lifeworld does not 
change. This flexibility means that new understandings can be made and old ones 
discarded. Knowledge from the lifeworld can be problematized where a segment of 
the lifeworld is highlighted in a specific situation. This brings it to the surface, as it 
were, making the assumptions contained in it vulnerable to criticism. However, the 
knowledge of the lifeworlG³FDQQRWEHLQWHQWLRQDOO\EURXJKWWRFRQVFLRXVQHVV´79 
 
Thus, while it may not seem at first glance that there is a common lifeworld existing 
between states in collective security discourses, it may be possible to identify one. It 
is not suggested that states in security discourses share a particularly thick lifeworld. 
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Further, it is submitted that few normative assumptions exist between states. Indeed, it 
has been the normative aspects of self-defence that have proved the most 
controversial.80 The validity of a self-defence claim could not be ascertained through 
assumptions about the existence of a right to pre-empt threats, for instance. That is not 
to say that no normative assumptions exist. For instance, it is submitted that the 
proposition that the avoidable killing of large numbers of civilians in pursuit of self-
defence is assumed to be wrong.81 Indeed, state actors frequently make assumptions 
about how one another ought to behave. 
 
Owing to the unreflective nature of lifeworld suppositions, it is not possible to 
identify them at the level of participant in self-defence discourses. If lifeworld 
knowledge were to become an object of discourse, it would be criticizable and no 
longer taken for-granted by state actors. +DEHUPDV H[SODLQV WKDW ³LQ GHOLPLWLQJ WKH
domain of relevance for a given situation, the context remains itself withdrawn from 
WKHPDWL]DWLRQZLWKLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQ´82 He explains that a move must be made from the 
WKHRUHWLFDO FRQFHSW RI OLIHZRUOG WR WKH ³everyday concept of lifeworld´83 This 
HYHU\GD\OLIHZRUOG³GHILQHVWKHWRWDOLW\RIVWDWHVRIDIIDLUVWKDWFDQEHUHSRUWHGLQWUXH
VWRULHV´84  
 
When a state makes a complaint that a use of force has been made against it or 
submits a report of self-defence, it often engages in narration.85 The state refers to 
facts in the world that it assumes are, or can be, shared by other actors. In self-defence 
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claims, the idea of the common lifeworld refers to the supposition that most actors 
make that they inhabit the same world, and that things and events in that world can be 
comprehensibly described and referenced. One means by which this assumption can 
be seen is in the use of agenda items by the Council and Assembly. For instance, these 
RUJDQVKDYHEHHQUHIHUULQJWR³WKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKHPLGGOHHDVW´ for over forty years.86 
This has become a narrative that is shared by all states in its form rather than in its 
substance. The details of the plot are not common among states, but the basic 
narrative arc and the shared appreciation that there is a narrative is common. 
 
When state actors refer to events or objects in the world, they appear to assume that 
they can be appreciated by others. Thus, when the US bombed a pharmaceutical 
IDFWRU\ LQ.KDUWRXP6XGDQRIIHUHG WRSURYLGH ³IXOO LQIRUPDWLRQ´ WR WKH &RXQFLO DV
regards the ownership of the factory and its output.87 Sudan proceeded to submit a 
significant amount of documentation in support of this claim.88 Sudan put its faith in 
µWKH IDFWV¶ WR FOHDU LWV QDPH89 As far as self-defence claims are concerned, this 
common assumption can be counted as an object of knowledge taken for-granted in 
the lifeworld. This tends to mean that as between states, common understandings are 
more likely to consist of knowledge about the external world of facts than normative 
assumptions. We will now turn to examine this statement. 
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D. Facts not Norms. 
 
The sorts of criticizable validity claims that have a better chance of garnering 
communicative understanding about the justification or otherwise of a use of force in 
self-defence are assertoric statements. These are statements which may be falsified, 90 
and can be usefully compared to normative and expressive statements which require 
validation on other grounds (such as legitimacy and sincerity, for instance).91 
$VVHUWLRQVGHVFULEHIDFWV LQ WKHµREMHFWLYH¶ZRUOGQRUPDWLYHVWDWHPHQWVUHODWHWR WKH
appropriateness of something in society and expressive statements relate to the 
subjective internality of the speaker.92 
 
,W LVVXEPLWWHG WKDWDFWRUVKROGVKDUHGDVVXPSWLRQVDERXW WKHµREMHFWLYHZRUOG¶7KH
world of facts contains many things that we can take for-granted. For instance, 
+DEHUPDV UHFDOOV -RKQ 6HDUOH¶V H[DPSOH RI ³WKH FDW VDW RQ WKH PDW´ ,Q RUGHU WR
uncover the presuppositions, he asked the reader to suppose this occurred in outer 
space, thus making the reader aware of his normal supposition that the cat is affected 
by gravity.93 The nature of the lifeworld means that it is not really possible to 
articulate unproblematic lifeworld knowledge, even from an observer perspective. 
However for Habermas, an attempt to document the lifeworld at a specific point in 
time would not necessarily make sense. What is important is that it is credible that 
states share assumptions about the world. 
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None of this should be taken to suggest that all facts are unproblematic.94 In the first 
place this is because facts are statements about the world. As such, they introduce an 
element of subjectivity insofar as they imply a single perception of the world. Indeed, 
this perception may be flawed for reasons of mistake or deceit. As Habermas wrote, 
³>N@QRZOHGJHFDQEH FULWLFLVHGDVXQUHOLDEOH´95 However, just because facts are not 
immutable objective units, does not mean that they cannot play a useful part in 
grounding discourses about self-defence claims. This is because it will be possible for 
the participants in a discourse to construct understandings about the world. This will 
require a rigorous process of testing according to ostensive definitions wherever 
possible.96 In this way, the evaluation of a self-defence claim resembles one of 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V VLPSOLILHG ODQJXDJH JDPHV LQZKLFKFRPPXQLFDWLRQ LV VWULSSHG ULJKW
back to its basic parts.97 
 
Ostensive definition works as a process of testing because it is not dependent on any 
single subject of discourse. In theory, because it relates to things that are outside 
individual subjects, all subjects have equal access to it. Habermas explained that 
³[t]he abstract concept of the world is a necessary condition if communicatively 
acting subjects are to reach understanding among themselves about what takes place 
LQ WKH ZRUOG´98 In other words, if participants presume that they can agree about 
something in the world, there is a certain assumption that they share that world or at 
least have equal access to it. It is suggested that while this concept may be 
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philosophically controversial, for the purposes of communications about the use of 
force, the existence of an external reality is not really questioned.  
 
In the next chapter this idea of common facts will be further explored, and 
problematized. It will be argued that while ³WKH QRWLRQ of anticipatory self-defence 
[may be] ERWKUDWLRQDODQGDWWUDFWLYH´, if such claims ³GLVWRUWUHDOLW\´,99 it should be 
possible to discover and expose them by a process of establishing what happened. 
This section of the chapter will be confined to some observations about the 
commonality of norms in the international system.100 The purpose is to underline that 
appeals to normative commonality can be extremely hard to bear out in practice. One 
of the main dangers of the appeal to principles is that they can be exploited because of 
their indeterminacy.101 Further, the appeal to norms can stymie communicative action 
rather than further it. This is because certain abstract norms have great rhetorical 
power and it can be difficult to make arguments against them in particular situations. 
These two aspects of assertions of common norms will be dealt with in succession. 
 
Koskenniemi asserted that ³we assume [principles of justice] to be subjective, 
LQGHPRQVWUDEOH DQG RSHQ WR PLVXVH´ ,QGHHG WKLV LV SUHFLVHO\ ZK\ ³>Z@e have 
recourse to the law in the control of social behaviour´102 The idea is that the 
institutions of law provide a central channel that filters out merely subjective 
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LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV)UDQFN¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµLGLRW¶DQGµVRSKLVW¶UXOHVLVLQVWUXFWLYH 
³:KLOH DQ LGLRW UXOH PRUH-or-less applies itself, sophist rules require an effective, 
credible, LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGDQG OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUSUHWHURI WKH UXOH¶VPHDQLQJ LQYDULRXV
LQVWDQFHV´103 While Franck says that Charter articles 2(4) and 51 were supposed to be 
µLGLRW¶UXOHVWKH\GRQRWVDWLVI\WKHWHVWRIFRPPRQVHQVHDQGWKHUHIRUHKDYHQRWEHHQ
followed.104 However, if the rules are now seen as having been complicated by 
practice, they still lack the institutions that might make their application credible.  
 
In fact, Franck was not optimistic about the search for legitimate norms in the area of 
the use of force. He held that in the area of the use of force neither sophist nor idiot 
UXOHVZLOOKDYHPXFKVZD\DQGWKDWLWPD\EHEHWWHUWRUHVRUWWRSROLWLFV³VLQFHQHLWKHU
an idiot rule nor a sophist rule seems to be able, so far, to express a clear and credible 
QRUPDWLYHFRQVHQVXV´105 :KLOH)UDQFN¶VRHXYUHGLVSOD\VDQXQXVXDOVHQVLWLYLW\WRWKH
prevailing political conditions of the day, periodically veering from pessimism to 
optimism, he was, at first, reserved as to the normative consensus over self-defence. 
Even in the mid-V ZKHQ KRSHV IRU D µ1HZ :RUOG 2UGHU¶ ZHUH DW WKHLU KHLJKW
Franck remained cautious.106 He became more optimistic as to normative consensus 
after the millennium. In Recourse to Force, he suggested that ³>L@QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
like domestic law, also has begun gingerly to develop ways to bridge the gap between 
ZKDWLVUHTXLVLWHLQVWULFWOHJDOLW\DQGZKDWLVJHQHUDOO\UHJDUGHGDVMXVWDQGPRUDO´.107 
His view remained that a consensus had built up, through practice in UN organs, that 
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anticipating an imminent attack was within the law but the Bush doctrine of pre-
emption was not.108  
 
It is submitted that Franck was attempting to speak law to power and to do so, he 
opposed the normative force of the law against the subjective hegemony of the US. 
)UDQFN¶V ODWHUZRUNGLVSOD\VGLVPD\ DW WKH WXUQ WR UHDOLVP WDNHQE\ WKH *:%XVK
Administration.109 Franck advocated that international lawyers on the left should stop 
deconstructing the law and start defending it.110 'HHSO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH µVSLQ¶
realists ZHUHSXWWLQJRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶VHIILFDF\)UDQFNZDVHQJDJHGLQDSURMHFW
of counter-spin.111 It is submitted that the normative consensus behind this project 
came mostly from like-minded international lawyers rather than from states. States 
have not taken unambiguous positions on the scope of the right of self-defence.112 
While it may be that the absolute prohibition on the use of force does command 
extremely broad support, the content of self-defence does not. That states go out of 
their way to avoid discussing doctrine is not reflective of normative consensus. In 
consequence it is submitted that attempting to find normative consensus over specific 
uses of force would be unlikely to end in intersubjective agreement without more. 
 
The second problem that was mentioned was that the invocation of norms can prevent 
communicative action taking place. This is because so-FDOOHG µXQLYHUVDO¶ QRUPV RI
liberal-capitalist states in the West such as liberty, equality and human dignity are 
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rhetorically hard to dismiss. The Bush doctrine of pre-emption was part of a broader 
strategy that attempted to secure US safety by exporting its values and systems 
abroad.113 One of the key aspirations of the NSS waVWR³FKDPSLRQKXPDQGLJQLW\´114 
The idea that liberal values of freedom and equality are universal has been growing 
since the end of the Cold War,115 and there have been suggestions that this 
XQLYHUVDOLVPPLJKWXQGHUSLQ IRU LQVWDQFH D ³UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WRSURWHFW´RU DGXW\RI
humanitarian intervention.116 While these sorts of values may not seem immediately 
relevant to the issue of self-defence, they have nevertheless become entwined in self-
defence debates. A case in point is that of Operation Enduring Freedom. This action 
was justified in October 2001 as measures in self-defence ³against Al-Qaeda terrorist 
WUDLQLQJ FDPSV DQG PLOLWDU\ LQVWDOODWLRQV RI WKH 7DOLEDQ UHJLPH LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ´117  
However, as the operation stretched on, it was re-branded as having humanitarian 
objectives.118  
 
Another place in which one can find reference to common normative values is in the 
writings of international lawyers who supported the broad Bush doctrine of pre-
HPSWLRQ )RU LQVWDQFH 6RIDHU OHQGV KLV VXSSRUW WR 0F'RXJDO¶V FDOO IRU
³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV LQ D VSHFLILF FRQWH[W´119 McDougal supported a vision of 
international law wherein authoritative coercion was distinguished from unlawful 
coercion on the basis of its relationship to the primary value of World Public Order, 
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human dignity.120 This language presages that which appears in the Bush 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V1SS. 
 
The problem with broad principles like human dignity is that they tend not to offer 
specific guidance in particular cases. This is because such moral values are 
amorphous and beg of multiple interpretations.121 McDougal and Feliciano appeared 
to be aware of this. They referred WR ³D ZRUOG PDUNHG E\ GHHS FRQWLQXLQJ FRQIOLFW
DPRQJ GLIIHULQJ FRQFHSWLRQV RU V\VWHPV RI :32´122 DGGLQJ WKDW ³XQLYHUVDO
FRQVHQVXV´ RQ WKH YDOXHV RI ZRUOG RUGHU VHHPV XQOLNHO\ H[FHSW ³RQ WKH OHYHO RI
rhetoric of a sufficiently high RUGHURIJHQHUDOLW\´.123 This did not prevent the authors 
UHO\LQJ RQ WKH ³UHDVRQDEOH´ FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW DV WKH FRUUHFW RQH124 
Nevertheless, another problem with such values is that they are often held sacred. 
Thus, Duxbury wrote that McDougal and FeliFLDQR¶V position was that the values of 
human dignity ZHUH³EH\RQGHWKLFV´DQGWKHUHIRUHDERYHGLVFXVVLRQ.125  
 
It is submitted that communicative action over normative values where those values 
are essentially contested is unlikely. The invocation of norms may exclude processes 
of coming to an understanding because it may be hard to escape stalemate-situations 
ZKHUH RQH VWDWH¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI D QRUP LV OHYHOOHG DW DQRWKHU¶V ZLWK QR shared 
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means of choosing between the two. It is submitted that facts may be able to break 
deadlocks over the application of norms in particular cases, insofar as the external 
ZRUOG FDQ SURYLGH VXSSRUW RU µUHDVRQV¶ WKDW DUH DFFHSWDEOH E\ DQ DXGLHQFH RI
evaluators in a way that a subjective interpretation of a norm cannot. 
 
PART TWO: PARTICIPANTS IN THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. 
 
In this part of the chapter, we are moving from a focus on the objects of discourse, 
what is discussed, to the subjects of discourse, who it is doing the discussing. 
Intersubjectivity has effects for botKHOHPHQWV³>&@RPPXQLFDWLRQDERXWSURSRVLWLRQDO
content may take place only with simultaneous metacommunication about 
LQWHUSHUVRQDO UHODWLRQV´126 We have already seen that one of the consequences of 
intersubjectivity is that the objects of discourse are constructed through the 
communicative action of participants. In this part of the chapter we will discuss 
implications for the subjects of discourse. Intersubjectivity ties individuals together 
and renders them dependent on one another, not only for the meaning of objects in the 
world, but for their own identities. 7KLVWLHVLQZLWK:HQGW¶VYLHZRIWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
of enemy-, rival- and friend-relations between states. Two major aspects of the issue 
will be discussed here.  
 
7KHILUVWFRQFHUQV+DEHUPDV¶GLVWLnction between strategic and communicative action. 
It is argued that states which are in Hobbesian or Lockean relations with others are 
unlikely to adopt an attitude open to understanding. In part, this is because such 
relations tend to involve the idea of the individual actor as an autonomous subject 
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vying for the upper hand. Where such a society of states contains a state whose ability 
to impose its will is much stronger than that of most states, as is at present the case 
with the US, the idea that it will engage communicatively decreases further still. In 
this regard, the exercise of self-defence can be seen as an instance of unreviewable 
sovereign power. This is incompatible with the criticizable validity claim, the core of 
which is that statements made at the international level are subject to critique.  
 
The second aspect concerns the construction of identities through discourse. It is 
argued that where states construct one another as enemies, they cannot take part in a 
mutual process of coming to an understanding about a given self-defence claim. This 
is important because, ideally, both target and claimant states would be involved in the 
discourse evaluating a self-defence claim. In the first place this is because these actors 
would be in a good position to provide information about what happened. In the 
second place this is because the act of evaluating self-defence claims could put the 
brakes on escalating cycles of violence where neither state accepts that the other has 
used force lawfully. In this case, the involvement of concerned states may give the 
evaluation discourse more plausibility with those parties. Another aspect of the 
construction of identities through discourse and the Hobbesian relation of states is that 
enemies are aggressors. The roles of aggressor and defender are presupposed where 
states in a Hobbesian relation meet one another. Again, this means that the parties will 
not have attitudes open to understanding as regards the attempt to validate the self-
defence claim. 
 
+DEHUPDV¶ 7&$ LV not an institutional template: It does not provide structural 
guarantees that participants will act communicatively rather than strategically and it 
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does not require a specific institutional framework for implementation. Instead, 
+DEHUPDV¶WKHRU\VLWVSHrhaps unsteadily, between the ought realm of philosophy and 
the is realm of sociology.127 The TCA posits an ideal-type communicative scenario, 
WKH ,GHDO6SHHFK6LWXDWLRQ ,66DVDPRGHO IRU µUHDO¶GLVFRXUVHV7KH IDFHWVRI WKH
ISS are utopian and threaten to render the theory esoteric; participants must come to 
discourse with attitudes open to understanding. This seems to rule out strategic 
thinking or goal-oriented behaviour of any kind. It is unlikely that state 
representatives would come to security discourses in such a frame of mind.  
 
On the other hand, the TCA has sociological elements. It locates meaning-creation, 
coming to an understanding, in the actions of individuals within social discourses. 
Habermas has explained that the ISS is not meant as a practicable ambition for a 
discourse. Instead, it is an ideal that all participants possess when they enter into 
communicative action.128 Habermas explained that communicative reason has only 
µZHDN¶ QRUPDWLYH IRUFH ³LW LV QRW DQ LPPHGLDWH VRXUFH RI SUHVFULSWLRQV´ :HDN
QRUPDWLYLW\ PHDQV WKDW ³LQGLYLGXDOV PXVW FRPPLW WKHPVHOYHV WR SUDJPDWLF
presuppositions of a counter-IDFWXDO VRUW´129 This should mean that the theory is 
immunised against criticisms of utopianism, although in practice Habermas is often 
criticised for being overly normative.130 
 
Communicative action, the process of reaching understanding through criticising 
validity claims, relies on communicative actors. Claimants must take responsibility 
for their assertions, and evaluators for their understandings of the claims. In this 
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VHQVH µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ PHDQV WKDW RQH ³RULHQWV RQH¶V DFWLRQV WR FULWLFL]DEOH YDOLGLW\
FODLPV´131 Ultimately, the onus is on the participants in a discourse to adopt 
communicative rather than strategic attitudes. While institutional structures may 
improve the chances of actors adopting such attitudes, they cannot force actors to 
view claims as criticizable or to attempt to redeem them. This relates to the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the individual and society, the agent and structure, 
the state and the international organisation. Neither element has complete priority 
over the other and neither element can completely determine the other. It is therefore 
submitted that one of the key conditions for identifying valid self-defence claims is 
that states change their attitudes to processes of justification. 
 
This may seem to render the communicative approach to self-defence justification 
esoteric. It demands that claimant states take responsibility for their uses of force by 
attempting to redeem their self-defence claims. Simply expecting states which have 
used force to explain, in detail, why it was used may seem utopian. However, seen in 
a broader perspective, it may seem less so. Firstly, when states justify their uses of 
force as self-defence, whether in letters to the Security Council (SC), in International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings or in the SC itself, they are already disposed to 
give reasons. For instance, when the US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 
 WKH 86 OHWWHU WR WKH 6& H[SODLQHG WKDW ³>L@Q UHVSRQVH WR WKHVH DWWDFNV DQG LQ
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, United 
States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks 
RQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´132 :KLOH WKLV UHPDLQV WHFKQLFDOO\ D µUHSRUW¶ UDWKHU WKDQ DQ
attempt at vindication, the willingness of states not merely to explain what they have 
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done but also to explain why suggests that a more thorough process may not be 
beyond the pale.  
 
A second reason to believe that a communicative approach may be possible is that it 
is not only the attitude of the claimant state that must change. The attitudes of 
(potential) evaluating states must also change. If states, as just mentioned, feel the 
need to flesh out their self-defence reports with reasons, this may be because they 
think other states require it of them. This would seem commensurate with the 
exceptional nature of self-defence; the absolute prohibition on the use of force renders 
armed violence an abnormal act that requires explanation. Habermas suggested that 
the demand for discursive redemption of validity claims grows as society becomes 
more integrated.133 To some extent, states already adopt such an attitude. For instance, 
at a meeting in the Security Council, the US representative invoked article 2(4) to 
TXHVWLRQ 5XVVLD¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ *HRUJLD LQ 134 However, it is often apparent 
that such challenges are no more than political point-scoring rather than an attempt to 
open a dialogue about what happened. This is reflected in the words of the Australian 
representative to the SC who said: 
 
[t]oo often we turn up at open debates and merely read out what our 
capitals have sent us, rather than responding to the interventions that have 
gone before and that have been the product of very careful 
consideration.135 
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It is submitted, therefore, that states must begin to engage with each other in order to 
evaluate self-defence claims. This should have a two-fold effect. First, if third states 
demand that a state which has reported a use of force in self-defence explains itself, 
then it would seem diplomatically difficult for that state to refuse. Second, if third 
states take a more engaged attitude in meetings where such claims are discussed, then 
they may begin to ask questions and demand reasons of the claimant state, rather than 
simply constituting a sounding-board for self-defence reports. Thus, while it will be 
argued that justifying self-defence is about responsibility, it should be borne in mind 
that this responsibility rests on the shoulders of all the members of the collective 
security system and not just the state that has used force in self-defence. 
 
A. Individual Subjects and Strategic Action. 
 
The move to intersubjectivity can be accommodated in the UN system of collective 
security. In the view of the present writer, the collective element of the system lies in 
the appraisal of self-defence claims which, except in cases of collective self-defence, 
emanate from a single state. Self-defence claims are, at the international level, as at 
the national level, initially a matter for the individual decision-maker.136 However, if 
the absolute prohibition on the use of force is not to be reduced to vanishing point and 
self-defence is to remain an exception to and not an alternative to collective action, 
self-defence claims must subsequently be subject to evaluation.137  
 
It has been suggested that one of the features of a realist or instrumental optic on the 
collective security system is the idea of the individual as an autonomous decision-
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maker whose subjective preferences can be influenced, but whose interests are 
immutable.138 Franck has written that the effect of the radical right on the US 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZDV WR DGYRFDWH ZKDW ³DPRXQW>HG@ WR a doctrine of illimitable 
VRYHUHLJQW\´139 It has also been suggested that, among international lawyers, the 
traditional conception of sovereign states as the source of the authority of law is 
capable of being linked in to realist individualism.140 The idea is that states are like 
billiard EDOOV ZKRVH LQWHUDFWLRQV WDNH SODFH LQ DQ ³REMHFWLYH ZRUOG´141 their 
interactions do not change the fundamental cores of one another.  
 
This realist conception of the individual as a rationally self-interested strategic actor 
operating independently of his environment is incompatible with a communicative 
approach to self-GHIHQFH FODLPV +DEHUPDV KDV H[SODLQHG WKDW ³>Z@KDW FRPHV DERXW
manifestly through gratification or threat, suggestion or deception, cannot count 
intersubjectiYHO\ DV DQ DJUHHPHQW´ ,Q VWUDWHJLF DFWLRQ WKH DLP LV QRW WR UHDFK DQ
understanding about something but to exert a causal influence on the hearer.142 In 
contrast to strategic action, those acting communicatively do so through acts of 
reaching understanding and not egocentric calculations of success.143 This also means 
that factors such as military might or economic prowess do not weigh heavily in 
processes of communicative action. 
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While it has been the case that states have acted strategically, it is not necessarily so. 
It is submitted that the realist conception of the individual is unconvincing. Individual 
states, even powerful ones, do not act completely independently of their 
environments. This is particularly the case where communication is concerned. 
Communication, unlike other media of interaction, levels the playing field to some 
extent. If a state wants to make itself understood, it has to rely on the receipt, and 
therefore the recipient, of its communication. Language is an intersubjective practice. 
TKH³VWUXFWXUDOFRQVWUDLQWVRIDQ LQWHUVXEMHFWLYHO\VKDUHG ODQJXDJH´ LPSHODFWRUV³WR
step out of the egocentricity of a purposive rational orientation to their own respective 
success and to surrender themselves to the public criteria of communicative 
ratioQDOLW\´144 As has been noted previously, the context in which that receipt takes 
place influences the meaning that is attributed to it.145 The context also affects the 
way that others in the discourse are viewed. 
 
In this section, it will be argued that the ways that states view one another, whether 
they take a more strategic or communicative attitude, is closely linked to the nature of 
WKH µVRFLHW\¶ RU WR XVH :HQGW¶V WHUP µDQDUFK\¶ LQ ZKLFK WKH\ ILQG WKHPVHOYHV $V
mentioned previously, Wendt posits three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean 
and Kantian.146 He argues that the cultures of anarchy arise from the generalisation of 
relations of enmity, rivalry or friendship, respectively.147 7KHVHµFXOWXUHV¶DUHFRQWH[WV
in which communication can take place. They are constituted by the attitudes and 
DFWLRQV RI DFWLQJ VXEMHFWV DQG WKHVH VXEMHFWV¶ LGHQWLWLHV DQG DFWLRQV DUH, in turn, 
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constituted in the cultures. This is what is meant by the mutually constitutive nature of 
the individual and his society. 
 
It should be emphasised that the relations constructed between states have 
implications for the identities of the states in question and not merely their 
interaction.148 This is to emphasise that actors within a discourse cannot simply be 
WDNHQDVµJLYHQV¶7hey are profoundly influenced by the contexts in which they find 
WKHPVHOYHV DQGE\ WKHDWWLWXGHVRIRWKHU DFWRUV WR WKHP)RU LQVWDQFH WKH ³QDWXUHRI
HQPLW\DVDSRVLWLRQIRU WKH2WKHU´KDV³LPSOLFDWLRQVIRU WKHSRVWXUHRI WKH6HOI´ LI
state A determines that state B is an enemy, its behaviour to that state will very likely 
induce state B to construct it as an enemy, this will perpetuate the enmity and risk a 
spiral of violence.149 States who conceive of one another as enemies do not enter into 
communicative action with one another. 
 
Similarly, the Lockean culture of anarchy is not particularly compatible with 
communicative action. This is because when states conceive of one another as rivals, 
they imagine a state of competition in which strategic action must be taken in order to 
µZLQ¶150 Habermas has explained that a strategic attitude oriented to success is 
inimical to communicative action.151 This is because where a participant in a 
discourse has a particular goal, the communicative goal of coming to an 
understanding about something is subordinated. The realist conception of the state as 
decision-maker is Hobbesian or Lockean; states are seen as rivals or enemies. Carty 
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has suggested that Vattel introduced this logic into international law.152 Thus, many 
international lawyers buy into the dogmatic realist conception of the sovereign state 
which interacts cleanly with its environment.153  
 
In this regard, the work of Carl Schmitt is pertinent. Schmitt was concerned with the 
identity of the sovereign and with the exception. The exception, according to Schmitt, 
could not be codified in a normative order or circumscribed factually and was 
therefore not amenable to theories of constitutional liberalism. For Schmitt, the 
H[FHSWLRQLV³DFDVHRIH[WUHPHSHULODGDQJHUWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHVWDWH´154 Since 
the exception cannot be circumscribed by norms, the decision of what constitutes the 
H[FHSWLRQ LV WDNHQ E\ WKH VRYHUHLJQ ZKR ³VWDQGV RXWVLGH WKH QRUPDOO\ valid legal 
V\VWHP>EXW@QHYHUWKHOHVVEHORQJVWRLW´155 There are two main points as regards self-
defence. The first is that, as an exception, its bounds cannot be preordained 
normatively; instead, it is a decision for the sovereign in each case as it arises.  The 
second is that the sovereign decision occurs outside the collective security system, 
and yet still belongs to it. It is submitted that the G.W. Bush doctrine of pre-emption 
displayed these characteristics. While demanding the right to the ultimate decision on 
the use of force in self-defence, it nevertheless attempted to retain some connection 
with the existing collective security system.156 Such a conception of self-defence is 
incompatible with the notion that all decisions to use self-defence are subject to 
collective intersubjective evaluation. 
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6FKPLWW¶V work has become popular with some international lawyers.157 Schmitt wrote 
about international law,158 and was concerned with the idea of the sovereign.159 
Koskenniemi has written that Schmitt has become popular among European 
international lawyers trying to understand the current realist US approach to 
international law.160 Koskenniemi has also written that Morgenthau and Schmitt 
engaged in some academic exchanges, DQGWKDWVRPHRIWKHIRUPHU¶VDQDO\VHV³ZHUH
strikingly similar to those expressed by Schmitt.161 As Morgenthau was a founding 
figure in the discipline of International Relations, it would not be surprising to see the 
UHPDLQVRI6FKPLWW¶V LQIOXHQFH LQ UHDOLVW DSSURDFKHV WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO DIIDLUV Indeed, 
RQHRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI6FKPLWW¶VH[FHSWLRQLVWKDWLWLVDQLQVWDQFHRI³UHDOOLIH´
EUHDNLQJ³WKURXJKWKHFUXVWRIDPHFKDQLVPWKDWKDVEHFRPHWRUSLGE\UHSHWLWLRQ´162 
Schmitt rejected the ought of normative order for the is of the decision. 
 
Particularly rHOHYDQWWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQLQWKHSUHVHQWWKHVLVLV6FKPLWW¶VFonception of 
WKHVRYHUHLJQDQGRIWKHSROLWLFDO+HZURWHWKDW³>W@KHSROLWLFDOHQWLW\SUHVXSSRVHVWKH
H[LVWHQFH RI DQ HQHP\´ +H VHHPHG WR KDYH DQ DOPRVW 'DUZLQLDQ DSSURDFK WR
international relations, suggesting that states that did not fight would die out.163 This 
seems very close to the Hobbesian idea that the state of nature is a state of war: 
+REEHVZURWHWKDW³GXULQJWKHWLPHPHQOLYHZLWKRXWDFRPPRQ3RZHUWRNHHSWKHP
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DOOLQDZHWKH\DUHLQWKDWFRQGLWLRQZKLFKLVFDOOHG:DUUH´164 Indeed, Schmitt relied 
on Hobbes to make his point.165 The international realm lacks such a common power. 
This suggests that states are in a constant struggle with one another for ascendancy. It 
does not suggest an inter-relation of states geared to identifying the better argument. 
 
It has already been mentioned that the lack of a centralised and effective body for 
maintaining order led some to suggest that states could fill the gap left by the 
paralysed Security Council using self-defence.166 It has also been affirmed that the 
right of self-defence is a sovereign right that is inherent in the concept. Schmitt wrote 
WKDW ³7KH VRYHUHLJQ LV +H ZKR GHFLGHV RQ WKH VWDWH RI H[FHSWLRQ´167 This can be 
ERLOHGGRZQWRWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQIULHQGDQGHQHP\³7KHVSHFLILFGLVWLQFWLRQWR
whLFKSROLWLFDODFWLRQVDQGPRWLYHVFDQEHUHGXFHGLVWKDWEHWZHHQIULHQGDQGHQHP\´
6FKPLWWVDLGWKDWLW³GHQRWHVWKHXWPRVWGHJUHHRILQWHQVLW\RIDXQLRQRUVHSDUDWLRQDQ
DVVRFLDWLRQRUGLVVRFLDWLRQ´168 It might thus be thought that the decision to use force 
in self-GHIHQFHLQYROYHVDGHFLVLRQWKDWWKHWDUJHWVWDWHLVDQHQHP\,Q6FKPLWW¶VYLHZ
this finding is irreversible insofar as it was made by a sovereign. This rules out the 
possibility of subsequent review of the action. 
 
Indeed, Schmitt has writtHQWKDWDFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHHQHP\³FDQQHLWKHUEHGHFLGHGE\
a previously determined norm nor by the judgement of a disinterested and therefore 
neutral third party´. This is because only the actual participants are in the right 
SRVLWLRQWR³FRUUHFWO\UHFRJQLVHDQGXQGHUVWDQG´WKHVLWXDWLRQ169  Schmitt emphasised 
                                                 
164
 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (1985) Penguin, p. 185 P. I, Ch. 13. 
165
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 52. 
166
 See Chapter I, at pp. 37. 
167
 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5. 
168
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 26. 
169
 Ibid., p. 27. 
232  
WKDW ³WKH VWDWH RI H[FHSWLRQ LV QRW D GHFLVLRQ WKDW FDQ EH FRQVWUDLQHG E\ MXULVWLF
norms.170 This would be to exclude the collective security system and to effectively 
over-run it with the exception. It should also be understood that the sovereign is 
identified as an is rather than an ought LQ 6FKPLWW¶V WKHRU\ +H ZKR LV capable of 
deciding on the exception. As an exception, the category of self-defence becomes an 
exploitable category for powerful states who wish to assert their sovereignty separate 
from the collective security system. 
 
After 11 September 2001, various writers indicated that there had been a change in 
the US world-YLHZ$³GDQJHURXVZRUOGUHTXLUHVDKDUGHQLQJRIDWWLWXGHVDQGPRUH
determLQDWHOHVVFRQFLOLDWRU\EHKDYLRU´171 This can be seen in the National Security 
Strategy of 2002. Not only did the US make a sharp division between its enemies and 
its friends, but it also made it clear that it would not make compromises for the sake 
of mulWLODWHUDOLVP³ZHZLOOQRWKHVLWDWHWRDFWDORQHLIQHFHVVDU\WRH[HUFLVHRXUULJKW
of self-defense by acting pre-HPSWLYHO\´172 The doctrine of pre-emption appeared to 
have been formulated on the assumption that the US would ultimately have to look to 
itself, rather than the rest of the world, for its security. This implies a subjectivization 
of security interests that denies the existence of a collective security system. It will be 
argued that collective evaluation of self-defence claims requires an intersubjective 
openness to other actors in the collective security system. 
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B. Attitude Open to Understanding. 
 
Evaluating self-defence claims demands a certain attitude from discourse participants; 
an attitude open to understanding. If one has already made XS RQH¶V PLQG DERXW D
thing, the only point in undertaking a process of criticism is to legitimate that 
decision. Habermasean communicative action is not, therefore, purely persuasive. 
When claimants attempt to vindicate their criticizable validity claim by giving 
reasons, they must adopt an open attitude. This entails not restricting the information 
that can be brought to the evaluative discourse on the grounds that it is sensitive 
intelligence material, for instance.173  
 
The openness of the attitude of the claimant also extends to its acceptance or rejection 
of criticisms. If reasons are given for a criticism that a claimant cannot counter and 
must in good conscience accept, then the claimant should be willing to revise his 
position as to the validity of his self-defence claim. 5LVVHKDVH[SODLQHGWKDW³>Z@KHQ
actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own 
YLHZV RI WKH ZRUOG WKHLU LQWHUHVWV DQG VRPHWLPHV HYHQ WKHLU LGHQWLWLHV´174 This is 
particularly important where two states are both claiming self-defence.175 In this case, 
DQHIIHFWLYHHYDOXDWLRQGLVFRXUVHPD\LGHQWLI\WKHDFWRUVZLWKWKHUROHVRIµDJJUHVVRU¶
DQGµGHIHQGHU¶IRUinstance. 
 
The requirement of an attitude open to understanding extends to other actors involved 
in the evaluation of a self-defence claim. If an evaluator were to come to a discourse 
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with a preconceived notion about the aggressive or defensive character of a given use 
of force or state, it is unlikely that the evaluator will be receptive to the force of the 
better argument. Evaluators must be willing to revise their positions in the light of 
new understandings. In other words, a discourse evaluating a given self-defence claim 
is not a bargaining process where existing positions are traded off against one another, 
it is a constructive process where a new understanding is created. 
 
A fair criticism, then, is that communicative understanding between states is a utopian 
notion.176 However, the attitude open to understanding is part of a pure form of 
communication that Habermas calls an ideal speech situation (ISS).177 Risse has 
written that the conditions of the ISS are not necessary to achieve understanding.178 It 
is not therefore expected that in practice states will enter into communication without 
a position on whether a self-defence claim was valid or not. Certainly the claimant 
state and target state are likely to have strongly held contrary positions. Instead, a 
better way of conceiving the practical form of the open attitude is in contrast to its 
opposite. 
 
Habermas uses rational-purposive action as a counterpoint to communicative action. 
+HUH³WKHDFWRULVSULPDULO\RULHQWHGWRDFKLHYLQJDQHQG´DQGGHILQHVVXFFHVVDV³WKH
DSSHDUDQFH LQ WKH ZRUOG RI D GHVLUHG VWDWH´179 Strategic action is coercive and the 
VWUDWHJLFDFWRUZKRVH LGHQWLW\ LV IL[HG$QDFWRU¶V LQWHUHVWVDQG WKHUHIRUHEHKDYLRXU
can be changed using bargaining tools; providing incentives or costs. For Habermas, 
VWUDWHJLFDFWRUVDUHQRWµUDWLRQDO¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\GRQRWUHVSRQGWRUHasons given 
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LQ GLVFRXUVH WKH\ DUH ³GHDI WR DUJXPHQW´180 Where all participants are deaf, an 
evaluative discourse becomes a dialogue de sourds; an empty mime. According to 
5LVVH³>L@IHYHU\ERG\LQDFRPPXQLFDWLYHVLWXDWLRQHQJDJHVLQUKHWRULF± the speaker, 
the target and the audience ± they can argue strategically until they are all blue in the 
IDFHDQGVWLOOQRWFKDQJHDQ\RQH¶VPLQG´181 This is important because, when reasons 
fall on deaf ears that do not attempt to understand them, the process of giving reasons 
becomes an empty process that might appear to legitimate a decision.  
 
Risse distinguishes three logics of social interaction: bargaining, rhetorical action and 
truth seeking arguing.182 Each mode of behaviour has its own logic. The game theory 
logic of bargaining, for instance, supposes that rational actors choose the most cost-
effective means of reaching a desired goal. In the TCA, people who behave rationally 
DUHZLOOLQJ³WRH[SRVHWKHPVHOYHVWRFULWLFLVPDQGLIQHFHVVDU\SDUWLFLSDWHSURSHUO\LQ
aUJXPHQWDWLRQ´183 In the first model, reasons for acting are presupposed, exogenous 
to individual actors. In the second model, reasons for understanding are created 
through an intersubjective process of argumentation. 
 
In bargaining models, participants can be encouraged to change their positions on a 
given proposition by the provision of costs and benefits. This means that bargaining 
chips are introduced from outside the discourse to influence participants. For instance, 
a permanent member of the SC might offer trade and development incentives to a 
small non-permanent member. At its most radical, strategic bargaining can be seen as 
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waging of war by other means.184 Instead, ³[p]articipants in argumentation have to 
presuppose in general that the structure of theiU FRPPXQLFDWLRQ«H[FOXGHV DOO
IRUFH«H[FHSWWKHIRUFHRIEHWWHUDUJXPHQW´HLWKHULQWHUQDOIRUFHZLWKLQWKHSURFHVVRI
reaching understanding or external to it.185 5LVVHDVVHUWVWKDW³UHODWLRQVKLSVRISRZHU
and social hierarchies [must] recede into the backgrouQG´186 
 
The idea that participants have attitudes open to understanding is coextensive with the 
idea that participants in a discourse are accountable for their utterances. As discussed 
above,187 this means that they can redeem their statements by giving reasons if 
necessary. Where states do not consider one another accountable and refuse to be 
open to the reasons given by the other, they adopt an objectifying attitude to that 
other.188 This means that they do not treat the other as a participant in a discourse, but 
as a discursive fact in itself ± an object of discourse. Wendt has suggested that the 
question of mutuality is dependent on the identification of the self and the other. He 
says that this occurs on a continuum; where there is no identification ± as in neo-
realist theories ± the other is completely objectified.189 To state the obvious, 
intersubjectivity implies that there is a relation between self and other; the colour of 
this relation will affect the understandings that are created. At the same time, as Risse 
has written, the mutual constitutiveness of agents and social structures means that the 
object of discourse, what is talked about, cannot but compromise the subjects of 
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discourse, those who talk.190 It is to the identity of the participants in a discourse to 
which we will now turn. 
 
C. The Identity of Participants. 
 
As suggested above, the idea of coming to an intersubjective understanding is 
LQLPLFDO WR WKH LQGLYLGXDOLVWSHUFHSWLRQRI VWDWHV¶ LQWHUDFWLRQV7KLV LVEHFDXVHVWDWHV
would be expected to participate in evaluation discourses. Further, they will be 
expected to be ready to vindicate their claims and to change their positions to the 
extent that rational communication demands it. To the extent that a Lockean culture 
prevails among states, it is submitted that they will have to change their identities 
from rivals, or strategic actors, to communicative actors. It will be suggested that this 
FDQEH DFKLHYHG LI VWDWHV FKDQJH WKHLU DWWLWXGHV WRRQH DQRWKHU:HQGW¶V WKHRU\ ZDV
that cultures of anarchy gain their character from a generalisation of the way that 
individual states see others. Intersubjective structures determine what sort of anarchy 
it is: Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian.191 In this way, the identity of a state is 
FRQGLWLRQHGE\RWKHUV¶SHUFHSWLons of it. 
 
Just as participants in security discourses construct the external world to which their 
claims pertain by making and understanding assertoric statements about it,192 so they 
construct one another. This involves collapsing the distinction between objects and 
subjects of discourse. The word subject often denotes, grammatically, the actor in a 
sentence and object denotes the thing with reference to which the subject acts. For 
LQVWDQFHLQWKHVHQWHQFH³WKH6&LVGLVFXVVLQJVHFXULW\SROLF\´WKH6&LV the subject 
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of the sentence and security policy the object. If the SC were discussing Iran, Iran 
would be the object of the sentence. The point is that discourse is full of 
objectification insofar as to talk about a person, thing or event is to reify it giving it a 
core meaning or bounding a concept. Communication would be impossible without it.  
 
However it must be stressed that this objectification, if communicative action is to 
take place, cannot be totalising. The degree of objectification in the system depends 
on the relationship between self and other; is it one of enemy, rival or friend? ³7KH
greater the degree of conflict in a system, the more the states will fear each other and 
GHIHQGHJRLVWLF LGHQWLWLHV´:HQGWVD\V WKDW LQD+REEHVLDQbellum omnium ³PXWXDO
IHDU´SUHYHQWVDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQQHJDWLYHLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHRWKHU193 A lack of 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHRWKHULPSOLHVWKDWRQH¶VUHODWLRQZLWKWKHRWKHUZLOOQRWFKDQJH
Once designated as such, the other is immutably an enemy. This means that the 
project of involving the protagonists in a process of intersubjective evaluation of a 
self-defence claim would not work. States in an enemy-relation are unlikely to be 
persuaded by the power of better argument. It is submitted that this was the attitude 
taken on by the US under G.W. Bush in its War on Terror. So-FDOOHGµURJXHVWDWHV¶DUH
the objects of security discourse and not participating subjects in it. Furthermore, it is 
VXEPLWWHG WKDW WKH GHVLJQDWLRQ RI µURJXH VWDWH¶ SUHVXSSRVHV DQ HQHP\-relation that 
tends to pre-decide questions of role-identity UROHVIRULQVWDQFHVXFKDVµDJJUHVVRU¶
DQGµGHIHQGHU¶ 
 
$FFRUGLQJ WR :HQGW LGHQWLW\ FDQ EH VHHQ DV ³D SURSHUW\ RI LQWHQWLRQDO DFWRUV WKDW
JHQHUDWHVPRWLYDWLRQDODQGEHKDYLRXUDOGLVSRVLWLRQV´DQGLV URRWHGLQDQDFWRU¶VVHOI-
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understanding but also dependent on the intersubjective understanding of others; 
³LGHQWLWLHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGE\ERWK LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDO VWUXFWXUHV´194 States do not 
have a single identity but many different ones that will come to the fore in particular 
social contexts in which a state acts. Two identities particularly concern us for the 
purposes of this thesis. One is that of aggressor/defender, identities that may be 
claimed by, or attributed to, states in self-defence discourses. Another is that of 
friend/enemy, roles that are to be found in the G.W. Bush Administration National 
Security Strategy. 
 
Wendt distinguishes different types of identity; personal/corporate, type, role and 
collective. Type identities pertain to the quality of the state; is it a democracy, a 
capitalist state or a monarchical one? Role identities depend even more on others 
because they depend on the culture in which a state acts.195 Role identities ± such as 
aggressor or defending state ± are not dependent on properties that are intrinsic to the 
state in question; in other words, the qualities that make the UK a parliamentary 
democracy still exist whether others recognise them or not, but a given role identity 
adopted by the UK depends essentially on the social structure in which the UK acts, 
for instance as a permanent member of the SC. This role is meaningless if no other 
state accepts that the UK is a permanent member. Role identities are therefore 
GHSHQGHQWRQ³>W@KHVKDULQJRIH[SHFWDWLRQV´196  
 
Wendt has written WKDW VWDWHV¶ LGHQWLWLHV DUHQRW LQGLYLGXDOO\ JLYHQRUSRVVHVVHGEXW
constructed intersubjectively in society.197 In Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian 
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cultures, states gain their identities according to their conception of the other as an 
enemy, a rival or a friend.198 Rivals and enemies can be distinguished because, while 
HDFKDUHUHYLVLRQLVW WKHULYDOPHUHO\VHHNVWRUHYLVHWKHVHOI¶VEHKDYLRXURUSURSHUW\
and not its identity or existence, as does an enemy.199 Violence between rivals is self-
limiting becaXVHLWLVFRQVWUDLQHGE\DPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHRWKHU¶VULJKWWRH[LVW
this right is not recognised by Hobbesian enemies.200 These identities are important to 
this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, they are pertinent as regards the possibility of 
interacting communicatively with an enemy or rival in a self-defence evaluation. It is 
important that states see one another as communicatively equal; that is equally 
capable of expressing themselves. Secondly, they pertain to evidencing claims to use 
force in self-defence. In the next chapter it will be argued that uncertainty is a major 
factor in the security environment. Owing to the lack of information about what is 
being done, predictions about behaviour can also be made according to VWDWHV¶
identities. Where concepts of incapable or malfeasant states are held beyond the 
protagonists in question, the answer to the question of whether force has been used in 
self-defence or not may be presupposed. 
 
It has already been stated that the distinction between friends and enemies was central 
WR6FKPLWW¶VZRUN201 For him, WKHQDWXUHRIWKHHQHP\LVRIWKHRWKHU³LWLVVXIILFLHQW
for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different 
DQGDOLHQ´202 It is suggested that this extreme otherness can be seen as the root of the 
ODFN RI UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH RWKHU¶V ULJKW WR H[LVW :HQGW H[SODLQV WKDW RQH RI WKH
FRQVHTXHQFHVRI WKLV ODFNRIPXWXDO UHFRJQLWLRQ LV WKDW WKHRWKHU³ZLOOQRWZLOOLQJO\
                                                 
198
 Ibid.,  p. 260. 
199
 Ibid., p. 261. 
200
 Ibid., p. 261. 
201
 Supra, at p. 229-232. 
202
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 27. 
241  
OLPLW LWV YLROHQFH WRZDUGV WKH 6HOI´203 A strategic environment containing enemies 
ZLOO WHQG WR EH YLHZHG DV SDUWLFXODUO\ ³GDQJHURXV´ E\ VWDWHV204 and therefore to be 
tackled on the precautionary principle. Where national security is seen as a process of 
managing risks, the presence of enemies can raise the stakes so high that even a 
remote threat cannot be risked.205 
 
It is suggested that the G.W. Bush Administration National Security Strategy (NSS) 
moved away from the assumption that other states were Lockean rivals and marked 
out certain states that stood in a relation of Hobbesian enmity to the US. This does 
two things. It objectifies such states, effectively excluding them from participating in 
evaluative discourses, and it presupposes the question of whether there was prior 
aggression despite the absence of concrete evidence. This is summarised in an 
apparent shift in world-view of a strong US ally, former UK Prime Minister, Tony 
%ODLU³[B]efore September 11th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy in 
international relations from a traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country's internal affairs are for it and you don't 
interfere unless it threatens you´206  
 
The US declared itself to be at war with terrorists.207 A declaration of war is a formal 
statement that a Hobbesian relation exists between two actors. The NSS draws certain 
parallels between the War on Terror and the Cold War.208 However, in comparison 
ZLWK WKH µURJXH VWDWHV¶ DQG WHUURULVWV DUPHG ZLWK :HDSRQV RI 0DVV 'HVWUXFWLRQ
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(WMD), the Soviet Union appears in an almost nostalgic light.209 The view that some 
governments lack either the capacity or the will to ensure they do not pose a threat to 
others has effects for communication. The competence and trustworthiness of such 
actors can be compromised to the point that their utterances are not taken on the same 
terms as those of other participants. 
 
The otherness of terrorists in the collective security system is relatively easy to 
identify. They are non-state actors who lack legal personality, and therefore a voice, 
in the UN. Terrorist networks lack many characteristics of states. They lack attributes 
like territory and populations which can deprive states of bargaining chips against 
them. They also lack unified structure which makes it hard to think of them, or strike 
at them, as a single entity.210 It is controversial in international law whether one can 
use force in self-defence against a non-state actor.211 This aside, it would seem hard to 
escape the problem that such an act would probably involve an act of violence against 
another state. 
 
In consequence, the G.W. Bush Administration adopted the concepts of conspiring 
ZLWK DQG KDUERXULQJ WHUURULVWV 7KH 166 VWDWHV ³:H PDNH QR GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or proYLGH DLG WR WKHP´212 In this 
FRQQHFWLRQ WKH86 LGHQWLILHG µURJXH VWDWHV¶ DV DOOLHVRI WHUURULVWV5RJXH VWDWHV DOVR
brutalize their own people, have no respect for international law, seek to use WMD 
DJJUHVVLYHO\³UHMHFWEDVLFKXPDQYDOXHVDQGKDWHWKH8QLted States and everything for 
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ZKLFKLWVWDQGV´213 7KH86FRQFOXGHGWKDW³[w]HFDQQRWOHWRXUHQHPLHVVWULNHILUVW´, 
not only because of the potential magnitude of harm caused by WMD but also 
EHFDXVHRI³WKHLQDELOLW\WRGHWHUDSRWHQWLDODWWDFNHU´.214 Former President Bush has 
DOVRUHIHUUHGWR³ZHDNVWDWHV´215 These are states which are either unwilling or unable 
to prevent terrorists from operating from their territory. It has been noted that the US 
saw itself as facing just as big a threat from weak states as from rogue states.216 
 
Rogue and weak states are not equal before the law; rather the US adopts a kill or be 
killed attitude that designates them high-risk and therefore eliminable ± or at least ripe 
for regime change - for a more secure world. Less polemically, this was stressed by 
&RQGROHH]]D 5LFH ZULWLQJ DERXW WKH 86 UHVSRQVH WR WKH ³VWUDWHJLF VKRFN´ RI 
³>Z@KDW KDV FKDQJHG LV PRVW EURDGO\ KRZ ZH YLHZ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH
G\QDPLFVZLWKLQVWDWHVDQGWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHUDPRQJWKHP´ Since some states 
DUHQRW ³willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign responsibilities´
³democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest´217 It 
is suggested that this rhetoric from the US effectively attempted to change the 
identities of states acting within the collective security system by constructing them as 
µURJXH¶RUµZHDN¶ 
 
7KH*:%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V166LPSRVHGDWZR-tier structure onto the collective 
security system that makes the type identity of states relevant to the evaluation of their 
FODLP 7KH W\SH LGHQWLWLHV WKDW DUH VHHQ LQ WKH 166 DUH ³W\UDQQRXV UHJLPH´
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³RSSUHVVLYH DQG EUXWDO GLFWDWRUVKLSV´ ³IUHHGRP-ORYLQJ VWDWHV´ DQG ³PDUNHW
GHPRFUDFLHV´ inter alia. Former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has 
UHIHUUHGWRDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDOOLHVDQGSDUWQHUVRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKHIRUPHU³VKDUH
YDOXHV´ZKLOHWKHODWWHUPHUHO\³VKDUHLQWHUHVWV´7KHODQJXDJHRI³SHUPDQHQWDOOLHV´
DQG ³SHUPDQHQW HQHPLHV´ LV DOVR VWULNLQJ LQ her article.218 It seems that there is a 
hierarchy among states that not only gives the lie to the principle of sovereign 
equality, but also militates against the idea that states could engage with one another 
in justificatory discourses. It is likely that the target of a use of force would wish to 
participate in argumentation establishing what happened.219 Indeed, it is submitted 
that its participation would, in most cases, be crucial. If this target state were to be 
ZULWWHQRIIDVHLWKHUWRRZHDNRUWRRµHYLO¶WRSDUWLFLSDWHLWZRXld not be possible for 
evaluators to come to a meaningful understanding about a self-defence claim. 
 
:KLOHWKHUKHWRULFRIµURJXHVWDWHV¶LVQRWZLGHO\XVHGRXWVLGHWKH86WKHFRQFHSWRI
weak or failed states is. The High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change used 
identified weak states as a prime danger to international peace and security.220 The EU 
KDYHDOVR LGHQWLILHG³VWDWH IDLOXUH´DVD WKUHDW± which seems to capture elements of 
both rogue and weak states: ³%DG JRYHUQDQFH ± corruption, abuse of power, weak 
institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from 
ZLWKLQ´221 A similar approach is taken in the UK Security Strategy which was 
published more recently, in 2008.222 It is submitted that this construction of certain 
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states as inimical to, or incapable of, collective security is likely to make any 
evaluation of a self-defence claim involving such a state a purely strategic matter. 
 
As well as the problem of lack of communication, the enemy-relation has another 
effect on self-defence discourse. This relates to the identity of aggressor and defender. 
The nexus between the identity of the state and its security interests has been sketched 
by Wendt;223 DVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQFODVVLI\LQJDXVHRIIRUFHDVDJJUHVVLRQRUGHIHQFHLV 
given by its identity as a target or claimant state of self-defence. Insofar as these 
identities remain paramount in the discourse, the interests and therefore positions of 
the states concerned will not change. This will lead either to a volatile stalemate or, 
where one state is considerably stronger than the other, to the subjugation of the 
weaker state. According to Koskenniemi, DVWDWH¶VVHOI³FRQVLVWVRISURMHFWLRQVDERXW
LWVµLGHD¶LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSK\VLFDOEDVH´+Hexplains that whether the observer sees 
DJJUHVVLRQRUGHIHQFHLVGHWHUPLQHGE\³ZKDWHYHUZHVHHDVWKHSULQFLSOHXQGHUO\LQJ
WKHVWDWH¶VLGHQWLW\´224 
 
To decide that a given state is a rogue state is also to decide that it is an enemy, and 
therefore an aggressor. This was evident in the so-FDOOHGµD[LVRIHYLO¶ WKDW LQFOXGHG
Iran, Iraq and North Korea.225 One of the consequences of this is that the state is 
completely objectified in discourse. In other words, the enemy is not somebody to talk 
to, but rather somebody to talk about. This can mean that attempts by a state to rebut 
accusations or make counter-FODLPVDUHGLVFRXQWHG/LE\D¶VDWWHPSWVWRXVHWKH,&-WR
counter-SRLQWWKH868.DQG)UDQFH¶VXVHRIWKH6&RYHUWKH/RFNHUELHGLVDVWHULVD
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case in point.226 A more recent example is that of Iran. Its arguments for its 
development of a nuclear fuel cycle are dismissed by most states.227 A certain animus 
belligerendi is imputed to such states; a presumption of mala fides that is very hard to 
counter. 
 
It is worth stating the obvious; that an enemy is aggressive per se. This imposes a 
role-identity on a state that presupposes the very question that a discourse evaluating a 
self-GHIHQFH FODLP ZRXOG ZLVK WR DQVZHU $Q HQHP\¶V PLOLWDU\ FDSDELOLWLHV ZLOO EH
used to predict his future behaviour because ZH µNQRZ¶ his inimical trajectory if 
XQHQFXPEHUHG7KHFXOWXUH ³JLYHV FDSDELOLWLHV DSDUWLFXODU meaning´228 This means 
that a state must be able to pre-empt in a world where technology has made the first 
strike potentially fatal.229 Thus, another feature of tKHVHOI¶VGHFLVLRQ-making is that it 
will tend to assume the worst; negative possibilities rather than probabilities.230  
 
D. Communicative Action in the Security Council. 
 
In the previous chapter, the work of the Security Council was discussed as regards the 
evaluation of self-defence claims. The point was made that the SC appears to operate 
according to µSROLWLFDO¶ XQ-formalised, considerations can be seen as exploitable by 
more dominant states.231 Nevertheless, some writers have attempted to conceive of the 
&RXQFLO DV IRUPLQJDQ µLQWHUSUHWLYH FRPPXQLW\¶RI LQWHUVXEMHFWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ232 
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This proposition, it will be argued, is not easy to bear out. This will be argued because 
it is to be stressed that taking advantage of intersubjective understanding in the 
evaluation of self-defence claims requires a radical change in attitudes and, 
correspondingly, in institutional structures. In the previous chapter it was argued that 
the SC is opaque, selective, exclusive and dominated by powerful states.233 These 
characteristics are more conducive to strategic rather than communicative action. 
 
In the work of Ian Johnstone, the concept of interpretive community is attributed to 
literary theorist, Stanley Fish.234 The idea is that the interpretive community provides 
internal constraints on interpretation that emanate from the fact of membership of a 
community235 LQ WKH IRUP RI ³VKDUHG VWDQGDUGV DQG H[SHFWDWLRQV´236 Fish used this 
FRPPXQLW\WRORFDWHLQWHUSUHWLYHDXWKRULW\³0HDQLQJLVSURGXFHGE\QHLWKHUWKHWH[W
nor the reader buWE\WKHLQWHUSUHWLYHFRPPXQLW\LQZKLFKERWKDUHVLWXDWHG´237 It has 
some aspects in common with the idea of intersubjectivity, and Johnstone 
acknowledges a debt to Habermas.238 It will be argued that while Johnstone makes use 
RI WKH FRQFHSWV RI µEHWWHU DUJXPHQW¶ DQG LQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\ KLV ILQGLQJV DV WR
communication in the SC do not point to the presence of intersubjective 
understanding. 
 
Johnstone is attempting to vindicate the thesis that international law is important, if 
perhaps not decisive, for SC decision-PDNLQJ +H KROGV WKDW ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
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operates largely through processes of justificatory discourse within and constrained by 
LQWHUSUHWLYH FRPPXQLWLHV´239 The UN Security Council is a body in which such 
discourses occur and Johnstone wishes to argue that when law is invoked in that body, 
it is not merely for rhetorical value. He uses the debates surrounding the NATO 
bombing of Serbia in 1999, Operation Allied Force (OAF), to illustrate his point. It is 
submitted that by presenting his thesis as descriptive, Johnstone does not manage to 
bear it out without imputing certain non-exploitative attitudes towards the law to the 
state actors participating in SC debates. 
 
-RKQVWRQH SRVLWV WKDW ³WKHUH LV D QRUPDWLYH IUDPHZRUN WKDW VWUXFWXUHV 6& GHEDWHV´
which FDQEHVHHQEHFDXVH³VRPHDUJXPHQWVDUHPRUHDFFHSWDEOH«WKDQRWKHUV´7KH
framework comes from the UN Charter and the law relating to international peace and 
security.240 Johnstone also points out that the SC, or at least the P5, have been 
operating as a bod\IRURYHU\HDUV³WKH3KDYHEHFRPHDQH[FOXVLYHFOXEZLWKD
VKDUHG KLVWRU\ DQG VHW RI H[SHULHQFHV´241 As well as this procedural community, 
Johnstone also suggests that there is burgeoning community as regards substance: 
³7KHHQGRI WKH&ROG:DUKDVKHUDOGHG VRPHFRQYHUJHQFHRIYDOXHV´ Specifically, 
Johnstone suggests that the burgeoning human rights discourse evidences the 
existence of normative community.242 Johnstone claims that this common framework 
of procedural and substantive norms makes it possible for states to identify better 
arguments.  
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Examining the debates around OAF in 1999, Johnstone argues that while practice was 
IDUIURPGHPRQVWUDWLQJWKDWVWDWHVLQYROYHGVKDUHGDFRPPRQFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHµULJKW
DQVZHU¶ WKH\GLG VKDUHYLHZVDERXWZKDWwas the better argument.243 However, the 
episode is notoriously divisive.244 The SC did not mention the bombing campaign in a 
resolution passed immediately after OAF had finished.245 In the public debate, some 
VWDWHVURXQGO\FRQGHPQHG1$72IRUµDJJUHVVLRQ¶DQGYiolation of Charter norms.246 
Among NATO states, some were adamant that their action was within the law.247 It 
was also suggested that the action was simply necessary or legitimate to prevent a 
³KXPDQLWDULDQFDWDVWURSKH´248 In fact, perhaps in order to secure the votes of each of 
the permanent five, resolution 1244 made no mention of OAF.  
 
This is problematic insofar as Johnstone has asserted that one of the reasons that 
GLVFRXUVHLQWKH6&LVQRWHSLSKHQRPHQDOLVWKDWWKHLQWHUSUHWLYHFRPPXQLW\³LQHIIHFW
passHVMXGJPHQWRQOHJDOFODLPV´249 Indeed, it would seem that if Johnstone wishes to 
assert that a community which interprets norms according to shared standards and 
expectations exists, he must do more than point to a plethora of divergent arguments. 
Johnstone wrote that while the episode shows there was no normative commonality 
over the legality of humanitarian intervention in the SC, it also shows that the 
LQWHUSUHWLYHFRPPXQLW\LQWKH6&³LVVXIILFLHQWO\UREXVWWRZDUUDQWDQHIIRUWWRMXVWLI\
positions on lHJDOJURXQGV´250 It is submitted that this does not overcome the realist 
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argument that states can, in this way, simply exploit legal norms rhetorically. The idea 
that states were alive to the issue of precedent-setting does not act as strong enough 
evidence to counter the claim that NATO states may have strategically exploited legal 
arguments to rationalize OAF. 
 
Johnston argues that the fact that legal claims were not simply made 
straightforwardly, the fact that states were concerned about precedent and the fact that 
UHSXWDWLRQDO FRVWV DUH FRQQHFWHG ZLWK LPSODXVLEOH DUJXPHQWV ³DUH HYLGHQFH RI D
UDWLRQDO GLVFRXUVH ZLWKLQ DQ LQWHUSUHWLYH FRPPXQLW\´251 It is submitted that the 
Kosovo episode may be said to demonstrate the potential power of the better 
argument, but that it is hard to see the SC as a body acting as an interpretive 
community to identify the better argument in practice. This is chiefly because the 
states arguing in the SC were not engaged with one another. This was spelled out by 
the Russian delegatHZKRVWDWHGWKDW³>Q@RWKLQJRIZKDW,KDYHKHDUGKHUHKDVFKDQJHG
WKDWSRVLWLRQ´252 In effect, there were two sets of norms being opposed to one another: 
On the one side the sovereign integrity of the former Yugoslavia was stressed, on the 
other side the legitimacy of humanitarian action was argued. This dilemma was 
UHIOHFWHG LQ PDQ\ DFDGHPLFV¶ UHDGLQJV RI 2$)253 It was sometimes said that the 
operation was illegal but legitimate.254 This seems to reflect more of a normative 
confusion between order and justice than consensus over the action. 
 
Indeed, Johnstone emphasises that the arguments of NATO states ran the gamut of 
GRXEW7KRVHZKRKDG³UHDOGRXEWDERXWWKHOHJDOLW\RIWKHDFWLRQWRWKRVHZKRKDG
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QR VXFK GRXEWV EXW ZHUH UHOXFWDQW WR SXVK WKH OHJDO FDVH´ due to concerns over 
plausibility or precedent, through to those who had no doubts and were not 
concerned.255 ,QGHHGKHQRWHV WKDW WKH DUJXPHQWVJLYHQE\ WKH86ZHUH D³ODXQGU\
OLVW´UDWKHUWKDQDFOHDUDWWHPSWWRSLQSRLQWWKHEHWWHUDUJXPHQW256 This might be taken 
to indicate the absence of a better argument, as opposed to the consciousness of a 
plethora of normatively undifferentiated different arguments.  
 
7R FRQFOXGH SHUKDSV WKH PRVW VWULNLQJ HOHPHQW LQ -RKQVWRQH¶V ZRUN LV WKH
tentativeness of the assertion that commonality of values exist in the SC. For instance, 
KHDGPLWVWKDW³>L@WZRXOGVHHPUDWKHUIDU-fetched to suggest that a shared culture and 
FRPPRQYDOXHVLQIRUPGHOLEHUDWLRQVLQWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´257 His argument is not 
that there is fully fledJHG QRUPDWLYH FRPPXQLW\ EXW UDWKHU ³D VHQVH RI EHLQJ LQ D
UHODWLRQVKLSRIVRPHGXUDWLRQ´258 More recently, Johnstone has written that Operation 
,UDTL )UHHGRP LQ  ZDV ³D EULGJH WRR IDU´259 DQG WKDW ³WKH QRUPDWLYH DQG
institutional framework embodied in tKH81&KDUWHUKDVEHHQGDPDJHG´260  
 
It is submitted that this ambivalence is symptomatic of the desire to claim that the 
collective security system works without enquiring too deeply into the workings of 
WKH&RXQFLO ,QDZRUNWKDW LQIOXHQFHG-RKQVWRQH¶VRwn study, Risse gave the SC as 
the example of an instance where disparate power determines who has access to a 
discourse and also where relative power determines how much weight is given to a 
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given argument.261 It seems to me that the selectiveness and opacity of the Council 
discussed in the previous chapter tends to militate against the construction of an 
intersubjective understanding about a given use of force in that body. While the 
desirability of the SC constituting an interpretive community may provide a direction 
for the reform of the body, it is submitted that it does not accurately describe current 
Council practice.  
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
The re-conception of the report of self-defence as a criticizable validity claim removes 
the authority to decide about an exercise of self-defence from the state that used force. 
This is because a claim is an offering in discourse, rather than an imposition on 
discourse. These is no obligation to accept a claim if good reasons cannot be produced 
to support a controversial statement. The claimant loses control of the decision to use 
force in self-defence as soon as it is uttered in an international discourse. This is 
because the statement becomes a positive object of critique. The central core of this 
thesis is simply that accountability is the obverse of legitimacy. The realist argument, 
that the law of self help can enter into the collective security system as a stop-gap for 
the loopholes and inadequacies of the UN rules and institutions, effectively 
reintroduces a situation where the international system is exploited for its legitimating 
properties and shorn of its critical capacities. 
 
,W LV QRW HQRXJK LQ WKLV DXWKRU¶VYLHZ WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUVZHOO YHUVHG LQ WKH
annals of doctrine know that this or that claim was, despite its apparent acceptance or 
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the lack of adverse reaction, invalid. Kept within the college of international lawyers, 
such convictions carry little force. If law is to operate as a means of resistance to 
power, as well as a conduit for power, then it must do so communicatively. The 
communication of the insights of international lawyers and the use of legal structures 
to condition discourses, can give the law force in the material world; communication 
can bring into play the abstractions of law.262 However it must be accepted that in this 
descent, the purity of abstraction will be lost and the law will become contestable and 
legal argumentation political. 
 
It is suggested that an assumption should be created that self-defence claims will be 
scrutinised. Johnstone has written that ³JRYHUQPHQWV FDQQRW HVFDSH FROOHFWLYH
MXGJPHQWRIWKHLUFRQGXFWE\RWKHUJRYHUQPHQWV«LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVDQGRUJDQVRI
SXEOLFRSLQLRQ´.263 For Koskenniemi the accountability of the strong, the articulation 
and protection of the weak, DQG DUJXPHQWV DERXW OHJDO YDOLGLW\ ³LPDJLQH WKH
SRVVLELOLW\RI´DFRPPXQLW\WKDWRYHUULGHVLQGLYLGXDOVXEMHFWLYLWLHV. This community 
PDNHV ³D PHDQLQJIXO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ODZIXO FRQVWUDLQW DQG WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI
QDNHGSRZHU´264 It seems to me that the UN collective security system supposes that 
VXFKDµFRPPXQLW\¶RIHYDOXDWRUVH[LVWVRUDWOHDVWWKDWLQWHUVXEMHFWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
is possible within it. 
 
The next chapter will discuss what sort of intersubjective understanding might be 
possible within the collective security system. It will be argued that understanding 
about the facts of a particular case may provide the firmest footing for the evaluation 
                                                 
262
 The direct involvement of international lawyers in public discourses about the legality of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in 2003 is an example of the strength international legal discourse can has when it 
engages with external debates. See e.g. letter to the Guardian, 7 March 2003. 
263
 -RKQVWRQH³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´p. 441. 
264
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, p. 502. 
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of self-defence claims. In this regard &DUW\¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW ³WKH SRWHQWLDO WDVN RI
legal doctrine is to reconstruct conflict situations in accordance with basic principles 
of possible understanding, a theory of knowledge based on the development of 
DUJXPHQW UDWKHU WKDQ D VHDUFK IRU REMHFWLYLW\ RU H[SHULHQFH DV VXFK´ LV KLJKO\
instructive.265 It will be argued that there are cases where it will not be possible to 
build such an intersubjective understanding of a given situation. Into this category, it 
will be argued, falls the Bush doctrine of pre-emption.  
 
                                                 
265
 A. Carty, The Decay of International Law: A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in 
International Affairs (1986) Manchester University Press, p. 114. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
Evidencing Self-Defence Claims. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how facts are and might be used in the 
evaluation of self-defence claims. A lack of consensus about normative substance 
means that divergent interpretations of the law can be justified in particular cases. 
Indeed it is said that states share little in common at the best of times; as Nardin 
points out, few environments are more pluralistic than the international one.1 Instead, 
this thesis argues that common understandings, or knowledge, about the world may 
provide a practicable frame of reference in certain conditions. Importantly, the 
referent is both external to individual states and notionally shared by them all. This 
means that it should be theoretically possible to test propositions by ostensive 
demonstration. It is hoped that intersubjectivity will provide a limit of plausibility that 
can accommodate flexibility without enabling exploitation. 
 
In order to ascertain the conditions in which claims might be ostensibly testable, this 
chapter examines some attempts to simply allude to facts as though they were 
objective and obvious. It will be argued that these approaches fail where they rely on 
the objectivity of facts; such approaches can be seen as exploitable where reliance on 
facts legitimises a given position without allowing for scrutiny. The position taken in 
this thesis is that social knowledge of facts is constructed through intersubjective 
processes; it is not the product of individual discovery. This approach has been 
influenced by the theories of social constructivism of the latter part of the twentieth 
                                                 
1
 T. Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (1983) Princeton University Press, p. 51. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµNardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States¶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century.2 $V .RVNHQQLHPL H[SODLQV ³D SDUW RI PRGHUQ SKLORVRSK\ KDV UHMHFWHG WKH
HSLVWHPRORJLFDOHQWHUSULVHDQGWKHLGHDRIREMHFWLYLW\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKLWDOWRJHWKHU´3  
 
Apologists for pre-emptive self-defence have occasionally relied on the objectivity or 
obviousness of the threat.4 It will be argued that refusal by the most powerful states to 
open their assertions of self-defence to scrutiny in the form of an international claim 
is irreconcilable with their use of the collective security system as an arena of 
justification. Formal multilateralism fleshed out by substantive unilateralism is 
exploitation by another name. The turn to facts has been made by non-realist 
international lawyers as well. This is reflected in the widespread use of the primarily 
factual criteria of necessity and proportionality as customary norms that supplement 
the UN Charter.5 The principle of proportionality will be used to illustrate that where 
µFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶HYDOXDWLRn is relied on, one must also show that there is a common 
sense if such evaluation is not to be a site for exploitation or merely esoteric. 
 
It will be argued that where factual assertions are not given to ostensive 
demonstration, the justification process is vulnerable to exploitation. It should be 
FODULILHGWKDWµRVWHQVLYHGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶GRHVQRWFRQQRWHSURRIRUREMHFWLYLW\:KDWLV
meant by the phrase is that a factual assertion is capable of being taken as a 
                                                 
2
 See e.g. P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (1967) Penguin, London; J.R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, (1995) 
Penguin, London; A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999) Cambridge University 
Press. (Hereinafter, µWendt, Social Theory¶. 
3
 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argumentation 
(2005) Cambridge University Press, p. 517. +HUHLQDIWHUµ.RVNHQQLHPLFrom Apology¶ 
4
 E.g. :+7DIW,9DQG7)%XFKZDOG³3UHHPSWLRQ,UDTDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´(3) AJIL (2003) 
557, p. 557. 
5
 Infra, at p. 274-279. 
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criticizable validity claim and tested.6 On the one hand, this implies that the sort of 
fact claimed can be, in theory, commonly appreciated.7 For instance, the intention of a 
government to pursue aggressive policies against the claimant state is a fact, but 
animus belligerendi is not directly available to others, it can only be inferred from 
other facts.8 On the other hand, the fact claimed must be, in practice, available for 
critique. This means that states must take responsibility for their self-defence claims 
by undertaking to account for them. AV:LOPVKXUVWZURWH³>H@YLGHQFHLVIXQGDPHQWDO
WRDFFRXQWDELOLW\´9 
 
,WKDVEHHQZULWWHQWKDW³>L@QWHUQDWLRQDOODZDVDSURFHVVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQLPSOLFLWO\
demands an evaluation of evidence supporting opposable positions, particularly in the 
absence of judLFLDOUHYLHZ´10 In this regard, the practice of states to use intelligence 
to redeem their self-defence claims will be distinguished from the redemption of a 
claim by evidence of a fact. Similarly, the nature of intelligence as an assessment of 
probability will be distinguished from evidence of a material fact. The claim will be 
made that to evidence a proposition is to make an appeal to an audience which, as a 
reason supporting a criticizable validity claim, in practice gives that audience the 
capability to accept or reject the claim.  In other words, it is stressed that the process 
of justification is a two-way street that relies on the reception of a claim as well as its 
emission. 
 
                                                 
6
 7KHILUVWPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGµRVWHQVLYH¶OLVWHGLQWKH2[IRUG(QJOLVK'LFWLRQDU\LV³'HQRWDWLYH
directly or manifestly demonstrative. Chiefly in Logic: (of a proof, method, etc.) setting out a general 
principle manifestly including the proposition to be proved; direct (as opposed to indirect´ 
7
 See Chapter IV, at pp. 213-220. 
8
 -/%ULHUO\³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGWKH5HVRUWWR$UPHG)RUFH´Cam. LJ (1932) 308, p. 312. 
9
 (:LOPVKXUVW³7KH&KDWKDP+RXVH3ULQFLSOHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZRQWKH8VHRI)RUFHLQ6HOI-
GHIHQFH´) ICLQ S+HUHLQDIWHUµ:LOPVKXUVW³7KH&KDWKDP+RXVH
3ULQFLSOHV´¶ 
10
  72¶'RQQHOO³1DPLQJDQG6KDPLQJ7KH6RUU\7DOHRI6HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ´
17(5) EJIL (2006) 945, p. 51. +HUHLQDIWHUµ2¶'RQQHOO³1DPLQJDQG6KDPLQJ´¶ 
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In the final section of the chapter, it will be suggested that ± by elimination ± we have 
arrived at the sorts of fact that can ground a claim to self-defence. These facts, it will 
be argued, are open to ostensive demonstration: They can be tested. This flows from 
the idea that the obverse of the positivity of claims is their criticizability.11 If a state 
wishes to rely on the legitimating properties of collective security system justification, 
such a process must be interactive and not merely rhetorical. The interactivity of the 
process demands that positive statements are open to scrutiny. The process will be 
more-than-merely-rhetorical if these statements are referable to a point of common 
understanding and the commonality of this point can be tested. This approach, like the 
approaches attempting to counter realist criticisms that were critiqued in the preceding 
chapters, is open to the charge of esotericism. However it is argued that there is a 
TXDOLWDWLYH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ DWWHPSWV WR EDVH ODZ¶V IRUFH LQ REMHFWLYLW\ DQG WKH
present aWWHPSWWREDVHODZ¶VIRUFHLQD fluid intersubjectivity because it depends on 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWRUV¶ VRFLDOO\ FRQVWUXFWHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI IDFWV DQG JURXQGHG
because these understandings are less easy to manipulate than understandings about 
norms.12 
 
Owing to the narrow remit of the thesis to provide a theoretical inquiry into the 
matter, no blueprint for an evidence-based approach to evaluation is given. However, 
some ideas about how a communicative process might work are sketched out at the 
end of the chapter. It is argued that inspiration can be taken from the collective 
VHFXULW\V\VWHP¶VFXUUHQWXVHRIIDFW-finding commissions and from bodies such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency which deals with the accuracy of factual 
                                                 
11
 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, T. McCarthy (trans) (1987) Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 178. (Hereinafter, 
µ+DEHUPDVThe Theory of Communicative Action Vol II¶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 See Chapter IV, at pp. 213²220. 
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statements. It is suggested that a fact-finding commission might operate with the 
cooperation and participation of the most affected states to produce a picture of the 
facts of a particular case. It would be important for such a commission to engage 
closely with other evaluative discourses in order to respond to their critical analyses 
of assertions made in the process of redeeming the criticizable validity claim of self-
defence .  
 
In this conception of evidence, it will not be possible to assert a formal definition of 
self-defence which must be substantiated by relevant evidence of facts. This is 
because the aim is to enable evaluators to distinguish valid from invalid claims to 
have used force in self-defence without being unresponsive to changes in the 
perception of security. The definitional approach seems to have been the system 
envisaged by the UN Charter drafters; a claim of self-defence could be evidenced by 
showing that an armed attack had occurred. Owing to a partly self-perpetuating sense 
that a right of self-defence with such limited substance could not protect states ± 
either because the SC did not enforce international peace and security, or because new 
security threats surpassed the old standard of armed attack ± states purported to accrue 
more and more of discretion to interpret article 51 to themselves.13  
 
The 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies of the G.W. Bush Administration in 
the USA combined justifications of justice and efficacy to argue for an uninhibited 
right not only to use force in self-defence, but also to justify force as self-defence. It is 
DUJXHGWKDWZKDWHYHUSODFHLQGLYLGXDOLVPEDVHGRQWKHDELOLW\WRLPSRVHRQH¶VZLOOKDV
in the exercise of self-defence, it has no place in the justification of that violence as 
                                                 
13
 See Chapter I, at p. 37-40. 
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self-defence. This is because while to an extent states can argue that self-defence is a 
matter for the individual nation, it is a contradiction in terms to argue that justifying 
the forms that such protection takes can be done without regard to other international 
actors. Justification does not justify unless it speaks to an audience.  
 
A. Structure of the Chapter. 
 
This chapter does two things. On the one hand, it presents an argument against the 
Bush doctrine of pre-emption. On the other hand, it suggests a way that the collective 
security system could move forward in the evaluation of self-defence claims. These 
two functions are closely linked. The second function seeks a way to balance the 
imperative of flexibility with the danger of exploitation. While the Bush doctrine of 
pre-emption is presented as a flexible response to changing social circumstances, it is 
suspected of being an attempt to exploit, undermine or sideline the UN collective 
security system. 
 
,QWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHUWZRWKHRULHVZHUHLQWURGXFHG7KHILUVWZDV+DEHUPDV¶LGHDRI
communicative action and the second wDV:HQGW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRILQWHU-state relations. 
In this chapter, they will both be used to show that the Bush doctrine of pre-emption 
would have been beyond the limits of evaluation through the process of vindicating a 
criticizable validity claim. The SchmLWWLDQ DSSURDFK WR VRYHUHLJQ VWDWHV¶ ULJKW WR
decide the exception and the Hobbesian enemy relation, both introduced in the last 
chapter, can be used to understand the perspective of the Bush Administration and the 
tenor of their security policy. 
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Both the Schmittian exception and the Hobbesian enemy-relation can be seen as 
facets of the realist motto that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must. 7KH86LVFRPPRQO\KHOGWREHWKHZRUOG¶VVROHVXSHUSRZHUDQG14 on this 
logic, it is in a position to arrogate the ultimate right to use force to itself. The 
Hobbesian enemy-relation is also significant because of the way that it affects the 
threats perceived by a state. The perception of external enemies lays down a 
presumption that threats exist and is therefore incompatible with the idea of external 
constraints on the decision to use force. The perception of enemies means that when 
and where they attack is a matter of probability and risk. This suggests that the best 
way to ensure national security is through the precautionary principle.  
 
Having underlined the point that threats which are pre-empted are based in 
uncertainty, we will then move on to look at some of the ways in which international 
lawyers and states have used facts in attempts to evaluate the use of force. In the first 
part, we will deal with the claim that principles such as proportionality enable states 
to evaluate self-defence claims without committing themselves to certain readings of 
self-defence. It is argued that the principle of proportionality can lead to both 
esotericism and exploitation depending on whether one takes a constrain-view or a 
validation-view of it. This is because the calculation of proportionality depends on 
what one chooses as a referent. 
 
The next part of the chapter deals with intelligence. It is argued that one of the 
consequences of the doctrine of pre-emption is that it makes resort to intelligence 
more likely. This is because, as mentioned above, the risk-approach to national 
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security requires the prediction of outcomes. It is argued that this probabilistic process 
of decision-making is not easily transformed into evidence for the vindication of a 
self-defence claim at the international level. Secondly, it is argued that secret 
intelligence is, of its nature, anathema to the process of evidencing a claim. This is 
because it tends to be exempt from scrutiny. It is stressed that it is not enough to 
allude to facts, facts must be available for collective scrutiny. 
 
In the third part of the chapter, the idea that facts have to be available to collective 
scrutiny is expanded. Having given examples of how facts should not be treated in 
evaluations of self-defence claims, this part of the chapter attempts a rough sketch of 
how they should be treated. It is argued that facts which are capable of ostensive 
demonstration are the least likely to be exploitable and would therefore make a stable 
common platform from which to evaluate a self-defence claim. It is suggested that 
one way of building a collective understanding of facts is to use fact-finding 
commissions. These would operate with the participation of interested parties and 
would respond to the questions of third party evaluators. In this way they would help 
to mediate intersubjective understanding. 
 
B. Uncertain Threats and Hobbesian Decision-Makers. 
 
Realist critics of the collective security system have pointed out that the credibility 
gap between theory and practice enables self-defence to act as a justification for the 
use of force in pursuit of national policy.15 Realist scholars privilege the individual 
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 (J0-*OHQQRQ³7KH)RJof Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the 
8QLWHG1DWLRQV&KDUWHU´Harv. JL&PP (2001-2) 539, p. 540. +HUHLQDIWHUµ*OHQQRQ³7KH)RJ
RI:DU´¶ 
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decision-maker over the system in which he decides;16 using cost-benefit analysis 
they explain apparent phenomena of compliance as cost-effective and point out that in 
situations of extremity ± of which self-defence, by its nature, is characteristic ± states 
are unlikely to make short term concessions to long term collective security.17  
 
In this conception of the subject ± or actor - of collective security, realism coincides 
with voluntarism. It has been VDLG WKDW ³>O@HJDOSRVLWLYLVWVKLVWRULFDOO\SURYLGHG WKH
equivalent of the statist political theories advanced by Jean Bodin and Thomas 
+REEHV´18 This sort of positivist theory prioritises the sovereign state over the 
collective security system because the system exists by dint of the consent of states.19 
In the extremity of self-defence, the sovereign state can simply revoke its consent to 
be bound by the collective security system either because the sovereign has the ability 
to decide the exception, or because the authority of international law flows directly 
from the consent of sovereign states. In either version, the conception of inter-state 
relations is Hobbesian.20 In this conception, the right of self-defence is the exception 
to the collective security system; a residual right that predates the UN Charter and that 
states may resort to self help in lieu of the operation of the collective security 
system.21 
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 See Chapter I, at p. 20. 
17
 M.S. McDougal and F.P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation 
of International Coercion, (1961) New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 67. (Hereinafter, McDougal 
and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order¶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 &&XWOHU³&ULWLFDO5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH:HVWSKDOLDQ Assumptions of International Law and 
2UJDQL]DWLRQ$&ULVLVRI/HJLWLPDF\´Rev. IS (2001) 133, p. 140. 
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 Koskenniemi, From Apology, p. 304. 
20
 See Chapter IV, at p. 238. 
21
 See Chapter II, at p. 110-114. 
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It is said that states can resort to force when it is necessary to do so.22 According to 
(policy) realists this QHFHVVLW\LVSHUFHLYHGE\WKHFODLPDQWDQG³LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKH
SDWWHUQVRIKLVH[SHFWDWLRQV´.23 Such an overtly subjective understanding of necessity 
diminishes the usefulness of justificatory processes; it is unlikely to have much 
redemptive force in the face of contrary views, and it may encourage a claimant state 
to hide behind the formal rule. Others seem to view necessity as an objective fact: In 
DQVZHULQJ)UDQFN¶VFRQFHUQV WKDW the doctrine of pre-HPSWLRQFODLPVD³ULJKW WRXVH
force tRSUHYHQWHYHQDWKUHDWWR86VXSHULRULW\IURPGHYHORSLQJ´, Sofaer says that the 
³WKUHDW´ PXVW EH ³UHDO´.24 However in the absence of an authoritative body with 
compulsory jurisdiction to decide this question, it appears to remain a matter for the 
claimant state to decide the exception. 
 
This individualistic conception of security finds echoes in the semantic shift from 
µthreats¶ to µrisks¶.25 7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHFDVHZKHUHWKH³LQVXUDQFH-EDVHG´FRQFHSW
of risk is used because it is rooted in scientific positivism.26 7KHWHUPµULVN¶LPSOLHV
that a danger can be managed or at least probabilised.27 7KHWHUPµWKUHDW¶RQWKHRWKHU
hand, takes control of the danger away from the endangered state and cedes it to the 
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 See Chapter I, at p. 53. 
23
 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, p. 230.  
24
 $'6RIDHU³3URIHVVRU)UDQFN¶V/DPHQW´(3) Hastings I&CLR (2003/4) 437 p. 440. 
25
 2.HVVOHU³,V5LVN&KDQJLQJWKH3ROLWLFVRI/HJDO$UJXPHQWDWLRQ"´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LJIL (2008) 863, p. 863. 
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+RZHYHUZKLOHWhe 
UK National Security Strategy, Security in an Interdependent World RI0DUFKUHIHUVWR³ULVN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V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6WUDWHJLHVWKHWHQGHQF\WRUHIHUWRWKUHDWVUDWKHUWKDQULVNVLVHYHQPRUHSURQRXQFHG³ULVN´occurs only 
5 timesZKLOH³WKUHDW´ and its derivatives occurs around 50 times.  
26
 Kessler explains that in this conception the calculation of risk is quantitative and involves a 
PHDVXULQJRISUREDELOLW\DQGH[SHFWHGORVV.HVVOHU³,V5LVN&KDQJLQJWKH3ROLWLFVRI/HJDO
$UJXPHQWDWLRQ"´S. +HFLWHV)RXFDXOW¶VSecurity, Territory and Population (2007) Palgrave 
MacMillan, Basingstoke and Hacking¶VThe Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early 
Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (1975) Cambridge University Press for this 
³LQVXUDQFH-EDVHG´FRQFHSWLRQRIULVN 
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 That risk implies management or regulation is clear from the recent Leiden Journal of International 
Law symposium: 21(4) LJIL (2008), pp. 783-884. 
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originator of the threat.28 The implication is of an imposition on the claimant state, of 
something out-of-its-hands. Furthermore, Kessler argues that the doctrine of pre-
HPSWLRQ ³VKLIWHG WKH PRUDOLW\ RI WKH WKUHDW IURP WKH DFWXDO WR WKH SRVVLEOH´29 It is 
submitted that the move to the vocabulary of risk implicitly de-legalises the processes 
of security decision-making and justification because, as risks, the uncertainty of 
threats to international peace and security are a matter for predictive theories of 
international relations. 
 
Uncertainty is endemic in the facts that legal processes, such as evaluation of self-
defence claims, are called on to examine. In this sense the environment in which and 
on which the collective security system operates not only lacks norms, but also 
common facts.30 Uncertainty can encourage states to take a more risk-averse approach 
WR VHFXULW\1DUGLQKDVQRWHG WKHSRWHQWLDORIDQDUFK\ ³WKHDEVHQFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
JRYHUQPHQW´ WR EH D ³IHUWLOH JURXQG«IRU WKH JHUPLQDWLRQ RI PXWXDO IHDU´ DQG
WKHUHIRUHWROHDGWRD+REEHVLDQ³VHFXULW\GLOHPPD´%\WDNLQJVWHSVWRVDIHJXDUGLWV
security, it becomes a security threat to other states.31 Under G.W. Bush the US 
DSSURDFKHGWKLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUV)RUPHU866HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQFH'RQDOG5XPVIHOG¶V
famous treatment of uncertainty is indicative of the importance of uncertainty to US 
policy making.32 It is suggested that the lack of common facts, the siting of security 
dangers in what is not known, intensifies the Hobbesian attitudes of security decision-
makers. 
                                                 
28
 See examples given by Sadurska in ³7KUHDWVRI)RUFH´AJIL (1988) 239, pp. 242-4. 
29
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 Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States, p. 38. 
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 6HH³5XPVIHOGLQKLV2ZQ:RUGV´BBC, 8 November 2006. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6130316.stm  
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As has been asserted, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the former Bush 
AGPLQLVWUDWLRQ UHVSRQGV WR DQ DSSDUHQW ³SURIRXQG WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ´ LQ WKH JOREDO
VHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWE\³DGDSW>LQJ@WKHFRQFHSWRILPPLQHQWWKUHDW´ in the doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defence.33 Following 9/11, many commentators have agreed that µthe 
strategic reality¶ has changed.34 What they tend to disagree about is the ability of the 
UN Charter to accommodate the changes.35 In particular argument is made about the 
FRQWLQXLQJ UHOHYDQFH RI WKH SKUDVH ³DUPHG DWWDFN´ LQ DUWLFOH 36 However, the 
changed strategic environment also adds to the uncertainty states feel with regard to 
their security. This has two facets; owing to the identities and methods of the actors 
perpetrating them, threats to national security can be uncertain in time, place or shape. 
Secondly, in a world that was stunned by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
&HQWUH DQG WKH 3HQWDJRQ LQ  VWDWHV¶ IHHOLQJV RI XQFHUWDLQW\ FDQ construct 
threats.37 9/11 seemed to change the prism through which intelligence data and other 
facts were viewed.38  
 
,WKDVEHHQVDLGWKDWWKHUHDUHWZRDVSHFWVWRZKDWLVNQRZQ7KH³RQWRORJLFDO´DVSHFW
is empirical and relates to what we knowZKLOHWKH³HSLVWHPRORJLFDO´DVSHFWUHODWHVWR
how we know.39 After 9/11 it was the epistemology that changed rather than the 
ontology; what there was to know remained the same, but the techniques by which it 
was known differed and consequently so did the substance of the knowledge. This 
                                                 
33
 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, p. 15. Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf. +HUHLQDIWHUµUS 
National Security Strategy ¶.) 
34
 See Chapter I, at p. 40. 
35
 See e.g. Chapter II, at pp. 106-109. 
36
 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 2nd ed. (2004) Oxford University Press, p. 98. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ*UD\International Law and the Use of Force.) 
37
 To clarify: To hold that a threat is constructed does not necessarily mean that it is illusory. 
38
 .:KLWHODZ³5HPDUNV´ASIL Proc (2004) 156, p. 156. 
39
 Daase and .HVVOHU³.QRZQVDQG8QNQRZQV´, p. 413. 
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point will be dealt with more thoroughly below when the probability of intelligence 
estimates will be examined.40 Suffice it to say for now that the context in which data 
is analysed (interpreted) affects the conclusions that are drawn from such facts as to 
whether an actionable threat exists.41  
 
According to some commentators, ZKHQ LW FRPHV WR QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ ³XQFHUWDLQW\
GULYHV WKHSURFHVV´42 For instance, Amoore says that rather than place limits on the 
XVHIXOQHVV RI ULVN WKH ³VKHHU XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ RU LQFDOFXODELOLW\´ RI VHFXULW\ WKUHDWV
KDYH³PDGHUDGLFDOXQFHUWDLQW\WKHYHU\EDVLVIRUDFWLRQYLDULVNFDOFXODWLRQV´43 In the 
FDVH RI WKH µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ the subjects of security action were outside the 
recognised terms of international of national systems and devastating attacks could be 
launched out of the blue. The logic of the operations RI ³URJXH VWDWHV DQG WKHLU
WHUURULVWFOLHQWV´44 was alien to the system, and the strangeness of their rationales and 
the uncertainty of their future plans could engender fear.45 Wedgwood refers to the 
³XQZRUOGO\PRWLYDWLRQV´RIWHUURUQHWZRUNVDQGWKHKHHGOHVVQHVVRIURJXHVWDWHVWRWKH
wellbeing of their people.46 
 
When fear is apprehended by a society or system that bases its responses on a 
rational-purposive logic of prediction, it is likely to assume the worst. Thus, it has 
EHHQZULWWHQWKDW WKH³FODVVLFFDOFXODWLRQRIULVNVIURPWHUURU«WHQGVWRRYHUHVWLPDWH
                                                 
40
 Infra, at pp. 301-309. 
41
 See Chapter  IV, at p. 209. 
42
 1&&UDZIRUG³7KH)DOVH3URPLVHRI3UHYHQWLYH:DU7KHµ1HZ6HFXULW\&RQVHQVXV¶DQGD0RUH
,QVHFXUH:RUOG´LQ+6KXHDQG'5RGLn (eds), Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification 
(2007) Oxford University Press 89, p. 98+HUHLQDIWHUµ&UDZIRUG³)DOVH3URPLVH´¶ 
43
 /$PRRUH³5LVNEHIRUH-XVWLFH:KHQWKH/DZ&RQWHVWVLWV2ZQ6XVSHQVLRQ´21(4) LJIL (2008) 
847, p. 852. (+HUHLQDIWHUµ$PRRUH³5LVNEHIRUH-XVWLFH´¶ 
44
 US National Security Strategy (2002), pp. 13, 14 and 15. 
45
 See Chapter IV, at p. 241-264. 
46
 5:HGJZRRG³7KH)DOORI6DGGDP+XVVHLQ6HFXULW\&RXQFLO0DQGDWHVDQG3UHHPSWLYH6HOI-
'HIHQVH´AJIL (2003) 576, p. 582 
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DQGWRGUDPDWL]HWHUURU´47 This is because attempting to understand the risk in terms 
of potential lives lost and in terms of the probability that an out-of-the-blue event like 
 ZLOO RFFXU PHDQV ³>W@KH LPSUREDELOLW\ RI WKH ULVN¶V PDQLIHVWDWLRQ EHFRPHV
LUUHOHYDQW DV WKH FRVWV ZRXOG UHDFK LQILQLW\´48 $QRWKHU UHDVRQ LV WKDW ³Ln an 
anarchical order, understanding the intentions and capabilities of other actors has 
DOZD\V EHHQ DQ LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI VWDWHFUDIW´;49 terrorists and rogue states are 
conceived of as irrational,50  which renders their decision-making processes 
unfathomable.  
 
,Q VKRUW WKH FRPSOH[LW\ DQG XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ RI WKH ³VHFXULW\ ODQGVFDSH´51 renders 
knowledge elusive. For similar reasons, several commentators have noted the 
LPSRUWDWLRQ RI HQYLURQPHQWDO ODZ¶V ³SUHFDXWLRQDU\ SULQFLSOH´ LQWR VHFXULW\
discourse.52 The logic of this principle is that uncertainty is no reason for inaction. 
The presumption is that action should be taken and to rebut it requires proof of a 
negative.53 It should be clear that from the perspective of self-defence claim 
evaluation, uncertainty effectively excludes demonstration of a claim. Thus, Lobel 
wrote that in the context of terrorism, US officials have tended to presume that 
                                                 
47
 'DDVHDQG.HVVOHU³.QRZQVDQG8QNQRZQV´S. 
48
 Ibid.; The UK National Security Strategy, Security in an Interdependent World, March 2008 
³DFFHSW>V@WKHQHHGWRJHWEHWWHUDWSUHGLFWLQJIXWXUHWKUHDWV´EXW³UHFRJQLVH>V@WKDWVKRFNVDUH
inHYLWDEOH´S$YDLODEOHDW
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf. (Hereinafter, 
µ8.6WUDWHJ\ Security in an Interdependent World¶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 6&KHVWHUPDQ³7KH6S\:KR&DPHLQIURPWKH&ROG:DU,QWHOOLJHQFHDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´
27(4) Mich JIL (2006) 1071, p. 1076+HUHLQDIWHUµ&KHVWHUPDQ³7KH6S\:KR&DPHLQIURPWKH
&ROG:DU´¶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 $'6RIDHU³On the Necessity of Preemption," 14(2) EJIL (2003) 209, p. +HUHLQDIWHUµSofaer, 
³3UH-HPSWLRQ´¶+HH[SODLQVWKDW³6DGGDP¶VSROLFLHVKDYHQRWEHHQEDVHGRQUDWLRQDOFDOFXODWLRQ´ 
51
 UK Strategy, Security in an Interdependent World, p. 3. 
52
 F. Johns aQG:*:HUQHU³7KH5LVNVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´LJIL (2008) 783, p. 784. 
+HUHLQDIWHUµ-RKQVDQG:HUQHU³7KH5LVNVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´¶/$PRRUH³5LVNEHIRUH
-XVWLFH´SFLWLQJ56XVNLQGThe One Percent Doctrine 58UXHxD³5isk and 
5DQGRPQHVVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO$UJXPHQWDWLRQ´LJIL (2008) 787, p. 809. 
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 It is possible to see Operation Iraqi Freedom in this light. 
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evidentiary standards can be watered down.54 To state the obvious, it might be said 
that the evidenceability of a threat lies in direct proportion to its materiality, and this 
materiality is often a function of the passage of time. 
 
The doctrine of pre-emption relies on assessments of what the future will hold.55 This 
is problematic because assessments of what will be the case in the future depend 
heavily on epistemological techniques to generate knowledge because of the lack of 
empirical data available. ,WKDVEHHQZULWWHQWKDW³SUHGLFWLRQVWKDWYLROHQFHPD\RFFXU
are generally more subject to bias and error than observations that it is already 
RFFXUULQJ´56 This is not because its system of prediction demonstrates the likelihood 
of devastating attack, but because the system of prediction is in the dark. This means 
that mistakes can be made. It also means, to the extent that techniques of prediction 
invoke the legitimacy of science, that probabilistic assessments can be exploited to 
legitimate claims. 
 
It has been ZULWWHQWKDW³WKHDUWLFOHUHTXLUHPHQWRIDQRQJRLQJDUPHGDWWDFNVHUYHV
as a restraint against uses of force based on pretext, misunderstanding and erroneous 
IDFWXDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQV´57 It is hard to see how a permanent or future threat might play 
DVLPLODUUROH³$IDWDOIODZLQWKHFR-called doctrine of preventive self-defence is that 
it excludes by definition any possibility of an ex post facto judgment of lawfulness by 
the very fact that it aims to deal in advance with threats that have not yet 
                                                 
54
 - /REHO ³7KH 8VH RI )RUFH WR 5HVSRQG WR 7HUURULVW $WWDFNV 7KH %RPELQJ RI 6XGDQ DQG
$IJKDQLVWDQ´) YJIL (1999) 537, p. 548. +HUHLQDIWHU µ/REHO ³7KH8VHRI)RUFH WR5HVSRQG WR
7HUURULVW$WWDFNV´¶ 
55
 .HVVOHU³,V5LVN&KDQJLQJWKH3ROLWLFVRI/HJDO$UJXPHQWDWLRQ"´S. 
56
 A. Buchanan and R.O. .HRKDQH³7KH3UHYHQWLYH8VHRI)RUFH$&RVPRSROLWDQInstitutional 
3URSRVDO´ 18(1) Ethics & Int. Affs. (2004) 1, p. 9+HUHLQDIWHUµ%XFKDQDQDQG.HRKDQH³7KH
3UHYHQWLYH8VHRI)RUFH´¶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 /REHO³7KH8VHRI)RUFHWR5HVSRQGWR7HUURULVW$WWDFNV´S. 
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PDWHULDOLVHG´58 However it may be that as long as little pressure is put on a state to 
explain itself, the option of claiming an international legal justification without having 
participated in international legal processes remains attractive for many states. 
 
In the face of such analyses, it is not hard to see how the doctrine of pre-emption may 
appear reasonable from the perspective of certain states. Crawford has explained that 
³>W@KHFRQWHQWRIWKHQRw dominant international security imaginary is the Hobbesian 
QLJKWPDUH´59 It should not be supposed that the Hobbesian tendencies visible in the 
Bush Administration are limited to it. Lobel says that the Clinton Administration, like 
WKDWRI5HDJDQKDV D ³willingness to use military might before the facts have been 
HVWDEOLVKHG´60 The costly new strategic environment has also brought with it benefits, 
however. The right to pre-HPSW³VXIILFLHQWWKUHDWV´LVFLUFXPVFULEHGE\WKHFDYHDW³LI
QHFHVVDU\´61 The evaluation of whether armed action is necessary is left to the 
claimant state, as it is in most exercises of self-defence.62  
 
However, unlike most cases of self-defence, this national evaluation does not then 
become susceptible to international evaluation; in effect the national claim and the 
international decision are telescoped because the exceptionality of pre-emption puts it 
outside the system.63 Secondly, owing to the uncertainty of the threats which it 
counters, pre-emptive force is unlikely to be based on incontrovertible evidence.64  
Finally, the seriousness of the potential threat gives states the opportunity to withhold 
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 :LOPVKXUVW³7KH&KDWKDP+RXVH3ULQFLSOHV´S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 &UDZIRUG³)DOVH3URPLVH´, p. 115. 
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 US National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15. 
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evidence from those evaluating their claims because of the sensitivity of 
intelligence.65 This gives states a blank cheque with which to redeem their self-
defence claims. It will be argued in this vein that the key distinction between 
decision-making and decision-justification is mirrored in the difference between 
intelligence and evidence: The latter presupposes an audience and the former does 
not.  
 
It is to be emphasised that the doctrine of pre-emption needs to be read in the context 
RIWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHFXUUHQWVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWDVDZKROH
A necessary implication of pre-emption is that it is difficult to evidence, but ± in the 
FRQWH[W RI WKH µ:DU RQ 7HUURU¶ - the obligation on a state to evidence anything is 
displaced. Firstly, this is because a context of war is an exceptional state of affairs.66 
Thus Anghie suggests that the doctrine of pre-emption is reminiscent of the system 
that existed between European states in the late nineteenth century; that the 
declaration of war was the ultimate prerogative of the sovereign.67 Secondly this is 
because the use of force in war is governed by a different legal regime.  
 
As to the first point, this US justification for withdrawing from the Nicaragua 
proceedings is informative. It was argued, inter alia, that evidence in an on-going 
conflict could jeopardise US sources.68 As to the second point, questions about the 
validity of uses of force can be dealt with by the ius in bello, a pragmatic body of law 
that seeks to regulate armed violence rather than to prevent it. For instance, referring 
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 R. :HGJZRRG³5HVSRQGLQJWR7HUURULVP7KH6WULNHVDJDLQVWELQ/DGHQ´ 24(2) YJIL (1999) 559. 
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to /REHO¶V FRQFHUQV DERXW HYLGHQFH LQ 2SHUDWLRQ ,QILQLWH 5HDFK (OIR), Wedgwood 
wrote that ³>W@KH VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW PLOLWDU\ WDUJHWLQJ GHFLVLRQV VKRXOG H[ DQWH RU H[
SRVWDOZD\VEHVXEMHFWWRWKHUHYLHZRIDPXOWLODWHUDOERG\LVVLPSO\XQUHDOLVWLF´ She 
also implied WKDWLQDVLWXDWLRQRI³ZDU´WKHFRVW-benefit analysis will never prefer the 
intelligence-sharing option.69 War is characterised by isolationism, urgency and 
anomia; it is no surprise that Hobbes characterised his anarchy as war ³RIHYHU\PDQ
DJDLQVW HYHU\PDQ´70 The designation of a state of affairs as war also confuses the 
issue as regards the operative legal regime. It is hard to disagree with Wedgwood 
insofar as the strike on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant could be seen as a targeting 
decision for the ius in bello, rather than a policy decision for the ius ad bellum. On the 
other hand, it is hard to see why Operation Infinite Reach should have been taken as 
tactical rather than a policy decision.71  
 
This section aimed to show that the Bush doctrine of pre-emption not only had 
consequences for when force can be used, but also for when uses of force could be 
evaluated. It was suggested that for various factors relating to the exceptionality of 
DUPHG YLROHQFH WKH XQFHUWDLQW\ RI WRGD\¶V VHFXULW\ WKUHDWV DQG PHWKRGRORJLFDO
attempts to quantify them using risk analysis, collective security system evaluation of 
claims to have used force in self-defence are excluded. In the next section it will be 
shown that some of the same features apply to propositions that self-defence claims 
should be evaluated according to their proportionality. This principle relies on 
findings of fact to be applied and is interesting because it is invoked by formalists and 
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realists alike. It is preferred to armed attack because it is far more flexible; rather than 
refuse states the right to counter threats that do not take the form of an armed attack, 
the proportionality principle enjoins states simply to tailor their responses to the 
threat. However, it is worth noting that this implies, inter alia, that the size and shape 
of the threat must be knowable. 
 
PART ONE: A COMMON STANDARD OF PROPORTIONALITY?  
 
A. Flexible Standards not Rigid Rules. 
 
Previously in the thesis, it has been written that some supporters of the Bush doctrine 
preferred flexible standards over rigid rules.72 They took inspiration from older 
theories that WKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIDQ³DUPHGDWWDFN´is ³DWUDSIRUWKH
LQQRFHQW DQG D VLJQSRVW IRU WKH JXLOW\´73 The argument was that specific rules are 
inflexible and can be either over- or under-inclusive, while broad principles can 
accommodate the justice of the case because they give appliers more discretion to 
react to the facts of particular cases.74 We will now look more closely at the 
implications of such theories.  
 
Such writers argue that the relatively rigid rules of doctrine can be managed or even 
replaced by more flexible principles.  However, as Thomas Franck showed in his 
FRPSDULVRQ EHWZHHQ ³LGLRW´ DQG ³VRSKLVW´ UXOHV FRPSOH[ QRUPV WKDW JLYH D EURDG
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discretion to the evaluator require sophisticated machinery for their application.75 It is 
unsurprising that the move to flexible standards has drawn objections from those 
fearing the law could be used as a pretext for aggression.76 The concern is still more 
SUHVVLQJZKHUHWKHLQGLYLGXDOSHUVSHFWLYHLQTXHVWLRQLVWKDWRIWRGD\¶VPRVWSRwerful 
VWDWH,Q*OHQQRQ¶VYLHZ the US is moving towards a new paradigm of the legal rule. 
Apparently, this is because the US views categories and rules as flexible and 
adaptable so that they can be the subject of cost-benefit analysis and resource 
balancing operations.77  
 
Appeal to case by case analysis guided by flexible principles,78 implies the use of 
µREMHFWLYH¶IDFWWRSDYHRYHUWKHVXEMHFWLYLW\RIQRUPV7KHGLVFXVVLRQEHJLQVWRORRN
like a cat-and-mouse game between facts and ideas; the justification of one requires 
resort to the other.79 In order to prevent the right of pre-emptive self-defence from 
being easily abused, it has been circumscribed by some writers who have broken 
down what it may mean that the US will act pre-HPSWLYHO\³LIQHFHVVDU\´80 6RIDHU¶V
relevant factors are; the nature and magnitude of the threat faced, the likelihood that 
the threat will be realised notwithstanding preventive action, the exhaustion of 
alternatives to the use of force and consistency with the UN Charter and other 
international agreements.81 Similarly, Yoo uses the probability of an attack, the 
existence of a window of opportunity and the magnitude of the harm.82  
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 T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) Oxford University Press, Chapters V 
and VI pp. 67-90. 
76
 E.g. M. Bothe, ³7HUURULVPDQGWKH/HJDOLW\RI3UH-HPSWLYH)RUFH´EJIL (2003) 227. 
77
 0-*OHQQRQ³7KH(PHUJLQJ8VH-of-)RUFH3DUDGLJP´JCSL (2006) 309 p. 313. 
78
 6RIDHU³3UH-HPSWLRQ´, p. 213. 
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According to Sofaer without such safeguards, pre-HPSWLRQ ³would allow a state to 
attempt to ensure its RZQVHFXULW\E\DWWDFNLQJVWDWHVZLWKRXWSURRI´RIDQ\DWWDFNRU
its preparation.83 A similar impetus can be seen in the rationale of Yoo for this 
SURSRVDO ³>L@W SHUPLWV PRUH LQIRUPDWLRQ WR EH EURXJKW WR WKH GHFLVLRQ WKURXJK WKH
analysis of probability and PDJQLWXGHRIKDUP´84 The key point is that the process of 
bringing and presenting the information for collective scrutiny cannot be taken for 
granted. Later in the chapter we will consider the matter of probability in more detail. 
For the present, let it be noted that both Sofaer and Yoo both employ criteria that 
appear to refer to the world of fact but that in effect rely on the subjective perceptions 
of the interpreter. 
 
The principles of necessity and proportionality are arguably the most well-known 
altHUQDWLYHVWRµDUPHGDWWDFN¶$OWKRXJKWKHUHDUHWKRVHZKRDUJXHWKDW the principles 
have been wrongly excluded from the public policy debate about the use of force in 
foreign affairs,85 necessity and proportionality are said by many academics to 
condition the use of force in self-defence.86 The principles are used by realist and 
doctrinal writers alike because while they can be shown to satisfy the doctrine of 
sources, they are also flexible enough to respond to social change. They are said to 
have originated in the Caroline case87 ZKLFK *UD\ VD\V KDV DWWDLQHG ³P\VWLFDO
DXWKRULW\´88 More recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed their 
continued relevance to self-defence after 1945 as part of customary international 
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law.89 Indeed, Gray writes that state practice casts WKHSULQFLSOHVDV³WKHonly IDFWRUV´
relevant to validity.90  
 
However, their application ± owing to the lack of both consistency and a doctrine of 
precedent ± tends to be more realist than doctrinal because ³TXHVWLRQVRIQHFHVVLW\Dnd 
SURSRUWLRQDOLW\DUHGHSHQGHQWRQWKHIDFWVRIWKHSDUWLFXODUFDVH´91 Franck has stated 
WKDW³>Y@DJXHSULQFLSOHV«WHQGWRLQYLWHVFRIIODZU\´92 This need not be a problem if, 
as Gray assumes, WKHUHLV³XQLYHUVDODJUHHPHQW´about the facts.93 There is little inter-
state discussion of these principles in doctrinal terms; rather they are applied in 
VSHFLILF FDVHV EHFDXVH WKH TXHVWLRQ ³LV DOPRVW H[FOXVLYHO\ RQH RI IDFW´ eschewing 
doctrinal questions that might engender expectations of consistent application in the 
future.94 It is argued that in themselves necessity and proportionality mean very little 
and that once a scholar begins to elaborate on them, their advantages of flexibility are 
lost.  
 
While on the surface it seems that necessity and proportionality figure heavily in state 
practice, we might question how useful the principles prove as a means of critiquing 
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or vindicating self-defence claims. Gardam has warned WKDW ³QHFHVVLW\ DQG
proportionality played no real role in debates over the legitimacy of the uVHRIIRUFH´
EXWUDWKHUWKDW WKH\³ZHUHUHIHUUHGWRDOPRVWDVDQLQFDQWDWLRQ´ If the principles are 
merely alluded to and not substantiated on the facts of a particular case, this suggests 
that they are not being evidenced properly. The superficial consensus therefore seems 
misleading because the principles are hollow; particularly because although the ICJ 
has mentioned them it has never really considered them in detail.95 Owing to the 
thinness of the principles, it is submitted that there is a danger that they may be 
exploited to garnish self-defence claims. This is because they can be seen in a 
rational-instrumentalist light; where the ends justify the means, the ultimate end of 
protecting the nation can render almost any action necessary, particularly in 
conditions of uncertainty.96  
 
The principle of proportionality will be taken as an illustration of the problems of 
using flexible standards. Franck admits that since proportionality has not been 
GHILQHG ³>W@KLV REVFXULW\ FDQXQGHUPLQH LWV FUHGLELOLW\´97 It will be argued that the 
proportionality of a given use of force is not an objective measurement. This is 
because it depends on putting the force purportedly used in self-defence in a relation 
with another factor. The identity of this other factor differs according to whether one 
takes a broad approach to the right of self-defence where proportionality is judged 
IURP WKH FODLPDQW VWDWH¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RU D QDUURZ DSSURDFK ZKHUH WKH MXGJPHQW LV
made from the system perspective. These will be known as the validation-view and 
the constraint-view, respectively. Although judgments about proportionality cannot be 
made without reference to the facts, it is not an objective standard. This is because the 
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choice of matrix within which to make the calculation of proportionality affects the 
choice of relevant facts and the weight that will be assigned to them. 
 
B.  Proportionality. 
 
The principle of proportionality will be examined as an illustration of the problems of 
a merely allusive approach to facts; where facts are invoked but not examined. The 
proportionality principle is said to stem from the decentralised nature of the response 
to wrongful conduct between states.98 One disadvantage attendant on the 
advantageous flexibility of the principle of proportionality is that it can lack either 
critical bite or persuasive potential. Arguments are made against those who assume 
that because proportionality appears as prima facie a matter of fact, it acquires 
determinacy on the facts of each case. Another problem with proportionality is that it 
describes the state of one thing relative to another. This means that writers must 
decide on what is held to be proportionate to what. For instance, whether a use of 
force is proportionate will depend on whether it is judged according to the amount of 
force necessary to repel an attack, to the harm actually caused by the threat, or to the 
potential harm that could have been caused by it.  
 
On this view, the principle has its limits: If a claim of pre-emptive self-defence were 
to be judged according to proportionality, it is submitted that such facts would be 
lacking because proportionality would have to be measured according to an 
immaterialised threat. However, the principle of proportionality can also be measured 
according to the positive aims of the claimant state; for instance, to ensure national 
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security. On this view, the doctrine of pre-emption could be viewed as proportionate. 
)UDQFN KDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW LQ WKH ³SULPLWLYH´ VRFLHW\ RI WKH VWDWHV ³SURSRUWLRQDOLW\
assumes a central role, both permitting and limiting discretionary reprisal and other 
FRXQWHUPHDVXUHV´ WKDW ILOO WKH YRLG OHIW E\ ODFN RI FHQWUDOLVHG HQIRUFHPHQW99 It is 
therefore argued that proportionality can be exploited by states and does not yield a 
single authoritative answer when applied to the facts. 
 
Proportionality is used by both doctrinal and realist writers.100 According to Gardam, 
although the law on the use of force is plagued by controversy and disagreement, 
WKHUH LV ³XQDQLPRXV DJUHHPHQW RQ WKH QHHG IRU WKH IRUFHIXl action to be 
SURSRUWLRQDWH´101 Apparently tKLV LV EHFDXVH RI ³LWV QHXWUDO UROH LQ WKH FRQWHQWLRXV
WDVN RI GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI WKH JURXQGV IRU UHVRUWLQJ WR IRUFH´102 Its 
interpretation tends to be a function of whether the system perspective or the 
individual state perspective is taken. Thus, it will be seen either as validating, or as 
FRQVWUDLQLQJVWDWHV¶H[HUFLVHRIVHOI-defence. The constraint view tends to characterise 
proportionality as a secondary consideration that may invalidate a prima facie valid 
claim to have used force in self-defence if a state uses excessive means to repel an 
(imminent) armed attack;103 proportionality is contextualised by the Charter and the 
DUWLFOH  FRQGLWLRQ RI DQ µDUPHG DWWDFN¶. In contrast, the validation view sees 
proportionality through the prism of just war theory; in this case proportionality can 
be judged according to the importance of the ends pursued. The validation view is so-
called because it also involves the idea that proportionality is (among) the primary 
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standards against which the validity of a use of force is judged, it would therefore 
provide a means of validating pre-emptive self-defence claims.  
 
The argument will be made that although many writers point to the unusual degree of 
consensus over the applicability of proportionality,104 the principle is not necessarily a 
useful, non-exploitable means of distinguishing valid from invalid claims of self-
defence because of the indeterminacy caused by its contested character. This is not 
merely academic pedantry: The readings of proportionality are contested by states as 
well as writers. Thus Gardam compares the approaches of Iran and the US in the Oil 
Platforms case; Iran had taken the constraint-view while the US argued from 
validation that it was entitled to remove continuing threats to its security.105 This tends 
to show how proportionality can fail to provide a useful common point of reference 
according to which valid from invalid claims to have used force in self-defence can be 
distinguished. 
 
Writers differ over the requirements of proportionality, but in large part they seem to 
agree that there must be a threat that action taken in self-defence is proportionate to. 
Koskenniemi writes that an assessment of proportionality ZRXOG LQFOXGH ³the 
foreseeable consequences of a strike, the types of weapon employed, the gravity and 
IRUHVHHDELOLW\RIWKHWKUHDW«WKHWLPLQJRIWKHVWULNHWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHWDUJHW«ZKDW
other means are available, and the costs or consequences of non-XVH´106 On this view, 
almost none of these factors could be evidenced in the case of pre-emption of an 
embryonic threat ZKHUH³XQFHUWDLQW\UHPDLQVDVWRWKHWLPHDQGSODFHRIWKHHQHP\¶V
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DWWDFN´107  Gardam also notes that the delimitation of the threat that is required for the 
calculation oIWKHQHFHVVLW\RIWKHIRUFLEOHUHVSRQVHLVSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVH³WKHUHPD\
still remain a great deal of uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the threat, a state 
RIDIIDLUVWKDWZLOOQRWIDFLOLWDWHWKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHHTXDWLRQ´108  
 
While states, like Israel, have attempted to infer the size of the threat from the posture 
of the target state,109 it is submitted that it is not enough to use indirect evidence from 
which to infer the threat. Relying on the demonstration of an animus belligerendi in 
the target state is extremely problematic because intentions are not easy to prove.110 
Thus 2¶&RQQHOO VD\V WKDW ³>W@he law should require that inferences be drawn from 
REMHFWLYH IDFWV RQO\´111 In effect this would rule out the role of intention in the 
designation of the size of the threat faced by a claimant state.    
 
Approaches based on the constraint view are likely to lead to opposite conclusions to 
approaches based on the validation view. As for the constraint view, the ICJ has 
affirmed the place of necessity and proportionality in the evaluation of self-defence 
claims several times.112 Its position is that self-GHIHQFH DOORZV³measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it´113 This clearly 
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contextualises proportionality within the Charter114 and limits it to the repulsion of an 
armed attack. Accordingly it would be difficult to extend the rationale to cover pre-
emptive force because there would as yet be no attack to repel.  This may render the 
constraint-view esoteric because it ties proportionality too closely to the existence of 
an armed attack, thus recapitulating the perceived problems of article 51. The benefits 
of proportionality as a flexible standard rather than a rigid rule, are not available 
where proportionality is a secondary factor which can only invalidate a claim.  
 
Thus, the relationship between constraint-view proportionality and the facts of the 
case it relates to is established in the abstract because the measurement need only be 
made once it has been established that the use of force was in response to an 
(imminent) armed attack.115 %URZQOLH¶VH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHVLWXDWLRQLVLQVWUXFWLYH 
 
It is possible that in a very limited number of situations force might be a 
reaction proportionate to the danger where there is unequivocal evidence of an 
intention to launch a devastating attack almost immediately. However in the 
great majority of cases to commit a State to an actual conflict when there is only 
circumstantial evidence of impending attack would be to act in a manner which 
disregarded the requirement of proportionality.116 
 
The implication of this is that where a threat is emergent and not yet temporally 
imminent, it is unlikely that evidence will exist according to which it could be 
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calculated what sort of use of force, if any, would be needed to allay the threat.117 It is 
suggested that the constraint-view of proportionality can be seen as part of what might 
be called a minimising approach to the use of force.118 This can seem to render the 
law esoteric because proportionality, on this view, is not responsive to changing social 
circumstances or novel situations. Instead, it is tied to the occurrence of an armed 
attack.  
 
Despite these limitations, the constraint approach can still give rise to ambiguity. For 
instance, what is the position as regards a pattern of pin-prick attacks? The US and 
Israel have both appeared to argue that proportionality should be measured against the 
³DFFXPXODWLRQ RI HYHQWV´119 While some scholars have dismissed this approach as 
tantamount to reprisal,120 it is said that there does not appear to be stable agreement 
between states as to whether the accumulation of events argument is acceptable or 
not.121 The US Operation Eldorado Canyon against Libya in 1986 was reported to the 
Security Council (SC) under article 51 of the Charter. The right of self-defence was 
LQYRNHGWRUHVSRQG³WRDQRQJRLQJSDWWHUQRIDWWDFNVE\WKH*RYHUQPHQWRI/LE\D´122 
The SC is said to have rejected this justification.123 It did not reject a similar 
justification made by the US of Operation Enduring Freedom where potential future 
attacks deflected the charge of reprisal, but their connection with the destruction of 
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the World Trade Centre made them appear material rather than embryonic.124 
Foreshadowing this, Greenwood had suggested that the SC was wrong to reject the 
accumulation of events thesis and suggests that in the case of modern day terrorism it 
is more sensible to measure the proportionality of a defensive response against the 
accumulated raids and not every particular one.125  
 
Contrary to this limited view of proportionality is the validation approach. According 
to scholars who wish to take a more flexible approach to the validation of claims to 
have used force in self-defence, the validity of an exercise would not be dependent on 
the occurrence or imminence of an armed attack. This is because, they argue, the 
current security environment contains threats that are too large and too unpredictable 
to wait for. The logic of this approach is teleological; the proportionality of the means 
is to be judged by the importance of the ends sought. This has been called an 
µDEVROXWH¶DSSURDFKWRSURSRUWLRQDOLW\WKDWPD\KDYHWKHHIIHFWRIDOORZLQJ³responses 
>WKDW@JUHDWO\H[FHHG>«] the magQLWXGHRIWKHRULJLQDOEUHDFK´126  
 
There are, indubitably, cases in which the validation approach over-laps with the 
constraint approach. For instance, where the aim happens to be the repulsion of an on-
going attack or the quashing of an incipient attack: In these sorts of cases, the 
validation approach to proportionality operates in a similar way to the constraint-
approach because in such cases the size and character of the threat faced is 
demonstrable. However in the new strategic environment where uncertainty 
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characterises threats to security,127 Reisman and Armstrong rightly point out that with 
pre-HPSWLRQ ³>W@he nature and quantum of evidence that can satisfy the burden of 
proof resting on the unilateralist becomes less and less defined and is often, by the 
YHU\QDWXUHRIWKLQJVH[WUDSRODWLYHDQGVSHFXODWLYH´.128 If proportionality is judged in 
terms of ending uncertainty anything, beyond regime change, becomes an option. 
 
The application of the principle of proportionality is where the danger lies. Gardam 
points out that ³>S@URSRUWLRQDOLW\LVDFRPSOH[FRQFHSWWR DSSO\LQSDUWLFXODUFDVHV´129 
This is because self-defence situations are complicated and the distillation of their 
pertinent facts into a workable shape involves selections and preferences that affect 
the perception of the situation. It is submitted that Sofaer¶V argument that evaluations 
of pre-emptive self-defence should take place on a case-by-case basis according to 
ZKDWLV³QHFHVVDU\LQWKHUHOHYDQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV´130 is fundamentally undermined by 
WKHFRPSOH[LW\RIVXFK³UHOHYDQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV´ 
 
Furthermore, the workability of a distinction between valid and invalid uses of force 
in self-defence based on proportionality, will open the door to exploitation to the 
H[WHQW WKDW WKH ³UHOHYDQW FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ DUHQRW PDGHSXEOLF Greenwood has noted 
that evaluating the calculation of proportionality in the context of anticipatory force is 
problematic because the intelligence on which such a calculation is based is often 
XQGLVFORVHG7KXV³>W@KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDVUHIXVHGWRPDNHSXEOLFWKH
details of the terrorist attacks which it claimed Libya was about to carry out. While 
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this refusal is perfectly understandable in view of the need to protect intelligence 
sources, it makes it impossible to determine whether the air strike satisfied the 
requiremHQW RI SURSRUWLRQDOLW\´131 This key point will be discussed in more detail 
below.132 Suffice it to say that unwillingness to share intelligence implies that the 
evaluation of a self-defence claim is ultimately for the state using force. 
 
If the measure against which proportionality is calculated is flexible rather than fixed 
at armed attack, the potential of self-defence to justify uses of force is greater. The 
constraint-approach allows proportionality to limit the means used because the end is 
fixed and narrow, but the validation view subordinates the means used to the ends 
sought. In the US NSS the ends of an exercise of self-defence are the protection of 
³the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad´.133 
These ends are positive rather than negative like the aim of repulsion and they are also 
very broad. Accordingly, the US reserves the right to respond to threats with 
³RYHUZKHOPLQJIRUFH´134  
 
This shows how the validation-view of proportionality is to be read with the proactive 
approach to the use of force: Rather than force being used as little as possible, such a 
view encourages an active pursuit of situations in which force could be used.135 Thus 
where a risk-averse government takes action to pre-empt an emergent threat, the 
details of which are sketchy, proportionality would be measured in the light of the 
importance of protecting the US and its citizens. Thus iQ <RR¶V FRQFHSWLRQ
                                                 
131
 *UHHQZRRG³$LU2SHUDWLRQ$JDLQVW/LE\D´S. 
132
 Infra, at pp. 293-301. 
133
 US National Security Strategy (2002) p. 6. 
134
 US National  Security Strategy (2006), p. 22. 
135
 The assumption underlying this is that a use of force is always the most effective means of 
safeguarding national security. 
288  
³>S@URSRUWLRQDOLW\ DVNV ZKHWKHU WKH FRVWV RI WKH SUH-emptive use of force are 
outweighed by the proEDELOLW\RIWKHDWWDFNDQGPDJQLWXGHRILWVKDUP´+Hsuggests 
that a state may minimise collateral damage by striking earlier.136 This was one of the 
arguments of Israel in its bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor.137 
 
The validation-view is connected to theories of just war. According to Gardam just 
ZDUVFKRODUV³KDYHFRQVLVWHQWO\IRFXVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDOLW\DVDFRPSRQHQWRIWKHius 
ad bellum´138 The normative framework which anchors such proportionality gives a 
broad discretion to states in determining the existence of a just cause. This emphasises 
that proportionality is to be judged according to positive ends sought and not 
according to a negative factor such as the repulsion of an armed attack. It has been 
suggested that WKH ³SUDFWLFH RI VWDWHV LQ >WKH UHFent Gulf conflict] reveals that the 
OHJDOLW\RIDVWDWH¶VUHVRUWWRIRUFHKDVDVXEWOHLPSDFWRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQE\WKDWVWDWH
RIWKHPHDQVWKDWFDQOHJLWLPDWHO\EHXVHGWRDFKLHYHLWVJRDO´139 Gardam notes that 
³LW FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW WR WUDQVSRVH WKH FRPSOHxity and overt subjectivity of the 
EDODQFLQJSURFHVVLQMXVWZDUWKHRU\LQWRDOHJDOUHJLPHLVXQZRUNDEOH´140  
 
The operation of proportionality in a just war matrix would depend on a widespread 
sharing of moral values. This is highlighted by McDougal and Feliciano who suggest 
that just war doctrine fell out of fashion when the centralising authority of Rome was 
diminished.141 The doctrine of sovereign equality would have meant that conflicts of 
opinion as to the justice of a cause would have ended in stalemate. During the 
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nineteenth century, when war was used as an instrument of national policy, it was not 
used.142 It is suggested that a just-war dependent concept of proportionality would be 
subject to exploitation. Thus Gardam complains that as far as self-defence is 
concerned, SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ ³VHUYHV DV D UKHWRULFDO WRRO WR VXSSRUW ZKDWHYHU YLHZ LV
WDNHQDVWRWKHPRUDOLW\RIDSDUWLFXODUXVHRIIRUFH´143 
 
The principle of proportionality is not only potentially exploitable because it can be 
interpreted broadly. The exploitability of the principle is intensified by its appearance 
in two separate bodies of law: The ius in bello and the ius ad bellum. The difference 
in treatment of proportionality even in doctrinal approaches to law is marked. 
Proportionality in the ius ad bellum is said to have two roles; signalling both when 
force can be used and how much is permitted.144 In the ius in bello proportionality 
balances military advantage and humanitarian concerns.145 Insofar as proportionality 
is an on-going measurement rather than a one-off assessment, it is easy to see how 
these might be confused,146 particularly in the context of the so-FDOOHG µ:DU RQ
7HUURU¶ The proportionality requirement in the ius in bello is the more permissive; it 
is not restricted to the restoration of the status quo ante. Once hostilities have started, 
the ius in bello has to take account of the objective of both belligerents to win.147 The 
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ius in bello proportionality takes account of the positive ambitions of states and not 
just the negative repulsion of an armed attack.  
 
It has been said that the line separating these two conceptions of proportionality 
³WHQGV WR EOXU LQ SUDFWLFH´148 )RU LQVWDQFH :HGJZRRG KDV ZULWWHQ WKDW ³>V@trategic 
proportionality asks that civilian causalities be weighed against the justification for 
XVLQJIRUFH LQ WKH ILUVWSODFH´149 This is problematic because it can lead to the case 
where a state can validate its use of force as self-defence on the grounds that the 
number of (target state) civilians killed did not outweigh the number of claimant state 
citizens which might otherwise have been harmed. The use of ius in bello 
proportionality to evaluate uses of force in self-defence effectively lowers the 
standard of validity for uses of force. This is because while the ius ad bellum seeks to 
minimise resort to force, the ius in bello seeks to regulate it. This implies that it 
accepts the resort to force. 
 
This section of the thesis has attempted to show that the principle of proportionality is 
capable of supporting both narrow and broad conceptions of self-defence. The 
constraint and validation views of proportionality take differing perspectives on 
proportionality and consequently measure the proportionality of self-defence against 
different referents. It was said that the constraint view of proportionality tends to 
recapitulate rather than adapt the narrow article 51 approach to self-defence. On the 
other hand, the validation view showed the ways in which a flexible standard such as 
proportionality can be exploited by states to validate their claims of self-defence. The 
ambiguity of the principle can be resolved by placing it within a frame of reference, 
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for instance the ius in bello or the new strategic reality where the attitudes of states 
can be characterised as Hobbesian. This can enable proportionality to be measured 
without the existence of a concrete threat to national security but instead according to 
concrete aims. 
 
This means that while facts are not incapable of distinguishing valid from invalid uses 
of force in self-defence, evaluators must share the same frame of reference.150 This is 
problematic where self-defence is concerned because, as Franck points out, in self-
defence contexts both sides tend to claim self-defence.151 6WDWHV¶ TXDOPV DERXW RU
objections to, self-defence claims will remain as a disruptive force in the collective 
security system unless they are dealt with either by coercion or by a more detailed 
process of vindication which could create new understanding of what occurred in a 
given situation. This thesis takes the position that the creation of new understandings 
is a preferable process to coercion. The next section will focus on ways in which 
processes of understanding-creation have been over-looked on the grounds that facts 
µVSHDNIRUWKHPVHOYHV¶ 
 
PART TWO: REDEMPTION THROUGH INTELLIGENCE? 
 
We will now turn to look at the role that intelligence plays in the vindication of claims 
to have used force in self-defence. It will be argued that the use of intelligence is 
problematic for several reasons. Although it alludes to facts and to the objective 
world, intelligence, of itself, cannot vindicate claims to have used force in self-
defence. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, the nature of intelligence is not 
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compatible with an open approach to communication; sources must be protected and 
intelligence sharing is limited to tight alliances. Secondly, intelligence produces 
estimates and not proof. Its goal is often to foretell what will happen rather than to 
establish what has happened.  
 
Intelligence was at the centre of the national security strategies of the UK and the 
US.152 Its usefulness in determining the existence of threats to national security is 
particularly useful with regard to the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) by rogue states.153 Intelligence is, inter alia, crucial to the operation of the 
doctrine of pre-emption. This is because intelligence not only deals with past and 
present facts, but also with future ones.154 In the second section of this part the place 
of probability in the vindication of self-defence claims will be questioned. In the first 
section, the unavailability of intelligence to scrutiny will be examined. It will be 
argued that each of these factors prevent any direct analogy between intelligence and 
evidence.  
 
The US National Intelligence Council has stated that intelligence is not about proof: 
³DVVHVVPHQWV DQG MXGJPHQWV DUH QRW LQWHQGHG WR LPSO\ WKDW ZH KDYH ³SURRI´ WKDW
VKRZVVRPHWKLQJWREHDIDFWRUWKDWGHILQLWLYHO\OLQNVWZRLWHPVRULVVXHV´ Instead, 
they have underlined that intelligence analyses are intended to guide decision-
makers.155 However this has not stopped the products of intelligence being 
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increasingly invoked in international forums.156 The idea that the positive force of 
claims implies their availability for critique is central to this section of the chapter, as 
is the related idea that justification implies a collective process, not merely an 
individual statement. 
 
A. Facts but not Positive Ones: Lack of Critical Potential. 
 
Recourse to intelligence can be seen as another ineffective allusion to facts that does 
not permit sufficient scrutiny or the adoption of critical attitudes. It is not enough to 
reference facts as though they could be taken for-granted as universally valid and 
understood, particularly where issues of trust are at stake. If the ability of factual 
statements to gain intersubjective understanding is to be mined, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the facts concerned. This is because self-defence claims are essentially 
contested; for every Colin Powell presentation, there is an Iraqi declaration like that of 
7 December 2002 in which Iraq attempted to demonstrate that it was complying with 
its SC obligations.157  
 
Processes of critical inquiry into claims to have used force in self-defence depend on 
the claimant producing reasons that can be subjected to scrutiny.158 This is 
particularly important where claimant states and target states make very different 
assertions about the capabilities and intentions of the latter. Koskenniemi was wise to 
suggest that in cases of conflicting propositions, ³WKH VROXWLRQ PXVW EH DUULYHG DW
WKURXJKDQRSHQXQFRHUFHGGLVFXVVLRQRI WKHDOWHUQDWLYHPDWHULDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ´DQG
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WKDWWKH³FULWLFDOSURFHVVPXVWFRQWLQXH´DQGEHDSSOLHGWRWKHULYDOFRQFHSWLRQ.159 This 
contains the crucial implication that contestation must be inclusive and visible. This 
PHDQVWKDWZKHUHVWDWHVDOOXGHWRµWKHIDFWV¶WRUHGHHPDVHOI-defence claim, such facts 
must be made criticizable and this means that they must be made visible.  
 
One of the major sources of fact in national security matters is, inevitably, secret 
intelligence. One of the distinguishing factors of intelligence is that it is protected 
IURP VFUXWLQ\ ,W KDV EHHQ GHILQHG DV ³>L@nformation developed through secret 
processes to addrHVV D QDWLRQ¶V PRVW SURIRXQG VHFXULW\ FRQFHUQV´160 Intelligence is 
often not public information that can be used as evidence.161 It is seen as ³DEODFNER[
WKDWVSHZVRXW UHVXOWV´ and that cannot therefore be closely scrutinised.162 There are 
two other key subsidiary problems with the use of intelligence. One is that 
intelligence does not deal with facts, it deals with probability and the other is that 
intelligence, owing to its impunity from critique and cloaks and daggers reputation,163 
makes for stirring rhetoric. These factors also tend to diminish its criticizability and 
therefore increase the exploitability of the self-defence claim. 
 
It is to be stressed that intelligence cannot be seen as a simple alternative to giving 
evidence in support of a claim. Intelligence and evidence are fundamentally different 
as regards their ability to redeem a self-defence claim. National security is often 
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thought of as too important to be subject to public scrutiny.164 Intelligence is 
SDUWLFXODUO\ LPSRUWDQW LW LV VDLG ³WR FRQWHQG ZLWK XQFHUWDLQW\´ LQ RXU QHZ VWUDWHJLF
environment.165 It seems that intelligence has an important prospective role to play in 
informing policy choices. Evidence, on the other hand is primarily retrospective. It 
speaks to an audience in justification of a particular proposition. It should be 
underlined at this point that what is argued is not that intelligence is worse than 
evidence, but simply that it is functionally different. To underline the point, it has 
been said that ³,UDTKDVSURYHGEH\RQGDQ\UHDVRnable doubt that intelligence cannot 
SURYLGHHYLGHQFHUHOLDEOHHQRXJKWRMXVWLI\ZDURQVXFKDVSHFXODWLYHEDVLV´166 
 
It is sometimes argued that to share intelligence with other nations would undermine 
QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\E\UHYHDOLQJLQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQFLHV¶methods and sources and that it 
may even jeopardise the safety of agents in the field.167 ,QWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶WKHXVH
of intelligence, rather than evidence, to ground a use of force tended to imply the 
withholding of information. For instance, in 2003 Colin Powell told SC members that 
³,FDQQRWWHOO\RXHYHU\WKLQJZHNQRZ´168 The problems encountered by international 
lawyers when they are excluded from knowing the facts are illustrative of the 
problems that may face other evaluating audiences. Thus, writing about Operation 
Eldorado Canyon, *UHHQZRRG KDV ZULWWHQ WKDW ³PXFK RI WKH HYLGHQFH RI DOOHJHG
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Libyan involvement in terrorism, as opposed to revolutionary rhetoric, is necessarily 
secret and thus cannot be evaluated by those, like the present writer, not privy to the 
VHFUHWVRIWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHFRPPXQLW\´169  
 
Without this evidence it is not, however, possible to come to evaluate that use of force 
because there are gaps in the factual landscape to which the law should apply. In the 
same article, Greenwood wrote that KLVDVVHVVPHQWZDV³based on the assumption that 
the United States did indeed posses convincing evidence that Libya was directly 
responsible for some WHUURULVW DWWDFNV«,I WKDW DVVXPSWLRQ SURYHV IDOVH WKH HQWLUH
justification for the airstrike colODSVHV´170 The episode is a nice illustration of the 
problems of attempting to validate a claim to have used force in self-defence in the 
absence of evidence.  
 
The US claimed that the use of force, in April 1986, was in self-defence.171 A White 
House statement suggested that part of the rationale of the strikes had been to pre-
empt future Libyan attacks on US nationals and interests.172 On the day of the attacks, 
President Reagan addressed the nation and described Operation Eldorado Canyon as a 
³SUH-emptive actLRQ DJDLQVW WHUURULVW LQVWDOODWLRQV´173 The US claimed that it had 
³LUUHIXWDEOH SURRI´ RI /LE\DQ LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH %HUOLQ 'LVFRWKqTXH ERPELQJ WKDW
was thought to have been aimed at US service-personnel.174 Addressing the nation, 
Reagan VWDWHG³>R@XUHYLGHQFH LVGLUHFWLWLVSUHFLVHLWLVLUUHIXWDEOH´175 However, the 
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LQWHOOLJHQFHRQZKLFKWKLVµHYLGHQFH¶ZDVEDVHGZDVQRWUHOHDVHG Libya categorically 
denied involvement.176 +RZHYHUZKHQTXHVWLRQHGDERXWWKHSURRIRI*DGGDIL¶VJXLOW
Secretary of State Shultz sWDWHG WKDW ³ZH KHVLWDWH DOZD\V WR EH WRR H[SOLFLW EHFDXVH
EHLQJWRRH[SOLFLWWHQGVWRGU\XS\RXULQWHOOLJHQFH´DQGWKHUHIRUHXQGHUPLQHWKHILJKW
against terrorism.177 
 
The invocation of intelligence as a justification for a particular action has not always 
been well received. This is particularly the case where it turns out to have been 
mistaken, a risk attendant of probabilistic prediction. 2¶&RQQHOOhas written WKDW³>W@KH
86 HYLGHQFH IRU ERPELQJ /LE\D ZDV VHULRXVO\ TXHVWLRQHG´.178 The Reagan 
Administration ZDVQRWDORQH LQ LWV UHOXFWDQFH WRGLVFORVHHYLGHQFH2¶&RQQHOO adds 
that when the Clinton Administration invoked self-defence in 1998 in response to 
attacks on US embassies in Africa, its evidence for bombing Sudan was also ³KHDYLO\
FULWLFLVHG´DQG³GHULGHG´179 Lobel explains WKDWWKH&OLQWRQ$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ³IDLOHGWR
GLVFORVHWKHHYLGHQFHXSRQZKLFKLWUHOLHGLQRUGHULQJ´2peration Infinite Reach and it 
would QRW ³DOORZ DQ\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO IDFW-finding or public discussion with regard to 
WKDWHYLGHQFH´180 When states do not disclose the factual grounds for their belief that 
a use of force was necessary, there is no critical bite. It is not possible for evaluators 
to decide whether the claim was well-founded or not. 
 
In addition to failure to disclose facts on the grounds of secrecy, intelligence can have 
other adverse effects for the transparency and critical-force of a process of 
justification. The rhetorical effect of intelligence can be devastating. The prime 
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example of this was former US Ambassador to the U1$GODL6WHYHQVRQ¶VGUDPDWLF
unveiling of reconnaissance plane images of Soviet installations in Cuba in the SC.181 
Former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell attempted to recapture this success in 
February 2003 by presenting a medley of satellite imagery, intercepted 
communications and eye witness accounts to the SC.182 It might be better to call such 
DSUHVHQWDWLRQRILQWHOOLJHQFHD³SHUIRUPDQFH´183 In the context of a formal attempt to 
MXVWLI\LQYDGLQJDVRYHUHLJQVWDWHDQGGHSRVLQJLWVOHDGHU³SHUIRUPDQFH´ is pejorative 
because it implies a subjective and sensational presentation.  
 
Yet more damningly, it could be seen as part of a widespread charade: Franck has 
accused the Bush Administration of ³PHUHO\SUHWHQG>LQJ@WR>³SOD\E\WKHUXOHV´@´184 
More interesting than the presentation itself was its reception by other members of the 
6& $OWKRXJK 3RZHOO¶V SUHVHQWDWLRQ ZDV RQH-way and involved no exchange,185 
several SC members mentioned that they wished to further scrutinise the evidence.186 
This is encouraging because it suggests an appreciation of intelligence as the starting 
point IRUEXLOGLQJDFDVH UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLVSXWDEO\³VROLGJURXQGV´IRUDFDVHper se. 
There seemed to be a stark divide between those states who believed the presentation 
concluded the case for intervention and those states who viewed it as a useful starting 
point for consideration.187 Other states thought the presentation should be taken in the 
                                                 
181
 It is alluded to by several of the contributors to the American Society of International Law Panel 
³7KH/DZVRI)RUFHDQGWKH7XUQWR(YLGHQFH´ASIL Proc. (2006) 39. 
182
 UN Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003) Meeting of the Security Council 5 February 2003. 
183
 -DFREVVRQ³(YLGHQFHDVDQ,VVXH´SFLWLQJ%RE:RRGZDUGPlan of Attack (2004) Pocket 
Books, London. 
184
 70)UDQFN³5HIOHFWLRQVRQ)RUFHDQG(YLGHQFH´ASIL Proc. (2006) 51, p. 52. (Hereinafter, 
µ)UDQFN³5HIOHFWLRQVRQ)RUFHDQG(YLGHQFH´¶ 
185
 Mr Aldouri, the Iraqi representative complained that he was given insufficient time to rebut the 
allegations. UN Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003) Meeting of the Security Council on 5 February 2003 , p. 37 
186
 Ibid., Russia, pp. 20-1; France p. 23; Guinea p. 35; Germany p. 36. 
187
 &RPSDUHWKHVWDWHPHQWVRIWKH8.DQG)UDQFHLQWKLVUHJDUG6WUDZVDLGWKDW³>Z@HKDve just heard a 
PRVWSRZHUIXODQGDXWKRULWDWLYHFDVHDJDLQVWWKH,UDTLUHJLPH´SDQGGH9LOOHSLQVDLGWKDW
299  
context of the investigations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).188 Indeed, 
many states urged the US to share its intelligence with these dedicated monitoring and 
verification agencies,189 as did the heads of these agencies.190 The drive was for the 
US to adopt a more open approach. 
 
One of the chief arguments against reliance on the work of the IAEA and UNMOVIC 
was that the success of their investigations depended on the cooperation of Iraq, the 
host state. In contrast, intelligence gathering operates without regard to the sanctity of 
the territorial integrity and political independence of a sovereign state.191 As such, it is 
seen as a way of penetrating beyond what the host state is willing to show and to 
FRPHXSZLWKPRUHGHFLVLYHDQVZHUV7KHVDIHJXDUGVDJHQFLHV¶GLUHFWRUVHans Blix 
and Mohamed (O%DUDGHLKDGJLYHQDSUHVHQWDWLRQWRWKH6&DZHHNEHIRUH3RZHOO¶V
Although the reports evidenced desultory cooperation and even the existence of 
FKHPLFDOURFNHWZDUKHDGVLWZDVDOVRVWDWHGWKDWZKHWKHUWKHURFNHWVDUH³WKHWLSRID
sXEPHUJHG LFHEHUJ´ ZDV QRW \HW NQRZQ192 ElBaradei went even further saying that 
³ZLWKLQWKHQH[WIHZPRQWKV>LWVKRXOGEHSRVVLEOH@WRSURYLGHFUHGLEOHDVVXUDQFHVWKDW
,UDTKDVQRQXFOHDUZHDSRQVSURJUDPPH´193 In response, the French representative at 
the SC suggested that inspections might be strengthened.194 However, this more 
measured approach to information-gathering was not compatible with the urgency of 
the US approach to removing the potential threat. 
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Franck wrote that the February 2003 presentation to the SC by Powell ZDV³QRWSURRI
of our superior information-gathering capability, but just of our willingness to 
PLVOHDG´195 Franck pointed out that the veracity of the information the Secretary of 
State presented had already been questioned in the Administration and that some had 
already been falsified by the IAEA and contradicted by Vaclav Havel, president of the 
Czech Republic.196 However the SC process prevents effective engagement with this 
sort of presentation.197 The SC is not a court and any analogy between its members 
and a jury is tenuous at best; where parties to a given dispute use the SC as a forum to 
make presentations there is little chance for engagement or critique of what is said. In 
ODUJHSDUWWKLVLVEHFDXVHWKHµUHDO¶EXVLQHVVRIWKH6&JRHVRn outside the gaze of the 
public.198 $QRWKHU IDFWRUZKLFKSUHYHQWV WKH6&IURPHIIHFWLYHO\VFUXWLQLVLQJVWDWHV¶
claims is that it lacks the fact-finding and analysing capacity that would enable it to 
compare narratives. This will be returned to below.199 
 
The possibility of distinguishing valid from invalid claims is only a valuable 
distinction for the collective security system if it is the case that a reason given in 
redemption of a claim could persuade a critical hearer with an attitude open to 
understanding to accept the claim.200 This means that where differing accounts of 
facts exist, an audience cannot choose between them if they are closed to criticism. 
/REHODUJXHVWKDWXQOHVVWKHFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHPLVWREH³UHQGHUHGDQXOOLW\´LW
must not be possible for a nation to present a self-VHUYLQJYHUVLRQRI WKH IDFWV ³QRW
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VXEMHFWWRPXOWLODWHUDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´201 It has been argued that intelligence cannot be 
WDNHQDVDSXUHDFFRXQWRIµWKHIDFWV¶$VIDUDVWKHVRUWRILQWHOOLJHQFHWKDWPLJKWOHDG
a nation to resort to force is concerned this is said to be an even firmer proposition:  
 
[W]hen it comes to strategic decision, issues of war and peace, for example, the 
kinds of assessments we are most interested in usually depend least on specific 
nuggets of information. Instead, they tend to hinge on analyses and speculations 
about how foreign leaders and institutions may in the future act or react.202  
 
B.  Probability. 
 
In this section it will be argued that the calculation of probability is not a neutral 
process. It is argued that the use of intelligence in attempts to redeem self-defence 
claims is therefore vulnerable to exploitation. As Chesterman colourfully puts it, 
³SROLF\-makers soon learn that intelligence can be used the way a drunk uses a lamp-
post ± IRU VXSSRUW UDWKHU WKDQ LOOXPLQDWLRQ´203 Calculating the probability of the 
emergence of a threat to national security is a way of managing risk in a security 
environment characterised by uncertainty.204 Projections based on intelligence data 
and analyses can then be used as a starting point for decision-making. However, the 
probability that a given threat will materialise cannot by itself necessarily justify a use 
of force as self-defence. Aside from practical objections such as the availability of 
other means of tackling a merely emergent threat, there are conceptual problems. 
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Conceptually, the calculation of probability is not a neutral, scientific process that 
yields an objective answer.  
 
Intelligence analysts produce estimates, they do not divine fact.205 It has been 
explained that intelligence is not a homogeneous thing; it might refer to nuggets of 
hard fact and it might refer to convergent analyses.206 This means that what is referred 
WRXQGHU WKHXPEUHOODRI³LQWHOOLJHQFH´ LVQRWQHFHVVDULO\ WKH VRUWRI µREMHFWLYH IDFW¶
that might redeem a self-defence claim. It has been said that there are ³LQKHUHQW
OLPLWDWLRQVRI LQWHOOLJHQFH UHOLDELOLW\ DQGFUHGLELOLW\´207 This is particularly the case 
ZLWKWKH³ORZ-probability, high-ULVN´VFHQDULRVRIWKHVRUWHQFRXUDJHd by a Hobbesian 
mentality.208 It is suggested that when intelligence services are geared to warning 
about everything, they make it easier for executives to justify preconceived policy 
choices simply because they provide a larger field of probability. It has been 
suggested that the problem with Hobbesian risk-DYHUVLRQ LV WKDW ³Zhen you warn 
DERXWHYHU\WKLQJ\RXZDUQDERXWQRWKLQJ´209  
 
Some writers have demonstrated a preference for a risk-assessment approach to self-
defence that would depend on calculating the probability of attack and does not 
therefore require that an armed attack is imminent.210 *OHQQRQKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDW³WKH
JUDYLW\ RI WKH WKUHDW DQG WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI LWV RFFXUUHQFH´ DUH HQRXJK IRU WKH
distinction between valid and invalid claims of self-defence.211 For Yoo, ³WHPSRUDO
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LPPLQHQFHKDVVHWWKHEDUWRRKLJKRQKRZSUREDEOHDQDWWDFNPD\EH´KHDUJXHVIRU
a reconceptualization of imminence based on the magnitude of the harm and the 
probability of the risk. He argues WKDWWRGD\¶VWKUHDWVFDQQRWEH countered by waiting 
until an attack has been launched, but he also says that pre-emption can reduce the 
number of casualties and therefore may be preferable in cost-benefit terms.212  
 
The problem is that while this calculus may work in the abstract, in practice the 
outcomes reached can only be as good as the data inputted. This data is often 
FRPSRVHGRI LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSRWHQWLDO WKUHDWV¶FDSDELOLWLHVDQG WKHLU LQWHQWLRQV213 
While capability may be directly evidenced, intention can only be inferred. The 
reliability of probability assessments relies on the identification of a hostile intent or a 
rogue state.214 Ascertaining the intention of another state is problematic,215 
SDUWLFXODUO\ ZKHUH WKDW VWDWH¶V ORJLF LV VDLG WR EH ³DOLHQ WR UDWLRQDO WKRXJKW´ DV LV 
purportedly the case for rogue states and their terrorist clients.216 
 
,WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDWWKHVHZULWHUV¶FRQFHSWLRQVRISUREDELOLW\DUHEDVHGRQZKDW.HVVOHU
calls the quantitative approach to risk assessment. He says that this approach to 
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probability is based on scientific positivism.217 This introduces connotations of 
objectivity or neutrality which cannot be borne out in practice because intelligence is 
usually fragmentary and dependent on the context provided by the evaluator.218 Since 
WKH ³UHODWLYLW\ RI VFLHQWLILF NQRZOHGJH´ LV VDLG WR EH SXEOLFO\ UHFRJQLVHG219 it is 
submitted that quantitative probability does not provide an incontrovertible (or even, 
conceivably, plausible) means of redeeming a claim to have used force in self-
defence.  
 
It has been suggested that many commentators confuse this sort of quantitative 
probability based on relative frequency with qualitative probability based on degree of 
belief.220 Rather than requiring a distinctive and exhaustive set of possible states of 
the world, degree of belief requires qualitative assessments to be made about what is 
the case. This second approach to probability attempts to convert unstructured 
uncertainty into manageable risk.221 Daase and Kessler say in the degree of belief 
notion of probability, a different VRUWRI UDWLRQDOLW\ LV UHTXLUHG WKDW UHOLHVRQ³QRUPV
DQG YDOXHV QRW LQVWUXPHQWDO NQRZOHGJH´222 This means that the plausibility or 
acceptability of probability calculations depends on the evaluators and claimants 
sharing the same normative framework. For the reasons already given, this leaves 
QRWKLQJIRUGLVVHQWHUVWRRSSRVHWRFODLPDQWV¶DVVHUWLRQVRIYDOLGFODLPVWRKDYHXVHG
force in self-defence. 
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Another problem with justifying a self-defence claim on the basis of intelligence is 
that estimates based on probability have proved to be wrong in the past. The 
possibility of mistake is not only real, it is a fresh memory. The US and the UK 
infamously invaded Iraq on the strength of a so-FDOOHG³GRGJ\GRVVLHU´DQGHYHQWKH
86 DGPLWWHG ³WKDW SUH-war intelligence estimates of Iraqi WMD stockpiles were 
ZURQJ´ DIWHU WKH ,UDT 6XUYH\ *URXS UHSRUWHG223 It was thought by the Bush 
Administration and by certain academics, that this can be overcome simply by 
improving intelligence institutions.224 However others are more sceptical.  
 
One of the most notorious uses of intelligence to justify a use of force in self-defence 
was Operation Infinite Reach. In 1998 the Clinton administration claimed that firing 
Tomahawk missiles at a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum and training facilities in 
Afghanistan was an exercise of self-defence. The claim was that the pharmaceutical 
IDFWRU\LQ6XGDQZDVEHLQJXVHGWRSURYLGHFKHPLFDOZHDSRQVIRU2VDPDELQ/DGHQ¶V
terrorists. The US justification of self-defence FRQWLQXHG ³>W@KDW RUJDQL]DWion [bin 
/DGHQ¶V@ KDV LVVXHG D VHULHV RI EODWDQW ZDUQLQJV WKDW VWULNHs will continue from 
HYHU\ZKHUH´ against American targets, and we have convincing evidence that further 
VXFK DWWDFNV ZHUH LQ SUHSDUDWLRQ IURP WKHVH VDPH WHUURULVW IDFLOLWLHV´225 FBI agents 
were dispatched to Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi to search for forensic evidence.226 
Lobel says that if the US could have shown that it was producing chemical weapons 
for bin Laden who was conducting a systematic terror campaign against the US, then 
                                                 
223
 US National Security Strategy (2006), p. 23 The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 
Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was released on 30 September 
2004. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html. 
224
 US National Security Strategy (2006S<RR³8VLQJ)RUFH´, p. 760; E. Rindskopf-Parker, 
³,QWHOOLJHQFHDQGWKH8VHRI)RUFHLQWKH:DURQ7HUURULVP´S. 
225
 Letter dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council S/1998/780 (1998). 
226
 :HGJZRRG³Responding to Terrorism´, p. 560. 
306  
the US could have argued that it was targeting an instrument of the campaign.227 The 
US also suggested that it had information that the factory owner was an associate of 
Osama bin Laden and that traces of VX nerve gas had been found in soil samples 
collected near the factory.228 
 
The claim that the factory in question produced chemical weapons, as the US alleged, 
is now widely disbelieved. Lobel reports that French, German, Italian and British 
officials had been alarmed at the poor evidence on which the US took action.229 But 
KHVD\VWKDWWKLVDUJXPHQWZDVEXLOGRI³IDXOW\SUHPLVHV´230 For instance at first the 
Clinton Administration stated that the factory did not produce medicines and that it 
was heavily guarded. Lobel says that these claims were quickly forgotten 
subsequently.231 In large part this was because of the high-profile nature of the factory 
which was a show-case regularly visited by foreign dignitaries, school children and 
Americans.232 There were also problems with the soil sample233 and the bin Laden 
connection.234  
 
Nevertheless, the US did not seem to be orientated to finding out whether the factory 
was in fact involved. Apparently the Clinton Administration refused to look at a 
separate analysis of the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant which showed that bombing it 
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would be a mistake.235 Sudan, backed by the Islamic Group of States, the Arab 
League, the Group of African States and the Non-Aligned Movement, sought an 
international investigation.236 The US ³VXFFHVVIXOO\EORFNHG6XGDQ¶VHIIRUWVWRLQLWLDWH
a Security Council fact-finding investigation of [its] claim that the El Shifa plant had 
SURGXFHG D SUHFXUVRU RI OHWKDO 9; JDV´237 The inscrutability demonstrated by this 
was in stark contrast to the openness of Sudan which inundated the SC with 
documentation. As well as offerinJHYLGHQFHDV WR WKH IDFWRU\¶VRZQHUVKLS DQGXVH
6XGDQ VDLG LW ZDV ³UHDG\ WR UHFHLYH D PLVVLRQ IURP WKH &RXQFLO WR YLVLW WKH VLWH
FRQVXOWWKHGRFXPHQWDWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKDOOWKHYDULRXVDVSHFWVRIWKHIDFWV´238  
 
The episode indicates not only the benefit that a culture of evidence can give to 
accused states, but also the dangers of analysing intelligence in the light of 
preconceived policy-choices.239 In such cases intelligence does not enlighten policy-
makers, it justifies their independent decisions.240 Intelligence has a powerful role in 
legitimizing reliance on probability because intelligence analyses are compiled by 
experts. This helps to justify the proposition that force can be used pre-emptively 
before a specific threat has materialised; pre-emption is by its nature probabilistic. 
The relative independence of intelligence agencies from executive bodies also means 
                                                 
235
 *DWL³5HPDUNV´S. 
236
 UN Doc. S/1998/791(1998) /HWWHU'DWHG$XJXVWIURPWKH&KDUJpG¶$IIDLUHV$,RIWKH
Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council; 
UN Doc. S/1998/804 (1998) Letter Dated 25 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of 
Colombia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council S/1998/804; UN 
Doc. S/1998/802 Letter Dated 25 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the 
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council; UN Doc. S/1998/790 (1998) Letter 
'DWHG$XJXVWIURPWKH&KDUJpG¶$IIDLUHV$,RIWKH3HUPDQHQW0LVVLRQRI4DWDr to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
237
 /REHO³7KH8VHRI)RUFHWR5HVSRQGWR7HUURULVW$WWDFNV´, p. 538. 
238
 UN Doc. S/1998/786 (1998) Letter Dated 98/08/21 from The Permanent Representative of the 
Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, para 4. 
239
 /REHOVXJJHVWVWKDWZDUQLQJVE\86$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO-DQHW5HQRZHUHLJQRUHG/REHO³7KH8VHRI
)RUFHWR5HVSRQGWR7HUURULVW$WWDFNV´S FLWLQJ6+HUVK³7KH0LVVLOHVRI$XJXVW´The New 
Yorker 12 October 1998. 
240
 )UDQFN³5HIOHFWLRQVRQ)RUFHDQG(YLGHQFH´S. 
308  
that intelligence can be used as a ³shield to absolve the policy maker from 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\´241 Against this, Gati stresses that the responsibility is always with the 
policy maker even where he relies on intelligence. This is because it is he who makes 
the leap from intelligence to action.242 Invoking intelligence so as to avoid having to 
DFFRXQW IRU RQH¶V DFWLRQ LQ GHWDLO FDQ OHDG WR WKH H[SORLWDWion of self-defence. 
Statements of facts are not always innocent in the hands of interpreters and claimants. 
The non-objective nature of facts rests in their expression and presentation to others.  
 
There are at least three factors that differentiate intelligence from evidence 
fundamentally. The first is that the raison G¶rWUH of evidence is to demonstrate to an 
audience in justification of a proposition; its function ± vindication or redemption ± 
necessitates sharing. The second is that in evidence - rather than intelligence-
IUDPHZRUNVLWLVWKHDXGLHQFHDQGQRWWKHSURJHQLWRURILQWHOOLJHQFHWKDWKDVµFRQWURO¶
over the information. The third is that intelligence is not fact.243 It has been said that 
assessments of risk resemble norms in their counterfactual nature.244 Where 
intelligence is used to support the veracity or accuracy of a proposition, it is being 
used to evidence the factual validity of that proposition and not merely its qualified 
probability. The problems with this are illustrated by Colin PowelO¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQ WR
the SC.245  
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Where intelligence data is used as evidence, its shortcomings should be made plain.246 
The weight that evaluators do or ought to give to a particular piece of information will 
depend on the probability that the target state posed an actionable threat to the 
claimant and the confidence with which such an assessment was made. This leads to 
the conclusion that a datum of knowledge cannot be both intelligence and evidence at 
once. Granted, intelligence can become evidence, but this necessitates a core change 
in the matrix in which the information is dealt. In short, states cannot have it both 
ways: They cannot claim to be demonstrating propositions while simultaneously 
withholding any useful information from evaluators on the grounds of national 
security.  
 
What has been said in criticism of the use of intelligence in the justification of self-
defence claims in international law should not be taken to suggest that intelligence is 
useless in the process. While intelligence cannot be wholly relied on to vindicate a 
self-defence claim, it can be a useful starting point IRU HYDOXDWLQJ FODLPDQWV¶
renditions of the facts.247 In this section on the use of intelligence in the vindication of 
self-defence claims it has been argued that secret intelligence by definition lacks the 
positive or visible element that allows the scrutiny or critique of factual claims. It was 
also suggested that attempts to analyse national security in terms of risk and 
regulation will depend on the calculation of probability. It was argued that calculating 
the probability of an act of aggression in abstracto, where no particular threat has 
been identified is problematic. The language of probability helps to affirm the 
Hobbesian culture of anarchy in which the doctrine of pre-emption would operate. 
This is because where nothing is known, anything is possible. 
                                                 
246
 UK Intelligence Community Online.  
247
 *ROGVWRQH³5HPDUNV´S. 
310  
 
PART THREE: REDEMPTION THROUGH CRITIQUE. 
 
It is argued that the ability to distinguish valid from invalid claims to have used force 
in self-defence depends on a common frame of reference existing for evaluators and 
claimants. It was suggested in the previous chapter that insufficient common 
understanding about norms exists in the collective security system to enable this to 
occur.248 7KHSRVVLELOLW\RIXVLQJVWDWHV¶VKDUHd experiences of the material world as a 
point of commonality was then considered instead. It was argued that using flexible 
standards as a measure for facts about the world can be dangerous where the content 
of those standards is not spelt out. Similarly, it has been said that the use of secret 
intelligence to vindicate self-defence claims is problematic because it is not easy to 
scrutinise. 
 
It is suggested that while alluding to particular facts in support of a claim might 
provide a point of commonality, the usefulness of that potential depends on its ability 
WR EH WHVWHG RU FULWLFLVHG ,W LV VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH PXFK PDOLJQHG SKUDVH ³DUPHG
DWWDFN´ IRXQG LQ DUWLFOH  OHQGV WKH EHQHILWV RI YLVLELOLW\ DQG FRQWHVWDELOLW\ WR
international law.249 However it is thought that it may be possible to identify other 
phrases that are also testable. For instance, it is suggested that in most cases, it should 
EH SRVVLEOH WR GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW DQ DWWDFN ZDV ³LPPLQHQW´ LQVRIDU DV LPPLQHQFH
suggests that a threat had actually materialised. In short, it seems that a factual 
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standard can be flexible in as much as it still relates to a visible element that exists in 
the external world and not the internal perceptions of states.250  
 
In this section, it will be emphasised that the conditions of distinguishing valid from 
invalid self-defence claims using facts are that the facts are capable of ostensive 
demonstration and that the evaluation is an experiential process in the hands of the 
evaluators and not a pro-forma exercise to be completed by the claimant. Having, in 
the previous sections of this chapter, suggested how the treatment of facts should not 
look, it will finally be considered how the treatment of facts might look. The 
proposals made are mere sketches because it is beyond the remit of the present thesis 
into the theory of communicative evaluation to produce a fully operational model. It 
will be suggested that the collective security system make use of fact-finding in order 
to produce commonly held understandings of the facts in a particular case. 
 
A. Standards of Evidence. 
 
In order to distinguish valid from invalid claims to have used force in self-defence, it 
is necessary to bring direct evidence of a material and present threat to national 
security. This is because in self-defence cases, it is not unusual for both sides to make 
self-defence claims. Franck explains that without fact-finding, culpability cannot be 
³PDGH PDQLIHVW´.251 This approach is supported elsewhere in the literature: Lobel 
wrote that in the Nicaragua case the ICJ can be seen to have set a minimum of 
evidence obligations; that the claimant state carefully evaluates the evidence, that this 
evidence is made public and that the facts are subjected to international scrutiny and 
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investigation.252 Indeed, Franck says that the obligation to evidence claims is imposed 
by the Charter.253 It is submitted that the emphasis in this process should not be on the 
existence of facts so much as the availability of these facts to processes of scrutiny.  
 
Various scholars have suggested that the claimant of self-defence must satisfy certain 
standards of evidence. On one hand this acknowledges the importance of evidence in 
processes of distinguishing valid from invalid claims to have used force in self-
defence. On the other hand, in some cases consideration of the standard of proof has 
been at the expense of consideration of what exactly must be proved and whether it 
might be possible to do so.254 )RU LQVWDQFH 2¶&RQQHOO VD\V WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO
WULEXQDOVVHHPWRDJUHHWKDW³HYLGHQFHVKRXOGEHµFOHDUDQGFRQYLQFLQJ¶´255 Wellens 
GLVWLQJXLVKHVWZRVWDQGDUGVRIHYLGHQFH³SUHSRQGHUDQW´DQGWKHKLJKHUOHYHORI³FOHDU
DQG FRQYLQFLQJ´256 *UHHQZRRG VXJJHVWHG ³VXIILFLHQWO\ FRQYLQFLQJ´ RU ³FRQYLQFLQJ
HYLGHQFH´257 DQG/REHOVXJJHVWHGD³FOHDUDQG VWULQJHQW´VWDQGDUGRIHYLGHQFH258 The 
6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶VKLJK /HYHO3DQHORQ7KUHDWV&KDOOHQJHV DQG&KDQJHDOVR FLWHV
WKHQHHGIRU³FUHGLEOHHYLGHQFH´QRWRQO\WKDWD WKUHDWH[LVWVEXWDOVRWKDWDPLOLWDU\
response is appropriate.259 The problem is that these abstract formulations do not tell 
us much about what would be needed to identify a given self-defence claim as valid. 
Except insofar as these standards are compared inter se IRU LQVWDQFH D ³EH\RQG
UHDVRQDEOHGRXEW´ VWDQGDUG LV KLJKHU WKDQD ³EDODQFH RISUREDELOLWLHV´RQH LW LV QRW
easy to see ZKDW³FOHDUDQGFRQYLQFLQJ´HYLGHQFHORRNVOLNH 
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Accordingly, 2¶'RQQHOO ULJKWO\ SRLQWV RXW WKDW ³WKH WH[WXUH RI VXFK VWDQGDUGV´ RI
HYLGHQFHDV µFOHDU¶ µFRQYLQFLQJ¶ µVWULQJHQW¶RU µSUHSRQGHUDQW¶ LV ambiguous.260 The 
attempts to validate Operation Eldorado Canyon are illustrative of this. The US was 
unwilling to release its evidence of Libyan involvement in acts of terrorism for 
general evaluation.261 This is reminiscent of the Bush Administration safeguard to the 
doctrine of pre-HPSWLRQ ³7KH UHDVRQV IRU RXU DFWLRQV ZLOO EH FOHDU WKH IRUFH
PHDVXUHG DQG WKH FDXVH MXVW´262 When the reasons for US action are based on 
intelligence that it does not release263 and risk assessments based on a Hobbesian 
conception of the other,264 the clarity of those reasons is unlikely to be apparent to 
many evaluators.  
 
The rhetorical force of the familiar language of evidentiary standards may be 
exploited for purposes of spurious justification. It is argued that the claimant state 
cannot EH WKH XOWLPDWH LQWHUSUHWHU RI ZKDW ³FRQYLQFLQJ´ HYLGHQFH LV EXW WKDW WKLV
standard in a question for the evaluator of a particular claim. Franck has written that a 
VWDWHZLVKLQJWRLQYRNHDUWLFOHPXVWGHPRQVWUDWH³WRWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIWKHZRUOG¶V
goYHUQPHQWVWKDWWKHUHLVJRRGDQGFOHDUHYLGHQFHWKDWDQRYHUZKHOPLQJGDQJHU«LVD
UHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQ´DQGWKDWDSUH-emptive strike is the only means of preventing the 
realisation of that expectation.265 This sort of approach has the benefit of flexibility as 
the standard of proof required depends on the recognition of external evaluators. Such 
a non-formalistic approach to standards of evidence is preferable to one that attempts 
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to classify potential demonstrations in abstracto. It should be added that the force of 
an evaluation lies in its ability to command intersubjective understanding. As has 
already been explained, intersubjective understanding is constructed through 
processes of evaluation of criticizable validity claims. The convincing or implausible 
nature of the evidence is therefore not an intrinsic quality of the facts presented, but of 
the perceptions and understandings of the audience involved. 
 
Henkin warned that self-defence VKRXOG RQO\ EH XVHG ZKHUH WKH HYLGHQFH LV ³FOHDU
unambiguous, subject to proof and not easily open to misinterpretation or 
IDEULFDWLRQ´.266 While he concluded that consequently this standard can be provided 
by an armed attack, it is submitted that by putting the emphasis on what can be 
accepted if good enough evidence can be produced produces a more flexible standard 
that is not guarded against exploitation. The test is that an evaluating audience, with 
good reasons ± these reasons to be accepted or rejected by subsequent evaluating 
audiences, does in fact find that the self-defence claim is valid. Before this can 
happen, institutional reform will be necessary to minimise the strategic nature of 
discussions about self-defence, to encourage open attitudes to the process of 
evaluation and to maximise the potential for scrutiny. Thus, /REHO UHIHUV WR ³WKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶V QHHG WR GHYHORS UXOHV DQG PHFKDQLVPV WR DGGUHVV WKH
IDFWXDODVVHUWLRQVXSRQZKLFKDQDWLRQHPSOR\VDUPHGIRUFH´267  
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B. Common Understandings about the External World. 
 
In this section, reference to facts is problematized. It is argued that shared 
understandings about the world cannot be taken for-granted. Instead, a common 
understanding of the facts of a particular case must be constructed in discourse before 
normative questions about whether a self-defence claim was valid or not can be 
GLVFXVVHG &HQWUDO WR HYDOXDWRUV¶ DELOLW\ WR HVWDEOLVK VXFK XQGHUVWDQGLQJV LV WKHLU
ability to scrutinise assertions of fact and to test them. This means that the information 
on which assertions are made should be shared and the information itself should be 
testable. 
 
7KHFRPPRQDOLW\RI³UHDOLW\´FDQQRWEHDVVXPHG268 Therefore claims about it should 
not be exempted from scrutiny on the grounds that they are obvious. Wendt has 
explained that there are three dominant theories of reference, theories which explain 
the relation of mind and world, in International Relations: The realist causal theory, 
the empiricist description theory and the postmodern relational theory. Relational 
theories assert that meaning is produced by relations of difference within a 
discourse,269 and descriptive theories suggest that it is produced by descriptions 
existing within a language. By contrast in realist theories, meaning is determined by 
GLVFRXUVHKRZZRUGVDUHXVHGDQGQDWXUH WKXVPHDQLQJ³LV Uegulated by an extra-
OLQJXLVWLF ZRUOG´270 In other words, realist theories tend to minimise or ignore the 
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effect of expression on statements about the world. To express a fact about the world 
is to mediate the objectivity of the external with the subjectivity of the internal.271 
 
This distinction is important in order to understand why certain scholars assume that a 
µFDVH E\ FDVH¶ DQDO\VLV RI VHOI-defence claims could produce incontrovertible 
assessments about the validity of the given use of force.272 McDougal and Feliciano 
wrote that self-GHIHQFHFODLPVFRXOGEHGHFLGHGDFFRUGLQJ WR³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV LQ WKH
SDUWLFXODU FRQWH[W´273 This assumes that what constitutes a particular context is 
XQSUREOHPDWLF,QVRIDUDVWKRVHVFKRODUVDGRSWDUHDOLVW³FDXVDO´YLHZRIWKH world of 
IDFW WKHLU IDLWK LQ IDFW¶V DELOLW\ WR UHGHHP D VHOI-defence claim without opening the 
law to abuse is understandable.274 It is hoped that the foregoing sections have 
demonstrated that such faith is misplaced. As Fuller explains, at base the realists do 
QRWDSSUHFLDWHWKDW³LQWKHPRYLQJZRUOGRIIDFWDVLQWKHPRYLQJZRUOGRIODZWKHis 
and the ought DUHLQVHSDUDEO\PL[HG´275 The point is that a description of fact is not 
neutral; subjectivity is introduced in the person of the describer and in the person of 
WKH DXGLHQFH ,W LV VDLG WKDW DQ LQWHUSUHWDWLYH SURFHVV FRQYHUWV ³VHQVH GDWD´ LQWR
³NQRZOHGJH´276  
 
The context in which a statement of fact is presented or understood shapes the 
substance of that understanding.277 This context can be formed by a certain narrative 
in which facts are given a certain significance. Gray gave a good example of this in 
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the Cameroon v. Nigeria FDVHZKHUH³DIXQGDPHQWDOGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRVWDWHV
ZDVDSSDUHQWLQWKHLUFDWHJRUL]DWLRQRIHYHQWV´278 &DPHURRQ¶VQDUUDWLYHwas a tale of 
DQQH[DWLRQ DQG 1LJHULD¶V ZDV RQH RI D ERXQGDU\ GLVSXWH279 Additionally, 
&KDUOHVZRUWK KDV TXHVWLRQHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV¶ DSSURDFKHV WR WKH IDFWV RI WKH
.RVRYRFULVLVHPSKDVLVLQJWKDWWKH³GLVFLSOLQHGRHVQRWHQFRXUDJHWKHZHLJKWLQJXS
of coPSHWLQJ YHUVLRQV RI HYHQWV´280 An intersubjective process of understanding 
creation would engage reflectively with the matter of the contextualisation of facts. 
The process of criticism and testing would encourage participants to remain aware of 
the partiality and particularity of their positions.  
 
It is important that the context is shared between participants in an evaluative 
discourse. Habermas drew a distinction between communicative action in a weak 
sense and in a strong sense.281 He used the weak sense ZKHUH³UHDFKLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
DSSOLHV WR IDFWV´ among other things. Communicative action in the strong sense 
FRQQRWHV SURFHVVHV ZKHUH ³XQGHUVWDQGLQJ H[WHQGV WR WKH QRUPDWLYH UHDVRQV IRU WKH
VHOHFWLRQ RI WKH JRDOV WKHPVHOYHV´282 In the case of weak communicative action 
FODLPV WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV DUH QRW RULHQWDWHG WR ³LQWHUVXEMHFWLYHO\ UHFRJQLVHG ULJKWQHVV
FODLPV´ DV WKH\ DUH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI FRPPXQLFDWLYH DFWLRQ LQ WKH VWURQJ VHQVH283 
Similarly, Kratochwil draws a distinction between assertoric and normative 
statements: Assertoric statements depend on a reference to shared external 
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phenomena,284 while normative ones reference shared expectations.285 Instead of 
making reference to an intersubjectively shared understanding of the normative 
requirements for valid self-defence, participants will make reference to the shared 
external world of fact. It is suggested that participants should endeavour to establish 
shared understandings about factual questions, for instance about whether a missile 
had been launched, a nuclear installation had begun to produce weapons-grade 
uranium, or whether the defensive force resulted in civilian casualties. These elements 
can then serve as referents in a discourse about the normative question of whether the 
claim of self-defence was valid or not.   
 
µ)DFWV¶RUµGDWD¶DERXWWKHZRUOGGRQRWKDYHDQDXWRQRPRXVH[LVWHQFHapart from the 
speakers and hearers in a discourse. This means that when two people refer to the 
VDPH µIDFW¶ LW LV QRW FHUWDLQ WKDW WKH\ PHDQ WKH VDPH WKLQJ 7KH LQHYLWDELOLW\ of an 
element of subjectivity in the expression of things-in-the-world does not, however, 
mean that all assertions of fact are radically subjective. Subjectivity is mitigated 
where participants in a discourse can test whether they understand the same thing. It is 
necessary to move to a more basic level of commonality wherein the materiality of the 
commonality can be established by testing. 
 
This means that the process by which a self-defence claim is redeemed through 
testing cannot be implicit. The criticizability of a self-defence claim is the obverse of 
its redeemability.286 To redeem a claim means to give good reasons for its validity. 
The effectiveness of these reasons depends on their being capable of being 
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understood; the possibility of this understanding renders the reasons criticizable.287 
MacCormick called this the principle of defeasibility. However he stressed that most 
things that are defeasible are not in fact defeated ± perhaps because they are never 
questioned.288 In contrast, in situations of contestation like evaluations of self-defence 
claims, participants are unlikely to take claims about the world of facts for-granted. 
 
The process of testing is not simply intended to weed out spurious factual assertions it 
is also intended to have a positive function of establishing common understandings 
about given phenomena in the world. Habermas KDVZULWWHQ WKDW ³>W@KHZRUOGJDLQV
objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community of 
VSHDNLQJ DQG DFWLQJ VXEMHFWV´289 Contested propositiRQV ZLOO µFRXQW¶ DV YDOLG RQFH
they have been intersubjectively tested and accepted by participants in a discourse. In 
terms of the claim to use force in self-defence, it would be necessary for the claimant 
to show what it was defending itself against. This implies that the threat can be shown 
LQ WKH VKDUHG µREMHFWLYH¶ ZRUOG EHWZHHQ VSHDNHU DQG KHDUHU DQG QRW WRWDOO\ LQ WKH
subjective world of the speaker.290   
 
2¶&RQQHOOdifferentiates between (valid) anticipatory self-defence and (invalid) pre-
emptive action on the grounds that there is an attack involved in the former but not in 
the latter.291 It seems likely that in many cases preparations for the attack will be in 
HYLGHQFH 7KXV 6LPPD¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW because RI WKH ³PDQLIHVW ULVN´ RI DEXVH, 
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article 51 muVW EH LQWHUSUHWHG ³DV FRQWDLQLQJ D SURKLELWLRQ RI DQWLFLSDWRU\ self-
defence´  His argument was that ³WKH DOOHJHG LPPLQHQFH RI DQ DWWDFN FDQQRW EH
DVVHVVHGE\PHDQVRIREMHFWLYHFULWHULD´ 292 It is submitted that this is overly exacting. 
A preferable approDFK LV %URZQOLH¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW DQWLFLSDWLRQ ZRXOG EH YDOLG in 
VLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHLVDFOHDULQWHQWLRQWRDWWDFNDQGZKHUHWKLVLV³DFFRPSDQLHGE\
measures of implementation not involving the crossing of the boundary of the target 
VWDWH´293  While the VWDQGDUG RI µDUPHG DWWDFN¶ PD\ SURYLGH WKH LGHDO VLWXDWLRQ LQ
which self-defence could be exercised, it is possible to conceive of situations in which 
waiting for an attack to be launched jeopardises the lives of too many citizens. In such 
a case, self-defence will be justifiable to the extent that the claimant state can 
demonstrate at the international level the reasons its decision was made at the national 
level. 
 
Firstly, this represents a departure from the appeal to secret evidence. This is because 
common understandings cannot be created when access to information is reserved to a 
select few. Where states wished to make the claim that a certain event was likely to 
occur, they would have to produce the grounds on which this assessment was made in 
order for an intersubjective understanding about whether the projected event was 
OLNHO\RUQRW6HFRQGO\WKLVDSSURDFKSURYLGHVEURDGFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³QHFHVVLW\´DQG
³SURSRUWLRQDOLW\´ZLWKDFRQFUHWH UHIHUHQW7KXVZKHUHDVWDWHFODLPVWKDW LWVXVHRI
force was proportionate, it should be possible to ascertain the referent for this 
proportionality. This technique, it is hoped, should at least limit the potential for 
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familiar terms in the self-defence discourse such as proportionality or necessity to be 
misused. 
 
Exploitability can be reduced by rendering the process as visible as possible, to 
maximise opportunities for scrutiny. The visibility of an object is linked to its 
SRWHQWLDO WR EH D VKDUHG REMHFW RI UHIHUHQFH LQ D GLVFRXUVH $V D ³VKDUHG H[WHUQDO
phenomHQRQ´ LW LV FDSDEOH RI EHLQJ WHVWHG EHFDXVH LW GRHV QRW UHO\ SXUHO\ RQ WKH
subjectivity of a particular participant.294 This minimises the possibility that risk-
assessments made under Hobbesian conditions will be viewed as plausible by other 
states which have not adopted this attitude. Where the nature of the threat resides 
more in the internal apprehension than in the external cause, a claimant of self-
defence will lack a visible referent with which to provide good reasons for its action. 
 
It might be said that the difference between the occurrence and the imminence of an 
armed attack is a question of degree and not kind. It is submitted that while the 
planning and launching of an attack may ipso facto be less visible than the 
manifestation of the attack, it nevertheless must be material. Once attacks become 
more temporally remote, material evidence becomes scarcer and more tenuous. In part 
this is because of the uncertainty that still characterises non-imminent threats to 
security. Anghie held that ³SUH-emption must be based on sound, if not overwhelming 
evidence, for it is only such a threshold that could justify the extraordinary measure of 
the pre-HPSWLYH XVH RI IRUFH´295 militates against the possibility of such a doctrine 
ever being workable. The discretion to infer conclusions from pieces of data decreases 
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in proportion to the strength of these inferences; the stronger the inference, the less 
latitude the evaluator had in reaching it.  
 
C.  Some Reflections on Institutionalisation. 
 
It is beyond the ambit of this thesis to provide an institutional model for proceeding 
with a communicative approach to the evaluation of self-defence claims. However, it 
may be useful to provide some reflections on how it might operate in practice. So far 
in this chapter, we have looked at how a communicative approach based on the 
assessment of facts would not work. This negative approach to outlining 
communicative evaluation was thought to be the most effective way of underlining 
what would and what would not be conducive to collective understanding of the facts 
of each case.  
 
Two major themes have emerged. The first is that the use of abstract standards that 
refer to external facts, whether they be the necessary and proportionate use of force or 
the clear and convincing standard of evidence, do not of themselves give rise to 
specific understandings about self-defence. The principles are capable of a variety of 
interpretations, the colour of which depends on the context in which they are set. This 
suggests that the context must be made explicit before interpretations of such 
principles are attempted. The second theme flows from the first. If the context of 
interpretation is to be made explicit, the facts that led an individual nation state to 
exercise its right of self-defence in the first place must be available for scrutiny. It was 
said that assessments based on secret intelligence could not be excused from 
collective scrutiny at the international level. To attempt to do so would be to make an 
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assertion and refuse to account for it; even if other perceived a criticizable validity 
claim, attempts to scrutinise the assertion would lack a clear object of critique. 
 
An attempt to institutionalise the process of redeeming and evaluating the criticizable 
validity claim that force has been used in self-defence therefore depends on 
constructing a collective understanding of the facts. In the previous section it has been 
DUJXHGWKDWVLQFHDFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµUHDOLW\¶FDQQRWEHWDNHQIRU-granted, it 
should be constructed by the participants in a particular discourse. It was suggested 
that assertions of fact made by the claimant state would be tested through a process of 
ostensive demonstration. To ostensively demonstrate something means, literally, to 
show it or to point it out.296 It is therefore necessary to think about who would 
participate in the discourse and how this process of testing might work in practice.  
  
It is to be emphasised that the institutionalisation of the process could not work 
without the participants in a given discourse coming with the expectation that an 
assertion of self-defence raises a criticizable validity claim and adopting an attitude 
open to understanding. ,QYLHZLQJDVWDWH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWLWKDVH[HUFLVHGWKHULJKWRI
self-defence as a criticizable validity claim, the evaluating audience is mobilised in 
the project of criticism and the onus lies with the claimant to justify his assertion. In 
turn, this relies on the claimant state feeling that it ought to give good reasons to 
redeem the claim that it has made.297 Any institutionalisation of this discourse should 
therefore be facilitative rather than directive and controlling. Structural bias could be 
minimised if evaluation was not institutionalised in a single discourse, but was rather 
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the outcome of overlapping discourses evaluating one another as well as the self-
defence claim at issue.298 
 
The FROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHPLVZKDW+DEHUPDVFDOOVD³PHWD-LQVWLWXWLRQ´WKHius ad 
bellum LVD³NLQGRILQVXUDQFHDJDLQVWEUHDNGRZQ´RIOHVVIRUPDOLVHGVRFLDOV\VWHPs 
of understanding.299 In large part this is a function of the positivity of its norms.300 
This means that discourse about law tends, by its nature, to be controversial because 
positive norms have been violated. This means that there is a presumption of criticism 
and also that this criticism will take place positively rather than take the form of a 
negative assent by acquiescence. Although the sovereign claimant of self-defence 
loses control of his utterance by yielding it up to criticism, the claimant can be 
protected by rendering this process public so as to reveal the reasons behind another 
VWDWH¶V DFFHSWDQFH RU UHMHFWLRQ RI KLV FODLP :KDW LV UHTXLUHG LV WKHUHIRUH WKDW the 
process of criticism which separates individual claim and collective decision is overt, 
accessible and comprehensible. 
 
The first important factor is that the state which has used force in self-defence makes 
a claim and that this is received by the evaluating audience. Habermas explained that 
any utterance can be taken as a criticizable validity claim because the act of 
expression renders an idea material and therefore criticizable.301 It may be possible to 
YLHZ VWDWHV¶ REOLJDWLRQ WR UHSRUW WKHLU XVHV RI IRUFH WR WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO LQ WKLV
way.302 This report could form the starting point for debate. However, this debate 
would not necessarily have to take place in the SC. Indeed, there are good reasons for 
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rejecting the SC as a suitable body for evaluating self-defence claims.303 6WDWHV¶
reports are circulated as documents of the Council and as such are a matter of public 
record. They would be available to other discourses as well. Reports that a state has 
used force in self-defence are not usually attended with the assumption that the 
Council will meet to discuss the matter, as is the case that complaints that force has 
been used are.304 It is suggested that there is no necessary reason why interested 
parties, be they other states, non-governmental organisations or even, perhaps, 
international lawyers, should not use such a report as a jumping-off point for inquiry 
outside the Council. 
 
It is submitted that a preferable state of affairs would be if the report of self-defence 
triggered a meeting of the Council or other body. While in national courtrooms, self-
defence is pleaded in response to a criminal charge this reactive sort of evaluation 
may be ineffective at the international level. This is because in domestic legal 
systems, like that of the UK, criminal charges are mostly brought by the state and not 
by individual UK citizens. The evaluation of self-defence claims is not part of an 
international criminal process in which an evaluative discourse should be seen as a 
courtroom. It is important to emphasise that the communicative approach to 
evaluation would still primarily be a political process, albeit tamed by communicative 
rationality. 
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At this stage, it would be important to hear both the claimant state and the target 
VWDWHV¶YHUVLRQVRIHYHQWV7KLVZRXOGPHDQWKDWVR-FDOOHGµURJXHVWDWHV¶FRXOGQRWEH
excluded from the discourse.305 The project of furthering a common understanding of 
the facts would be aided if these states could reach agreement on basic facts, thus 
highlighting particular contested areas that communicative discourse could focus on. 
The importance of both parties participating in this process is highlighted by the 
Nicaragua case.306 It is to be expected, however, that in many self-defence cases there 
ZLOOEHIHZXQFRQWHVWHGIDFWV,QGHHGWKHSDUWLHV¶ODFNRIDJUHHPHQWRQWKHIDFWVZDV
one of the chief stumbling blocks for the ICJ in Nicaragua.307 It will therefore be 
necessary to rely on some independent fact-finding, of the sort that the ICJ was 
criticised for failing to do in Nicaragua.308 
 
The collective security system must take advantage of its capacity for fact-finding. 
Such bodies could not only provide relatively independent information about a given 
factual situation, but they could also provide information that could be used to test 
FODLPDQWV¶ VWDWHPHQWV DERXW WKH VHOI-defence situation and they could be staging-
houses for the collection of information from third states and open sources. In effect, 
such a fact-finding body would act as a repository of common knowledge. The 
advantage of this is that an intersubjective discourse was not dominated by the 
findings of the intelligence services of particular states. The big disadvantage of such 
an approach is that the evaluative discourse would be removed to this technical arena 
and away from the political arena of states. This is disadvantageous because it would 
mean that the states were not directly involved in constructing their own 
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understandings. It would therefore be necessary to establish a dialogue between the 
technical fact-finding commission and the organ considering the self-defence claim.  
 
According to some commentators, the present fact-finding capacity of the collective 
security system is flawed not only in the collection of facts, but also their analysis. 
However, the Council has developed techniques of fact-finding and these will be 
considered below. The UN has no intelligence capacity of its own. In the same way 
that it relies on its member states to take action, it relies on its member states for its 
NQRZOHGJH )UDQFN KDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW ³XQWLO WKH 81 GHYHORSV DQ LQWHOOLJHQFH
capability of its own, using personnel in situ, or gains its own surveillance capability, 
LWZLOOKDYHWREHJXLGHGE\LQIRUPDWLRQVHOHFWLYHO\SURYLGHGE\LQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHV´309 
+RZHYHU LW KDV EHHQ VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKLV ³is neither feasible nor desirable for 
[international] organisations to develop an independent capacity to collect 
LQWHOOLJHQFH´ because of ³WKH XQGHUVWDQGDEOH ZDULQHVV RQ WKH SDUW RI VWDWHV RI
DXWKRULVLQJDERG\WRVS\RQWKHP´WKHUHOXFWDQFHRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV³WRDVVXPH
functions that might undermine its actual or perceived impartiDOLW\´ DQG ³D ODUJHU
anomaly in the status of intelligence under international law as an activity commonly 
GHQRXQFHGEXWDOPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\SUDFWLVHG´310 It is submitted that this assessment is 
persuasive.  
 
Another argument against the UN acquiring intelligence-gather capacity is that it will 
not always be necessary to rely on evidence brought by the parties, for instance, in the 
Hostages case, the &RXUWVWDWHGWKDW³>W@KHHVVHQWLDOIDFWVRIWKHSUHVHQWFDVHDUHIRU
the most part, matters of public knowledge which have received extensive coverage in 
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WKHZRUOGSUHVVDQGLQUDGLRDQGWHOHYLVLRQEURDGFDVWV«´7KH&RXUWWUHDWHGWKLVDVD
³PDVVLYHERG\RI LQIRUPDWLRQ´DYDLODEOH IRU LWV GHOLEHUDWLRQV311  If the UN had the 
capacity to create its own understandings about a given self-defence claim 
independent of the parties involved, these parties may feel less inclined to take part in 
a collective process of coming to an understanding about whether it was valid or not. 
 
,W LV PRUH LPSRUWDQW LQ WKLV ZULWHU¶V RSLQLRQ, that the UN develop a means of 
processing the information it receives. Thus, Chesterman suggests that the UN should 
at least develop a capacity to assess intelligence given by states in evidence of their 
self-defence claims.312 +HZULWHVWKDW³>W@he history of Council decisionmaking when 
DXWKRUL]LQJ PLOLWDU\ DFWLRQ GRHV QRW LQVSLUH FRQILGHQFH´313 Mutatis mutandis, the 
same applies to its evaluations of self-defence claims. A fact-finding commission 
comprised of experts could assist in the processing of information. Anomalies and 
inconsistencies could be identified by such a body, assessments of the probity of 
given statements could be made, and regular reports could be produced for the 
evaluating entity. 
 
The presentation of information in a more digestible form would not necessarily 
exclude the evaluating entity from participating in the creation of understanding. Part 
of the purpose of the regular reports and open dialogue between the technical and 
political organs would be to ensure that evaluators could in practice criticize the 
FODLPDQWVWDWHV¶YDOLGLW\FODLPV:KLOHSDUWLFLSDQWVFRXOGTXHVWLRQDVVHUWLRQVWKDWWKH\
doubted in the political discourse, this should lead to the presentation of the technical 
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body with the grounds for these concerns. The importance of this sharing of 
information is highlighted by the experience of the IAEA and UNMOVIC during the 
run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.314 
 
A two-tier process of evaluation is being proposed. An attempt is being made to 
integrate the technical and the political. The IAEA is an example of an existing 
institution that contains separate political and technical elements. The IAEA consists 
of a Secretariat run by the Director General and policy-making bodies, the General 
Conference and the Board of Governors. Amongst other things, the Director General 
is in charge of the process of inspecting nuclear installations pursuant to 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) called for under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1970.315 The Director General makes regular 
reports to the Board of Governors and has, on occasion, been asked to report to the 
SC.316 While the IAEA is not a model institution,317 it is submitted that the separation 
of technical and political aspects of fact-finding and analysis may accommodate a 
flexible approach to evaluation while anchoring that flexibility in technical 
competence. 
 
An alternative to a permanent fact-finding body like this would be the use of ad hoc 
commissions of inquiry into specific incidents. These may be said to have taken 
LQVSLUDWLRQIURPWKHµWUXWKFRPPLVVLRQV¶XVHGLQWKH+XPDQ5LJKWVILHOGWRLQYHVWLJDWH
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past abuses.318 Indeed, one of the roles of truth commissions is to provide a cathartic 
acknowledgement of the past.319 It is suggested that one of the major reasons for 
evaluating self-defence claims is that the finding that one of the parties was the 
aggressor and one the defender could put a stop to escalating violence between states 
that have conceived one another to be in a Hobbesian relation with one another.320 It 
is to be hoped that such a finding would put a stop to the inimical behaviour that 
reinforces the impression of an enemy-relation. 
 
The collective security system has made use of fact-finding for some time. Successive 
Secretary Generals have taken a very broad interpretation of their Charter powers and 
these have often included fact finding.321 While the Secretary General has undertaken 
fact-finding on its own initiative,322 these days the SC also makes use of commissions 
of inquiries. It has requested that the Secretary General establish commissions on 
several occasions. Such panels of experts considered the situation in Darfur,323 the 
Rwandan genocide,324 violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia,325 and 
the assassination of the President of Burundi,326 to name but a few. In many cases 
these commissions act as centralising bodies which collect and collate the findings 
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and reports of various agencies. This was the case for the Commission of Inquiry in 
Darfur.327  
 
Indeed, in the case of the Darfur commission, the SC specifically requested it to 
³investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred, and to identify the perpetratoUVRIVXFKYLRODWLRQV´7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVZDV
WR HQVXUH ³WKDW WKRVH UHVSRQVLEOH DUH KHOG DFFRXQWDEOH´328 The commission was 
praised for the comprehensive and detailed report that it produced.329 The work of the 
Darfur commission has also been welcomed, in pDUW EHFDXVH LW ³SURPRWH>G@ DQ
HOHPHQWRIWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\LQWKHZRUNRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´330 
 
The use of fact-finding commissions would have the benefit of flexibility; the size, 
shape and specialisms of the commission could be tailored to the particular case. In 
1991 the General Assembly passed the Declaration on Fact-finding by the United 
Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.331 The 
UDWLRQDOH EHKLQG WKH GHFODUDWLRQ ZDV WKDW ³DFTXLULQJ GHWDLOHG NQRZOHGJH DERXW WKH
IDFWXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DQ\GLVSXWHRI VLWXDWLRQ´ is crucial for the UN to maintain 
international peace and security. While it was affirmed that sending a fact-finding 
mission requires the consent of the territorial state,332 the resolution also said that any 
state refusing should give reasons for its refusal.333 According to Berg, this issue was 
contested during the debates of the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and 
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of the Strengthening of the Role of the Organisation (the Charter Committee) that 
drew it up. Nevertheless, it seems that only in the case of a Chapter VII resolution of 
the SC would fact finding be compulsory.334 
 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\%HUJLGHQWLILHVDJHQHUDOSROLF\³WRLQGXFHPHPEHUVWDWHVWRWDNHDPRUH
SRVLWLYH DWWLWXGH´ WR IDFW ILQGLQJ335 Indeed, it should be acknowledged that 
encouraging states to cooperate with fact-finding missions will not be easy. However, 
it is hoped that the involvement of both claimant and target states in the process of 
fact-finding will make them less wary of such commissions. The parties would not be 
µREMHFW-ified¶E\WKHFRPPLVVLRQDVLWZHUH336 Instead, the contributions of the parties 
ZRXOG IRUP DQ LQWHJUDO SDUW RI WKH FRPPLVVLRQ¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQV )RU RQH PHDQV RI
doing this, we can look to the IAEA for inspiration once again. The IAEA inspections 
process is led by the production of reports by member states that are then verified by 
IAEA inspectors on the ground.  
 
One drawback with the traditional IAEA process is that it depends on the 
completeness of declarations by the host state.337 7KH ³WUDGLWLRQDO´ VDIHJXDUGV 
approach confines inspectors to verifying these declarations, while strengthening 
measures enable the Agency to identify any undeclared nuclear activities and thereby 
validate what is not said.338 The openness in attitude that this wider approach implies 
is commensurate with the communicative approach to evaluation. The critical nature 
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of the process of evaluating a validity claim would enable a participant to query the 
omissions from an assertion about a self-defence claim. In this case, rather than 
testing WKHFODLPDQWVWDWH¶VLQIRUPDWLRQIRUIDOVLW\WKHIDFWILQGLQJFRPPLVVLRQZRXOG
EHWHVWLQJWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHHYDOXDWLQJVWDWH¶VFRXQWHU-assertion.  
 
Whether the findings of the fact-ILQGLQJFRPPLVVLRQZRXOGEHµELQGLQJ¶ZRXOGEHIRU
a more comprehensive modelling of this approach to determine. However, it is 
submitted that the persuasive force of the fact-finding commission will depend on the 
extent to which it engages with the concerns of evaluating states and on the perception 
that it has acted competently and impartially.  Franck has written that the probity of 
evidence depends in part on the impartial identity of whoever presents it.339 However, 
crucially, the persuasiveness of the evaluation of the fact-finding commission would 
depend on how well it stood up to evaluation at the hands of political organs. Any 
assertion can be taken as a criticizable validity claim, and the evaluations of fact-
finding commissions are no different. This is one of the reasons that a two-tier system 
of evaluation is desirable: Each body can provide a critical check on the other. It is 
submitted that it is the fact that these evaluations are, or at least can be, scrutinised in 
which their authority lies. It is therefore crucial that as much as possible of the 
evaluation process is reported and made publicly available. 
 
D. Beyond Esotericism and Exploitation? 
 
In order to avoid being hoist by my own petard, it would seem necessary to show that 
requiring states to redeem their self-defence claims by adducing evidence would not 
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render the law esoteric. At the beginning of this thesis a dilemma was raised: The 
further the logic and scope of the right of self-defence veered from the interests and 
practice of states, the less relevant it seemed. On the other hand the narrower the 
µFUHGLELOLW\JDS¶WKHOHVVFRQVWUDLQLQJIRUFHWKHSURKLELWLRQRQWKHXVHRIIRUFHZRXOG
retain. It was indicated that arguments made by international lawyers vacillate 
between the poles of esotericism and exploitation trying to accommodate both of 
these concerns.  
 
The dilemma between an effective and an exploitation-proof right of self-defence was 
translated into a dilemma between the individual state and the collective security 
system. While the present thesis has by no means eradicated the initial dilemma, it has 
refused to reprise it in the language of individual/system or subjective/objective. 
Instead, the concept of intersubjective evaluation has been used as a means of 
countering the individualism of realist criticisms of self-defence. 
 
Intersubjectivity is not open to the same criticisms that objectivity is. For a start, it is 
not susceptible to being appropriated by individual states in the same way that 
abstract norms are. Secondly, it is responsive to the imperative to adapt to changing 
social circumstances. The strength of the argument from intersubjectivity is that it 
opposes the individual subjectivity with that of multiple, connected subjectivities. It 
should be emphasised that this is not the same as the abstract collective. It is for this 
reason that the practical application of intersubjective understanding proposed in this 
thesis applies in a case-by-case manner and applies to factual questions rather than 
normative ones.  
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As the project progressed, it became clear to the author that, although the dilemma of 
esotericism and exploitation could not be escaped and although it would always be 
possible to critique the thesis from one perspective or the other, it was possible to find 
a better way forward. Indeed, the idea of the better argument rather than the correct 
DQVZHU LV DW WKH KHDUW RI +DEHUPDV¶ ZRUN340 It is submitted that the present thesis, 
while vulnerable to the charge of esotericism, is nevertheless a strong counter-
argument to realist criticisms. This is because instead of uncritically adopting 
dogmatic realist assumptions about the behaviour of rationally-self interested states 
DQGSXWWLQJWKHRQXVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVWRµVDYH¶WKHULJKWRIVHOI-defence, it has 
put the onus on states. 
 
The esoteric arguments addressed in chapters II and III often involved the dislocation 
of normativity from state practice. For instance, international lawyers relied on the 
opinio iuris element of customary law and on system-perspective interpretations of 
the Charter text. In consequence, international law risks becoming a language of 
international lawyers that cannot reach outside discourses populated by international 
lawyers and, in consequence, cannot reach the very political and social actors whose 
behaviour it seeks to constrain or regulate. 
 
In order to emphasise the difference between the approach advocated in this thesis, 
and esoteric approaches wherein the law is withdrawn from the is of social reality in 
order to insulate it from abuse, it is appropriate to say a few words on the subject of 
KosNHQQLHPL¶V µFXOWXUH RI IRUPDOLVP¶ )RU .RVNHQQLHPL LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ FDQ EH
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WKRXJKWRISULPDULO\DV³ZKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVGRRUWKLQN´341 He developed the 
idea of international law being a language with its own distinctive rules or 
grammar.342 However the language of international law is presented as the preserve of 
WKRVHZLWK³FRPSHWHQFH´WRSURGXFH³JRRGOHJDODUJXPHQWV´343  
 
.RVNHQQLHPL ZURWH WKDW KLV ERRN ³DVVXPHV WKDW WKHUH LV QR DFFHVV WR OHJDO UXOHV RU
legal meaning of international behaviour that is independent from the way competent 
ODZ\HUV VHH WKRVH WKLQJV´344 Certainly, it is not argued that an international lawyer 
could view state behaviour independently from his identity as such. However, it is felt 
that other actors in the international legal system feel that they can and should make 
OHJDODUJXPHQWV:KLOH VRPHRI WKHVHFDQEHGLVPLVVHGDVPHUHµUKHWRULF¶345 others 
can be seen as attempts to hold decision-makers to account for their decisions. In the 
examples that follow, it can be seen that state officials have held one another to 
account and, in some cases, have expected to have to account for their uses of force.  
 
The practice of states has included the presentation of evidence in order to justify the 
classification of their action as self-defence. Thus, it has been pointed out that 
³HYLGHQFHGLGPDWWHUHQRXJKWR3UHVLGHQW%XVKIRUWKH8QWLHG6WDWHVDQGLWVDOOLHVWR
ZDLWXQWLO2FWREHUWRVWULNHEDFN´IROORZLQJ346 The same writer suggested that 
lack of evidence has prevented the US carrying out forcible responses to terrorist 
attacks on the USS Cole, the Khober Towers, or the WTC bombing of 1993.347 It 
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could be argued that the same logic saw Colin Powell give his infamous presentation 
to the Security Council in February 2003.348 It seems, then, that even powerful states 
VHHWKHYDOXHLQJLYLQJUHDVRQVIRUWKHLUFODLPV7KHUHDUHDOVRµFRVWV¶IRUVWUDWHJLFDOO\
minded states involved in walking away from an evaluation process, particularly 
when it is regarded as legitimate by others. The practiFDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI D VWDWH¶V
refusing to give evidence in its defence were demonstrated in the Nicaragua case. The 
US famously withdrew before the merits stage. Stressing that ³TXHVWLRQVRIIDFWPD\
EH HYHU\ ELW DV LPSRUWDQW DV WKH ODZ´ LQ the case, Judge Jennings indicated that by 
failing to appear at the merits stage the US had IRUIHLWHGLWVDELOLW\WR³H[SRXQGDQG
H[SODLQ«WKHPDWHULDO´349  
 
It is submitted that international law might not be best seen as a language. Instead, it 
might be better viewed as a mode of communication. Language can be seen as 
relatively inert. A language, words and grammatical instructions for their use, can 
exist without being spoken.350 In contrast, communication is a wider concept; one 
need not use language to communicate. Communication is, above all, something that 
people do. In this way, the language of UN Charter norms would be protected from 
exploitation without depriving the language of international law from state actors. The 
essence of such a mode of communication is explained above; it would consist in 
WDNLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU RQH¶V DVVHUWLRQV DQG KROGLQJ RWKHUV WR DFFRXQW IRU WKHP
Characteristic of discourses in which this could occur would be that they themselves 
are open to critique. This would require transparency and accessibility. 
 
                                                 
348
 Supra, at pp. 298-300. 
349
 Nicaragua (Merits), Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p. 544. 
350
 Ancient languages like Greek and Latin demonstrate this. 
338  
7KLVFRQFHSWLRQRIODZLVVRFLDO,WVKDUHVDPRWLYDWLRQZLWK.RVNHQQLHPL¶VµFXOWXUHRI
IRUPDOLVP¶³>7@KDWWKRVHZKRDUHLQSRVLWLRQVRIVWUHQJWKPXVWEHDFFRXQWDEOH´DQG
WKDW WKHUH FDQ EH ³D PHDQLQJIXO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ODZIXO FRQVWUDint and the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIQDNHGSRZHU´351 .RVNHQQLHPL¶VFXOWXUHRIIRUPDOLVPOLNH+DEHUPDV¶
DWWLWXGH RSHQ WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV LGHQWLILHG ³LQ RSSRVLWLRQ WR VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LW LV
QRW´352 ,Q.RVNHQQLHPL¶VFDVHWKLVZDVWKHµFXOWXUHRIG\QDPLVP¶WKDWSHUPHDWHd the 
work of certain international lawyers.353 If international law, or formalism, is to shake 
off its esotericism, it is suggested that the society in which this culture should inhere 
is that of state decision-makers and not international lawyers. My thesis has attempted 
to show that states need to take responsibility for the redemption and evaluation of 
self-defence claims. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
In the foregoing chapter, an attempt has been made to imagine how a communicative 
approach to the evaluation of self-defence claims based on evidence might look. At 
first, this was achieved by examining some of the ways in which facts are currently 
involved in self-defence claims and critiquing them. It was argued that merely 
alluding to facts without opening them to scrutiny or making it clear precisely what 
facts were indicated may lead to the exploitability of the system.  
 
7KH SULQFLSOH RI SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ ZDV WDNHQ WR LOOXVWUDWH WKH GDQJHUV RI D µIDFWXDO¶
approach to justification that does not really engage with particular facts. It was 
DUJXHG WKDW LW LV QRW HQRXJK WR UHIHU WR ³WKH FRQWH[W´ LQ WKHDEVWUDFW LI VHOI-defence 
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claims are to be judged proportionate, it must be clear precisely what it proportionate 
to what.  
 
Secondly, the allusion to secret intelligence to support self-defence claims was 
criticised. It was argued that intelligence cannot masquerade as evidence. Evidence 
connotes scrutability because to evidence something is to demonstrate it and not 
simply to restate its truth. Indeed, since the infamous Colin Powell presentation in the 
SC, it is submitted that the use of intelligence to vindicate claims has lost credibility 
once and for all. While it was acknowledged that states can and do make national 
level decisions to use force based on intelligence, if the validity claims raised for such 
uses of force are to be redeemed at the international level then it is necessary to 
provide good reasons that can be tested for the collective evaluators of the claim. 
 
The testability of the reasons provided was emphasised in this chapter. In the previous 
chapter it was said that criticizability depends on a claim being available for scrutiny. 
In this chapter, this was interpreted as a claim being capable of being ostensively 
demonstrated. This very basic level of vindication of a claim flows from the 
problematic nature of rhetorical means of vindication using normative and expressive 
statements. It was argued that the process of ostensive demonstration could be aided 
by the use of a fact finding commission. This commission would be in charge of 
collecting and marshalling information involved in the evaluation of a claim to have 
used force in self-defence. It would take statements from the parties concerned and 
open a dialogue with them regarding the validity of particular claims they were 
making in support of their assertions that the use of force was or was not defensive. 
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Indeed, the involvement of the parties concerned was considered vital for the process 
of coming to an understanding. It is thought that by involving the parties concerned, 
the conclusions of the evaluating discourse have more weight with those parties, 
hopefully leading to a scaling-down of tension. The wider membership of the 
collective security system could also be involved, it was suggested, in a second tier of 
evaluation that would use the factual conclusions gleaned by the fact-finding 
commission as the basis for its evaluation of the normative claim that force was used 
in self-defence. The factual evaluation would form the common referent for normative 
statements about necessity and proportionality, for instance, and thereby anchor them 
in common understanding, or at least make statements about them criticizable. 
 
An approach based on intersubjective understanding about whether a use of force was 
made in self-defence or not would not provide a perfect answer to the question. 
However, it is submitted that by focusing on accountability, scrutability and 
transparency, the communicative approach to the evaluation of self-defence claims 
represents a step forward in the reconciliation of flexibility and integrity in the 
collective security system. 
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CONCLUSION. 
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This thesis has attempted to offer an alternative answer to the problem of identifying 
uses of force in self-defence. In order to do this, it first set up a problèmatique. 
Accepting that it is sometimes necessary for the rules on the use of force to respond to 
changes in the strategic environment, the problem was in preserving the collective 
security system from exploitation. It was argued that the ultimate authority to interpret 
the right had to be removed from the hands of the claimant state.  
 
In order to do this, it was suggested that other actors in the collective security system 
should conceive of a report that self-GHIHQFHKDVEHHQXVHGDVD³Friticizable validity 
FODLP´ ,Q +DEHUPDV¶ 7KHRU\ RI &RPPXQLFDWLYH $FWLRQ 7&$ VXFK FODLPV FDQ EH
redeemed by the construction of intersubjective understanding through discourse. It 
was suggested that the most fruitful avenue for such understanding lies in the world of 
facts and the vindication of self-defence claims with ostensible evidence. 
 
A. Review of the Argument. 
 
In the first chapter realist criticisms of self-defence within the UN collective security 
system were set out. The realist criticisms were important because they were said by 
some to lie behind the approach to international law of former US President G.W. 
Bush.1 In order to understand these criticisms, it was felt necessary to discuss some of 
the central assumptions and techniques of realist thought. One of the most important 
assumptions, for the purposes of this thesis, is that individuals are autonomous actors 
who rationally pursue their own self interest and, in doing so, seek to minimise costs 
and maximise benefits. This assumption was joined by a methodology that sought to 
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draw a veil of objective inquiry over the business of proposing the best means to 
pursue individual interests. 
 
These characteristics of realist thought lead such scholars to reject the value of legal 
systems insofar as they are conceived of as containing rules that constrain state 
behaviour. The narrowly conceived right of self-defence as it appears in article 51 of 
the UN Charter is anathema to realists. Although it appears as an exception to the 
absolute prohibition on the use of force contained in article 2(4), realist scholars have 
sought to argue that it must be interpreted from the perspective of the individual 
nation-state and not that of the collective security system in order to respond more 
effectively to the dictates of necessity. This puts all the authority to interpret the 
exception in the hands of the individual state and allows that state to exploit the legal 
claim of self-defence. 
 
The thesis then turned to look at responses by international lawyers sympathetic to the 
UN collective security system. These international lawyers used two main tracks to 
counter realist criticisms of the system. One track tended to render the law esoteric. 
Such international lawyers downplayed the imperative for change and highlighted the 
formal validity of the law. At one stage it was believed that the validity of the law lies 
in its formal objectivity.2 The more common view these days is that valid law must 
DOVR EH UHOHYDQW WR VRPH GHJUHH LQGHHG LW KDV EHHQ FDOOHG DQ ³REVHVVLRQ´ RI
international lawyers.3 Thus, some international lawyers make arguments that 
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acknowledge the self-interested nature of states and the inevitability of their acting 
against the formal rule. 
 
Certain writers argue that state practice should be taken into account in interpretations 
of the right of self-defence, either through the doctrine of subsequent practice or 
through the intermingling of customary rules with those of the Charter. This reduces 
WKH µFUHGLELOLW\ JDS¶ EHWZHHQ VWDWH SUDFWLFH DQG WKH IRUmal rule, but as it does so it 
either approaches the realist conflation of the descriptive is and the prescriptive ought 
or it simply reasserts the formal rule in another guise without addressing underlying 
concerns about formal inflexibility. The former approach leaves the collective 
security system exploitable and the latter renders it esoteric. 
 
In contrast to realist writers, most defenders of the collective security system deny 
that the individual state has the ultimate right to interpret self-defence. Chapter III 
therefore examined the practice of the Security Council (SC). On the one hand, a 
conception of the SC as constrained by normative imperatives could seem detached 
from the experience of Council practice. On the other hand, locating the authority to 
evaluate self-defence claims in the Security Council (SC) could render the system 
exploitable. This is because its authority comes from the presence of those same 
powerful states, a presence which is guaranteed by the privileged status of permanent 
member and the veto power. It was argued that the SC was inconsistent, selective and 
opaque; a prime breeding ground for abuse of power. 
 
After this discussion of counter-arguments to realist criticisms of the collective 
security system, we were left with some insights into the reasons why these 
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approaches did not seem to escape the dilemma of esotericism/exploitation. On the 
one hand, esoteric arguments often sought to avoid exploitability by relying on 
³VHFRQGDU\UXOHV´RILQWHUSUHWDWLRQRURIILFLDOSURFHGXre, for instance. However such 
secondary rules meant that the realist criticism of inflexibility could simply reform 
itself at the secondary level: The intentions of the Charter drafters are outdated, or the 
procedural rigour of the ICJ cannot adapt to rapidly changing, complex factual 
situations concerning self-defence, for instance. Locating the force of the law in 
formal objectivity did not seem to engage with realist concerns enough to counter 
them. 
 
On the other hand, exploitable arguments often engaged too readily with realist 
premises and conceded too much. These arguments were too ready to read contrary 
state practice as evidence of an evolution of the right of self-defence that cemented 
the continuing relevance of the Charter framework. The concentration on state 
practice over the formal credentials of particular interpretations meant that the 
prescriptive force of self-defence was in danger of giving way to its descriptive 
relevance. In a similar vein, it was sometimes argued that the SC had implicitly 
evaluated a self-defence claim by acquiescence. This sort of theory is bolstered by the 
practice of the SC and the fact that international lawyers often overlook, and are 
excluded from viewing, the processes by which certain decisions came about. 
 
It therefore seemed that any new approach to reconciling flexibility and lack of 
exploitability should probably not be based in the force of formal norms. It appeared 
that two of the greatest factors increasing the likelihood of exploitation were the lack 
of a really engaged process of evaluation of a claim and the lack of transparency in, 
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and publicity of, the process of evaluation. It therefore seemed sensible to propose a 
means of evaluating self-GHIHQFHFODLPVWKDWIRFXVHGRQFODLPDQWVWDWHV¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\ 
WR UHGHHPWKHVHFODLPVDQGHYDOXDWLQJVWDWHV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WRDFFHSWRU UHMHFW WKHP
for good reasons. 
 
$FFRUGLQJO\WKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHWKHVLVERUURZHGFHUWDLQFRQFHSWVIURP+DEHUPDV¶
Theory of Communicative Action. It stated that the identification of valid self-defence 
FODLPVFRXOGHPDQDWHIURPVWDWHV¶XQGHUWDNLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRRQWKHRQHKDQGWDNH
self-defence reports as criticizable validity claims and, on the other hand, to vindicate 
such claims with good reasons that could be accepted or rejected by evaluators. It was 
argued that the evaluation of claims on the basis of their merits depended on actors in 
the evaluation discourse, including the claimant state, target state and third party 
evaluating states, required the parties to find common ground from which to 
determine the validity of the claim. Suggesting that common ground would be 
difficult to find in the field of norms, it was argued that facts could provide such a 
common point of reference. 
 
In the final chapter, the use of facts was problematized. Caution was urged regarding 
the sorts of facts that were presented in vindication of a claim and it was held that 
VXFKIDFWVVKRXOGLGHDOO\EHFDSDEOHRIRVWHQVLYHGHPRQVWUDWLRQ3UREDEOHµIDFWV¶DQG
facts grounded in intelligence, in particular, would not vindicate a self-defence. This 
was because they could not, for different reasons, be demonstrated. It was also 
submitted that, while experts could play an important role in establishing these facts, 
they would benefit from the participation of the states concerned. This links back into 
the Habermasean idea of intersubjective understanding and the communicative 
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attitude oriented to understanding. Where states adopted the incompatible strategic 
attitude of self-interested, autonomous actors, facts established were unlikely to 
provide a common understanding of the factual circumstances of a given self-defence 
claim. 
 
The thesis ended with an admission that, given the inability of the evaluation 
discourse to provide an absolute or objectively valid evaluation of a self-defence 
claim, the communicative approach to evaluation may only provide weak medicine. 
In reply, it can be said that if third party states begin to view self-defence reports as 
criticizable validity claims, it is possible that a culture of justification will build up in 
the collective security system. The attitudes of distrust among states could be used as 
D FDWDO\VW WR HQFRXUDJH VWDWHV WR WDNH D FULWLFDO DWWLWXGH WR RQH DQRWKHU¶V FODLPV ± 
whether they be claims of self-defence or rejections of such claims.  
 
)XUWKHULWPD\EHSRVVLEOHWRHQFRXUDJHVWDWHVWRDFFHSWWKHµEHWWHUDUJXPHQW¶LIWKDW
argument is couched in hard-to-deny fact, rather than interpretable norms. If such a 
process is visible it is also capable of external scrutiny, another factor that may 
dissuade states from rejecting good arguments or accepting weak ones. If a culture 
can be encouraged whereby states see justification as more than a pro forma affair, a 
virtuous circle could be created. It may be that international lawyers have a role to 
play in encouraging such attitudes by being less forgiving of the adoption of strategic 
attitudes by states. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to find a more effective way of answering realist criticisms 
of the collective security system. In examining previous attempts to do this, the 
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conclusion was reached that at present the identification of valid self-defence claims 
is piecemeal and opaque. It was concluded that the fault lay not with the collective 
security framework in the Charter, so much as the attitudes of the states that act within 
that framework. In so concluding, this thesis puts the onus on states to take 
responsibility for the identification of valid self-defence claims.  
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